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This thesis addresses the question of how states, meaning organised political 
communities, were historically able to secure their sovereignty through gaining the 
recognition of other states. As sovereignty refers to the presence of a state’s 
authority, its existence is premised on states and other internal and external actors 
recognising claims to sovereignty. Therefore, states, such as the Ottoman Empire, 
which historically had a different understanding of legitimacy, faced challenges to 
their sovereignty following the emergence of new global understandings of 
sovereignty in the late nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire was distinct in that it 
was the only Islamic state that was not subject to and was able to avoid completely 
falling under the influence of then-dominant European states. However, the Ottoman 
Empire still experienced European intervention and there was a desire to end forms 
of European extraterritorial jurisdiction. Ottoman elites, who were affiliated with the 
reformist Young Turks, sought to secure recognition of their state’s sovereignty by 
reconstituting it along novel international standards of legitimate statehood. These 
standards were based on the concepts of “civilised”, “militarist”, “popular” and 
“national” statehood, and were reinterpreted by the Young Turks in the course of 
their efforts to secure the recognition of European powers. These efforts included 
diplomacy with European powers, institutional reform and conceptual innovation. 
However, it also involved engaging in practices associated with sovereignty such as 
the control of territory. In all of these areas, the Young Turks reinterpreted aspects of 
the existing Ottoman legacy of statehood and international norms, to secure their 
claim to sovereignty. Therefore, the Ottoman state elites sought to convey an 
impression of governing a state that could be recognised as sovereign by other 
European powers. Ultimately, the remnants of the Young Turks, secured 
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1. The problem and the question stated: 
 
This thesis engages with and critiques two clashing accounts of the emergence of 
contemporary global international society. Global international society refers to a 
group of states that share common institutions1. Crucially, the shared institution of 
sovereignty enables these states to view each other as possessing authority in their 
jurisdictions (Hinsley, [1966] 1986: 215 – 216). Sovereignty here is defined as the 
status of possessing ultimate authority over certain people, territories and other 
entities, which are collectively understood as falling under its jurisdiction (Beale, 
1923; Philpott, 1995; 354; Poggi, 1990: 21). However, the question of how different 
forms of sovereignty emerged and came to sustain global international society has 
been left unanswered. One set of accounts in International Relations, seeking to 
explain how the current global international society of sovereigns developed, argue 
that it emerged in Europe and then spread globally (Boli, 2001; Meyer, et al., 1997; 
Meyer and Jepperson, 2000: 105 – 106; Thomas and Meyer, 1984). These accounts 
suggest that an international society of sovereign states emerged in Europe, which 
was then followed by similar developments occurring globally, following the 
template of European forms of state-building (Ayoob, 1995: 27 - 37; Lemay-Hébert, 
2009: 25 – 26; Nardin, 2015; 2019). This strand of the literature has recently been 
labelled as broadly falling under what Buzan and Schouenborg (2018: 75) term the 
“like unit model”. Accounts under this model explain the formation of global 
international society through pointing to how it involved the emergence of a number 
of similar units (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 75 - 95). Counter arguments stress 
the exceptionalism of non-European parts of the world (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; 
Buzan and Little, 2010: 206). They propose that theories used to explain 
developments in Europe cannot be used to understand “distinct” situations elsewhere 
(Acharya and Buzan, 2010: 2; see also Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 3, 96 - 122)2. 
Although the regional accounts capture the particular processes that enabled global 
 
1 See Buzan (2010) for this definition of global international society and an overview of these two 
approaches. 
2 See also Burgis (2009), Acharya and Buzan (2010), and other chapters in this volume, including 
Tadjbaksh (2010). On the regional dimension of global international society see Buzan and Gonzalez-
Pelaez (2009), Schouenborg (2013), Zhang and Buzan (2012). 
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international society to be consolidated in these particular spaces, they are not 
sufficient in explaining the “binding forces” that hold global international society 
together (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 237). This leads to the question of how 
exactly these forces constitute global international society.  
 
This thesis argues that neither positions that focus on the agency of the West nor 
those that concentrate on regional and local developments can fully explain the 
emergence of global international society. It, instead, develops a more historically 
informed account. In particular, this thesis notes that several states existed prior to 
their integration into global international society (Alexandrowicz, 2017; Benton, 
2001; Buzan and Little, 2010: 208). These states, generally understood to have been 
outside of international society for centuries, did not fully experience European 
colonisation and are therefore often assumed to be exceptional cases (Acharya, 2011: 
622; Acharya, and Buzan 2010: 2; Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014). Such states, 
understood here as “institutional arrangements for rule” (see Poggi, 1978: 1), ranged 
from empires to nation-states3. They can be identified as being present in different 
groups at various times throughout the world. Such groups have been termed 
“systems” (see Buzan and Little, 2001: 19) or “societies” (see Buzan and 
Schouenborg, 2018: 226) by different scholars. Each of these groups of states can 
also be said to have had their own set of constitutional rules, dictating proper 
conduct for their members (Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999). Many existing accounts in 
International Relations have not considered the different states within these groups, 
which may deviate from what we now take to be “modern states”, (see Poggi, 1978: 
89) as states in their own right and have often sought to emphasise their differences 
(Bull, 1984: 123; Little, 2014: 162; Poggi, 1990; Suzuki, 2009: 35). These accounts 
have also argued that states that deviate from the idea of a “modern state”, (see 
Poggi, 1978: 89) either presently or historically, cannot be considered actual states, 
or only came to exhibit the full range of characteristics of states subsequently (Boli, 
2001; Giddens, 1985). This echoes the idea of the standard of “civilisation”, (see 
Buzan, 2014: 576) which the established European sovereign states of global 
international society used to deny recognition of the sovereignty and status to these 
 
3 Cummings and Hinnebusch (2011: 1), Cooper (2014: 41 - 42) and Suny (2001) have recognised that 
sovereignty can come to be held by both empires and nations and that it is difficult, in many cases, to 
distinguish between an empire and a nation.  
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states (Anghie, 1999; Gong, 1984). Nevertheless, such non-established states are 
long-standing members of global international society (see Alexandrowicz, 2017; 
Buzan and Little, 2010: 208), even if they have not been considered equal to the 
established states of that society. How did these states later become recognised as 
equal to other members of global international society? The thesis addresses this 
question by focusing on the Ottoman Empire. This was a state that existed for 
centuries without being recognised as an equal sovereign by the European states 
(Pitts, 2018: 28).  
 
The Ottoman Empire and Iran, prior to the recognition of their equal 
sovereignty in global international society, did in fact share a common genealogy 
with European states. These states were sovereign in the sense of being independent 
from other entities4 and in terms of how they asserted that they possessed supreme 
authority (Zarakol, 2018a). The literature on the “expansion of international society” 
(see Bull and Watson, 1984: 1), that focuses on the spread of shared international 
institutions, is hence mistaken insofar as it assumes that these non-European states 
were blank slates (Bull, 1984: 125 - 126; Buzan and Little, 2010: 206 – 207; Watson, 
1992; Wight, 1977). Bull and Watson (1984: 2) argue that “Europe … dominated 
and, in so doing, unified the world” and hence focus on European actors as the 
shapers of international society. Instead, this thesis argues that states that were not a 
part of the European international society were able to become accepted as members 
of global international society and have their equal sovereignty recognised on the 
latter’s rules. Benton (2001: 253), though cognisant of the similarities between 
European and other empires, such as Islamic ones, does not consider how these other 
states, which were not colonised, came to be considered equal sovereigns in 
accordance with global constitutional rules. These rules, which included moral 
principles agreed upon by international actors, make it possible to speak of a global 
international society in the first place (Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999)5. They included rules 
which determined which entities could be considered fully sovereign (Barkin and 
 
4 For this definition of sovereignty, see James (1986: 25). 
5 Reus-Smit (1997: 28) argues that ideas about morality, which he terms the “moral purpose of the 
state” form the basis of these rules, because of how all of the different members of international 
society, like any other group engaged in communication must “orient their actions to intersubjectively 
recognized validity claims“ as Habermas (1986: 14) suggests. However, as will be made clear, this 
thesis uses an approach based on intellectual history and global history to explain how these rules 
emerge and develop.  
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Cronin, 1994; Glanville, 2016; Reus-Smit, 1999: 6; Sorensen, 1999). Non-European 
states enacted reforms to place themselves in a position to be recognised as fully 
sovereign (see Strang, 1996) under these constitutional rules. The statements that 
representatives of these non-European states made in writing and in speech, were 
complemented by reforms aiming to conform to these constitutional rules (Strang, 
1996)6. The rules of international society, in turn, are not fixed and may change over 
time (Phillips, 2010; 2017). Therefore, states that were already sovereign, in the 
sense that they effectively had authority over their jurisdiction, eventually achieved 
their goal of gaining recognition of their sovereign equality. 
 
 Sovereignty is often equated with the recognition of a state as the ultimate 
authority over a given area, known as a jurisdiction. There is especially a stress, in 
definitions, on the significance of control over territory as part of this jurisdiction (A. 
Hudson, 1998: 89 - 90; C.-A. Schulz, 2019). But sovereignty is not merely 
territoriality, meaning control of territory, since sovereigns also engage in actions 
beyond their territories, citing how their jurisdiction may apply in these other 
geographies (Beale, 1923; Simpson, 2004: 64 - 65). Increasingly, sovereignty is also 
seen as entailing forms of extraterritoriality, including the right to secure citizen’s 
rights outside the territory of the state (Agnew, 1994; Collyer, 2014). Sovereignty 
also includes the ability of states to engage in diplomacy, which involves then the 
recognition of sovereignty by outside entities (Österud, 1997: 170). Additionally, 
sovereignty and statehood differ from each other both conceptually and historically. 
A state may exist and even become the sole authority within its own territory, while 
lacking other characteristics of sovereignty (Agnew, 1994)7. The recognition of a 
state’s sovereignty and of its sovereign equality are important processes and should 
be considered separately from the process of state-building (Mathieu, 2018a: 2 – 3; 
Simpson, 2004: 31; Zaum, 2007: 4). The literature on de facto states in International 
Relations has attempted to address the issue of the non-recognition of states (Fabry, 
2010: 16; Kolsto, 2006; Pegg, 1998). But this literature continues to focus on the 
 
6 Kayaoğlu (2010a: 119) goes some way towards developing such an account by explaining how 
“statebuilding” practices on the part of these states, such as Japan, China and the Ottoman Empire, 
can account for the ultimate recognition of their sovereign equality. See also Strang (1996) and 
Horowitz (2004).  
7 On the distinct history of territory and sovereignty see Elden (2010: 810), who discusses how 
Foucault (2004: 99 - 100) saw territory, alongside population, as concepts that played a role in 
allowing sovereign states to govern spaces and people. 
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moment of the inception8 of late twentieth century de facto states and their failure or 
success in gaining recognition throughout their often short-lived9 periods of 
existence (Caspersen, 2012; 2015; Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011; Florea, 2017; O 
Beachain, Comai and Tsurtsumia – Zurabashvili, 2015; Pegg, 1998). It overlooks the 
fact that states have also existed for long periods of time without having their claims 
to sovereignty or sovereign equality recognised by other states10. This literature also 
does not recognise how de facto statehood can be partial, since supposed de facto 
states may, in fact, enjoy some level of recognition from other states, even if they are 
not recognised as sovereign by all other states (Simpson, 2004: 31). The recognition 
of a state may also be withdrawn by other states, which had recognised it, such that a 
state may come to be rendered a de facto state (Lemay-Hébert, 2020). States can 
therefore exist without being recognised as possessing sovereignty or being equal to 
other sovereign states, in accordance with theories of sovereignty. This is because of 
how they are not recognised as sovereign under existing global constitutional rules.  
 
 The fact that a state may become a de facto state points to the significance of 
changes to the constitutional rules of global international society. Such changes can 
take the form of either alterations to the content of the rules or how these rules are 
enforced. States may be considered de facto because they no longer conform to 
international constitutional rules of statehood (Lemay-Hébert, 2020). Simpson 
(2004: 31) argues that many states experienced new hurdles to their recognition after 
the Vienna settlement of 1815. A system of international law that posited the idea of 
the standard of “civilization” to measure those entities that were worth being 
recognised, under the pretext of managing violence, also imposed obstacles to the 
recognition of non-European states as equal in sovereignty to European states 
(Bartelson, 2018: 130). Therefore, changes in the dominant states in global 
international society may also bring changes to the rules of global international 
society. Here, the concept of constituent power plays a pivotal role in the main 
argument of this thesis. Constituent power is a concept that was developed in 
 
8 Fabry (2010; 2013) and Coggins (2014) engage in more historical studies but only focuses on how 
novel states were recognised, without studying the recognition of old states. 
9 On explanations of the lifespan of de-facto states see Florea (2017) and Buzard, Graham and Horne 
(2017). 
10 On de facto states and “sovereignty claims” see Berg (2009: 219). Many powerful states, such as 
China, the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires, existed in Asia without initially being recognised by 
European states (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 8).  
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constitutional theory (Kalyvas, 2005; Loughlin, 2013; Müller, 2014: 87 - 90; 
Pfenninger, 2015). It denotes who or what authors a constitution, meaning the basic 
rules or norms of the society that a constitution sustains (Hardt, 2009: vii-viii; 
Kalyvas, 2005: 226; Tully, 2007: 230)11. It is often contrasted with the “constituted 
power”, meaning the existing power under a constitution (Hardt, 2009: ix). Sets of 
norms can also serve to define who or what the constituent power ought to be (De 
Ville, 2008: 96). Forms of constituent power may exist in a domestic or international 
context. At the domestic level, it refers to whoever or whatever creates the rules that 
form the constitution of a state (Kalyvas, 2005: 230). At the international level, 
constituent power refers to who or what authors the constitutional rules of global 
international society or establishes the norms that form the constitution of an 
international society (Müller, 2014: 88; Oates, 2017: 200; Thornhill, 2012a: 372). 
The French Revolution, for example, resulted in a shift in the understanding of 
constituent power at the international level (Thornhill, 2012a: 379). When combined 
with a historical study of how different constituent powers shaped constitutional 
rules in different contexts, the concept can be used to enrich Buzan and 
Schouenborg’s (2018) account of global international society. This is because it can 
build on Buzan and Schouenborg’s (2018: 237) concept of “binding forces”, by 
drawing attention to how forms of constituent power create the rules that determine 
how “binding forces” operate. 
 
Specifically, this thesis argues that the concept of constituent power can be used 
to show how states that had not been recognised as equal came to be recognised as 
such by other states in time. Using the concept of constituent power as an analytical 
tool enables one to comprehend how alterations of the global constitutional rules, 
and the reactions of governments and movements within states to these changes, 
facilitated such recognition. The emergence of a rule in favour of democracy 
internationally, for example, may result in changes in the internal composition of 
states (Weinert, 2007). The recognition of states as equal sovereigns, which were 
sovereign but not considered equal was made possible because domestic forms of 
constituent power came to possess similarities with forms of constituent power 
 
11 In both the international and the domestic contexts, theories of constituent power have been used to 
provide a substantive definition of who the constituent power is in the form of a class, political party, 
political movement or other category, such as the people (Kalyvas, 2008; Oklopcic, 2014). 
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operating at the global level12. The interaction between the local and the global 
forms of constituent power enabled states that were already in existence, but not 
recognised internationally, to be integrated into the contemporary global 
international society.  
 
Contrary to a widely held view in International Relations theory13, this thesis 
does not assume that states that are recognised as sovereign by other states adopted 
forms of sovereignty solely as a result of the direct and indirect influence of Europe. 
However, the thesis disagrees with the view that non-European states ought to be 
considered separately from studies of global international society14, which is 
generally understood to be dominated by European states. This is because several 
non-European states later became a part of this global international society (Ayoob, 
1995: 72). One is then led to question to what extent these non-European states or 
global international society itself changed to accommodate this development15. The 
English School literature, focusing on how the spread of international institutions 
results in the ‘expansion of international society’, is an example of an approach that 
assumes that the European experience of history can or ought to be directly 
replicated in other contexts (Hobson, 2012: 223 – 226; Schouenborg, 2012)16. The 
modernisation approach, which views modernisation as a multi-faceted process of 
transformation, also shares the assumption that Europe should be taken as a 
paradigm17 (Hobson and Sajed, 2017: 554 – 556; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 84 - 
 
12 De Carvalho and Paras (2015) develop a similar argument concerning sovereignty without 
considering the role of constituent powers at the local and international level, which focuses on the 
role of solidarity between different international actors, in constructing their sovereignty. By “global”, 
what is meant here is that pertaining to different geographies throughout the world, as has been used 
in the discipline of International Relations by Acharya (2016: 4; see also Acharya, 2004, 2011; 2014).  
13 Robert H. Jackson (1990: 54 – 55) argues that sovereignty spread as an idea as a result of the 
influence of European states, whereas Strang (1996: 44) argues that, in the face of European 
expansion, non-European states engaged in “defensive Westernization”, in which they adopted 
Western practices and ideas to challenge Western power. 
14 This is  the case in studies such as those of Suzuki (2009) and  Zhang and Buzan (2012). Similarly, 
Saikal (2008: 73) argues for a study of “Westphalian” and “Islamic” sovereignty in the Middle East, 
which involves suggesting that they are  essentially separate concepts without considering how they 
may be interlinked. 
15 Barnett (1995) develops a rich account of the Middle Eastern international system which 
nonetheless stresses its exceptionalism and does not serve to demonstrate how it is a part of the 
international system as a whole. For a critique of the supposed exceptionalism of sovereignty in the 
Middle East see Stein (2012).  
16 See Bull and Watson (1984: 1) and Hobson (2012: 223).  
17 Eisenstadt (2000) claims that different forms of modernity can be identified in various contexts 
outside of Europe. But Bhambra (2010: 127) asserts that the literature on multiple modernities 
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114). But, one can speak of notions such as sovereignty or the state beyond the 
geography of Europe and hence challenge perspectives which suggest that non-
European contexts are exceptional18.  
 
This thesis explains how the process of the recognition of the equal sovereignty 
of the Ottoman and later the Turkish state, by the established sovereigns throughout 
the globe, occurred together with the emergence of new international constitutional 
principles. The Ottoman state had struggled to secure recognition of its claim to be 
an equal sovereign power under existing international constitutional norms in the 
nineteenth century (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 111 – 112; Simpson, 2004: 244). However, 
with changes occurring in the constitutional principles underpinning international 
society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Turkish state came to 
be recognised as an equal sovereign state by the established sovereign states (Fortna, 
2011). Although the Ottoman state became the Republic of Turkey, the latter drew 
much of its population, many of its institutions and state officials, and even its early 
constitution (see Zürcher, 1992) from the Ottoman state (Zürcher, 2010). Focusing 
on the Ottoman case, this thesis shows how the external recognition of the sovereign 
equality of states that were not previously recognised as equal sovereign states by the 
established sovereign states involved the transformation of both these states and 
global international society. What was once a restrictive global international society 
became more accommodating of difference and this led to the recognition of non-
European states as sovereigns equal to other European states (Bull and Watson, 
1984; Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018). Previous practices of exclusion employed by 
members of global international society were removed or replaced. 
 
2. Applying a global intellectual history approach: the case of the Ottoman 
Empire’s transition to the Republic of Turkey 
 
 A historical approach can demonstrate how the constitutional rules that 
composed global international society changed. It may also explain how states and 
 
assumes nonetheless that modernity was a universal experience that different societies would 
experience.   
18 Theories and practices of sovereignty, in the sense of supreme authority, were common throughout 
the Islamic world (Crone, [2004] 2014: loc. 3289; Blaydes, Grimmer and McQueen, 2018; Zarakol, 
2018a: 506 - 509). Studies have also focused on sovereignty in East Asia (Hui, 2005: 176; Zhang and 
Buzan, 2012: 15 - 18).  
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non-state actors came to adopt and shape these rules. It is important, here, to provide 
a critique of the existing literature in International Relations. There is a general 
assumption that the terms of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 resulted the emergence 
of the dominant form of sovereignty in European international society (Aalberts, 
2012: 12; Caporaso, 2000; de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011; Inayatullah and 
Blaney, 2004). This Westphalian notion of sovereignty was then supposedly 
projected globally through the agency of Western states and the submission of non-
Western actors (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011: 756 - 757; Ling, 2013; 
Schouenborg, 2017: 155). These assumptions, held by International Relations 
theorists, are problematic because they point to only the West playing an active role 
in the process of the emergence of the contemporary global international society 
(Hobson and Sajed, 2017). This privileging of Western European forms and ideas of 
sovereignty overlooks the actual presence and historical influence of other forms and 
ideas of sovereignty on the development of global international society (Hobson and 
Sajed, 2017). Certain advocates of social scientific approaches, including Marxists 
(see Rosenberg, 2006; 2007; Teschke, 2005), world systems theorists (see 
Wallerstein, 1974; 1980) and early works bridging historical sociology and 
International Relations (Hobden and Hobson, 2002; Lawson, 2007) claim to distance 
themselves from Eurocentric accounts, but they still contain assumptions regarding 
the inevitability of historical processes that occurred in Europe (Bhambra, 2010: 127 
- 128). The meanings of concepts that play a role in such accounts, such as 
modernity, have themselves been historically contested by individuals holding 
different values (Cooper, 2005: 113 - 152).  Many accounts overlook the plural and 
contested nature of sovereignty and statehood as they do not take into consideration 
the different interpretations of what it means to be modern which are often tied to 
subjective political processes instead of denoting objective social processes (Cooper, 
2005: 113 - 152; Guillaume, 2009: 78 - 79). Therefore, an intellectual and global 
history of the emergence of the contemporary global international society would 
allow one to test the assumptions about global international society held by 
international actors and presented in scholarly accounts.  
 
An approach combining global history and intellectual history can also reveal 
the role of global and local constituent power in the emergence of global 
international society. Ideas that later became the dominant ideas in global 
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international society, such as national sovereignty (see Bukovansky, 2002: 74; Sluga, 
2013: chs. 1 - 2) or human rights (see Reus-Smit, 2001; 2013a), were advanced by 
actors (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 204) who can be identified as invoking local 
and global forms of constituent power. The literature on social movements and 
revolutions can show how social and political movements in certain states may 
receive support from movements in other states, which share their ideas (Brysk, 
1993; Davies, 2014; 2019; Lawson, 2016; Ritter, 2015). Some of the social 
movements studied by this literature can also be termed “transnational” (see Davies, 
2019: 264), on account of how they are present in areas falling under the sovereignty 
of more than one state (Colas, 2002). These social movements may shape global 
international society by assuming control of, or otherwise influencing, the states 
within the society (Allinson, 2019; Davies, 2019; Lawson, 2016). They may then re-
constitute the basic rules within a state and within global international society 
(Bukovansky, 1999; 2002; Halliday, 1990; 1999). In other cases, the need to secure 
international support may result in a group of actors who take control of a state 
altering their interpretation of constitutional rules to ensure that their political project 
survives and thrives with outside support and the securing of recognition from states 
in global international society (Allinson, 2019; Thornhill, 2012b: 403 – 404; 2013).  
Such interactions have historically resulted in the spread of new ideas of sovereignty, 
such as those present in ideas of republicanism or democracy (see Weinert, 2007), by 
revolutionary movements inspired and supported by states and other external actors 
upholding these ideas (Bukovansky, 1999; 2002; Halliday, 1990; 1999). In these 
instances, the global move towards reconstituting the rules of legitimate statehood 
would serve to support local processes of such transformation. This, in turn, points to 
the usefulness of the concept of constituent power in understanding how the 
constitutional rules of global international society developed and spread.  
 
Three schools of intellectual history may be employed to gain an 
understanding of the moments when global and local forms of constituent power 
came to interact with each other. The Cambridge School of intellectual history 
provides an excellent set of tools to consider how texts gained their meanings in the 
contexts in which they were produced (Skinner, 1969). Skinner (1969: 10 - 11) 
argues that individual speech acts furnish the meanings of ideas by establishing 
connections between these ideas and other ideas and elements within a particular 
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context. This approach may be combined with the considerations of the school of 
conceptual history developed by Koselleck (2002), which focuses on how the 
meanings of concepts evolve as a result of broader historical changes. According to 
Koselleck (2002: 5), the period beginning in the late eighteenth and ending in the 
late nineteenth century, which he terms the “Sattelzeit”, involved the generation of 
the ideas that form the basis of European thought. The idea of the ‘Sattelzeit’ can 
also be used in the context of the transformation of global international society into 
its current form. Using the concept of the Sattelzeit as an analytical tool, one may 
identify a period of transition between the contemporary global international society 
and what preceded it19. In this period of transition, it is possible to study the 
emergence and travel of different meanings of sovereignty. Ideas of sovereignty 
were developed in specific contexts, but later travelled to other contexts where they 
encountered other ideas of sovereignty and related concepts such as the state 
(Biersteker, [2002] 2013: 245). Skinner’s (1969) awareness of the importance of 
context needs to be complemented by the approach adopted by Lovejoy (1940), 
which acknowledges how ideas travel and interact with other ideas in different 
contexts (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 9). Lovejoy’s (1940) approach provides a means of 
combining the views of Skinner (1969) and Koselleck (2002) by focusing on the 
encounters between different contexts and ideas in the Sattelzeit leading to the 
emergence of the contemporary global international society. 
 
Therefore, a global intellectual history can be used, together with a theoretically 
informed global history, to demonstrate the role of forms of constituent power in the 
reshaping and recognition of sovereign states that were initially excluded from 
contemporary global international society. Such an approach can be used to 
understand how the contemporary global international society emerged through the 
recognition of actors by others. The study of recognition necessitates a study of 
ideas, alongside a study of power relations which enable recognition, since acts of 
recognition are premised on impressions of the other being recognised (Markell, 
2003: 28). A distinction can be made here between struggles for and struggles over 
recognition, developed by Tully (2004: 86 - 90) in his studies of recognition in 
 
19 Motzkin (2005) demonstrates that the concept of the Sattelzeit can be used to denote other periods 
of transition in history, aside from that which Koselleck (2002) was focused on.  
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constitution-making. Struggles for recognition involve actors seeking recognition 
under the framework of existing constitutional rules (Tully, 2004: 86 – 90). 
Struggles over recognition refer to struggles to define the very rules of recognition 
(Tully, 2000; 2004: 86 - 90). The emergence of contemporary global international 
society, involved actors being perceived as having met the requirements for being 
recognised as sovereign, through being successful in struggles for or over 
recognition. Historically, local and global forms of constituent power were invoked 
by different actors engaged in and responding to the struggles, which resulted in the 
consolidation of the rules of global international society (see Müller, 2014: 88; 
Oates, 2017) and forms of sovereignty (see Pfenninger, 2015) that its members 
recognised.  These struggles involved the use of power and appeals to legitimacy on 
the basis of ideas, such as the ideas of “civilisation” (see Buzan, 2014: 576) or 
sovereignty (see Aalberts, 2014), by those seeking and those conferring recognition. 
In the context of states that were already existing but not recognised as equals, 
internal actors used local and global constituent power to secure the position of their 
own societies in global international society. 
 
 In this thesis, a combination of global intellectual history and a theoretically 
informed global history is used to examine the transition of the Ottoman Empire to 
the Republic of Turkey as a case of local and global constituent power resulting in 
the recognition of sovereign equality in global international society. The Ottoman 
Empire existed as a state for centuries, and was also able to maintain its distinct 
tradition of Islamic statehood in its encounters with European states (Bennison, 
2009; D. Goffman, 2002; Kupchan, 2012: 47 – 57; Tadjbaksh, 2010: 178). Other 
states, such as Morocco20, Iran21, China22, Afghanistan23 and Siam24, experienced 
European-driven processes of state-building as European states carved their own 
spheres of influence within these states (Horowitz, 2004). In the case of Morocco25 
and, to some extent, China26, this resulted in the colonisation of these states. 
However, the Ottoman Empire continued to be an empire controlling wide-ranging 
 
20 See Rutherford (1926) and Dunn ([1977] 2018). 
21 See Bonakdarian (2006: 72).  
22 See Osterhammel (1986: 290 - 314). 
23 See Bayly (2016: 48). 
24 See Horowitz (2004: 446 – 447) 
25 See Gershovich (2000) and Seoane (1998). 
26 See Osterhammel (1986). 
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territory until its collapse after the end of the First World War. But, parts of the 
territory within the empire came to have uneven relations of authority with its centre. 
Japan also maintained its independence, but did not interact with European states to 
the same extent as the Ottomans (Trimberger, 1972). In contrast, the Ottomans had 
their own practices and ideas of empire, developed at least partly in interaction with 
European empires (Horowitz, 2004). Even when the Republic of Turkey was 
effectively formed, as a new government came together in a constituent assembly in 
Ankara in 1920, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire continued to shape the new state 
(Zürcher, 1992). The Turkish state claimed territories that consisted of the core of 
the Ottoman Empire and it gained international recognition of its jurisdiction over 
these territories in 1923 (Demirci, [2005] 2010). The founders of the new Turkish 
state were also originally members of the Ottoman bureaucracy and security forces, 
and they continued to play an active role in Turkish political life until the 1950s 
(Zürcher, 2010). Additionally, prior to the drafting and adoption of a new 
constitution in 1921 and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the new Turkish state 
maintained several Ottoman institutions, including the Ottoman constitution of 1876 
(Zürcher, 1992). Hence, the external recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state, with 
an equal right to asserting its jurisdiction over its territory, coincided with its 
transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, which, in fact, 
involved the transformation rather than the destruction of the Ottoman state.  
 
 The Ottoman Empire’s transition to the Republic of Turkey coincided with 
the period in which the contemporary global international society emerged. This 
thesis therefore involves a study of two ‘Sattelzeits’. In the case of the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkey, the period of transition was characterised by the presence of 
some ideas from the Ottoman past and some which would form the basis of the 
future Turkish state (Hanioğlu, 2005; Zürcher, 2010). Similarly, the first two decades 
of the twentieth century contained elements of older forms of international order as 
well as the beginnings of the contemporary global international society (Buzan and 
Lawson, 2015: 7). Although sovereignty at the end of this period was still 
conditional on a state being understood as worthy of recognition as sovereign, the 
regime of sovereignty which became predominant in the post-First World War 
global international society differed in some respects from the earlier regime of 
sovereignty (Anghie, 2002). Specifically, “civilized” states were understood as being 
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deserving of equal external recognition before 1914 (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 59). 
In the post-war period, ‘civilisation’ came increasingly to be equated with 
nationhood (Allain, 2006; Anghie, 2002; Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 122 – 123). 
Nations were deemed to have a right to be recognised as sovereign, but the standard 
of “civilisation” continued to be used to judge the level of “civilisation” of different 
nations (Mayall, 1990: 46). Although the Ottoman Empire can be defined as a 
constitutional monarchy after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, carried out 
primarily by the eponymous group of political movements, by the end of the First 
World War the status of the Sultan had been greatly diminished. Although most 
often associated with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (see Zürcher, 
2010), the “Young Turks” refers to several political organisations, which played 
their role in this transition (Hanioğlu, 2001: 95). The Ottoman state’s move towards 
adopting a more “national” character was later officially adopted by the Republic of 
Turkey in its constitution of 1923, which recognised the Turkey as a nation-state 
(Özkan, 2012: 3). This change in the form of sovereignty in the Ottoman and 
Turkish case points to how the two periods of transition were interconnected with 
each other. This was because the Young Turk revolutionaries acted to respond and 
contribute to changes to global international society. 
 
  The Young Turks sought to gain the external recognition of the state as an 
equal of other sovereign states by seeking to re-constitute their sovereignty. This was 
at a time when the Young Turks considered the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire 
to be under threat. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 aimed to end what were 
considered to be practices of intervention that ran counter to the sovereignty of the 
Ottoman state (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 2 – 3; 2000). The Young Turks sought to 
challenge the maintenance of extraterritorial consular courts by European states 
under trading treaties known as the “capitulations” and aimed to end other forms of 
European intervention in the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad, 2000: 1; Burgis, 2009: 59). 
In the nineteenth century, such interventions took the form of military actions 
intended to prevent the massacres of Christians and ensure stability within the 
Ottoman Empire (M. Schulz, 2011; Rodogno, 2011a; 2011b; 2012). The Young 
Turks were especially concerned with how the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, signed after 
the defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War, granted European states the 
power to oversee reforms in western and eastern provinces of the empire in what is 
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today’s Southeast Europe and eastern Turkey (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 167 – 168, 309 - 
310). In the immediate lead up to and after the 1908 revolution, the Young Turks 
engaged in diplomacy and implemented reforms with the aim of ending these 
practices and thereby achieving the full recognition of the sovereignty of their state 
(Hanioğlu, 2001: 236). The capitulations and practices of humanitarian intervention 
had been developed over centuries by the Europeans in their relations with the 
Ottomans (Pitts, 2018: 30 - 43). To understand how the Young Turks, sought to 
secure a recognition of the sovereignty of their state, as an equal to other sovereign 
states, by challenging these practices, this thesis will engage in a study of 
communications made by the Young Turks to international audiences. In these 
communications, the Young Turks were seeking to shift their position in global 
international society by aspiring to gain recognition of what they perceived to be 
their rights as representatives of a sovereign state.  
 
 Studying the process by which the Young Turks oversaw a transformation of 
their state, from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, in the context of 
broader transformations that were occurring throughout the world (see Buzan and 
Lawson, 2015; Kurzman, 2008; Sohrabi, 1995; 2011; Yenen, 2016), provides a 
means of theorising the role of local and global constituent powers in the emergence 
of global international society. Specifically, it accounts for how states that were 
already sovereign, but denied the full range of rights associated with sovereignty, 
gained recognition of these rights by other states in global international society, 
thereby moving to a condition of greater sovereign equality. Different movements, 
which had their origins in the Young Turks, engaged with understandings of 
sovereignty that were widely held in global international society to gain recognition 
of the sovereign equality of their state (Fortna, 2011). In this process, different 
Young Turk groups advanced an agenda for domestic reform to empower the state 
and enable it to be recognised as ‘civilised’ by the dominant states in global 
international society. This meant that, in different periods after the revolution, the 
Young Turks adopted forms of sovereignty that were associated with ‘civilised’ 
states. They also sought to influence how the constitutional rules of global 
international society were applied with respect to their state. In both cases, they 
wielded forms of constituent power at the domestic and international level. These 
forms of constituent power took the form of social and normative power (Kavalski, 
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2013; Mann, 1986: 1; Phillips, 2010: 19). Social power, in this context, involved the 
Young Turks using military, economic and other forms of power, to compel others to 
recognise their sovereignty, whereas normative power involved them seeking to 
achieve sovereign equality for their state by means of persuasion (Kavalski, 2013; 
Mann, 1986: 1 – 33). Constituent power was therefore deployed in struggles of and 
over recognition27 in global international society, which involved the use of social 
power28 and normative power29 on the part of the Young Turks. Both the normative 
and social power used by the Young Turks were forms of constituent power, insofar 
as diplomats, statesmen and intellectuals wielding them sought to secure the 
sovereign equality of their state in global international society.   
 
3. Outline of the thesis: 
  
The first chapter reviews the literature on sovereignty and the emergence of 
global international society in International Relations, demonstrating how there is a 
need to explain how states that were already sovereign came to be recognised as 
equal in the nature of their sovereignty to the established states in global 
international society. The chapter begins by defending the definition of sovereignty 
as supreme authority over a jurisdiction and reviews the existing literature on 
sovereignty in International Relations. It concludes its reviews of existing 
approaches to defining sovereignty by suggesting that a more comprehensive 
definition of sovereignty can be provided if facts from a greater historical and 
geographical scope are considered and compared. This points the way towards using 
a historical and global approach to the study of sovereignty. Historical accounts of 
the development of what has become the contemporary global international society 
 
27 Kavalski (2013: 250) argues that those who wield “normative power” do so in the context of 
“struggles of recognition” (see also Ringmar, 2012: 19). This is because “normative power” can only 
be realised if it is recognised as such by those it is seeking to influence (Kavalski, 2013: 250). There 
is no reason why this argument cannot be understood as also being the case in the context of what 
Tully (2004: 84) terms “struggles over recognition” as well.  
28 See Mann (1986: 1 - 33). 
29 See Manners (2002: 253), Jay Jackson (1975: 237 - 239) and Kavalski (2013). As Kavalski (2013: 
248) points out, Manners (2002: 253) also uses the term “normative power”, but Manners (2002: 253) 
argues that it ought to be understood as “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world 
politics”. However, as Kavalski (2013: 248) notes, “normative power” was also used  by Jay Jackson 
(1975: 237 - 239) to involve “the potential for influencing activity … [by] the power of norms.” This 
thesis follows Kavalski (2013: 248) in viewing both accounts as capturing different aspects of 
“normative power”, namely how it is tied to “legitimacy” and “ability” (emphasis in original). Phillips 
(2010: 19) uses the term “authoritative power” to refer to what is defined here as “normative power”. 
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are then reviewed (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018). Recent historical accounts of the 
development of the society have involved a greater awareness of the theoretical 
assumptions of earlier accounts and, in doing so, have produced more convincing 
theoretical arguments. Although studies of “stigmatisation” (see Adler-Nissen, 
2014b: 143; Zarakol, 2014: 331) have helped demonstrate how states that were 
sovereign were not recognised as equal to other sovereign states, it is argued that 
they can be complemented by studies of “normalization”, (see Smetana, 2020: 27) to 
provide a more complete picture of the emergence of global international society 
(Berg and Toomla, 2009). The final section of the first chapter contends that much 
more attention needs to be given to the fact that different forms of states existed 
which were scattered throughout the globe prior to the recognition of their 
sovereignty. To this end, a “re-centering” of the concept of the state is needed to 
distinguish processes of the recognition of sovereignty from the processes of state-
building (Grzybowski, 2018: 199). This involves considering how the state was a 
constant in the process of its representatives seeking to secure recognition of their 
equal sovereignty. This then makes it possible to study the historical processes 
involved in the recognition of the sovereignty of states and whether such recognition 
is also a recognition of sovereign equality or not. 
 
 The second chapter of this thesis outlines the specific theoretical framework, 
case selection and methodological approach that will be used to answer the specific 
research question of the thesis. A theoretical framework combining historical and 
philosophical studies of ideas, together with a focus on the concept of constituent 
power, will be used to answer the question of how the Young Turks gained external 
recognition of the sovereign equality of their state. Along with presenting the ideas 
of sovereignty that enabled the recognition of the sovereign equality of the state, this 
thesis also asserts that this recognition can be understood through a theoretical 
framework that builds on the concept of constituent power. It argues that global 
intellectual history can be used to explain the emergence of sovereignty in global 
international society through the practice of what Cornago (2017: 327) terms 
“constituent diplomacy”. “Constituent diplomacy” is therefore introduced as a 
concept that can convey the processes whereby the sovereign equality of states in 
global international society is recognised (Cornago, 2017: 327). This framework is 
then further outlined and the advantages of using it, when contrasted with other 
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explanations of the emergence of global international society, are highlighted. The 
final sections of this chapter demonstrate how this approach can be applied to the 
cases of the Ottoman Empire and the Young Turks. 
 
The following four empirical chapters consider four key moments in the 
transition periods involving the re-constitution of international order and the re-
constitution of the Ottoman and later Turkish state. The emergence of the standard of 
‘civilisation’ was a significant development that would be echoed in later debates 
about trusteeship and intervention in contemporary global international society 
(Anghie, 2002; Matz, 2005). The subsequent attempt to bring about changes in the 
international order in the First World War and the various interpretations of national 
self-determination also left their mark on contemporary global international society. 
The forms of international cooperation in the post-war period, most notably the 
League of Nations, resulted in the re-introduction of the idea of the standard of 
‘civilisation’ as a means of identifying which states were to be recognised as fully 
sovereign (Anghie, 2002). Additionally, a division of labour is observed between 
these empirical chapters. Firstly, both Chapters 3 and 5, in the respective periods 
1908 – 1911 and 1918 – 1922, focus on how the Young Turks, sought recognition 
under existing constitutional rules in global international society. Secondly, Chapters 
4 and 6 focus on how the Young Turks and their successors, in the respective periods 
1911 – 1918 and 1922 – 1923, sought to influence how global constitutional rules 
were applied to secure recognition of their sovereign equality. 
 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, focuses on the efforts of the 
revolutionary Young Turk factions to gain recognition of the equal sovereignty of 
the Ottoman Empire, in the face of the emergence of more stringent criteria of 
recognition in the late nineteenth century, based on the idea of ‘civilisation’ (Anghie, 
1999). The period covered starts with the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and ends 
with the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War in 1911. It argues that different Young 
Turk factions presented visions of the constituent power, within the Ottoman 
Empire, that was represented and shaped by a civilised “elite” which they identified 
as being themselves (Hanioğlu, 2001: 311). They therefore sought, in several 
political texts and communications, to demonstrate, to the dominant actors in global 
international society, their conformity with the idea of the standard of “civilisation” 
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(Buzan, 2014: 576; see also Gong, 1984). This mirrored the ideas expressed in other 
constitutional revolutions throughout the world which were occurring at the same 
time (see Blachford, 2019), such as those occurring in Russia, Iran, China and 
Mexico (Hanioğlu, 2001: 317 – 318; Kurzman, 2008; Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). 
Pursuing constitutional government was seen by all of the revolutionary factions as 
the best way to ensure that the standard of ‘civilisation’, understood as entailing 
representative forms of government, was fulfilled.  
 
This resulted in the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which the 
Ottomans had signed with the foremost European states after the Russo-Turkish War 
of 1877 – 1878, agreeing to withdraw their military forces sent to oversee reform in 
Macedonia and to reduce their overseeing of reforms in the region (Yosmaoğlu, 
2013: 48). However, the Ottoman state lost territorial control over Bulgaria, Bosnia 
and Crete in this period. These losses of Ottoman territories resulted from the new 
regime seeking to centralise control and autonomous entities within the empire, such 
as Bulgaria and Crete, aiming to become independent. Bosnia’s annexation by 
Austria-Hungary was justified on the basis of Austria-Hungary’s responsibilities 
under the Treaty of Berlin (M. Schulz, 2011: 204). Moreover, the CUP and others in 
the Ottoman government, initially disagreed with each other on matters of policy 
(Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 13 - 42). Different Young Turk factions and other political 
groups that emerged, such as the Muhammedan Union, disagreed with each other on 
how to realise constitutional rule (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 13 - 42). The Young Turks 
were able to achieve some of their goals in securing the recognition of sovereign 
equality in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, but they also faced what they 
considered to be multiple new challenges to the nature and extent of Ottoman 
sovereignty.  
 
The next empirical chapter, Chapter 4, focuses on how, soon after the 
revolution of 1908, the Young Turks came to recognise that there was no singular 
conception of ‘civilisation’ and other constitutional rules in global international 
society. As a result, and especially after the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911, the 
Young Turks sought to secure the position of the Ottoman Empire within one of the 
emerging global alliances. In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912 – 1913, 
greater urgency was attached to this desire, which was adopted by the military 
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government formed by the CUP. In the course of these conflicts, the Young Turks 
sought to secure the sovereign equality of the Ottoman state through an alliance with 
the Central Powers (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). Consequently, the CUP government 
entered the First World War with the intention of securing an end to the capitulations 
and gaining territory to prevent possible external intervention by enhancing their 
global standing (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120 - 123; Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015; 
Landau, [1981] 1995: 34 – 35). Although the Young Turks later signed an armistice 
with the Allies in 1918, they did so only after  US President Woodrow Wilson had 
promised that the rights of nations should be respected in the final peace settlement 
after the war. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses how in the period from 1918 to 1922 the Young Turks 
and their successors sought external recognition of their claims to sovereignty by 
appealing to different interpretations of global and domestic constituent power. The 
National Movement formed by Mustafa Kemal, a Young Turk and a military officer, 
is the most well-known of these groups, but there were other bodies (Zürcher, 2010). 
An Islamic government, for example, was established in Kars (Göl, 2013: 89). Many 
other political movements emerged from within the Ottoman Empire to advance 
their own demands for national self-determination. Some Armenian and Assyrian 
political organisations advanced claims in Anatolia (Anzerlioğlu, 2010; Kaplan, 
2004). The Greek government also argued that it had rights as an Allied power over 
Western Anatolia which it promptly invaded (Gingeras, 2016: 260 - 269). This 
chapter demonstrates how ideas of reconstituting international order to secure a 
durable peace as well as the notion of national self-determination were used by 
actors throughout the Ottoman Empire to advance their particular claims (Demirkent, 
2017: 93, 101 - 104). The Ottoman post-war governments in Istanbul at times 
collaborated with the Allies in the aftermath of the war to secure stability and 
entertained the possibility of mandatory rule for the empire (Gingeras, 2016: 251 - 
253; Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). The National Movement, on the other hand, drew upon 
ideas of national sovereignty, which were being promoted by Wilson and the 
Russian revolutionary leader, Lenin (Demirkent, 2017: 101 – 104; Throntveit, 2017).  
 
Focusing on the period 1922 - 1923, Chapter 6 provides an account of how 
the National Movement was able to present itself as the representative of the people, 
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framed as the constituent power in the geography of the occupied Ottoman Empire. 
This chapter concludes with the Treaty of Lausanne which resulted in the Republic 
of Turkey being recognised as a sovereign state and which led to abrogation of the 
capitulations (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 144 - 145). The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the 
Treaty of Sèvres that had been signed by the Ottoman government in 1920 (P.M. 
Brown, 1924). The Treaty of Sèvres had envisaged the partitioning of the Ottoman 
Empire with territories to be given to Armenia and Greece, the introduction of 
special administrative measures for Istanbul and the formation of a new Kurdish 
state from Ottoman territory (P.M. Brown, 1924). Following the signing of the 
Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, the Ottoman government was granted the right to control a 
small territory centred in Anatolia (P.M. Brown, 1924). Judging that the National 
Movement had gained the military advantage around Istanbul and other key 
locations, after defeating Greece’s invasion force, the Allies agreed to revise the 
Treaty of Sèvres (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 55). The National Movement’s assembly in 
Ankara responded by abolishing the sultanate and claiming the powers of the 
caliphate in the lead up to negotiations with the Allies (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 67). 
This prevented the Ottoman government in Istanbul from sending its own delegation 
to Lausanne (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 67). Both sovereignty and constituent power, 
therefore, had come to reside with the Ankara government (Demirkent, 2017: ch. 3). 
The Ottoman constitution had been effectively revised with the abolition of the 
sultanate. Following the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Ankara government 
agreed to receive legal advisors from neutral states (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 144 - 145). In 
order to obtain the recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state in control of its 
territory, like the established sovereign states in global international society, these 
advisers were tasked with developing Turkey’s legal system in line with what can be 
said to be the standard of “civilization” (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 157). The recognition of 
Turkey as a sovereign nation-state, with equal rights to other nation-states, was 
partially premised on it accepting the post-war understandings of ‘civilisation’, 
progress and peace, as exemplified by the new international order being constructed 
through institutions such as the League of Nations (Anghie, 2005: ch. 3; 2006). 
 
The conclusion summarises the argument of the thesis and demonstrates its 
broader implications for International Relations. The thesis argues that actors can 
invoke constituent power, when faced with changes to global international society, to 
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re-constitute their sovereignty. The conclusion begins by showing how the period 
from 1908 to 1923 demonstrates that local and global forms of constituent power 
best account for how states that were sovereign but denied sovereign equality in 
global international society came to be recognised as sovereigns equal to the 
established states in global international society. Next, it highlights the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis and the different ideas that form its premises. In doing so, it 
explains how constituent power, understood as normative and social power, is 
deployed to overcome the challenge posed by stigmatisation to the recognition of 
sovereign equality. If successful, such attempts at using constituent power, either to 
gain recognition of one’s status under existing constitutional principles or to advance 
new constitutional principles, result in the normalisation of the sovereign equality of 
states. This argument provides a better explanation of the emergence of the 
contemporary global international society, in which sovereign states are granted 
equal rights, than accounts which stress the role of the diffusion of ideas (see, for 
instance, Boli, 2001) or the assertion of power (see, for instance, Aalberts, 2012: ch. 
6) by actors. The final section of the conclusion demonstrates the broader 
significance of this argument for International Relations  and contributes to 
theorising how change can occur to international society through constituent power. 
 
4. A note on primary sources: 
 
 Both primary and secondary sources have been used in piecing together the 
events that posed challenges to Ottoman sovereignty and how the Ottoman 
authorities and others responded to these events. Primary sources, in the form of 
official communications or political texts contained in books and periodicals, have 
been used to convey the ideas and actions of the Young Turks. Diplomatic 
communications and consular correspondences stored in the British National 
Archives, including some not previously consulted by researchers, have been used. 
The use of archives, and in particular, state archives is always fraught with the 
problem of the accuracy of the information provided. This is because of how 
information may be presented by those who created the archive to reinforce a 
particular historical narrative (Stoler, 2008; Winrow, 2018). The intentions of those 
compiling the sources of an archive and deciding what should be made publicly 
available, there may be serious omissions and certain views and opinions may have 
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been thereby effectively silenced (Trouillot, 1995: 26). However, the British 
National Archives at Kew are an invaluable repository of information. They have 
been well-preserved and have avoided any war damage. These archives include 
records of the extensive consular network of the British Empire in the Ottoman 
Empire (see Berridge, 2009: 75 – 92, 160). Additionally and most crucially, the 
Foreign Office papers in the British National Archives  also contain copies and/or 
originals of documents submitted to the Foreign Office from other states and actors, 
including many petitions and other communications submitted by Ottoman 
individuals. Many of these communications, which also include documents sent 
simultaneously to other states besides Britain, cannot be found in archives at their 
location of origin, due perhaps to their destruction or censorship. These 
communications, together with the impression they made on external actors, can 
serve to reconstruct the global history of the emergence of international society. A 
close reading of these documents, alongside other primary sources in the form of 
political texts, is therefore used to explain how the Young Turks sought to gain 
















1. Sovereignty in International Relations: states, normalisation and the 




 This chapter reviews the existing literature on sovereignty in International 
Relations and develops the concepts of stigmatisation and normalisation. The first 
section examines the definitions of sovereignty. It supports the definition of 
sovereignty in the current global international society as one entailing supreme 
authority over a jurisdiction. The second section presents the broader question of the 
thesis concerning how the current global international society, composed of multiple 
sovereign states, came to emerge. The various existing accounts of the development 
of sovereignty, understood as the basis of global international society, are critiqued 
and the need for a relational account is highlighted. A relational account is one 
which explains how the essence of a phenomenon forms over time (Emirbayer, 
1997). It will be argued that studies of the recognition of sovereignty point to how 
the understanding of sovereignty shared by members of global international society 
came to be relationally constructed through acts of recognition. The third section 
demonstrates how a relational account must, however, consider how changes in 
power  can impact on relations that produce and sustain the outcome of recognition. 
This is the case with the phenomenon of “normalization”, which refers to how 
previously shunned actors or practices come to be accepted (Smetana, 2020: 27). 
These forms of normalisation emerge whenever the power relations that facilitate 
stigma undergo change. The fourth section builds on this by arguing that powerful 
states existed prior to being recognised as sovereign by other states in global 
international society, and they were thus initially excluded from the emerging global 
international society. However, through a process of normalisation, these states came 
to be recognised as sovereign by other international actors and were integrated into 
global international society.  
 
2. Defining sovereignty in International Relations 
 
This section introduces and defends the definition of sovereignty that will be 
used in this thesis, to explain how states gained recognition of their sovereign 
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equality in global international society, by presenting and critiquing existing 
understandings of sovereignty in the discipline of International Relations. It first 
considers several existing definitions. The first of these is Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 
2005: 13) idea of sovereignty as the ability to declare an “exception” to existing 
constitutional rules, which has been influential in International Relations but is 
shown to be rooted in the specific intellectual context of the Weimar Republic. Next, 
Kelsen’s ([1934] 1970) understanding of sovereignty as a norm outlining the source 
of domestic and international authority, which emerged from the same historical 
context as the thought of Carl Schmitt, is shown to be influential over the discipline 
of International Relations. Subsequently, the argument presented by Walker (2010) 
for recognising the common intellectual heritage of both thinkers is presented and it 
is suggested that a more inclusive and global understanding of sovereignty needs to 
be advanced. Specifically, all of these ideas of sovereignty emerged, in the context 
of European political philosophy, as attempts to impose order on the world. 
However, a separate approach to understanding sovereignty to those presented thus 
far is provided by the English School of International Relations, which incorporates 
studies of history in its approach (Hurrell, 2001). This means that its approach to the 
study of concepts, such as sovereignty, is not based purely on speculative thoughts 
on how order can be imposed on to the world, in the context of understanding it 
scientifically and/or ruling it, but also on how such concepts have been understood 
and used historically. As the recent turn to disciplinary history within International 
Relations demonstrates (see Guzzini, 2013), such historical studies can also show 
how the historical use of concepts, such as sovereignty, also came to influence how 
they came to be adopted in the discipline of International Relations. Finally, studying 
the history of the use of a concept, such as sovereignty, can reveal how any 
definition of a concept needs to be sufficiently broad to encapsulate how it may 
appear to have been developed in a specific context but, in fact, may have a parallel 
or earlier history in other contexts. 
 
One definition of sovereignty advanced in International Relations is the idea of 
sovereignty as the ability to “decide” an “exception” to existing constitutional rules 
(C. Schmitt, [1922] 2005: 13). This definition, first advanced by Carl Schmitt 
([1922] 2005: 13), later came to be highly influential in International Relations 
theory (Huysmans, 1999; Pichler, 1998; Scheuerman, 1999; Suganami, 2007: 513; 
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M.C. Williams, 2005: 84 - 100). Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 5) developed his theory 
in the context of the debate over the source of sovereignty in the Weimar Republic, 
i.e. “the problem of sovereignty”, which emerged because the officially recognised 
sovereign may not in practice wield supreme authority within a state (Huysmans, 
2008: 167). Here, Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 13) sought to address this problem by 
asserting that, in practice, the sovereign was whoever had the power to determine the 
proper source of authority in a constitutional order through their “decision” (see also 
Huysmans, 2008: 171; M.C. Williams, 2005). This power included the ability to 
suspend existing rules (Huysmans, 2008: 171). Hence, Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 5) 
argued that “the sovereign is he who decides on the exception”, regardless of 
whether the sovereign was the actual officially recognised source of authority. 
Morgenthau (1948: 268) builds on Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005: 13) definition of 
sovereignty to argue that sovereignty referred to “the mightiest social force” within a 
nation30. As Michael C. Williams (2005: 85 - 104) demonstrates, this understanding 
of sovereignty would form the basis of realist perspectives in International Relations, 
which recognise the presence of different states, wielding such sovereignty, engaged 
in relations among each other. However, more generally, this perspective is shared 
by all accounts that focus on sovereignty as a form of power or control over territory, 
which expresses itself as the ability to declare an exception to existing rules (see 
Duvall and Havercroft, 2008; Kratochwil, 1986; Wendt and Duvall, 2008). 
 
Another strand of literature in International Relations, is influenced by the 
philosopher, Agamben’s (1998) work, which builds on that of Carl Schmitt ([1922] 
2005), to argue that the power to decide the meaning of norms in sovereignty 
extends beyond arbitrating constitutional norms. Specifically, Agamben (1998: 6) 
suggests that sovereignty refers to the ability to produce “bare life”, meaning the 
ability to reduce individuals of all their characteristics aside from that of being 
biological beings. Studies have used Agamben’s (1998: 6) concept of bare life in 
different contexts such as the treatment of refugees in camps (Biswas and Nair, 
2010: 3; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 1999; 2005; Salter, 2008; Vaughan-Williams, 2009a: 
112 – 116; 2009b: 23 - 27). Studies using Agamben (1998: 6) have also focused on 
his concept of the “zone of indistinction”, which refer to contexts in which there is a 
 
30 See Scheuerman (1999: 229 – 243). 
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confusion over proper legal categories. Agamben (1998: 6) adds that, within this 
“zone of indistinction”, decisions defining “bare life” can be made by sovereign 
actors (see also Hozic, 2009: 247 - 248). Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005) idea of 
sovereignty has therefore also been indirectly influential in International Relations 
through influencing Agamben’s (1998) ideas of sovereignty. 
 
However, Carl Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty  emerged from a very specific 
historical context and was merely one possible response to the problem of 
sovereignty. Out of the range of different responses to this problem that were made 
in the Weimar Republic31, Kelsen’s ([1934] 1970) definition of sovereignty as a 
norm that structures the behaviour of individual actors has also been influential in 
International Relations theory (Aalberts, 2012: 58 – 59; Suganami, 2007). As 
Suganami (2007) demonstrates, Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005: 5) argument that 
sovereignty referred to the ability of an actor to declare an exception to existing rules 
was challenged by Hans Kelsen ([1934] 1970). Kelsen ([1934] 1970: 214), instead 
argued that sovereignty was a “basic norm” shared by those in the “international 
legal order” which gained its force through actors complying with it. This 
perspective, which extended beyond merely identifying the domestic source of 
sovereignty, would later inform subsequent discussions of sovereignty in 
International Law and International Relations (Aalberts, 2012: 58, 81 – 82; 
Koskenniemi, [1989] 2005: 227). According to Kelsen ([1934] 1970: 217), states 
have to conform to the international “norm” of sovereignty, given that they are a part 
of international society and need to abide by its principles of international law 
(Suganami, 2007: 518). This debate between Kelsen ([1934] 1970) and Carl Schmitt 
([1922] 2005) over the definition and location of sovereignty suggests two separate 
understandings of sovereignty. However, both thinkers were involved in the debate 
over the nature of sovereignty in the Weimar Republic, which begs the question of 
whether their positions can be understood outside of their particular historical 
context (Walker, 2010: 51). Ultimately, both thinkers shared an understanding of law 
as an activity producing and imposing rules to define and order the external world 
(Walker, 2010: 51). As Walker (2010: 51, 117 - 119) suggests, Carl Schmitt ([1922] 
 
31 See the overviews in Kelly (2003), Dyzenhaus (1997a; 1997b), Dyzenhaus and Cristi (1998) and 
Stanton (2016). On the situatedness of Kelsen within this context see Dyzenhaus (1997b) and 
Koskenniemi (2001: 413 – 509). 
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2005: 5) argued that sovereignty pointed to the ability of actors within states to 
impose order within their states, while Kelsen ([1934] 1970) referred to sovereignty 
as a norm that states are subject to internationally and domestically. In this sense, 
both thinkers may be said to have more in common than has been suggested by 
commentators who have been eager to contrast them, such as Suganami (2007). 
 
Several definitions of sovereignty in International Relations have echoed 
Walker’s (2010) idea of sovereignty a concept rooted in law that serves to impose 
order over the world. Walker’s (2010: 51) identification of sovereignty’s role in 
producing order stems from his reading of philosophical texts, namely of Hobbes 
([1651] 1996) and Kant ([1784] 1991), that he claims have informed influential 
concepts of sovereignty, such as those of Kelsen ([1934] 1970) and Carl Schmitt 
([1922] 2005: 5). As Walker (2010: 36) stresses, Kant ([1784] 1991) posited that 
individual human beings had the capacity to impose order on the world. According 
to Walker (2010: 100), Hobbes ([1651] 1996) instead argued that it was states which 
had this capability. Walker (2010: 51) asserts that the so-called Kelsen-Schmitt 
debate did not reveal a significant difference between Kelsen’s ([1934] 1970) and 
Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 1985: 5) understandings of sovereignty. Both Kelsen32 and 
Carl Schmitt draw upon the ideas of sovereignty held by Hobbes ([1651] 1996), who 
points to the coercive power of states, and Kant, who focuses on the individual’s 
capacity to legislate and develop a conception of sovereignty as a means of ordering 
the world (Walker, 2010: 50 - 51). Separately, earlier accounts have emphasised 
sovereignty’s role as a concept that is productive of an international order of distinct 
sovereign states, which allow us to conceive of them as possessing a separate 
“inside” and “outside”, with different forms of action being possible in each of the 
two contexts (Bartelson, 1995: 51; see also Rengger, 2000: 6; Walker, 1991; 1992). 
Similarly, Ruggie (1993: 159) claimed that sovereignty, denoting a position of 
authority over the world, could only be conceived because of the rise of artworks 
depicting a linear perspective in Europe, which privileged the perspective of the 
individual. Bartelson (2014: 9), on the other hand, argues that sovereignty is a 
 
32 Walker (2010: 116) argues that Kelsen ([1934] 1970) develops a Kantian approach given how his 
definition of sovereignty is based on the concept of sovereignty as the ability to impose order on the 
world through laws. Hobbes’s influence on Kelsen, stems from how Kelsen ([1934] 1970) views the 
establishment of the idea of sovereignty in international society as an event similar to the founding of 
a sovereign order in Hobbes’s ([1651 1996]) Leviathan (Walker, 2010: 142). 
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“symbol” that allows the world to be ordered into an “international system” 
composed of different states33. Bartelson’s (2014: 16) suggestion that sovereignty is 
a symbol captures how sovereignty does not need to be instantiated in reality, but 
can, and, in practice, is used, to point to a desired or hypothetical state of affairs34. 
Insofar as it is capable of explaining how ideas of sovereignty, originally developed 
in political philosophy, come to impose order on the world, even where the idea of 
sovereignty may not be instantiated, Bartelson (2014) provides a highly convincing 
definition of sovereignty in International Relations. 
 
However, the idea of sovereignty as ordering the world begs the question of how 
such ordering happens in time and space. An approach to the study of sovereignty 
that integrates a historical perspective is needed to understand how and why such 
ordering happens. The English School of International Relations is committed to 
studying  historical processes and the ideas held by historical actors throughout the 
globe.35 Wight (2004), considered one of the founders of this school (see I. Hall, 
2019: 189), argued that four distinct approaches to theorising, based on the ideas of 
Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant and Mazzini, were possible in International Relations. 
These approaches mirrored how ideas were used in relations between states. Wendt 
(1992: 425; 1999: 297), a constructivist scholar, would later argue that the theories 
of Locke, Kant and Hobbes similarly offered ways of understanding how states 
interacted at the international level. The international level, according to Wendt 
(1992: 391), can be defined as reflecting a state of “anarchy”, which states could 
respond to in different ways. All of the thinkers mentioned above, referred to by 
Wight (2004) and Wendt (1992), can offer different ways of understanding the 
nature of sovereignty in International Relations.  
 
The fact that all of these thinkers hail from the West gives rise, however, to the 
question of whether other means of comprehending sovereignty present in other 
parts of the world can also be used to develop a more inclusive understanding of 
sovereignty. As Bartelson (2014: 2) demonstrates, the reliance on concepts drawn 
 
33 Bartelson (1995) earlier argued that it is a concept that points to the idea of an indisputable 
foundation, which is also needed to have any knowledge of the world. 
34 Similarly, Lebow (2009: 12) argues that cartography can act as a conduit between visual 
representation and claims to sovereignty. 
35 See Hurrell (2001: 489 - 490), Buzan (2001: 480) and Little (1998; 2009). 
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from a Western context has meant that the limits of what can be theorised and 
studied in the discipline of International Relations derive from what can possibly be 
thought or studied in Western political philosophy more broadly. Bartelson (2014: 2) 
contends that sovereignty came to be used by commentators in the West to 
understand and order the world, but this definition of sovereignty arguably does not 
capture all uses of the concept in contemporary global international society36.  
Engaging with other geographies and histories can allow a comprehensive concept of 
sovereignty to be constructed (Waever, 2009: 202; Waltz, 1996; 1997; 2003; 2004). 
Such an approach to developing a theory of sovereignty is arguably employed by 
pre-nineteenth century European thinkers, such as Grotius. Grotius ([1609] 1916: 11) 
argued, in chapter 2 of his Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas) of 1609, that non-
European sovereign states had “their own government (suam republicam), their own 
laws (suas leges) and their own legal systems (suas jura)”, including states in 
“Ceylon, Java and the Moluccas”, who were recognised as such by European actors 
(see also Alexandrowicz, 1959: 164; Keene, 2002: 50, 90 - 91; Phillips, 2016; 
Phillips and Sharman, 2015a, 2015b). These examples also show how sovereignty 
does not necessarily entail control over territory, but does involve the internal and 
external recognition of authority37 (Zarakol, 2018a). Grotius’s ([1609] 1916) 
approach, therefore, demonstrates how it is possible to develop a theory of 
sovereignty that allows a clearer picture of the concept to be formed by observing 
and drawing comparisons from other times and places.  
 
 
36 Bull ([1977] 2012: 9 - 10) distinguishes between an international system and society, arguing firstly 
that “[a] system of states … is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them 
… to cause them to behave … as parts of a whole.” Separately from this definition of an international 
system, “[a] society of states”, according to Bull ([1977] 2012: 13), “exists when a group of states … 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions”. However, James (1993: 272) argues that this 
distinction is problematic insofar as it assumes that “regular relations”, mentioned in Bull’s ([1977] 
2012: 13) definition of an international system, can occur without rules. Additionally, the use of the 
term ‘society’ captures the processes of admission and exclusion that, following James (1993: 285 - 
286), can be said to characterise the history of international societies. Therefore, this thesis will mirror 
James (1993: 272) in using the term “international society” without contrasting it with an 
“international system”. 
37 Although Bartelson (1995: 30 – 31; 2014: 18 - 30) focuses on how the emergence of concepts of 
space resulted in the emergence of sovereignty as a form of control over territory, Keene (2002: 57) 
and Ruggie (1983: 274) both argue for how sovereignty can also involve jurisdictions being shared, as 
in the case of historical actors such as the British India Company pledging loyalty to different 
sovereigns (see Phillips and Sharman, 2015a: 441 – 442; 2015b: 85 – 89). 
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3. Sovereign states in history: the role of legitimacy in the emergence of global 
international society 
 
This section reviews existing accounts of the emergence of the current global 
international society of sovereign states and argues that more of a focus on the role 
of arguments of legitimacy is needed in explaining its onset. It begins by introducing 
and critiquing accounts of the emergence of modern sovereign states in historical 
sociology, such as those of Tilly ([1990] 1992), Spruyt (1994) and Teschke (2003), 
which have sought to reduce this process into structural and causal explanations that 
discount the role of human agency in this process. Perspectives that focus on 
discourses as constitutive of sovereignty, are not susceptible to this charge, since 
they focus on how forms of speech produce knowledge that shapes both sovereign 
states and their international context (Aalberts, 2012: ch. 6). However, as the 
scholars of the “practice turn” (see Kustermans, 2016: 175) suggest, this perspective 
has often overlooked the role of other practices, meaning actions that individuals 
engage in, aside from speech, in the emergence of sovereignty (see also Neumann, 
2002). Moreover, both the discursive and practice turn’s interpretations of the 
emergence of sovereignty involve privileging those who are able to speak and those 
who are able to act in their accounts, meaning that power is ultimately seen as 
explaining the emergence of sovereignty. Such an explanation cannot, however, 
explain how the emergence of sovereignty also involved states recognising each 
other as sovereign, in a process that ultimately resulted in the formation of a global 
international society. As Bull ([1977] 2012: 9) and Reus-Smit suggest (2001; 2002), 
this would suggest the presence of internal and external sovereignty, with separate 
institutions38 sustaining these two forms of sovereignty39. Although Reus-Smit 
(1997; 1999) convincingly argues that the presence of such international societies 
point to constitutional rules, these constitutional rules can, in fact, be contested 
within international societies. This is demonstrated by the many historical examples 
of states seeking to justify their sovereignty claims by different arguments appealing 
 
38 Reus-Smit (2002: 129) here draws upon the constructivist understanding of an institution as a 
“complex of norms governing the distribution and exercise of power and authority”, as developed by 
Adler (1997), Checkel (1998), Hopf (1998) and Price and Reus-Smit (1998). 
39 Shinoda (2000: 80, 136) also identifies the emergence of theories of sovereignty that can be 
understood to be international and constitutional insofar as they defined the nature of the sovereignty 
to be possessed by actors in international society. Although Shinoda (2000) does not distinguish 
between global international society and international society, his study provides an account of the 
development of sovereignty throughout the globe. 
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to legitimacy. This, in turn, is taken to suggest that more attention needs to be paid to 
the role of legitimacy in enabling the emergence of a global international society of 
equal sovereigns. 
 
Historical sociological accounts of the emergence of the modern sovereign state 
have identified the nineteenth century as the turning point which resulted in the 
emergence of the modern state (see Tilly, [1990] 1992), which, in turn, embodied 
sovereignty in its current form. Tilly (1985; [1990] 1992; 1994) focuses on how the 
contemporary state system emerged because of the coercive capacities and capital 
that nation-states possessed. This was a process which resulted in the emergence of a 
territorial state, which following Max Weber’s ([1921] 1978: 54) definition, is seen 
to hold a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its 
order [emphasis in original]” (see also Neocleous, 2011: 200). Although the idea of 
sovereignty held by these states implied that violence within the state was 
illegitimate, such violence persisted outside of the state, as evinced by the rise of 
piracy in the early modern period (Thomson, 1994; 1995). The centrality of military 
technology in Tilly’s (1985; [1990] 1992; 1994) account, led Duvall and Havercroft 
(2008: 758) to point to the parallels in Tilly’s ideas with those of International 
Relations theorists such as Morgenthau (1948) and Herz (1957; 1959), who have 
also pointed to how military technologies resulted in the emergence of new means of 
exerting power (Duvall and Havercroft, 2008: 759). Spruyt (1994), building on this 
account, suggests that the development of the sovereign state occurred as other 
means of organising society, such as empires and city-states, came to be eliminated, 
whereas scholars influenced from a Marxist40 perspective, that class coalitions within 
and outside states resulted in the emergence of the state. The exact timing of this 
development has been discussed by those commenting on the development of 
sovereignty in the literature on historical sociology (Spruyt, 1994; Tilly, 1994). 
Reus-Smit (2002: 135) challenges accounts such as those of Ruggie (1993: 24) that 
suggested that sovereignty began to emerge in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
by claiming that the international institutional framework, which enabled states to be 
understood as sovereign, only emerged in the course of the development of the 
concept in nineteenth century diplomacy. More recently, Buzan and Lawson (2015: 
 
40 See Rosenberg (1994), Teschke (2003; 2005; 2006) and Lacher (2006). 
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4) have argued that contemporary sovereignty emerged through the influence of 
multiple processes of “rational state building”, “industrialization” and “ideologies of 
progress” culminating in a global transformation in the nineteenth century. 
Regardless of when and why they identify the sovereign state as emerging, these 
historical accounts of the emergence of sovereignty argue that sovereignty emerged 
fully in the nineteenth century, in conjunction with the emergence of the sovereign 
states. 
 
These historical arguments have, however, been challenged by scholars who 
have argued that they are founded on assumptions concerning the forces that give 
rise to sovereignty, which post-structuralist accounts of the emergence of 
sovereignty do not possess (Lundborg, 2016). Both Lundborg (2016) and Bhambra 
(2011) have noted how historical sociological accounts have relied on drawing upon 
very particular European histories41. However, Lundborg (2016) argues that insofar 
as the advocates of these approaches assume the presence of a “foundation of 
objectivity”42, (see Lundborg, 2016: 106) by positing a “structure” for history, they 
themselves, rely on “a sovereignty politics of time” (see Lundborg, 2016: 100). This 
is because, like historical sociological accounts which aim to explain how 
sovereignty emerged, the use of sovereignty can involve a similar foundationalism 
insofar as it involves asserting the rootedness of the sovereign in time and space 
(Lundborg, 2011: 71; 2016). Post-structuralist perspectives, then offer, according to 
Lundborg (2016: 116) a means of “[e]xamining this politics of grounding, rather 
than trying to articulate an alternative ‘ground’”. By pointing to how the idea of 
sovereignty and who or what comes to be considered is constructed through 
discourse, Aalberts (2012: 143) argues that studying forms of speech can 
demonstrate how this “ground” is constructed43. Specifically, Aalberts (2012; 143) 
argues that the idea of “legal personality”, as advanced by Leibniz ([1706] 1989), 
made it possible to speak of sovereign states, as though they were persons, which is 
 
41 On how the association of sovereignty with modern sovereign states serves to limit understanding 
of the nature of the concept of sovereignty see also Prokhovnik (2007: 1).  
42 Lundborg (2016: 106) argues that Derrida’s ([1967] 2001: 199) identification of the tendency of 
thought to find a “common ground” forms the basis of the historical sociological approach in 
International Relations and informs many studies that have aimed to challenge the centrality of the 
idea of sovereignty (see Ashley, 1988; Campbell, 1992; Doty, 1997). 
43 See also Agathangelou and Ling (1997), Ashley (1988), Ashley and Walker (1990), Edkins (1999: 
6, 54 – 55; 2000), Edkins, Shapiro and Pin-Fat (2004), Edkins, Persram and Pin-Fat (1998), George 
(1989) and George and Campbell (1990: 287).  
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also echoed by the more recent idea of imputing “responsibility” to sovereign states. 
Following Foucault ([1976] 1980; 1982; [1978] 1991; 2007), Aalberts (2012: 134) 
argues in both cases that this is made possible by forms of knowledge, contained in 
speech, becoming dominant and thereby producing forms of what she terms 
“sovereign subjectivity”. Approaches that use discourse analysis also point to the 
emergence of sovereignty in the early modern period through the emergence of ideas 
of the political as a distinct activity (see Bartelson, 1995: 112, 138 and Leira, 2009: 
478). These accounts show that as a result of the emergence of new discourses, 
which produced forms of sovereign subjectivity, sovereignty came to refer to an 
agent who was considered to be responsible for control over a specific jurisdiction. 
 
The “practice turn” in International Relations offers an approach that has also 
been used to study the emergence of sovereignty in global international society. 
However, this approach has several problems (Kustermans, 2016: 175). The practice 
turn refers to a set of loosely similar approaches, which believe that International 
Relations theory should focus on the study of the individual actions, or practices, of 
actors (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a; 2011b; Bueger and Gadinger, 2014; 2015; Hopf, 
2010; P. Jackson, 2008; Kustermans, 2016). It therefore maintains the post-
structuralist focus on individual agency (Laffey and Weldes, 1998; Neumann, 2002: 
630; Swidler, 2001: 75). However, rather than argue that discourses are the building 
blocks of reality, it suggests that other forms of human action, in the form of 
practices that do not necessarily involve speech, are also significant (Neumann, 
2002). Bigo (2011: 227) argues, much like Lundborg’s (2016) critique of historical 
sociology, in favour of post-structuralism, that Bourdieu’s ([1972] 1977; 1985; 
[1980] 1990; [1994] 1998; see also Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994) social 
theory, focusing on practices engaged in by actors in the social world, does not 
presume a “sovereign” position from which to study International Relations. Bigo 
(2011: 254) argues that such a perspective can, in turn, explain how sovereignty 
emerges in “transnational fields”, referring to the shared spaces where individuals 
representing sovereign states and international organisations, advance and defend 
claims of sovereignty. Adler-Nissen (2013: 183) develops an approach which builds 
on Bourdieu’s ([1980] 1990: 52 - 64) idea that there are different forms of capital, 
i.e. resources held by actors, namely economic, political, symbolic and cultural. 
Adler-Nissen (2013: 183) argues that sovereignty is a form of meta-capital, meaning 
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a means of converting one form of capital into another (see also Adler-Nissen, 2011; 
2014a; 2014b). But accepting the definition of sovereignty, provided by Adler-
Nissen (2013: 183), requires accepting Bourdieu’s ([1980] 1990: 52 – 64) 
framework, including the different forms of capital he develops. Bourdieu’s 
perspective, like that offered by discourse analysis, offers the means of developing 
an account of sovereignty, without assuming the presence of a pre-given structure of 
society (Bigo, 2011). However, it nonetheless contains concepts that point to its own 
assumptions about society being structured by different forms of capital. 
 
Employing the practice turn to study the development of sovereignty is also 
problematic because of how it can involve making assumptions about practices, prior 
to studying practices historically. Approaches to the study of practices are also 
problematic because of how they advocate defining the practices in question prior to 
studying them, and thereby involve adopting the definitions of ideas that are present 
in existing discourses. This means that the practice turn cannot effectively account 
for the emergence of new practices, which deviate from existing understandings. For 
instance, Adler and Pouliot (2011b: 3) define practices as “competent 
performances”. However, such a definition is problematic as a guideline on how to 
define and then study historical practices, including sovereignty. This is because 
many of the institutions, ideas or actors that can be studied as practices, such as a 
sovereign state, can be defined in many different ways. These definitions could 
entail different meanings of  “competence” in the context of sovereignty (Duvall and 
Chowdhury, 2011: 339). Duvall and Chowdhury (2011: 348) note, for instance, that 
the existence of sovereign states such as Haiti and Liberia, populated and governed 
by former slaves, challenged existing understandings of sovereignty. Initially, 
neither of these states were considered to be competent sovereigns and they were not 
recognised until much later. Hence, Duvall and Chowdhury (2011: 351) claim that 
the sovereignty of these states can be termed and studied as examples of 
“incompetent performance”. Branch (2013: 9) also adopts a practice turn approach to 
demonstrating how new technologies, such as those of map-making, made it possible 
for actors to advance territorial claims. The acts of making and defending such 
claims were therefore practices of authority, through which sovereignty, denoting the 
authority of states, came to be realised in global international society (Branch, 2013: 
19). Consequently, even though it is faced with the question of how to define 
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practices that are ever-changing, the practice turn can be used to demonstrate how 
sovereignty emerged in the course of the development of contemporary global 
international society.  
 
However, both the practice turn and discourse analysis can be criticised for 
privileging forms of speech or, in the case of the practice turn, actions more 
generally, that rely on power to be successful. Yet, as has been established, 
sovereignty is also understood to be tied to the recognition of the legitimacy of 
claims to authority (Bartelson, 2013; 2014: 8; Erman, 2013; Fabry, 2013: 168)44. 
Despite following the practice turn approach, Branch (2013: 20) suggests that any 
form of authority is tied to concepts which outline “who or what is subject to the 
authority in question and how the limits of that authority are understood”. 
Arguments about legitimacy accompany the use of power and, as Branch (2016) 
subsequently claims, shape how and to what extent power comes to be exercised. For 
instance, Branch (2016: 23) argues that the viability of the geographical shape and 
political constitution45 of the territories that states govern or seek to govern have 
historically been used to legitimise their claims to sovereignty. The focus on ideas 
here may seem to mirror earlier post-structuralist concerns with identifying forms of 
knowledge that shape reality and subjects. The postcolonial perspective in 
International Relations, with its focus on how past beliefs about legitimacy are 
embedded in the actions of those who caused global international society to emerge, 
provides a means to consider questions of legitimacy in International Relations 
(Agathangelou and Ling, 1997; 2009: 54; Barkawi, 2013: 91; Grovogui, 2004: 33 – 
34; 2013: 112; Helliwel and Hindess, 2013: 74; Jabri, 2012: 8 – 9; Pasha, 2013: 
155). However, both of these perspectives can be said to focus on how ideas act as 
forms of power. In the case of postcolonial theories, they serve to maintain forms of 
colonial oppression, whereas in the case of poststructuralism, ideas, in the form of 
discourses, shape the subjectivity of actors. However, legitimacy can be conceived 
as distinct from the “logic of consequences” (see March and Olsen, 1998: 949) 
 
44 This was also recognised by M. Weber ([1919] 1994: 311), who stressed how states are sustained 
by legitimacy; see Laiz and Schlichte (2016: 1453). 
45 Rosenberg (1994: 126 - 129) also argues that forms of sovereignty shape the internal nature of 
sovereign states, which serve, in turn, to sustain the public-private distinction that is central to 
capitalism. However, Rosenberg (1994: 126 - 129) assumes that sovereignty ultimately fulfils this 
role because of his belief, derived from Wood (1981), in the state’s central role in overseeing the 
process of economic production. 
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entailed by focusing on power and the causal relations it can trigger. Instead, 
legitimacy can be conceived as following a “logic of appropriateness”46 (see Hurd, 
1999: 387). This, in turn, echoes the sociologist, Boltanski’s (2013: 44) claim that 
individual actors possess “critical capacities” that involve them engaging with 
arguments concerning legitimacy47 (see also Boltanski, 2011; Gadinger, 2016). It is 
therefore possible to conceive of an action or entity, including sovereignty, being 
sustained by legitimacy aside or alongside the assertion power.  
 
The authors within the English School perspective work with a conception of 
sovereignty as authority, which they share with international lawyers (Hurrell, 2001). 
They do not merely associate sovereignty with power, as some historical 
sociological perspectives have done. However, English School theorists are divided 
between those, such as Bull ([1977] 2012: 18 – 19), who claim that external 
sovereignty emerges after recognition by other states and those, such as James 
(1986; 1999: 460) who believe that it is sovereignty48 that enables an international 
society, composed of distinct sovereign states, to be conceived. Bull ([1977] 2012: 
30) recognises sovereignty as having external and internal forms49 and suggests that 
the recognition of each other’s external sovereignty, can ensure the “coexistence”50 
of different states within international society. James (1999: 461), on the other hand, 
argues that sovereignty denotes the “constitutional independence” of states from 
other states and bodies in international society (see also James, 1986). This begs the 
question of the relationship between internal sovereignty, meaning control over a 
jurisdiction, and external sovereignty, meaning the outside recognition of this 
jurisdiction.  Bartelson (2013: 113) argues that theorists he identifies as focusing on 
“political recognition” focus on how states come to exist after being recognised, but 
this begs the question as to what such states were, prior to being recognised. This 
suggests that states exist prior to their recognition (Bartelson, 1998). In International 
 
46 Epp (1998: 49 - 52, 56) also argues that the English School’s dedication to the interpretation of 
ideas of legitimacy demonstrates its continued value as an approach to International Relations.   
47 Boltanski (2000) himself engages, as a part of his study of actors wielding their critical capacities, 
with arguments for and against humanitarian intervention - an issue which is tied to the question of 
whether or not sovereignty can be judged as legitimate, thereby allowing it to be infringed (see C. 
Brown, 2002; Glanville, 2013a; 2013b; Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995; Moses, 2014). 
48 see also Mathieu (2018a: 9 – 10). 
49 See also Fowler and Bunck (1995: 49 - 50), Hinsley ([1966] 1986: 182, 230) and Pegg and Kolsto 
(2015).  
50 See also Manning ([1962] 1975: 44, 11, 162) as discussed in Aalberts (2012: 113). 
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Law, a similar debate revolves around whether states come into being when they are 
recognised, according to the constitutive theory, or when they fulfil the condition of 
being a state, as suggested by the declaratory theory (Bartelson, 2013: 115; Kurtulus, 
2005: 100 - 106). However, it can be argued that both theories “rely on a problematic 
distinction… between empirical facts, on the one hand, and social facts and norms 
on the other” (Erman, 2013: 130). Given how states can exist without being 
recognised, it would appear, as Fabry (2010: 7; 2013: 168) suggests, that a 
perspective that takes other explanations, aside from those in International Law, is 
needed to understand the recognition of states and their sovereignty. 
 
An alternative to this purely legal understanding of sovereignty is provided by 
Reus-Smit. Reus-Smit (1997; 1999) argues that there are constitutional norms of 
international society, which enable it to facilitate co-existence amongst states 
through providing rules concerning the recognition of external sovereignty. Reus-
Smit (1999: 33) demonstrates that it is these norms which provide standards of 
legitimate or acceptable sovereignty, alongside outlining forms of “procedural 
justice” that the members of different international societies are subject to. Although 
Reus-Smit (1999: 30 - 35) treats procedural justice as a separate category from 
sovereignty, procedural justice would, in the course of the nineteenth century, be 
equated with principles that “civilized” (see Reus-Smit, 1999: 35) states upheld. This 
fact is accounted for by James (1993: 285) who states that ideas of sovereignty can 
serve to exclude certain states from being recognised as fully part of international 
society, even if these states are sovereign in the sense of being constitutionally 
independent. Therefore, states that were deemed to be uncivilised were excluded 
from such forms of procedural justice and hence not treated as sovereigns equal to 
other states (Aalberts, 2014; Bartelson, 2018: 173 – 174; Buchan, 2006). Reus-Smit 
(1999: 31) stresses that sovereignty and procedural justice are, in turn based on 
different understandings of the “moral purpose of the state”, held by the members of 
these different international societies. Reus-Smit (1997: 557), here, draws upon 
Krasner’s (1983: 2) distinction between “rules” and “norms”, arguing that norms 
refer to general principles, whereas rules refer to written or agreed upon forms of 
conduct51. However, when individual actors seek to legitimise their actions, they blur 
 
51 See also Krasner (1982: 186). 
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the distinction between norms and rules, since justifications can draw upon both 
written and unwritten understandings of legitimacy52 (Kratochwil, 1986: 33). 
Nevertheless, Reus-Smit (1997: 584; 2002) illustrates the continued relevance of the 
English School concept of international society by showing how sustained 
interactions between the members of an international society are productive of 
constitutional rules that shape how external sovereignty is understood and enacted by 
these members.  
 
Reus-Smit’s (1997: 571, 578) argument of the significance of legitimacy in 
sustaining global international society is convincing, but his perspective is one that 
involves applying Habermas’s (1986) discourse ethics to suggest that moral 
principles always shape the meaning of sovereignty. Habermas’s (1986; 1990) 
assumption of the presence of an inherent rationality in interactions can be 
challenged. Tully (1983: 491, 502 - 505) argues that what is taken to be rationality, 
which Habermas (1986: 15 - 17) bases his understanding of morality upon, varies 
from context to context (Reus-Smit, 1997: 564). As there is no automatic consensus 
on moral principles of the sort implied by Habermas53 (1986; 1990), it is necessary 
to study the distinct contexts of those advancing constitutional principles of 
international societies. This can, in turn, demonstrate how international societies are 
often internally contested, with different state and non-state actors advancing 
separate understandings and justifications of sovereignty. Many states are compelled 
to make these justifications as a state that is recognised as sovereign has a greater 
chance of thriving and cooperating with other states, thereby sustaining its 
sovereignty over time (Pegg and Kolsto, 2015; Spruyt, 1994: 44 - 153). Such states 
are less likely to be the victims of interference, with “non-intervention” therefore 
being another important element of sovereignty (C. Weber, 1995: 11). Even when a 
state is constitutionally independent, in accordance with international law, it can 
simultaneously, be subject to other global forms of hierarchy (Bilgin, 2017: 133 – 
151; Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Park, 2017: 5 – 6; Zarakol, 2017). State 
representatives can then seek to argue for their sovereign right to challenge these 
forms of hierarchy by arguing that they possess specific rights over their 
 
52 See also Smetana (2020: 6), Kratochwil (1989: 10) and Onuf ([1989] 2013: 128 - 144). 
53 Habermas (1986: 17) argues that “a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end 
on reasons“ (emphasis in original; see also the discussion in Reus-Smit, 1997: 564). 
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jurisdictions as sovereigns (Kayaoğlu, 2007; 2010a; Thomson, 1994; 1995). 
Religious and other forms of solidarity can also be used to gain recognition of a 
state’s sovereign rights (de Carvalho and Paras, 2015; Philpott, 1997; 2001). These 
attempts to legitimise sovereignty claims can, in turn, influence the extent to which 
sovereign states enjoy sovereign equality in an international society. 
 
4. Sovereignty and legitimacy: From stigmatisation to normalisation 
 
In line with the previous section’s call for closer studies of legitimacy in 
accounts of the development of global international society, this section argues that 
the role of legitimacy may be studied by focusing on processes of normalisation. It 
begins by defending a relational approach to the study of legitimacy, since what is 
understood by legitimacy and who is considered legitimate both emerge in processes 
over time (Emirbayer, 1997; Jackson and Nexon, 1999). The section then reviews 
recent studies of the “expansion of international society” and notes how these studies 
have concentrated on issues of identity (Pella, Jr., 2014: 89; see also Neumann, 
2011). It is important to note, here, how this process of expansion entailed states 
being seen as possessing different types of sovereignty. So-called “quasi-states” (see 
R.H. Jackson, 1990: 21) in global international society possess “negative 
sovereignty” (R.H. Jackson, 1990: 26). They are recognised as sovereigns 
internationally so that they are subject to non-intervention54, but they do not exercise 
full control over their own jurisdiction. It has been suggested that these states are not 
fully sovereign when compared to other states within global international society 
(R.H. Jackson, 1990). The exclusion of these states from participation in global 
international society or the fact that they were not regarded as equal in their 
sovereignty to established states arguably reveals a hierarchy of sovereigns within 
global international society, sustained by stigmatisation (Zarakol, 2011; 2018b). 
However, studies of stigmatisation can benefit from a greater focus on relations, 
following the call of Emirbayer (1997) and Jackson and Nexon (1999) to focus on 
 
54 R.H. Jackson (1990: 26) coins the term “negative sovereignty”, based on his reading of Berlin’s 
(1969: 122) concept of negative and positive freedom, where negative freedom is used to refer to the 
idea of freedom from outside interference, and positive freedom refers to the freedom to act. R.H. 
Jackson (1990: 26) uses this concept to explain how “negative” sovereigns are subject to freedom 
from intervention, even though they may not be free to effectively control their jurisdiction or engage 
in actions associated with statehood. 
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relations in social science and International Relations. Stigmatisation envisages 
international relations to be a closed system with established states exerting a 
gatekeeping function recognising and excluding states with certain identities from 
being recognised as sovereign states (Zarakol, 2011). However, the history of global 
international society shows that the so-called established states change over time. 
Stigmatisation is ultimately enabled by power relations that sustain the established 
states. Hence, changes in stigmatisation can occur after shifts in power. The concept 
of “normalization” can be used as a tool to understand how actors that were 
previously stigmatised came to be subsequently recognised as sovereign states 
(Smetana, 2020: 27; see also Xiaoyu, 2012). Using the concepts of normalisation and 
stigmatisation then, enables one to better understand the processes involved in the 
emergence of global international society. 
 
The framework provided by the "relationalism" of Jackson and Nexon (1999: 
291) allows one to study the role of legitimacy in the emergence of the form of 
sovereignty associated with contemporary global international society. Here, 
relationalism refers to the approach in International Relations and the social sciences 
more generally which rejects the view that there are fixed essences to objects of 
study (Emirbayer, 1997). Relationalist scholars have argued that the objects of study, 
such as states, cannot be assumed to be timeless entities which have always been 
present in the sense we understand them to be (Jackson and Nexon, 1999). Instead, 
they argue that these objects of study, like the state, emerged through processes, in 
which the interaction of different actors ultimately produced the idea of an entity 
being a state (Jackson and Nexon, 1999). These processes of interaction can involve 
the exchange of actions or meanings which create or “yoke” (Jackson and Nexon, 
1999: 292), entities into being. This relational approach can be used to study 
legitimacy in International Relations because the content and meaning of legitimacy 
is contested (Hurd, 1999: 381). Disagreements in history over which forms of 
sovereignty are legitimate, reveal how there were separate ideas of legitimacy or 
differences over the applicability of these ideas (Benton, 2001; Sheehan, 2006). A 
relational approach can demonstrate how the role of legitimacy, alongside 
considerations of power, may determine whether a state is recognised as sovereign 
(Andersen, 2012; Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 315; Krebs and Jackson, 2007: 38; 
Lake, 2003; 2009b; 2009c; 2017; MacDonald, 2018). Such an approach can also 
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show whether and how states are able to maintain their sovereignty in the face of the 
threat of intervention or actual intervention (C. Weber, 1995). Although intervention 
has often been understood as a form of power, it is also tied to legitimacy insofar as 
interveners present arguments to counter the legitimacy of the sovereignty of those 
whom they are intervening against (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 14; Hurd, 1999: 
393 – 403; C. Weber, 1995). A relational approach, therefore, can be used to 
demonstrate how contemporary forms of sovereignty emerged by focusing on the 
role of power and legitimacy. 
 
Some studies have used relationalism to explain the emergence of contemporary 
global international society. They challenged the belief that the spread of 
international institutions entailed the continuing outward expansion of such 
institutions, as suggested by Bull and Watson (1984). Robert H. Jackson (1990: 21), 
for instance, stresses that the postcolonial states that became independent through 
de-colonisation were “quasi-states”. Robert H. Jackson (1990: 27) argued that these 
states could not effectively assert authority over their territory and hence were not 
sovereign in the established sense of the term. While the authority of these states was 
recognised internationally, they were unable to effectively control their territorial 
jurisdictions domestically (R.H. Jackson, 1990: 27). Because they did not share a 
form of sovereignty with other states in global international society, Robert H. 
Jackson (1990: 50) argued that these quasi-states were effectively outside that 
society, even though their independence was recognised by other states. Some 
scholars (see Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Neumann and Welsh, 1991) have noted 
how global international society is dependent on the presence of an “outside” or an 
“other” (Neumann, 2011: 465). They have suggested that this “outside” or “other” is 
constitutive as it allows the members of global international society to cohere around 
a shared and exclusive identity (Neumann, 2011: 465). Neumann (2011), 
accordingly, challenges the assumption that global international society will expand 
to cover the whole world by noting that some states may not be fully accepted in 
global international society. Neumann (2011) uses the example of Russia, which for 
centuries has interacted with broader international society. Therefore, the 
assumptions that ideas of sovereignty spread through the expansion of international 
society, and that international society has always expanded, may be challenged by 
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using a relational account to explain the emergence of the current global 
international society.  
 
Examples of the exclusion of actors from the international society have recently 
been studied in the literature on stigmatisation in International Relations (Zarakol, 
2011). This literature builds on studies of identity by focusing on what E. Goffman 
(1963: 19) understands as spoiled “social identity”. Stigma refers to the 
identification and exclusion of those from aspects of life which others are able to 
participate in (E. Goffman, 1963: 19). The excluded are deemed to have spoiled 
identities (E. Goffman, 1963: 19). Processes of stigmatisation, therefore, refer to 
those that enable and maintain stigma, which are carried out by established members 
of society (Adler-Nissen, 2014b; Zarakol, 2011: 95 - 102). These established insiders 
engage in gatekeeping practices, allowing some outsiders to become established 
members of society, while singling out others for exclusion (Zarakol, 2011: 27, 107). 
Applying this approach to the study of the emergence of what she terms the 
contemporary international state system, Zarakol (2011) argued that states that had 
been defeated militarily continued to endure forms of stigmatisation. These states, 
such as Japan, Turkey and Russia, were excluded from the international state system 
(Zarakol, 2011: 8). They were not recognised as possessing sovereignty equal to that 
of other states in the “international system” (Zarakol, 2011: 12). Adler-Nissen’s 
(2011; 2014a) study of sovereignty and the European Union (EU) demonstrates 
another form of stigmatisation. Britain and Denmark experienced stigma in the 
context of the EU because they opted out of several agreements as they sought to 
maintain a greater degree of control over their affairs (Adler-Nissen, 2014a: 174 - 
178). The desire of Britain and Denmark to maintain control over areas of policy, 
such as immigration, was seen to derive from their understanding of sovereignty 
(Adler-Nissen, 2014a: 174 - 178). This resulted in them being stigmatised by other 
EU members (Adler-Nissen, 2014a: 174 - 178). The study of stigmatisation 
contributes to accounts of the development of sovereignty by pointing to how states 
may be stigmatised because of the nature of their sovereignty. 
 
Relational accounts of the development of global international society have 
recently shifted from studying the formation and maintenance of identity through 
processes such as stigmatisation, to focusing on the study of hierarchy (Zarakol, 
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2017). Hierarchy can be used to demonstrate  how the development of global 
international society was not a process that led to the emergence of equal sovereigns 
(Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Lake, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; Zarakol, 2017). Some 
accounts in International Relations theory equated the process of the development of 
global international society with the emergence of sovereign equality (Cohen, 2012: 
201; Donnelly, 2006: 145; Dunne, 2003: 310). However, sovereign equality as 
implied in the recognition of sovereignty, is open to question because of the 
persistence of forms of global hierarchy (Holm and Sending, 2018; Mathieu, 2018a). 
Simpson (2004: 63 - 67), for instance, argues that the development of legal pluralism 
in nineteenth century international law resulted in the emergence of different types 
of sovereignty existing simultaneously in global international society. ‘Civilised’ 
states were understood as having one form of sovereignty, while states that were 
viewed as not being as civilised were understood to possess another form (Aalberts, 
2014; Bowden, [2009] 2014: 127 – 128, 136, 190; Buchan, 2006: 182; Gong, 1984; 
2002: 78 - 79; Koskenniemi, 2001: 83; Reus-Smit, 1999: 47, 142; Welsh, 2017: 
156). In effect, the difference in the forms of sovereignty translated to relations of 
hierarchy amongst sovereigns (Aalberts, 2014). Those states which were considered 
to be civilised were understood as having a form of sovereignty which entailed a 
greater scope of authority (Aalberts, 2014; Benton, 2001: 211; 2008; Buzan, 2014). 
For example, states that were not considered to be as civilised as others were subject 
to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of “civilised” states (Kroll, 2019: 144). States 
deemed to be ‘civilised’ were allowed to try their citizens in their consular courts 
located in states not deemed to be ‘civilised’ (Benton, 2001: 244 - 252; Donnelly, 
1998: 4; Horowitz, 2004; 2019; Kayaoğlu, 2010a; Todd, 2018; Taha, 2019; 
Tzouvala, 2019). Powerful states, which could stigmatise other states because of 
their position in the global hierarchy, were therefore able to determine which states 
were quasi-sovereigns55, quasi-states  and proper sovereigns (Benton, 2008). 
Studying hierarchy in international relations, therefore, points to how hierarchy can 
 
55 Quasi-sovereignty differs from quasi-statehood as it questions the basis of sovereignty rather than 
questioning the extent to which the state, which is potentially sovereign, is functional or not (Benton, 
2008; R.H. Jackson, 1990: 205; Schwarzenberger and Brown, [1947] 1976). Quasi-states can be said 
to possess juridical sovereignty, meaning that their sovereignty conforms to legal norms associated 
with sovereignty, but they lack the capacity to function effectively as states, see R.H. Jackson (1987; 
1992) and Jackson and Rosberg (1986).  
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be understood as the product of the stigmatisation of actors on the basis of the type 
of sovereignty that they exhibit. 
 
The idea of “normalization” can be used to understand the processes by which 
forms of international hierarchy – which may influence the form of sovereignty in 
global international society - are deemed normal or abnormal (Smetana, 2020: 48). 
Accounts of the emergence of global international society that focus on stigma argue 
that the forms of hierarchy that are enabled by stigma are highly durable (Zarakol, 
2014; 2018b). Zarakol (2018b) claims that this includes forms of inequality and 
hierarchy that shape regimes of sovereignty that are present globally. However, the 
emergence of the contemporary global international society can also be said to have 
been a product of the processes of “normalization” (Smetana, 2020: 48). Although 
the remnants of many forms of historical hierarchy continue to be present in 
contemporary international politics56, the history of global international society is 
also full of examples of the “normalization”57 of certain actors, ideas and institutions 
(Smetana and Onderco, 2018: 528). This is demonstrated in Smetana’s (2018) study 
of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Although India was initially stigmatised for 
pursuing a nuclear weapon’s programme, in time the idea of India possessing nuclear 
weapons became normalised to the extent that the effect of stigma was no longer felt 
(Smetana, 2018; Smetana and Onderco, 2018: 526). A similar process of 
normalisation occurred in the history of sovereignty with the literature on rogue 
states demonstrating how certain states and their sovereignty came to be recognised 
as being problematic (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 63). National and popular 
sovereignty, which identified the source of sovereignty in the nation or the people 
respectively, emerged in Europe following the French Revolution (Barkin and 
Cronin, 1994; Heiskanen, 2019; Kolla, 2017). Initially, national and popular 
sovereignty were deemed to be a cause for stigmatisation and intervention by the 
established monarchies of the nineteenth century who formed the Concert of Europe 
 
56 Postcolonial approaches have demonstrated how significant aspects of the current world are the 
product of European colonialism, see Agathangelou and Ling (2009), Barkawi and Laffey (2002) and 
Epstein (2017) .  
57 Smetana (2020: 48) understands “normalization” as a strategy used by the stigmatised, wherein 
they present themselves as “normal” to gain acceptance, but this thesis uses normalisation to refer to 
the successful outcome of challenging forms of stigmatisation. Smetana (2020: 48) also alludes to this 
definition, by pointing to how changes in power relations in society, which sustain stigma (see 
Bauman, 1991: 68, Elias and Scotson, [1965] 1994: xx), can result in the end of stigmatisation 
through the successful normalisation 
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(Holsti, 1991: 139 – 144; C. Weber, 1995: 40 - 60). However, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the spread of ideas of national and popular sovereignty resulted 
in these states coming to accept, and thereby normalise, such forms of sovereignty 
(Holsti, 1991: 139 - 144). Therefore, unlike stigmatisation, normalisation can explain 
how certain ideas, including forms of sovereignty, came to be accepted as normal by 
other actors in global international society, even though they were once shunned by 
these same actors. 
 
5. De-centring Westphalia and “re-centring”58 the state: accounting for the 
emergence of sovereignty 
 
 The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how viewing the emergence of 
contemporary forms of sovereignty through normalisation can answer the question 
of how states that were already in existence came to be recognised as part of 
contemporary global international society. Although the process of the ‘expansion of 
international society’ has been studied previously (see Buzan and Watson, 1984), the 
fact that this was a process that involved non-European forms of states becoming a 
part of global international society has not been considered. The agency of non-
European states has been largely ignored and a narrative of inevitable Western 
domination has been advanced by accounts of the expansion of international society, 
even when these accounts have claimed to have focused on non-Western states. A 
critique of the so-called Eurocentric “Westphalian” model of statehood and 
sovereignty is required to help understand how states were able to exist prior to them 
being recognised as sovereign (Buzan and Little, 2001: 25; see also Inayatullah and 
Blaney, 1995; 2004). The section argues that a similar Eurocentrism is present in the 
accounts of the expansion of international society and the assumptions these 
accounts have about the spread of regimes of sovereignty from a European centre. 
Given that states did exist historically outside of the framework of Westphalia, it is 
necessary to recognise how different states can move from one sovereignty regime to 
another. This move, which is expressed in the phrase “re-centring the state” (see 
Grzybowski, 2018: 201), leads to the main question of this thesis: How did states 
that existed prior to their recognition as equal sovereigns, come to be understood as 
equal sovereign states at the time of the advent of global international society in the 
 
58 See Grzybowski (2018: 201). 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth century? This question is made more pressing by 
the acknowledgement that these states not only existed but were also recognised as 
having supreme authority over their jurisdictions by many internal and external 
actors. These states were considered legitimate by many within their jurisdiction and 
they, therefore, had their own ideas of sovereignty (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 
9). These states, by and large, maintained their sovereignty as a global international 
society emerged, but they came to be more widely recognised as sovereign 
(Kayaoğlu, 2007; 2010a; Phillips, 2016). The section will conclude by arguing that 
the sovereignty of these states can be studied using a global and historical approach, 
which is open to considering how non-European states can also be sovereign.  
 
 A range of different perspectives on the connection between states, 
sovereignty and international society are provided by the members of the English 
School, but there is a lack of agreement among English School theorists on the 
nature of the relationship between these three concepts. According to James (1986: 
39),  states are sovereign because they are “constitutionally independent”, meaning 
that they do not answer to any other authority. Sovereignty, according to James 
(1986: 39), therefore refers to a state having unrestricted freedom of action over its 
own jurisdiction and foreign policy, regardless of whether it is recognised by others 
(James, 1986: 39). However, another understanding of sovereignty, which is 
developed in Bull’s ([1977] 2012: 35) Anarchical Society, stresses that sovereignty 
refers to a set of rules that are vital for the “co-existence” of members of 
international society. James (1993: 272 - 273) argues that Bull’s ([1977] 2012: 41 - 
47) understanding of international society, premised on the presence of shared rules, 
places stringent criteria on membership and effectively excludes many states. In 
addition, in his earlier writings, Bull ([1979] 2000: 149) argues that sovereignty is 
“conferred” by the “international legal order” to states. This view contrasts with that 
of James (1999), who argues that international society emerges as a result of the 
interactions between sovereign states. Yet all of these scholars fail to explain how 
sovereignty, in either sense, emerges in international society with James (1986: 40), 
as Aalberts (2012: 59) demonstrates, not explaining how external sovereignty differs 
from internal sovereignty through defining sovereignty solely as “constitutional 
independence”. Robert H. Jackson (1990: 50) suggests that former European 
colonies were recognised by other European states, but also suggests without 
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evidence that the first European sovereign states emerged without contact with each 
other59. Wight (1977) provides a more convincing account that identifies the 
presence of many different states-systems existing throughout history in different 
times and places, such as in Ancient Greece and Persia (see also Bull and Holbraad, 
[1978] 2002: 14; Buzan and Little, 2000; Cox, Dunne and Booth, 2001). But how do 
states came to be recognised as sovereign in the context of the emergence of global 
international society? Specifically, were states recognised as sovereign because of 
their constitutional independence, or because they were recognised as members of 
global international society on the basis of their adherence to its constitutional rules? 
 
The notion of the expansion of international society, developed on the basis 
of Bull’s ([1977] 2012) argument, suggests that his idea of sovereignty is based on a 
set of rules enabled the coexistence of states to be gradually accepted throughout the 
world (Bull and Watson, 1984). This occurred as more states adopted the institutions 
and practices associated with global international society, and were recognised by 
states who were a part of this society (Bull and Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992). As a 
result, international society became increasingly global as it encapsulated more states 
(Bull and Watson, 1984; Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018; Watson, 1992). James 
(1986; 1993: 285), while accepting that a single global international society has 
emerged today, argues that states need to be constitutionally independent in order to 
be members of it. According to this viewpoint, membership does not need to be 
premised on agreeing to a set of rules of co-existence. Independence is sufficient for 
membership, even though, struggles to define the constitutional rules of international 
society may occur. However, rather than acknowledging the presence of different 
types of states in international society, the English School instead focuses on a 
Eurocentric narrative of the spread and recognition of sovereignty (Bilgin, 2017: 133 
- 13860; Bull and Watson, 1984; R.H. Jackson, 1990). Although James (1986; 1999: 
460) argues that international society emerges through the actions of states, very few 
accounts have focused on the actions of states61 and those that have, have focused on 
 
59 Specifically, R.H. Jackson (1990: 50) argues that “’states’ appeared first in Western Europe. The 
original foundations were the region’s geographical and demographic configuration as ‘population 
islands’ in an ocean of forest and health.” 
60 Suzuki (2005) recognises how international society moved from being more to less Western, but 
contained elements of its European origins. 
61 The role of non-state actors has been emphasised in recent studies of the expansion of international 
society. Englehart (2010) argues that the aristocracy in Thailand adopted European cultural practices 
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the diffusion of European ideas of the state and sovereignty throughout the world 
(Bull and Watson, 1984; Strang, 1990; 1991a; 1991b; 1992; 1996). Instead, they 
have been presented as passive recipients of European institutions, in processes of 
reception (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 4 – 7). This is clear in the arguments of 
those who suggest that the practice of European states maintaining their 
extraterritorial jurisdictions in non-European states allowed these non-European 
states to develop their own institutions in the nineteenth century62 (Benton, 2002: 
244 - 252; Horowitz, 2004). However, it is necessary to study the history of states 
which became a part of global international society in order to consider the nature 
and extent of the role of these states as constitutionally independent entities in the 
emergence of global international society.   
 
Studies of the state in International Relations have recently contributed to 
developing an awareness of how the idea and practices of the state emerge in certain 
specific times and places (see Grzybowski, 2018), but they are problematic as 
explanations of how a global international society emerged. Definitions and histories 
of the state in International Relations have centred on the legacy of the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648, which is also understood as marking the emergence of states as 
sovereign, in the sense of having their own distinct jurisdictions (de Carvalho, Leira 
and Hobson, 2011; Philpott, 1997; 2001). This is because the Peace of Westphalia 
has been assumed to be the moment when sovereignty, meaning the supreme 
authority of a state over its jurisdiction, came to be recognised by a host of 
international actors (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011; Philpott, 1997; 2001). 
The Peace of Westphalia is understood in International Relations and International 
Law as an agreement which ended the Thirty Years’ War by bringing about a peace 
that involved different parties recognising the right of non-intervention in their 
 
and symbols to secure recognition of their state in global international society. Cantir (2016; 2017) 
points similarly at the role of non-state actors, such as anti-slavery activists, in enabling the expansion 
of international society to Haiti. Pella Jr. (2013: 70; 2014; 2015) argues that the expansion of 
international society to Africa was made possible by non-state actors ranging from those engaged in 
the slave trade and other actors engaged in trade. Schouenborg (2017: 11 – 12, 113) also points to the 
significance of commerce in resulting in the emergence of a global international society. 
62 Even accounts focusing on non-European developments in global international society focus 
exclusively on the agency of the West (Benton, 2001: 244 - 252; Clark, 2005; Keene, 2002; Strang, 
1990; 1991a; 1992b; 1992; 1996; see also the critical overview of such works in Hobson, 2007; 2011; 
2012; Hobson and Sajed, 2017). More generally, the chapters in Ejdus (2017) argue that memories of 
past subjection shape how sovereign states develop in their subsequent membership in international 
societies. 
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affairs (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011). More specifically, it is understood as 
ending the war between the “universalists”, in the form of the Catholic Spanish 
Empire and Holy Roman Empire, and the “particularists”, in the form of the 
Protestant states and the Protestant estates within the Holy Roman Empire (Osiander, 
2001: 252). However, the significance of the Peace of Westphalia has been 
challenged by Osiander (2001) and others who point to the nineteenth century as the 
true date for the recognition of the importance of sovereignty (Anghie, 1999; 
Benton, 2009; Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 116; Hinsley, 1973: 69 – 83; Sheehan, 
2006: 6; Thomson, 1995: 215;). Far from signalling an end to the challenge posed to 
the sovereignty of smaller entities within Europe, according to Osiander (2001), the 
Peace of Westphalia is better construed as shifting the balance in favour of smaller 
units, such as the Protestant principalities, within the Holy Roman Empire. However, 
the Peace of Westphalia, and similar “benchmark dates”63 (see Buzan and Lawson, 
2014: 437) have continued to influence theories of International Relations with 
regard to the emergence of sovereignty (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011).  
 
There is also an assumption that Westphalian sovereignty was constituted in 
Europe and then diffused to the rest of the globe. This original Eurocentric narrative 
of expansion has recently been challenged by scholars (Buzan and Schouenborg, 
2018; Ejdus, 2017; Pella Jr., 2014; 2015). These scholars echo many of the earlier 
arguments of the English School, which pointed to the presence of multiple 
international systems throughout history (Wight, 1977). More recently, the role of 
regional international societies has been promoted by theorists of the English School 
(Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009; Schouenborg, 2013. Buzan and Schouenborg’s 
(2018) account of the development of global international society focuses on the 
interactions between different regions. Regional international societies advance 
different understandings of what they deem to be normal “institutions” 
(Schouenborg, 2012: 40; 2013: 132). These understandings of “normal” institutions 
provided templates for forms of sovereignty that states within global international 
society could follow (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 19). A state may therefore be 
 
63 Wight (1977: 129), in fact, argues that the Council of Constance of 1414 - 1418 marked the onset 
of the international system. This was because at the Council, the Byzantine Emperor and the Papacy 
recognised the presence of different states as legitimate actors, instead of referring to a united 
Christendom. 
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considered sovereign by members of one international society, but not by members 
of another international society (Batora, 2017: 139). However, Hobson (2009: 682) 
argues that the “geopolitical/military, ideological/discursive and political” basis of 
sovereignty partially originated in Asia. Hobson (2009: 680 - 682) contends that 
forms of connectedness emerged between Europe and Asia immediately prior to the 
onset of sovereignty, as an idea and a practice in the seventeenth century and became 
institutionalised in the nineteenth century. 64 In addition to the similarities that 
existed in how sovereignty was understood in Asia and Europe in the seventeenth 
century, powerful states with their own understandings of sovereignty were 
historically present, which challenges the privileging of “Westphalian” sovereignty 
(Kayaoğlu, 2007: 649). Powerful non-European states, such as China, Japan, Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire, which often participated in sovereignty regimes shared by 
other non-European states, were present, and remained significant in the first half of, 
the nineteenth century (Bull, 1984: 12365; Neumann, 2014: 30; Suzuki, Zhang and 
Quirk, 2014: 8). It is hence necessary to consider the role of these non-European 
states with their own understandings of sovereignty, which were also often members 
of regional international societies, in the emergence of global international society. 
   
Although many approaches have focused on explaining how the concept of 
the state emerged as a result of global developments, studies focusing on the role of 
states present throughout the world, in the emergence of global international society 
are still needed. Different sovereignty regimes, meaning rules concerning which 
states can be considered sovereign and how sovereignty can be achieved (see 
Agnew, 2005: 438 and Kuus and Agnew, 2008), were present historically at the 
global and regional level. Schouenborg’s (2012: 130) regional and historical 
approach towards studying the development of global international society points to 
how different forms of sovereignty are present at the regional level, which challenge 
the assumption of “Westphalian” sovereignty being universal66. The presence of 
 
64 Hobson (2009: 682 - 686) here argues that once these connections were in place, interactions 
unfolded which resulted in the diffusion of new ways of conceptualising and controlling territory, 
such as the use of mapping techniques and gunpowder, which made it possible to think of the concept 
of sovereignty as exclusive control over territory. 
65 Bull (1984: 123) and Little (2014: 162) suggested that states existed prior to the expansion of 
European power, even though they had not been viewed as such by nineteenth century Europeans. 
66 On regional international societies see also Costa-Buranelli (2015), Linsenmaier (2015) and 
Stivachtis (2015). 
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different sovereignty regimes means that “Westphalian” sovereignty cannot be taken 
for granted as a characteristic present in all states (Kayaoğlu, 2007: 649). For 
instance, Grovogui (2002: 316 - 318) argues that European international thinkers 
believed that the various African polities in the Congo at the time of their 
colonisation were illegitimate. However, because of the limited degree of effective 
control in Belgium at the time of its colonisation of the Congo, Grovogui (2002: 316 
- 318) claims that Belgium would also fail to satisfy then-widespread criteria for 
sovereign statehood. But accounts that aim to demonstrate how factors aside from 
the state played a role in the development of characteristics of contemporary global 
international society continue to rely on the concept of the state, as in their use of the 
concept of “non-state” actors (Corry, 2010: 158). Hence, Grzybowski (2018: 201) 
argues that such approaches “re-centre the state”, as a part of their ultimate aim to 
“de-centre” dominant understandings of the state. Similarly, Lottholz and Lemay-
Hébert (2016) argue that a post-Weberian perspective is needed, which would 
involve recognising how states develop in contexts in which there are a wide-range 
of different ideas about legitimacy67. Additionally, the act of recognising another 
state as sovereign, which historically played a role in the emergence of global 
international society, has always been carried out by the representatives other states 
(Koskenniemi, 1991; Lorca, 2014). This means that these other states’ ideas of 
legitimacy are also significant in the development of sovereign statehood (Lottholz 
and Lemay-Hebert, 2016). It is therefore necessary to focus on the state to explain 
how sovereignty in global international society developed, owing to how sovereignty 
highlights particular forms of state authority and can be conferred by existing to 
prospective sovereigns.   
 
 
67 Hobson (1998: 295) earlier advocated a similar “Weberian” approach to demonstrate “the complex 
interrelationship between states, societies and international systems”. However, Hobson (1998: 295) 
here sees legitimacy as a causal factor in the emergence of international society (see Hobson, 1998: 
287 and his discussion of J.A. Hall, 1986; Mann, 1986; 1993; Runciman, 1989). Similarly to Ruggie 
(1983: 275 - 276), Hobson (1998: 294) argues that the focus on sovereignty by neo-realists, such as 
Waltz (1979: 40 – 60), has prevented the causal role of the “international system” and “societies” 
from being understood. This means that Hobson (1998; 2000; 2002: 66) does not understand the 
process of the emergence of a state to be subject to what March and Olsen (1998: 949) term the “logic 
of appropriateness”. March and Olsen (1998: 949) distinguish the “logic of appropriateness” from the 
“logic of consequences” and stress that the latter logic is present in causal explanations. A perspective 
that acknowledges the importance of March and Olsen’s (1998) insights and shares the goal of 
explaining the interactions between states, other actors and international society is provided by Mabee 
(2007). 
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Assuming the presence of state-like entities throughout the globe also aligns 
with recent studies of the history of global international society, which focus on the 
encounters between different forms of states associated with different places and 
different times (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014). Firstly, studies have focused on 
how states from different geographies interacted with each other, such as the initial 
interaction of non-European states with a powerful European international society 
(Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014). In these cases, as has been discussed, these states 
were unable to secure the full recognition of their sovereignty, which leads to the 
question of how these states which were sovereign were able to gain recognition of 
their equal sovereign rights in global international society (Kayaoğlu, 2007; 2010a). 
A clue as to how this may have been possible is present in how different forms of 
state and their respective forms of sovereignty may be associated with certain time 
periods (Lundborg, 2016). For instance, following the American and French 
revolutions, dynastic sovereignty, in which sovereignty was held by a monarch, 
came to be perceived as being of another time (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; 
Bukovansky, 2002; Kolla, 2017).  Although democratic or republican states were 
once stigmatised for not satisfying accepted definitions of sovereignty, they 
gradually came to be recognised as equal sovereigns by the established states of 
global international society (Holsti, 1991: 139 – 144; Simpson, 2004: 254 – 255; C. 
Weber, 1995). This chimes with the argument that the constitutional rules of 
international society underwent change through processes of wars and religious 
change (Phillips, 2010). States played a crucial role in this process because once a 
group advancing a new understanding of sovereignty took control of a state, they 
were able to use their position to enter into relations of solidarity with other groups 
seeking to take control of or consolidate their control of states  (Bukovansky, 1999; 
2002; Halliday, 1990; 1999; Mabee, 2007)68. It is therefore possible to ask whether 
and how the established states in global international society came to recognise the 
rights of states with different understandings of sovereignty. In other words, how did 
states that were stigmatised by the dominant states in global international society 
later become accepted as normal states within it? 
 
 
68 On the role of religious solidarity in facilitating the recognition of sovereignty in Europe see de 
Carvalho and Paras (2015).  
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6. Conclusion:  
 
 This chapter has demonstrated how our understanding of sovereignty can be 
furthered by asking the question how states that were sovereign in the sense of being 
independent later came to be considered equal sovereign states in the emergent 
global international society. It reviewed existing accounts of the development of the 
contemporary international society and noted how these accounts overlooked how 
states that exhibited a different form of sovereignty to the sovereignty recognised at 
Westphalia came to be a part of the global international society. The first section 
defended the idea of sovereignty as supreme authority over a given jurisdiction (see 
Kayaoğlu, 2007: 649 – 650; Thomson, 1994: ch. 1; 1995: 214; Zarakol, 2018a). It 
explained how such a definition of sovereignty was not Eurocentric because 
adopting a historical view of the development of sovereignty within global 
international society enables one to demonstrate the global relevance of the concept 
of sovereignty. Throughout history, both European and non-European states sought 
to assert their authority over jurisdictions (Alexandrowicz, 1959). The second 
section examined different applications of the concept of sovereignty within existing 
accounts of the emergence of global international society. It considered how 
sovereignty can be identified within these accounts and argued that sovereignty 
needs to be understood as both power and legitimacy. The third section argued that a 
relational account of the emergence of contemporary global international society 
could help trace how this society emerged. This section critiqued existing 
approaches for focusing exclusively on the emergence of hierarchy in global 
international society. It argued that a relational approach would necessitate also 
studying challenges to hierarchy and stigmatisation and thus pointed to the 
usefulness of the concept of “normalization” (Smetana, 2020: 42). The fourth section 
focused on how certain states, though not initially recognised as sovereign by the 
dominant states in global international society, had nevertheless for centuries had 
their own conceptions of sovereignty. Studying how these states became a part of 
global international society requires developing and applying a method of global 
history (Phillips, 2016). Such a global historical approach, which is developed in the 
next chapter, can demonstrate how these states came to be understood as sovereign 
in the same sense as the established states of global international society.  
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2. Global and local constituent power: The recognition of sovereign equality in 




 This chapter outlines how the research question of the thesis will be 
addressed. It presents the theoretical framework and justifies the application of this 
framework to the Ottoman/Turkish case. The first section demonstrates how an 
intellectual history approach reveals how the constitutional principles of global 
international society came to be understood. This section shows how this approach 
may be used to outline a theory of global constitutional change and explain concepts 
that are historically and theoretically associated with global constitutional principles, 
such as sovereignty and sovereign equality (Aalberts, 2014; Donnelly, 2006; 
Mathieu, 2018a). The second section presents the theoretical framework used to 
advance the argument that constituent power best explains the emergence of the 
constitutional principles of global international society. The third section reviews 
existing accounts of the emergence of the constitutional principles of global 
international society, such as those concentrating on the diffusion of ideas of 
sovereignty (see Boli, 2001) and the argument that sovereignty developed through an 
expression of state power (see Chowdhury and Duvall, 2014). These accounts have 
their merits, but it is argued that a focus on constituent power provides a clearer 
understanding of how these global constitutional principles emerge. A case is made 
for the use of the concept of “constituent diplomacy”, as pioneered by Cornago 
(2017: 327), to explain how actors engage in diplomacy to alter the constitutional 
principles of global international society. Here, constituent diplomacy is related to 
normative (see Kavakski, 2013: 250) and social power (see Mann, 1986: 1), and to 
the concepts of stigmatisation and “normalization” (Smetana, 2020: 42). The fourth 
section introduces the Ottoman/Turkish case. The Young Turks and their successors 
played a key role as the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Republic of Turkey 
emerged (Zürcher, 2010). An argument is made for the study of this case given the 
significance of the Ottoman Empire’s position on the cusp of European international 
society (Rae, 2017). This European international society, during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, became indistinguishable from global international 
society. Individual Young Turks formulated their ideas concerning the constitutional 
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rules of global international society, and, by engaging in constituent diplomacy, 
sought to gain external recognition of their sovereignty within it. 
 
2. Global history, intellectual history, International Relations and sovereignty 
 
This section introduces the specific approach of this thesis, combining global 
history and the history of ideas, and demonstrates how it can be used to understand 
sovereignty in International Relations, by showing how the concept has been 
understood and used historically, alongside its logical meaning. It firstly defends the 
use of intellectual history to advance theorising in International Relations. Here, the 
realist and non-ideal turn in political theory needs to be noted as providing a means 
of understanding how concepts can be studied in a historical and social context and 
philosophically (Bell, 2017; Galston, 2010). Koselleck’s (2002) conceptual history 
approach is then reviewed. How Koselleck’s (2002) approach may be integrated 
with other approaches to intellectual history is considered. In this context, the value 
of Koselleck’s (2002) concept of Sattelzeit for dating concepts in International 
Relations and for understanding how changes result in the production of new 
concepts is examined. Skinner’s (1969) contextualist approach to intellectual history 
is then discussed. This approach provides a crucial means to retrieve meanings from 
their specific contexts. It is invaluable for any study that seeks to explain how 
meanings have changed over time. However, Skinner’s (1969) approach is criticised 
for not being sufficiently global. He does not consider how ideas may move from 
one context to another. Lovejoy’s (1940: 4) “history of ideas”, which focuses on 
ideas as the unit of analysis, can be combined with Skinner’s (1969) approach to 
help understand how meanings may travel from one context to another 
(Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10). This section also considers how concepts tend to be 
closely related to each other. It explains how an approach to the study of the 
emergence of sovereignty throughout the world should focus on how concepts are 
tied to other concepts in terms of their actual and historical meanings. The section 
reviews different approaches to the history of ideas and presents what can be termed 




Prior to considering whether and how International Relations and intellectual 
history can be combined, it is necessary to understand the nature of the relationship 
between ideas and history. Various approaches contend that the study of philosophy 
can be reduced to the study of history, in the form of the study of ideas (Ball, 1988; 
Rorty, 1984; Skinner, 1969; 2002; White, [1973] 2014). However, other approaches 
have claimed that ideas actually shape the study of history (Bartelson, 2007: 103 – 
112; Danto, 1953; Gorman, 2007; Schaff, 1976). Here, it is argued that even 
accounts which claim to be purely historical are actually proponents of various 
theoretical perspectives that are, in some cases, tied to the political convictions of 
historians (Kurki and Suganami, 2012; Suganami, 2017). This is because they are 
formulated with a number of theoretical beliefs in mind, which shapes how the 
original question of the research is formulated and determines what sources and facts 
are deemed to be significant (Danto, 1953; Kurki and Suganami, 2012; Suganami, 
2013: 62; 2017). The argument stressing the primacy of theory over history is open 
to criticism by those who contend that all forms of theorising and philosophy are, in 
the last analysis, reducible to historical statements (Bartelson, 2007: 116). This 
argument, most clearly presented in the approach of Michel Foucault ([1969] 2002; 
see also the discussion in Bartelson, 2007: 116), claims that all ideas can only be 
expressed in language. Therefore, studying ideas merely involves studying what has 
been said about them. A summary of these different perspectives is provided by 
Mandelbaum (1965: 33), who outlines how the “history of philosophy”, “intellectual 
history” and the “history of ideas” are traditionally considered to be separate from 
each other. However, Mandelbaum (1965: 60 - 66) argues that this distinction is 
untenable if one challenges the separation between philosophy and other forms of 
thinking and reflection, given how forms of reflection in religion and science, for 
instance, may overlap with the concerns of philosophy. Moreover, the distinction 
between intellectual history and the history of ideas is also untenable once the 
movement of ideas from different contexts is acknowledged (Mandelbaum, 1965: 43 
- 66). Recognising the mobility of ideas in time and space enables the history of 
ideas to be used to provide a more rigorous intellectual history (Herbjornsrud, 2019). 
Yet concepts can also be said to have a logical existence outside of how they have 
historically been understood and used (Bartelson, 2007; Frazer, 2019; Green, 2015).  
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Therefore, sets of ideas can be understood to be coherent in two senses. 
Firstly, they may cohere historically. There is a history of them being used together 
(Geuss, 2001: 51 - 52). Secondly, they can be said to cohere logically, meaning that 
they are tied to each other in a logical argument (Bartelson, 2007: 115). Although 
scholars have tended to prefer one form of explanation over the other, this does not 
need to be the case (Bartelson, 2007; Frazer, 2019; Green, 2015; Nardin, 2015: 91). 
However, given how the ideas that are available at any given time are limited, 
studies of the history of concepts must concentrate on the ideas that are available in 
the present (Bartelson, 2007: 105). The realist turn in political theory has 
acknowledged this (Galston, 2010). Contextual historians have also problematised 
how ideas are situated within specific historical and geographical contexts (Skinner, 
2002). This means that it does not make sense to construct ideal theories, which are 
not informed by the actual history of concepts (Geuss, 2008: 38). Instead, realist 
political theorists argue for focusing on how concepts are actually used (Erman and 
Möller, 2018; Geuss, 2008: 38, 48 - 49; Valentini, 2012). Secondly, they call for a 
normative approach with regard to developing concepts that reflect reality (Bell, 
2017; Prinz and Rossi, 2018). This amounts to critiquing historical uses of concepts, 
which may be overly idealistic, in favour of developing a more realistic 
understanding of a concept (Bell, 2017; Geuss, 2008; Hall and Sleat, 2018; Rossi 
and Sleat, 2014). Realist69 political theory, therefore, engages in intellectual history 
insofar as realists consider previous philosophical arguments to be historical 
artefacts that ought to be examined and critiqued if they do not take reality as their 
starting point (Bell, 2017; Galston, 2010). However, the form of history advocated 
by realist political theory does not necessarily result in a critique of past ideas, since 
the retrieval of ideas from the past may improve our understanding of the present 
(Rorty, 1984: 49 - 50). Therefore, seeking to reconstruct the contexts in which a 
concept that is available in the present was used in the past, can help uncover 
forgotten meanings of the original concept and allow us to develop more accurate 
concepts and theories to make sense of these contexts. 
 
 
69 Sleat (2016: 34) argues that “realism” ought to be distinguished from “non-ideal” theory, since the 
former refers to a view that conflict is ubiquitous in society, whereas the latter opposes thinking in 
terms of ideal categories that are distinct from the lived experience of ideas. This distinction is not, 
however, adopted here. Both of these approaches, outlined by Sleat (2016), involve appreciating the 
value of studying the reality that concepts are embedded in.  
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The relationship between philosophy and history can be said to be mirrored 
by the relationship between political theory, an offshoot of philosophy, and 
International Relations, a field which was, at least partly, shaped by history. 
Specifically, the realist turn in political theory, which involves a focus on intellectual 
history, and the global and historical turn within International Relations, complement 
each other. This is because these perspectives can contribute to challenging the 
assumptions that are commonly-held in International Relations theory, including the 
view that sovereignty can only be understood within the European context of its 
origin (Bull and Watson, 1984). International thought throughout its history has been 
influenced by the broader political context in which it was developed (Armitage, 
2014). Armitage (2014), and Acharya and Buzan (2010: 2), who focus on the context 
of the development of International Relations theories, echo Cox’s (1986: 207) view 
that in International Relations, as elsewhere, “theory is always for someone and 
some purpose”. This chimes with the idea that International Relations emerged as a 
science of Western colonial administration, as many of its concepts were developed 
as a means to aid the colonisers  (Blaney and Tickner, 2017).  A similar view is held 
by Guzzini (2013: 523 - 530), who claims that the theoretical concepts applied in 
International Relations have emerged from its practice. As International Relations is 
concerned with the actual practice of international relations, its relationship to theory 
bears a similarity to the realist approach to political theory. Geuss’s (2008) definition 
of the role of realism in political theory involves building arguments in political 
theory on the basis of facts concerning politics rather than on an ideal vision of 
human relations. However, realism can also be used to study how normative 
proposals in International Relations are produced, according to Carr (1939; see also 
the discussion in Bell, 2017: 8). Bartelson (2018: 1 – 3, 29), building on the 
constructivism of Hacking (2004: 1), has argued similarly for studying the 
“historical ontology” of concepts. This approach, similar to Reus-Smit’s (2008: 410) 
call to study “ideas in history”70, involves studying how concepts historically 
emerged in philosophical theories and shaped reality by influencing practice. The 
 
70 Reus-Smit (2008: 410) here argues that constructivist accounts, such as Finnemore’s (2003) 
account of the justifications provided for interventions and Rae’s (2002) account of the justifications 
provided for genocide in the course of state-building, involve studying how ideas are used to bring 
about certain changes in the world. Unlike Bartelson (2007) though, Reus-Smit (2002; 2008) does not 
suggest that ideas may have a coherence that stems from their logical connectedness, alongside how 
they happen to be used to bring about certain effects in the world.  
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work of Shilliam (2010) and Ayoob (1995; 2002), in this context, has stressed the 
need to study theorising beyond the original context of the emergence of 
International Relations in the West (Acharya and Buzan, 2010). Therefore, both 
International Relations and intellectual history may be combined to question the 
origins and usefulness of concepts used within International Relations. 
 
Having demonstrated how International Relations and political theory can be 
combined, it is possible to review the different forms of intellectual history which 
aim to bridge philosophy and history. Here, the approaches adopted by Skinner 
(2002) and Koselleck (2002) can be combined with International Relations to 
provide an analysis of concepts in International Relations, including the concept of 
sovereignty71. Both Skinner (2002) and Koselleck (2002) engage in a history of 
philosophy with a broader aim of contributing to the understanding of philosophy 
more generally. Skinner (2002: 4, 82) argues, on the basis of Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 
1958: 146) consideration of how language is used in speech and writing, that it is 
impossible to conceive of the meaning of a term without relating it to its context and 
the individuals situated within it. Terms that are used in political and philosophical 
texts, such as sovereignty, therefore make sense in isolation or in relation to other 
concepts, insofar as they are used by their authors to convey particular meanings and 
bring about certain effects (Skinner, 2002: 82). Although this approach may not 
unjustifiably seem to deny theory any autonomy from its context, Skinner (2002: 4) 
argues that his ultimate goal is to clarify the terms which are used in theories. 
Koselleck (1982), on the other hand, developed a project that was much more 
explicitly philosophical, insofar as he was motivated by the desire to provide a 
definition of various philosophical terms that were used in politics (Richter, 1986). 
In contrast to Skinner’s (2002) focus on particular contexts, Koselleck’s (1982; 
2002) work involves identifying turning points in the history of ideas72. This 
approach involves an intervention on the part of the intellectual historian to 
arbitrarily divide periods in the development of ideas, with Koselleck (2002) himself 
 
71 Onuf (1991: 434 - 440) presents such a history of sovereignty, where he focuses on its early 
development in the sixteenth century. Onuf (1991: 434) here studies the emergence of the idea of 
sovereignty, by considering the writings of thinkers such as Bodin ([1576] 1992), and also focuses on 
how the historical trends of the collapse of theology, the emergence of republican ideas and their 
promotion by Protestant movements.  
72 A similar notion is conveyed by R. Williams’s ([1980] 2012: 120) who urges the study of “new 
meanings and values, new practices, new significances and experiences”.  
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arguing that the period from the eighteenth to nineteenth century in Europe was 
seminal in the development of contemporary political theories (Motzkin, 2005). As 
these approaches employed by Skinner (1969; 2002) and Koselleck (1982; 2002) are 
intended to provide new tools for theorising, they may be combined to provide 
accounts of concepts that are used in International Relations, such as sovereignty. 
 
 Although Skinner (1969; 2002) and Koselleck (1982; 2002) provide useful 
approaches to trace the history of concepts in International Relations, they need to be 
supplemented by Lovejoy’s (1940: 4) work to account for the “travel” of ideas 
(Herbjornsrud, 2019: 13). Both Skinner (1969; 2002) and Koselleck (1982; 2002) 
have approaches that are ideal for answering the question of this thesis concerning 
how contemporary global international society emerged because of how they 
proceed from our present-day understanding of concepts. Skinner’s (1969; 2002) 
works, for instance, involve tracing the original interlocutors of texts that are now 
understood to be canonical works of political theory, to advance new interpretations 
of these texts and their contexts. Koselleck’s (2002: 154 - 160) work involves a 
study of the trajectory of contemporary ideas that examines how these ideas came to 
be formed. However, both works can be said to be distinctly narrow in their focus, 
overlooking the insights of the earlier approach of Lovejoy (1940) to the history of 
ideas (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10). Lovejoy (1940) argued, in contrast to Skinner (2002) 
and Koselleck (2002), for an approach to intellectual history that would recognise 
how ideas have, throughout history, moved from one context to another 
(Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10). In contrast, Skinner (2002) only observes how ideas 
develop in singular contexts, whereas Koselleck (2002: 154 - 160) focuses on how 
ideas converge in the narrow context of the Europe of his day. Such a privileging of 
one context overlooks how these different contexts have been connected, as in the 
case of the emergence of global international society. Lovejoy’s (1940) approach can 
be combined with that of Skinner (1969; 2002), by highlighting how connections 
facilitated the transfer of ideas from context to context and that of Koselleck (1982; 
2002), by demonstrating how the movement of ideas can result in the emergence of 
new periods in the history of ideas.  By recognising how ideas are developed in 
individual contexts and then interact with each other through the establishment of 
connections between them such an approach can point to how ideas of sovereignty 
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and, related concepts, such as sovereign equality spread and develop in the context 
of the emergence global international society. 
 
 Focusing on Lovejoy’s (1940) approach also means that it is possible to 
combine philosophical and historical studies of ideas, given how it focuses on ideas 
and how they have historically moved from context to context. The contribution of 
his approach is to demonstrate how ideas can move into contexts and interact with 
other ideas already present in these contexts (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10; Lovejoy, 
1940). Moreover, ideas that are present in different contexts may have a shared 
origin, which can be revealed by tracing how the same ideas travelled from one 
context to another. Connections and comparisons can also be made between the 
contexts in which such ideas of sovereignty emerge and travel, thereby facilitating a 
dialogue between intellectual history and comparative politics (Simon, 2019). In the 
case of ideas of sovereignty, for instance, these may have travelled to different parts 
of the world from a single source (Hobson, 2009). As Herbjornsrud (2019) has 
noted, a connected history approach can reveal how the connections that once 
existed between different contexts can allow ideas to move from one context to 
another. By focusing on how the content of ideas was received and interpreted in 
different contexts, philosophical arguments concerning the true nature of such 
concepts can also be developed (Rorty, 1984). Moreover, attending to how various 
ideas are received in different contexts can also point to the similarities between 
ideas in these contexts (Herbjornsrud, 2019). In the context of state sovereignty, for 
instance, European states and Islamic73 states in Asia were influenced by ideas of 
sovereign statehood developed in antiquity (Crone, [2004] 2014: loc. 1201; 
Lambton, 1981; Vatikiotis, [1987] 2018). Identifying the connections between 
different contexts and how ideas of sovereignty travelled from one context to another 
can also point to how sovereignty came to be associated with other concepts, such as 
those of ‘civilisation’ and ‘nationhood’ in the nineteenth century. Similarly, it can 
demonstrate how ideas, such as sovereignty, came to be disassociated from other 
ideas in the nineteenth century, such as dynasticism (Barkin and Cronin, 1994). The 
way in which different ideas that came to be attached or detached from sovereignty 
 
73 See especially Lambton’s (1981: 72) discussion of how the late ninth and early tenth century 
Arabic thinker, al-Farabi, drew upon Plato and Aristotle to engage with political and social questions.  
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would also influence how actors would seek to justify their claims to sovereignty. It 
is therefore essential to adopt this approach to the history of ideas to understand how 
individuals historically understood sovereignty and sought to advance claims to 
sovereign equality in global international society.  
 
3. Constituent power, diplomacy and the normalisation of sovereignty in 
international society 
 
This section presents the conceptual framework used in this thesis, which argues 
that the concept of constituent power can be used to theorise how states that were 
sovereign, but not recognised as equals by the established states in global 
international society, came to secure recognition as equal sovereigns equals. It 
begins by outlining how this thesis argues that theory ought to be understood as a 
means of developing a clearer sense of reality and how a global intellectual history 
can aid in this process of theory-building. Next, turning to the development of global 
constitutional society, it argues that the idea of constituent power can explain the 
local and global processes that resulted in the emergence of a global international 
society in the nineteenth century. The concept of constituent power is then subjected 
to further analysis, on the basis of how it has been understood in constitutional and 
political theory. How instances of constituent power can take the form of different 
degrees of social power and normative power are then outlined. Social power refers 
to the ability of actors to enact their will over society (Mann, 1986: 1). Normative 
power refers to the persuasive force of the arguments of these actors, or to the 
legitimacy of the arguments themselves, which derives from their reference to 
ethical principles (Kavalski, 2013). The idea of “constituent diplomacy”, referring to 
how actors may wield constituent power at the global level, to achieve their 
diplomatic objects is then introduced and discussed (Cornago, 2017: 327). The 
connection between local and global forms of constituent power and how they may 
both be harnessed by constituent diplomacy is then discussed. Next, how this 
theoretical framework can be placed in dialogue with the ideas of normalisation and 
stigmatisation, presented and developed in Chapter 1, is discussed. Constituent 
diplomacy can, it is argued, by understood as a means by which stigmatisation can 
be challenged and normalisation advanced. Finally, the section concludes by noting 
how this normalisation can take the form of the normalisation of states in accordance 
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with global constitutional principles or it can involve the normalisation of new 
global constitutional principles, including new ideas of sovereignty and sovereign 
equality.  
 
In order for a theory to be compelling, it must provide a clear means of 
understanding phenomena in the external world, thereby enabling one to visualise 
the developments it seeks to represent (see Waever, 2009). As was argued in Chapter 
1, rather than assume that there are timeless concepts that can help understand 
phenomena, it makes sense to consider whether these concepts accurately convey the 
nature of reality. This can be done by studying whether and how the phenomena that 
these concepts seek to explain are instantiated in reality, thereby helping build an 
“analytical narrative”74 (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 157). This, in turn, can involve the use 
of global history, as many scholars working with the concept of international society 
have recognised (Phillips, 2016). Global history can draw upon global intellectual 
history, to describe the ideas that were available to actors in different historical 
contexts75. As noted in the first section of this chapter, when combined with a study 
of history, a study of concepts can demonstrate whether and how these concepts 
were realised by actors in international society (Lawson, 2010: 213 - 222). Such an 
approach can demonstrate how and to what extent the ideas contained in the 
constitutional principles of global international society came to be advanced by 
actors who adopted these ideas (Berenskötter, 2018: 817; Lawson, 2010: 219 – 222). 
Additional concepts, aside from the concepts present in a historical context, can act 
as ideal types to develop a theory of how the ideas that are revealed in intellectual 
history impact on the external world (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 157; Lawson, 2010: 219 - 
222)76. As Max Weber ([1921] 1978: 6) suggests, ideal types can assist in the 
 
74 Patrick T. Jackson (2010: 157) argues that such an approach, which he characterises as 
“analyticist”, involves providing an “analytical narrative” of processes occurring in the world, which 
draws upon different concepts to provide an explanation. These concepts are “ideal types”, in the 
sense used by Max Weber ([1921] 1978: 9) that are not entirely instantiated in reality; they are 
“deliberate oversimplifications” of reality (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 157).  
75 Many scholars, including Bell (2001; 2003; 2009), Armitage (2014) and Keene (2017) have argued 
for an intellectual history of the discipline of International Relations, rather than its objects of study 
(but see Bartelson, 2007 and Reus-Smit, 2008).  
76 Jackson (2010: 221) argues that single case studies can demonstrate the usefulness of ideal types in 
providing a picture of reality. Lawson (2010: 220), however, argues convincingly that ideal-
gyrification, of the sort presented by P.T. Jackson (2010) can form part of a process he terms 
“nomothetic history”, whereby studying historical cases of a phenomenon  can aid the process of the 
development of ideal types meant to convey a general sense of the phenomenon in question.  
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development of theories through the study of history because any deviation from an 
ideal type can contribute to developing more detailed and nuanced theories. Max 
Weber ([1921] 1978: 21) argues that “the more abstract and unrealistic” an “ideal 
type” is, “the better it is able to perform its functions in formulating terminology, 
classifications, and hypotheses”, before adding that “the procedure of the historian is 
essentially the same”. Ideal types can therefore be used to consider historical events, 
thereby demonstrating the weaknesses of existing ideal types. Such an approach can 
provide a means of understanding how ideas of sovereignty and sovereign equality, 
and those used in their justification, enabled these states to secure their desired status 
of sovereign equality in global international society.  
 
 The idea of constituent power can explain the local and global processes that 
resulted in the emergence of the constitutional principles of global international 
society, including sovereignty and sovereign equality. Constituent power was first 
used by Emmanuel de Sieyes ([1789] 2003) in his revolutionary tract, What Is The 
Third Estate?, written during the French Revolution (Rubinelli, 2018; 2019). The 
Third Estate, which included members of society who were not a part of the clergy 
or the aristocracy, were understood as those who actually constituted society and 
were thus able to legislate for all of society (Thornhill, 2014: 359 - 365). Although 
constituent power, therefore, refers to the force that creates a constitutional order in a 
given political community (see Arato, 2017; Del Lucchese, 2017: 4 - 5), it can also 
be understood as being present at a global level (see Müller, 2014: 88 - 89). It can 
explain how the constitutional principles of an international society undergo 
change77, in a way similar to how the constituent power can be employed to explain 
how domestic constitutions can undergo change (Oates, 2017; Patberg, 2013; 
Somek, 2012). Hardt and Negri (2001: 410 - 413) developed such an account of how 
a global constituent power could emerge by noting how different social movements 
throughout the globe could cooperate to challenge what they refer to as “Empire” 
 
77 Reus-Smit (2008: 401) Philpott (2001: 28) and Phillips (2010: 23) use the concept of a constitution 
to explain the norms that exist internationally. Phillips (2010: 46) additionally uses the term 
“constituent phases” to explain the phases that different international constitutional orders tend to 
undergo in the form of “decay, crisis, collapse and reconstruction”. However, neither Reus-Smit 
(2008) nor Phillips (2010) use the term ‘constituent power’ or explain how such constitutional orders 
emerge. Reus-Smit (1997; 1999; 2008), argues that constitutional principles emerge through 
communication. Philpott (2001) and Phillips (2010) point to the causal force of wars and religion, but 
do not consider how other forms of normative and social power may bring about changes to local and 
global constitutional principles. 
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(quoted from Hardt and Negri, 2001: xii). “Empire”, here, is taken to mean forms of 
global domination and exploitation that have emerged and replaced traditional forms 
of domination associated with sovereign states (Hardt and Negri, 2001: xii). 
However, as Barkawi and Laffey (2002) highlight, Hardt and Negri’s (2001) 
approach overlooks the various historical forms of states present throughout the 
world78. In the context of the actual historical development of European and later 
global international society, sovereignty was understood as the constitutional 
principle that had a bearing on which actors were considered its members (Philpott, 
2001: 28; Reus-Smit, 2008). Following a series of  revolutions, which, included the 
late eighteenth century French and American (see Partlett, 2017) revolutions79, the 
idea of sovereignty in European international society and, relatedly, how it could be 
gained and what it involved, underwent change as sovereignty increasingly came to 
be understood as held by peoples or nations within states (Kolla, 2017). The concept 
of constituent power can aptly explain how different ideas of sovereignty evolved in 
the context of international and domestic constitution-building efforts, either as 
novel constitutional principles or through the altering of existing constitutional 
principles.  
 
Instances of constituent power, whether present at the local or global level, can 
be characterised as forms of social power or may derive from normative power. 
“Social power” refers to the ability to enforce one’s will over others in the social 
context in which they are present (Mann, 1986: 6). “Normative power”, refers to the 
power that is possessed by an actor on the basis of its “recognition”80 by those whose 
actions it is influencing (Kavalski, 2013: 50). “Constituent power” can take the form 
of normative power when it influences how actors behave by providing legitimate 
guidelines for them to follow in their actions, which also serve to constitute new 
 
78 Building on earlier critiques of sovereignty, such as that of Krasner (2001b; see also Krasner, 1999; 
2001a) and Shaw (2000), Barkawi and Laffey (2002) argue that it is the agency of European empires 
and their continuing effects that can explain developments in International Relations. Barkawi and 
Laffey (2002: 121) accordingly criticise Held (1995), Bartelson (1995) and Bull and Watson (1984) 
for not considering how the same processes that resulted in the production of sovereignty also 
facilitated European imperialism and racism (see also Nişancıoğlu, 2019). However, recognising how 
the emergence of new rules of sovereignty facilitated such processes can contribute to developing a 
clearer historical understanding of sovereignty and does not mean that sovereignty ought to be side-
lined as an area of study.  
79 Popular and national sovereignty were also embraced by political movements in England, including 
those that facilitated the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (see Yack, 2001).  
80 See Ringmar (2012: 19) 
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constitutional rules (Müller, 2014: 88). As Loughlin (2014: 219) suggests, existing 
theories of the constituent power often differ as to whether it should be understood 
as a form of normative power or social power. Normative legal theorists, such as 
Dyzenhaus (1997a; 1997b), are sceptical of the analytical utility of the concept of 
constituent power, since understanding law as ultimately being based on a set of 
norms that are already in existence does not require an explanation of how such 
norms emerge (Loughlin, 2014: 219). In contrast, as Loughlin (2014: 219) explains, 
Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005) argues that law is premised on a “sovereign will”, which 
can be identified as the constituent power. This suggests that constituent power is 
reducible to social power81. However, Loughlin (2014: 219), adopts a “relationalist” 
perspective of the constituent power, which suggests that it is also based on 
conceptions “of political right … expressing the open, provisional, and dynamic 
dimensions to constitutional ordering”82. Müller (2014: 97), who argues that legal 
studies of international constitutional rules can be combined with historical studies 
of the relations between states, advances a similar proposal. Specifically, Müller 
(2014: 97) contends that “normative” explanations for the emergence and 
development of constitutional structures, can be complemented by a study of other 
“conditions” and “driving forces” to account for this emergence. This provides a 
useful means of applying constituent power in explaining changes in how 
constitutional rules are understood. This captures how constituent power is related 
both to normative power, expressed through the concept of rights, and social power. 
Specifically, the concept of the constituent power can be used to understand how 
sovereign actors can seek to consolidate their perceived rights in global international 
society, such as their right to sovereign equality.  
 
Cornago’s (2017: 327) concept of “constituent diplomacy” can explain how 
actors sought to use constituent power to alter the constitutional principles of global 
international society to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of states. This 
recognition may be achieved by using constituent power under existing 
constitutional rules, or by employing such power to secure changes to these rules to 
facilitate recognition. Cornago (2017) first advanced the idea of constituent 
 
81 See Kalyvas (2000; 2005: 225), Betances and Ibarra (2016), Colon-Rios (2010), Spang (2014: 3) 
and Vatter (2015: 648), who advance this view.  
82 See also Walker (2016).  
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diplomacy to explain how sub-state groups, such as pro-Basque and Catalan political 
actors within the Spanish state, sought to alter the constitution of Spain through 
engaging in diplomacy with the authorities in Madrid and in other states. Given how 
global international society can also be said to have its own constitutional rules, the 
concept of constituent power and diplomacy can be used, in a broader sense, to 
understand how actors seek to alter global international society and/or their place 
within it (Brunkhorst, 2016; Fierke, 2017;  Kumm, 2016a; 2016b; Müller, 2014: 88; 
Patberg, 2016; Teubner, 2012: 61 – 66; Thornhill, 2013; 2014; 2017). Both state and 
non-state actors could engage in constituent diplomacy to restructure the 
constitutional rules in the various contexts in which they find themselves, including 
the domestic, regional and global contexts (Cornago, 2017; Lorey, 2019; Niesen, 
2019a; 2019b). Thus, transnational social movements, as in the case of those who 
supported the French, American and more recent revolutions83, may be viewed as 
actors engaged in constituent diplomacy in both global and local contexts (Chang, 
2019; Lang, 2017; Murphy, 2019; Niesen, 2017; 2019a). As is often the case with 
nationalist movements, which can operate transnationally, actors engaged in 
constituent diplomacy can draw upon both social and normative forms of power. For 
instance, movements seeking national recognition could attempt to bring about 
constitutional change through wars (see Holsti, 2004: 122 – 123; Phillips, 2010) or 
through appealing to what they take to be their rights under the existing 
constitutional principles of global international society (see Griffiths, 2017; 
Thornhill, 2017). The significance of both ideas, and the historical contexts in which 
they are embedded in, to explain the emergence of international constitutional 
principles, has been stressed by Müller (2014: 72). Studying forms of normative and 
social power, revealed through the study of global intellectual history and global 
history can illustrate their role in constituent diplomacy. Constituent diplomacy, in 
the broad sense used here, can therefore involve actors at different levels seeking to 
secure their status under constitutional rules in different contexts, through the use of 
social and normative power. 
 
 
83 See Thornhill (2013; 2014: 359 – 362) for the study of how ideas of the constituent power 
influenced both the American and French Revolutions.  
 76 
 These forms of constituent diplomacy can be understood as responding to 
stigmatisation. Constituent diplomacy can overcome forms of international 
stigmatisation given how the maintenance of stigma rests on the power of 
gatekeeping actors in global international society (see Zarakol, 2011: 107) who 
impose and maintain stigma84 (see Adler-Nissen, 2014b). By the nineteenth century, 
when a global international society came to exist, states seen to be the most powerful 
European states, often termed the “great powers”, were arguably the gatekeepers of 
international society (Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 148; Simpson, 2004: 62; Zarakol, 2011: 
64). The idea of the “great powers” heralded the emergence of an understanding of 
equality amongst states who were equal in their “greatness” (Simpson, 2004: 107). 
However, states which were not recognised as fully sovereign and which did not 
enjoy relations of sovereign equality with those states at the centre of international 
society, may have faced stigma as they sought to be recognised as worthy of the 
sovereign rights enjoyed by the “great powers” (Donnelly, 2006: 145; R.A. Klein, 
1974: 73; Simpson, 2004: 62). According to these “great powers”, states needed to 
be accepted as “civilised” to be recognised as sovereign (Buzan, 2014: 581). States 
which failed to meet this standard of ‘civilisation’ could not be considered sovereign 
in the same sense as the “great powers” (Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 148; see also 
Aalberts, 2014; Buzan, 2014). This standard of ‘civilisation’ was enforced through a 
combination of normative and social power (Buzan, 2014; Gong, 1984). The 
foremost European states argued and used force to assert the standard of 
‘civilisation’ as an idea of international hierarchy (Bowden, [2009] 2014: 97 – 139; 
see also Bowden, 2004; 2013; 2014). This presented different ways of measuring the 
level of ‘civilisation’ in a state, including its legal system, its form of government, 
and its ethical principles alongside other possible metrics (Buzan, 2014: 580 - 581; 
Gong, 1984; Schwarzenberger, 1955; Schwarzenberger and Brown, [1947] 1976: 84; 
Towns, 2010). Perceptions of the nature and extent of a state’s sovereignty were also 
used to judge whether a state could be recognised as sovereign. (Holsti, 2004; C. 
Weber, 1995).  Constituent diplomacy, mobilising social and/or normative power, 
could, as cases when it was historically effective demonstrate, challenge these forms 
of stigmatisation. In response, those engaged in constituent diplomacy on behalf of 
 
84 As is suggested by the Greek etymology of stigmatisation, stigma refers to the marking of an actor 
as an outsider by a group of insiders (Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 145; E. Goffman, 1963; Link and Phelan, 
2001).  
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stigmatised states sought to mobilise their normative and social power to undermine 
the forms of stigmatisation that they were subjected to85. If the result of such 
constituent diplomacy would be the recognition of their state as ‘civilised’, this 
would remove the challenge posed to their recognition as sovereign states, equal in 
status to other states in global international society. 
 
 Constituent diplomacy, by challenging forms of global stigmatisation, such 
as those associated with the standard of ‘civilisation’, could facilitate the 
normalisation of a state within global international society or the normalisation of 
new constitutional principles within global international society. If constituent 
diplomacy results in the recognition of a state as equal to other sovereign states in 
global international society, in accordance with existing global constitutional rules, 
then the constituent diplomacy in question can be said to have been successful. 
States may, in this case, be deemed to have met a standard of ‘civilisation’, that they 
were previously unable or unwilling to meet, following successful constituent 
diplomacy by the representatives of the state. Constituent diplomacy in this instance 
can be likened to what Tully (2004: 86), in his discussion of recognition and 
constitution-building in domestic societies, terms a “struggle for recognition”. 
Alternatively, normalisation, meaning a move away from, or end to, stigma, can 
occur when actors succeed in changing the constitutional rules of international 
society, partially or wholly, or may be able to alter how these rules are applied to 
themselves (Smetana, 2020; Smetana and Onderco, 2018: 527 - 528). In the context 
of his discussion of recognition and domestic constitution-building, Tully (2004: 91) 
terms these struggles to define the broader rules constitutional rules, “struggles over 
recognition”. Instances of successful constituent diplomacy that fit the concept of 
struggles for recognition, in Tully’s (2004: 86 - 90) framework, can be interpreted as 
facilitating an expansion of global international society, insofar as they extend the 
status accorded to established states within global international society to other 
states. However, instances of successful constituent diplomacy, in global 
international society, which can be considered struggles over recognition result in 
 
85 Adler-Nissen (2014b) argues that there are different ways in which states can manage the stigma 
they face. This idea that stigma can be managed, but not overcome, builds on Zarakol’s (2014) 
argument that stigma is one of the main sources that explains contemporary relations between states. 
As Link and Phelan (2001: 381) argue, however, another approach may involve undermining the 
“mechanisms” that sustain stigma. 
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changes to the nature of global international society, stemming from how they alter 
the constitutional principles that hold it together. This thesis will use this theoretical 
perspective, focusing on constituent diplomacy and its interaction with local 
constituent power, to advance an explanation of  how states that were initially denied 
the status of being equal to other sovereigns were able to attain this status. 
 
4. Global constituent power and rival accounts of the emergence of sovereignty 
and global international society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century 
 
This thesis underlines the significance of constituent power to explain how states 
that were in effect sovereign, but not accorded the rights granted to other sovereign 
states, came to be recognised as sovereign in international society. However, there 
are other alternative arguments concerning the emergence of sovereignty which 
should be briefly considered. This section discusses the diffusionist argument that 
sovereignty, as an idea or a practice, emerged within Europe and then spread 
throughout the world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Boli, 2001; 
Nardin, 2015). It notes how different understandings of sovereignty, tied to concepts 
such as quasi-statehood, intervention and sovereignty as responsibility have often 
been cited as examples of how ideas and practices diffused from Europe to the 
remainder of the globe (Benton, 2008; Lawson and Tardelli, 2013; R.H. Jackson, 
1990). However, this diffusionist perspective cannot adequately explain how states 
that were not granted the rights usually accorded to sovereign states, and which were 
also not colonised by European states, eventually gained recognition of their 
sovereign equality. The unique position of the Ottoman Empire at the cusp of 
European international society, which would, in the course of the nineteenth century, 
come to be global international society, is then considered (Çapan and Zarakol, 
2017: 196; Rae, 2017; Trimberger, 1972: 191 - 192). Although sovereignty as an 
idea was developed within Europe, because of its location the Ottoman Empire 
cannot be separated from intellectual developments in Europe (Horowitz, 2004; 
Palabıyık, 2014). The Ottomans also had a particular understanding of sovereignty, 
which was similar to, and stemmed partly from, older ideas that informed European 
conceptions of sovereignty (Kafadar, 1995:132 - 133). Ottoman exiles and subjects 
alike were, increasingly throughout the nineteenth century, interlocutors in debates 
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in European international and political theory (Çiçek, 2010). The unique historical 
position of the Ottoman Empire demonstrates the usefulness of the concept of 
constituent power. Specifically, it shows how sovereign states, such as the Ottoman 
Empire, which were not accorded all of the rights granted to sovereign states, 
eventually gained the recognition of these rights. 
 
In the course of the emergence of the current global international society, 
sovereignty claims came to be subjected to stigma, with the basis of such 
stigmatisation arguably being laid before, and influencing, the subsequent 
development of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Bartelson (2018: 152) argues that, prior 
to the development of the idea of the standard of ‘civilisation’, European states 
developed a conception of warfare that contrasted it with the established order of 
sovereign states. This meant that all entities excluded from sovereign statehood 
could be considered to be in a state akin to that of warfare and hence were to be 
treated as such by European states ruled by individuals who had adopted this line of 
thinking (Bartelson, 2018). These different ideas of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘civilisation’ 
would later diffuse from Europe to the rest of the world. Examples of this include 
how the idea of race and religion was also used to justify denial of sovereignty to 
others by European individuals engaged in empire-building (Barkawi and Laffey, 
2002: 121; George, 1994: 205; Keal, 1995; 2003; Nişancıoğlu, 2019; Shilliam, 2013; 
Reus-Smit, 2013b: 1075; Todorov, 1984). Notwithstanding these recent approaches 
suggesting that an understanding of sovereignty that involved different means of 
marking others as outsiders emerged in Europe and resulted in the exclusion of non-
Europeans86, the standard of ‘civilisation’ has also been identified as a means of 
facilitating such exclusion (C.-A. Schulz, 2014: 856; Zarakol, 2011: 150). The 
standard of ‘civilisation’, which emerged together with the development of a 
positivist87 understanding of international law, produced a new set of ways in which 
individual states could be subject to stigma, on the basis of their perceived 
 
86 The Spanish jurist and theologian, Vitoria ([1533 - 1534] 1991: 169; [1539] 1991: 272), for 
instance, argued that the Spanish Empire’s actions in the Americas were not always just, but 
nonetheless argued that the Catholic Church had the authority to spread Christianity and that any 
resistance to this, on the part of the natives, justified military action against them, see also Reus-Smit 
(2013b: 1072) and Mathieu (2018b). 
87 However, as Carsten-Andreas Schulz (2014: 842) notes, many of the advocates of the standard of 
“civilisation”, such as Lorimer (1883: 101 as cited in C.-A. Schulz, 2014: 842), were, in fact, 
proponents of natural law, see also Koskenniemi (2001: 4). 
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shortcomings based on the standard (C.-A. Schulz, 2014: 847; Gong, 1984: 5, 240; 
2002: 78; Simpson, 2004: 255; Weitz, 2008: 1319). The rise of the standard of 
‘civilisation’ also coincided with the emergence of “quasi-sovereignty” (see Benton, 
2008: 595) as a concept advanced by European empire-builders, serving to argue that 
the form of sovereignty possessed by rulers in areas of increasing European 
influence could not be considered equal to that of European states (see also 
Bergmann, 2016; Datla, 2015; M.D. Lewis, 2013; Saksena, 2019). The idea of a 
group of “great powers” was subsequently formalised in the Congress of Vienna of 
1815, which established a system of diplomacy between them, known as the Concert 
of Europe (Keene, 2013b: 274; Simpson, 2004: 70; Zala, 2017: 367). By the 
nineteenth century, it is therefore possible to identify established understandings of 
sovereignty, linked to processes of stigmatising those entities who did not fit this 
definition of sovereignty, present throughout global international society. 
 
The argument that an understanding of sovereignty which emerged as a form of 
stigma against others can be said to be convincing as an explanation of how stigma 
emerged as an obstacle to claims of sovereign equality is supported by developments 
in global history. In the nineteenth century, the emergence of the standard of 
‘civilisation’ and the Concert of Europe’s promotion of dynastic sovereignty, 
resulted in the emergence of the practice of  international intervention (Benton, 
2011; C. Weber, 1995: 40 - 61). International intervention, since its heyday in the 
nineteenth century, has been premised on the identification of certain actors as 
appropriate for intervention and hence involved processes of marking or 
stigmatisation (Keene, 2013a; Lawson and Tardelli, 2013; Macmillan, 2013a; 2013b; 
Reus-Smit, 2013b; C. Weber, 1995: 27; Woodward, 2013). Similarly, in the context 
of the onset of colonisation, various states were identified as “backward” (see 
Aalberts, 2018: 874), thereby allowing European states to argue that they were 
allowing them to become a member of the “Family of Nations” (as quoted in 
Oppenheim, 1912: 110, 286; see also the discussion in Aalberts, 2018: 874), by 
convincing them to cede their sovereignty to them in treaties88. Additionally, Robert 
H. Jackson (1990: 26 - 27) argues, in the context of decolonisation in the twentieth 
 
88 As Aalberts (2018: 874), notes, rulers who ceded their sovereignty, such as those in Africa, were 
not always aware of the implications. On the connection between intervention and colonisation see 
Shilliam (2013). 
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century, that certain states only possessed negative sovereignty because they were 
unable to exert complete control over their territories. Conversely, positive 
sovereignty referred to the possession of effective sovereignty, as exhibited by 
established European sovereign states (R.H. Jackson, 1990: 50 - 54). Aalberts (2004; 
2012: 34) argues that these ideas of “negative” and “positive sovereignty”, as 
developed by Robert H. Jackson (1990: 30 as quoted in Aalberts, 2012: 108), can be 
understood as a “language game” (see Aalberts, 2012: 92) in the sense described by 
Wittgenstein ([1953] 1958). As language games, they refer to rules that determine 
how words are used in language to bring about effects in different contexts89, 
including the context of claims to sovereignty and sovereign equality (Aalberts, 
2012: 92 - 124)90. Although Inayatullah and Blaney (1995) have argued that quasi-
statehood is merely brought about by a quantitative lack of state resources, the idea 
of language games convincingly points to how it is founded on a language game that 
asserts the difference between negative and positive sovereigns. Examining the 
history of language games of sovereignty and practices of interventions adds to our 
understanding of how sovereignty and stigma are interconnected. However, this 
understanding of sovereignty as tied to stigma leaves open the question of how 
sovereign states were able to resist forms of stigmatisation that threatened sovereign 
equality. 
 
Sovereignty and stigmatisation have historically been identified as occurring 
simultaneously. But the very recognition of the sovereignty of an actor and 
subsequent successful attempts to gain recognition of its sovereign equality can be 
understood as challenging the validity of an account of sovereignty and 
stigmatisation that points to their simultaneity. As Mathieu (2018a: 2 -3) notes, a 
narrative of progress centring around the idea of sovereign equality has emerged 
which suggests that sovereign equality both goes some way towards describing the 
nature of international society and how it has varied historically. However, such an 
idea of sovereign equality can be criticised on the basis of how it involves accepting 
 
89  Language games have been used by constructivist scholars of International Relations, such as 
Fierke (2002), to explain how different meanings were mobilised by actors in their communications 
with each other.  
90 Alongside quasi-statehood, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility also entails a form of 
stigmatisation, since those who are understood as failing to act as responsible sovereigns are 
stigmatised, with possible effects on the continued recognition of their sovereignty and sovereign 
equality (Aalberts and Werner, 2011; Lake, 2009c: 78; Wendt and Friedheim, 1995). 
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the idea of sovereign equality as an empirical reality, often as a result of the 
assumption that the anarchic nature of international society means that sovereigns 
within it can be said to be equal in their status (Aalberts, 2014; Buzan, 2017: 235; 
Mathieu, 2018a; Welsh, 2017: 156). But the idea of sovereign equality cannot be 
used to describe an existing state of affairs due to the compelling historical reasons 
to adopt theories that assume that hierarchy is a better reflection of the relations 
between states and other actors in International Relations (Lake, 1996; 2007; 
Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Welsh, 2017: 156; Zarakol, 2017). Such hierarchy can, 
however, be interpreted as enabling the forms of stigmatisation that emerged 
simultaneously with the development of ideas of sovereignty in global international 
society (Zarakol, 2017). Yet postcolonial nationalism in Asia, Africa and the Arab 
world has often been cited as an example of the use of state and non-state power to 
advance an alternative vision of sovereignty through challenging such hierarchy and 
the forms of stigmatisation that are inherent to it (Suzuki, 2017: 226). Even though 
diffusionist accounts may insist that these regimes mirrored European states in the 
nature of their political ideas and institutions (see Boli, 2001; Nardin, 2015), 
including their dedication to sovereign equality (see Aalberts, 2018; Mathieu, 
2018a), postcolonial theorists such as Chakrabarty (2000: 117) have countered that 
European concepts, such as nationalism are not able to fully convey the meaning of 
their political ideas. Therefore, the argument that the agency of actors resisting 
hierarchy, including a form hierarchy which facilitates stigmatisation, cannot explain 
the fact that actors who were initially denied sovereignty and/or sovereign equality 
were subsequently able to overcome stigmatisation and gain recognition of one or 
either.  
 
By the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, global international society 
can be said to have emerged, and several states, including Japan and Turkey, the 
main successor state of the Ottoman Empire, were able to gain more equal 
recognition of their sovereignty, on a par with established states in international 
society. Unlike most other non-Western states, these states did not experience 
colonisation and were not subject to the division of their territory into spheres of 
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influence by European states, as had been the case with Iran91, Siam92, 
Afghanistan93, China94 and Morocco95. In the absence of a colonial past, diffusionist 
accounts and studies stressing the significance of power have explained how Japan 
and Turkey secured sovereign equality in international society (Bilgin, 2017: 135 – 
139; Suzuki, 2005). Modernisation theorists, such as Eisenstadt (2000: 13 – 16, 20 - 
21), for example, have argued that Japan and the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, 
underwent processes of modernisation modelled on the European experience, which 
would suggest that this enabled them to be recognised as equal sovereigns by the 
established states. The translation and spread of ideas from Europe, including 
political and social theories that contained understandings of sovereignty, has been 
cited in Wigen’s (2018) explanation of how the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, 
came to be recognised as equal sovereigns by the established states of global 
international society. Significantly, unlike the Ottoman Empire, Japan negotiated an 
end to extraterritorial consular courts maintained by European states following 
judicial reforms that were deemed to be satisfactory by European powers (Kayaoğlu, 
2010a: 66 - 103). Arguments that sovereignty in global international society came to 
be secured through power can also be applied to understand how these states were 
able in effect to maintain their sovereignty and gain recognition of what they deemed 
to be their sovereign rights throughout this period. The Ottomans, for instance, 
succeeded in defeating Russia at the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and enacted a 
set of reforms, which resulted in their inclusion in the Concert of Europe (Adanır, 
2005). Japan, when governed by a constitutional government, defeated Russia in 
1905, and thereby challenged ideas of racial hierarchy that were widespread in 
Europe at the time (Aydın, 2007: 71).  
 
The Ottoman Empire, however, came to be closely involved in inter-imperial 
rivalries with European powers and it was subjected to sustained interaction with 
neighbouring European states. This was because the Ottoman Empire had, in fact, 
enjoyed diplomatic ties with the Byzantine Empire, and Italian and Balkan states, 
before conquering Byzantium and the Balkans (Hupchik, 2002: 100; Zachariadou, 
 
91 See Bonakdarian (2006: 72). 
92 See Horowitz (2004: 446 – 447). 
93 See Bayly (2016: 48). 
94 See Osterhammel (1986). 
95 See Gershovich (2000) and Seoane (1998). 
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1983). The Ottoman state was, however, largely excluded from diplomacy with 
European powers until the sixteenth century (Göçek, 1987; Rudolph, 2013: 167; 
Yurdusev, 2004: 16 – 17). During the nineteenth century, new communication and 
transportation technologies meant that Ottoman subjects were exposed to 
neighbouring European ideas (Emrence, 2011: 36 – 40; Göçek, 1996: 117 – 118; 
Hanioğlu, 2008: 62; Rae, 2017). Ottoman elites, who spent periods of exile in 
Europe and, later, the Young Turks who were influenced by ideas that were 
European or global in origin, came to hold increasing influence over the Ottoman 
state (Hanioğlu, 2008: 103; Taglia, 2015: 1 - 50). Japan struggled to secure 
recognition as a significant state by European actors in global international society96. 
In contrast, the Ottomans, owing to their geographic location in close proximity to 
Europe, experienced no difficulty in attracting the attention of the European states 
(Yurdusev, 2009: 78). The Ottoman Empire was perceived as a significant power 
that could challenge the ambitions of expansionist European states, such as Austria-
Hungary, Britain and Russia (Hale, 2000: 3, 20). Moreover, in contrast to Japan, 
there were frequent exchanges of information between the Ottoman Empire and 
European states97. Missionaries98, migrants99, students, and merchants travelled in 
both directions and prompted the Ottoman state to seek to regulate these flows (Can, 
2016; Deringil, 1998; Gutman, 2016; Kasaba, 2009: 61). Certain transnational social 
movements, such as the networks established by Ottoman Muslims in recently lost 
territories and networks of exiled intellectuals operated in both Ottoman and 
European states and European colonies, such as Egypt (Emrence, 2011: 42; 
Hanioğlu, 2001: 62 – 77; Taglia, 2015: 3 – 5, 29 – 51). Unlike other non-Western 
independent states in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was, at least, 
partially integrated within European international society, even though Naff (1984) 
argues that it was always excluded from European international society (Yurdusev, 
2004). 
 
96 Suzuki (2005: 151) notes  how the Japanese leadership throughout the Meiji period sought to secure 
their inclusion within the “international order of the Law of Nations”, in the context of rising 
European powers (see also Trimberger, 1972: 191 - 192). The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, 
developed an awareness of European international law from its onset at the end of the thirteenth 
century, as a result of the wars it fought and the agreements it concluded with European states 
(Palabıyık, 2014: 235 – 236).  
97 Suzuki (2005: 151) notes that part of the reason why Japanese elites were eager to establish contact 
with European states was to ensure that Japan was aware of external developments in Europe.  
98 See Deringil (1998: 112 - 134). 
99 See Mirkova (2013) and Kasaba (2009). 
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Although Bartelson (2014: 2) has noted that sovereignty emerged as a “symbolic 
form by means of which Westerners have perceived and organized the political 
world” it can be argued that a similar form of sovereignty was present in the 
Ottoman Empire. Both the Ottomans and the Europeans were influenced by the 
political thought of the ancient Mediterranean. They drew upon the writings of 
Aristotle and Plato to justify their sovereignty (Sariyannis, 2019: 23, 91, 297). But, 
as Zarakol (2018a) notes, Islamic states, such as the Ottoman Empire and Safavid 
Persia, did have their own understandings of sovereignty based on the importance of 
authority, if not always territoriality. Moreover, internal sovereignty was established 
by the Ottomans through reference to the role of the state in securing justice100 (see 
Barkey, 2008: 100) and a founding narrative tied to an envisaged contract between 
the ruler and ruled101 (see Kafadar, 1995: 132). Bodin ([1530 -1596] 1969: xxi), 
indeed, also argued that the Ottoman state was a sovereign state, comparable to the 
Holy Roman Empire in terms of its claim to have inherited the legacy of the Roman 
Empire (Deringil, 2007: 712; Yerasimos, 2003). As İnalcık (1973: 11) notes, the 
Ottomans maintained suzerainty over “local lords”102 or potentates in the Balkans. 
This would suggest that forms of heteronomous sovereignty, similar to those 
identified as being shared by European and Asian actors in the Indian Ocean by 
Phillips and Sharman (2015a; 2015b) were present in the Ottoman Empire. 
Territorial sovereignty as a principle was stressed in treaties between the Ottomans 
and the Europeans. In the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699, the Hapsburgs and Ottomans 
reached a settlement on the basis of the principle of uti possidetis, meaning that each 
side would keep the territories they were effectively controlling (Abou-El-Haj, 2004: 
103). As Özsu (2016: 373) notes, the concept of “sovereign equality” in international 
law also allowed the Ottomans to develop claims that they saw as based on their 
sovereignty. Because of their situatedness on the edge of Europe, the Ottomans 
developed a familiarity with the European concept of sovereignty, which partially 
shared a common intellectual origin with Ottoman theories of the state. As the 
 
100 Barkey (2008: 100) also argues that the Ottoman state had an understanding of a contract between 
the state and society, based on the provision of justice by the state, as expressed in the Ottoman 
historian, Kınalızade’s, idea of the “circle of justice.” 
101 For the content and context of the dream narrative see Mikhail (2019: xi- xii). Osman I dreamt that 
a tree grew from his navel and that the world was covered by its shade (Mikhail, 2019: xi).   
102 See also Sugar (1977: 175) and Barkey (1994).  
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military power of the empire declined, the interactions between the Ottoman Empire 
and the European states increasingly took the form of diplomatic communications in 
which issues of sovereignty were discussed (Palabıyık, 2014). 
 
5. The Young Turks, their successors, their ideas and constituent diplomacy 
 
This section provides an overview of the Young Turks. It explains how the 
subsequent four chapters of the thesis will focus on the efforts of this movement and 
its successors to gain recognition of their sovereign equality in global international 
society. Interacting with the increasingly more powerful European states, in the 
nineteenth century the Ottomans developed understandings of sovereignty that drew 
upon their own ideas and practice of sovereignty as well as European conceptions 
(Horowitz, 2004). However, in spite of the reformist efforts of Ottoman statesmen of 
the Tanzimat period and the Young Ottomans, the capitulations were not abrogated 
(Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). This extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction had been 
initiated much earlier by the European powers in the Ottoman Empire. The 
capitulations persisted even though the Ottoman Empire was recognised as a 
significant state in the Concert of Europe in 1856 (see Adanır, 2005). The Ottoman 
statesman, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, codified the existing laws within the Ottoman 
Empire, in 1877, but this also did not result in the abrogation of the capitulations 
(Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, there was a 
period of transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey (Zürcher, 
2010). Eventually, the Turkish state would be recognised as an equal sovereign in 
global international society. The case of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to 
Turkey therefore demonstrates the role of constituent power in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century and its role in the emergence of global international society. The 
Young Turks formed a new group of state elites, who quickly consolidated control 
over the institutions of the Ottoman state and society (Kansu, 1997; Zürcher, 2010). 
In 1913, the CUP assumed control of the Ottoman state in a dictatorship, which 
would remain in place until 1918 (Zürcher, 2010: 95). Their successors also played a 
role in the founding of Turkey. This section of the thesis provides an outline of how 
the following four chapters will focus on the Young Turks and their efforts to secure 
the sovereign equality of their state. The methodology applied in the thesis will also 
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be introduced and the range of sources used to trace the constituent diplomacy of the 
Young Turks is presented.  
 
In the nineteenth century, Ottoman officials attempted to situate and define the 
Ottoman Empire in terms of international law as well as domestically through the so-
called Tanzimat, or “re-ordering” reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 20). As Çiçek 
(2010: 10) demonstrates, Ottoman diplomats engaged in these efforts in the context 
of the rise of the so-called “Eastern Question”, referring to the questioning of the 
international position of the Ottoman Empire by the European members of the 
Concert of Europe, particularly in light of their own clashing international interests 
(Aksan, 2003: 96; Frary and Kozelsky, 2014: 6; Schroeder, 1986: 6, 15; 1994: 121 – 
122; Schumacher, 2014). The autonomy of the Ottoman state from the personal rule 
of the Sultan was asserted by instituting a form of “constitutional” rule (Horowitz, 
2004: 459). However, the Ottomans were increasingly scrutinised on the basis of the 
standard of ‘civilisation’ (Finnemore, 1996). In the Greek war of independence, 
which ended in 1832, the French, British and Russians ultimately supported the 
Greeks who were seen as Christian peoples governed by “uncivilized” (see 
Stivachtis, 1998: 63) rulers (see also Holsti, 1991: 147, 169; Stivachtis, 2017). 
Ottoman diplomats, when confronted with these new conceptions of international 
law, sought to redefine their state in terms of the new forms of sovereignty present in 
these theories through a series of reforms (Horowitz, 2004: 485). For instance, 
following defeat in Greece and the signing of a free trade agreement with Britain 
(see Todd, 2018: 111), the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, announced a 
series of reforms in the so-called Gülhane Decree of 1839 (Anscombe, 2014: 105). 
However, these reforms were preceded by, and shared the goal of, earlier reforms 
that aimed to strengthen the Ottoman state in the face of internal crises brought about 
by Greece’s war of independence103 (Anscombe, 2014: 90 - 100). They drew largely 
 
103 The Tanzimat reforms were introduced in the context of a revolt by Muhammad Ali Pasha, the 
governor of Egypt in 1831, who was advancing towards the Ottoman capital (see Anderson, 1966: 77 
- 110). At this point, the Ottoman state sought to secure its legitimacy from its own population (see 
Abu-Manneh, 1995) and to ensure that it would be viewed as legitimate by European states (see 
Wigen, 2015). Anscombe (2014: 100) argues that the Islamic jurist, Muhammed Abduh (see Hourani, 
1983: 130 - 160), argued that different aspects of Islamic law could be used to enable the state to 
secure its standing in the world. Islamic law therefore could be mobilised to defend these reforms that 
sought to empower the state (Anscombe, 2014: 100). Palabıyık (2014: 238) argues that Koca Yusuf,  
the Grand Vizier, the second highest official in the empire, had also used this principle of citing the 
“order of the state” (nizam-ı mülk) to justify an alliance with Prussia in 1761 
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from Islamic104 arguments to press, in effect, for a guarantee of individual rights 
(Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 114). The Ottomans were only formally “admitted” to the 
Concert of Europe in 1856 after introducing additional reforms to protect the rights 
of their Christian population (Burgis, 2009: 65; Ringmar, 2014: 9). However, as 
Palabıyık (2014: 235) notes, the Ottoman state had an earlier awareness of 
international law, starting with the official translation of Emmerich de Vattel’s Law 
of Nations in 1837. Therefore, while drawing upon their own understandings of 
sovereignty, rooted in distinct political traditions, the Ottoman elite increasingly 
became more aware of and adopted to European understandings of sovereignty.  
 
 The accession of Abdülhamid II in 1876, soon followed by the Ottoman 
defeat to the Russian Empire, resulted in the Ottomans challenging the maintenance 
of extraterritorial jurisdictions. These jurisdictions had been established centuries 
earlier. Much of the initial contact between the Ottomans and Europeans had 
involved matters of trade and was promoted by European states, such as Venice 
(Yurdusev, 2004: 39). To facilitate trade, European states secured forms of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, whereby their residents in the Ottoman Empire would be 
governed under European legal systems. This was justified by Islamic legal precepts 
that the Ottomans termed “ahdnames”, or “decrees of the sultan” (see Burgis, 2009: 
57), which would later be known in Europe as the “capitulations” (Yurdusev, 2004: 
3). After defeat by the Russians in 1878, when the Russian Empire attempted to 
regain territory lost during the Crimean War, the Ottomans introduced further 
reforms in an endeavour to bolster their waning international standing. This was in 
spite of the fact that the Ottoman parliament had been dissolved during the latest war 
with Russia (Anscombe, 2014: 117). This moment also coincided with Britain 
claiming extraterritorial rule in other parts of the empire, including the birthplace of 
Islam in the Hijaz, which had hitherto been excluded from such measures because of 
their remoteness (Low, 2016). The Ottoman statesman, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, 
produced a law code in 1877 based on common interpretations of sharia law, which 
points to an attempt on the part of the Ottoman elites to enable the abolition of the 
capitulations by adopting ‘civilised’ legal norms (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). Crucially, 
the end of the capitulations would allow the Ottoman state to consolidate its 
 
104 See Abu-Manneh (1995) and Yazbak (1997). 
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territoriality, meaning that it would extend exclusive control over its own territory, 
thereby ending the use of consular courts by European states to try their own citizens 
resident in the empire. This would, in turn, enable the Ottoman state, which 
continued to be sovereign, in the sense of being constitutionally independent, to be 
recognised as an equal sovereign in global international society. 
 
However, this attempt to demonstrate the civilised nature of Ottoman law and 
thereby challenge one of the arguments for extraterritoriality would fail (Kayaoğlu, 
2010a: 120 - 123). Under the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, Montenegro, 
Romania and Serbia would become independent from the Ottoman Empire and 
Bulgaria was declared an autonomous principality (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 28). The 
Ottoman attempt to challenge the gains of Russia received the support of Britain and 
its allies (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 28). The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were 
revised by the Treaty of Berlin of July 1878 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25 - 26). The latter 
reduced the size of the territories that the Russians and their Allies claimed, and 
called for members of the Concert of Europe to oversee reforms in the western and 
easternmost provinces which Russia and its allies had sought to control (Yosmaoğlu, 
2013: 28). The treaty recognised the various Balkan and Caucasian populations as 
nations105, in the sense of homogenous groups with political aspirations, in the areas 
where the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been fought (Biondich, 
2011; Farrar Jr, 1996; Yasamee, 2011: 76).The reform proposals envisaged by the 
Treaty of Berlin were immediately criticised by the Ottomans because they would 
entail outside states having extensive control over the Ottoman Empire’s southeast 
European and western Caucasian provinces (Rodogno, 2012: 170).106 Throughout 
this period, the Ottoman state was seeking to standardise the form of Islam that was 
present within its borders107, while also developing its international legal 
competence, through establishing an Office of Legal Counsel in 1883 (Genell, 
 
105 Yasamee (2011: 67) echoes this by noting how the Treaty of Berlin resulted in Muslim 
communities, such as the Albanian Muslims, becoming “the main prop of Ottoman rule in the 
Balkans” (see also Blumi, 2003a; 2003b).  
106 Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, a gendarmerie force, made up largely of foreign military 
advisors, had been formed following the Illinden Uprising of 1903 of Macedonian and Bulgarian 
nationalists against Ottoman rule, in the region known as Macedonia (Mahon, 1998: 393). The 
atrocities committed by Ottoman forces against rebels and civilians prompted the Treaty of Berlin 
powers to establish this international force, which would be responsible for security, alongside the 
Ottoman security forces (Mahon, 1998: 393).  
107 See Deringil (1998: 44 - 67). 
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2016). The standardisation of Sunni and Hanafi Islam was intended to create a loyal 
populace, who could be recruited into the military as regular or irregular units of 
loyal Muslims (Deringil, 1998: 44 - 67; J. Klein, 2007). It also allowed the empire to 
use its Islamic legitimacy to secure the rights of Muslims in south-eastern Europe.108 
The translation of international legal texts would, in turn, harness the ability of 
Ottoman diplomats to defend the interests of the Ottoman state who were often 
dismissed for not being aware of different languages and concepts in international 
law. Both of these moves were intended to limit foreign influence in the empire, 
through empowering the state and securing its legitimacy, and enabling it to make a 
case for sovereign rights over Muslim populations.  
 
Disagreements, between the Ottomans and other signatories about how the 
terms of the Treaty of Berlin would  be implemented, led eventually to the Young 
Turk revolution of 1908 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 21 - 53). This revolution, in turn, 
triggered a series of events which would ultimately result in the transformation of the 
Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. Coming to power in the revolution of 
1908, the Young Turks constituted a new state elite that dominated the politics of the 
Ottoman Empire until its demise (Zürcher, 2010). Many of the founders of the 
organisation had spent considerable time outside of the Ottoman Empire in European 
cities109 and had formed branches in exile, meaning that the Young Turks can be 
seen as a transnational network, seeking to create a movement within the Ottoman 
Empire. They also produced many of the political elites of the first generation of 
Turkey (Zürcher, 2010). As the Young Turks consolidated power, elements of the 
previous regime were removed and the Young Turks came to control most sectors of 
the Ottoman state and society (Kansu, 1997: 115 - 156). The CUP110, a Young Turk 
faction, gradually consolidated its control over the Ottoman state (Ahmad, [1969] 
2010: 13 - 57). However, the CUP was only one of many groups which participated 
in the second and third conferences of the Ottoman opposition in Paris in 1902 and 
1907 (Hanioğlu, 2001: 28, 91 - 97). Such movements also included organisations 
 
108 See Mirkova (2013) and Kostopoulou (2013; 2016).  
109 On the Young Turk presence in Paris see Taglia (2015), Özervarlı (2018: 85) and Hanioğlu (2001: 
28 - 42). On their presence in Geneva see Ateş (2009) and Hanioğlu (2001: 52) .  
110The CUP emerged as a union of other groups, the earliest of which had been formed in Istanbul in 
1889 (Taglia, 2015: 4). It later exited in exile in chapters organised by exiled intellectuals in Europe 
(Taglia, 2015: 4 - 9). 
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that represented various religious and ethnic groups, such as the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (Hanioğlu, 2001: 95). These organisations played an active 
role in the revolution of 1908 (Berberian, 2019; Der Matossian, 2014; Hanioğlu, 
2001: 95). The CUP gradually consolidated its control over the Ottoman state. This 
started with its crushing of the counterrevolution of 1909 and led to the coup d’état 
of 1913, which was headed by Enver Paşa, a rising Ottoman general and member of 
the CUP (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 36 – 45, 104). The CUP went underground at the 
end of the First World War (Zürcher, 1984). But, the National Movement, formed by 
military officers who were resisting the Allied and Greek invasion of the Ottoman 
Empire, had figures who were closely associated with the CUP, and was composed 
of other political and military organisations (Zürcher, 1984). Consequently, it can be 
posited that a fairly homogenous class of state elites held state power in most of the 
period from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the emergence of Turkey. 
 
Even though the dominant notion of sovereignty in global international 
society emerged as a European concept and came to inform how Europeans 
understood and sought to shape the globe, the Ottomans, including those who would 
later found the state of Turkey, were exposed to the concept, through their inclusion 
in European diplomacy and through the influence of transnational movements. These 
transnational movements later invoked constituent power, which enabled the 
recognition of the Turkish state as an equal sovereign, even though the Ottoman state 
had previously been stigmatised for not meeting the standard of ‘civilisation’. This 
explanation of ideas and practices of sovereignty spreading throughout the world, for 
instance, is captured in the notion of a global constituent power, which can, through 
working in existing global connections111, alter the constitutional principles of global 
international society, including sovereignty and sovereign equality. The idea of local 
constituent powers, creating or reconstituting a constitutional order within a state, 
demonstrates how local forms of power may also contribute to the development of 
the idea, and possibly the attainment of a state of affairs of, sovereign equality in 
global international society. Constituent powers at the global and the local levels 
may influence each other and facilitate the recognition of sovereign rights (Cornago, 
 
111 Bhambra (2010) argues that International Relations ought to be mindful of connections between 
different historical contexts, rather than imposing one set of understandings, developed in a specific 
historical context, to understanding all historical developments. 
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2017; Fierke, 2017). They can also explain how states that are already sovereign in 
effect, may mobilise forms of local or global constituent power by wielding social or 
normative power to bring about constitutional change to enable greater international 
recognition of their sovereign equality112. Normative power necessarily involves 
shared ideas of legitimacy, which must have diffused throughout the globe, such that 
they could be held in common by actors seeking recognition of their sovereign rights 
and by those acting as gatekeepers of the principles of sovereignty in global 
international society (Kavalski, 2013: 250). The idea of constituent power also 
accounts for how actors may seek to change the ideas of sovereignty within global 
international society, as well as aiming to alter domestic constitutional norms, in 
order to gain recognition of their desired status as sovereigns. 
 
In the following four chapters, this thesis will focus on specific episodes in the 
course of the struggles of the Young Turk revolutionary and state elites to secure 
recognition of the sovereignty of their state in global international society in the 
period 1908 – 1923. Chapter 3 begins by focusing on the aftermath of the 1908 
revolution, when the Young Turks sought, with some success, to present themselves 
as a new ‘civilised’ elite. However, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, the Young Turks 
found themselves embroiled in international alliances, resulting ultimately in their 
alignment with the Central Powers and their attempt, through war, to advance a new 
conception of national sovereignty for the Ottoman state and the global international 
society. Chapter 5 focuses on how, following the Ottoman defeat in 1918, 
individuals affiliated with the Young Turks, appealed to the idea of national self-
determination to gain international recognition of their sovereign equality. As 
Chapter 6 will show, in 1923, the National Movement sought simultaneously to 
argue for their ‘civilised’ identity, to gain recognition of their actually existing 
sovereignty. Therefore, Chapters 3 and 5 focus on instances before and after the First 
World War, in which those who had ties to the Young Turks appealed to global 
constitutional principles of sovereignty to gain recognition as sovereign equals in 
global international society. Chapters 4 and 6 focus on two instances in which the 
Young Turks sought to alter how the existing constitutional principles of global 
 
112 See Corrias (2016: 6), who understands “populism” as referring to political projects that involve 
altering the constitution of a state, but keeping it intact during this process, by appealing to certain 
powers as constituent powers. 
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international society were enforced, by either attempting to change them by force or 
by seeking to influence how these principles were interpreted. In each chapter, the 
rich secondary literature on the period in question will be reviewed and primary 
sources will be used to show how the Young Turks and their offshoots sought 
recognition of their sovereign equality. These primary sources include 
communications submitted by the Young Turks and their successors to 
representatives of the dominant states at that time in global international society. 
After presenting the ideas that shaped the actions of the Ottoman/Turkish elites, each 
of the next four chapters will focus on how these ideas informed the actions of these 
elites and will examine to what extent and how these elites succeeded in securing the 
recognition of sovereign equality. 
 
6. Conclusion:  
 
This chapter has shown how the research question of the thesis will be addressed. 
It has presented the methodology which will be used and the theoretical framework 
that will be adopted in the thesis. It has demonstrated how the concept of sovereignty 
is connected to  other concepts that are used to understand and justify it. 
Comprehending these different concepts and how they are deployed requires an 
awareness of how concepts are tied to each other historically and philosophically. A 
global intellectual history, together with global history, can be used to develop a 
theory of how states came to be considered sovereigns equal to established states in 
global international society. The argument of the thesis draws upon the English 
School of International Relations and builds on it by contending that the concept of 
constituent power can be understood as operating at both the local and the global 
levels to explain the emergence of global international society. The thesis also 
suggests that the concept of constituent power contains both normative and social 
power, meaning that both ideas and capabilities influence the success of constituent 
power. Other historical accounts of the development of global international society 
have been considered. One perspective suggests that global international society 
emerged as ideas of sovereignty spread throughout the world (Boli, 2001; Nardin, 
2015). But, this suffers from a lack of emphasis on the local contexts which both 
challenged and altered Western ideas as they spread to different geographies 
(Hobson and Sajed, 2017). Arguing that global international society emerged 
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through the agency of states seeking sovereignty (see James, 1999) fails to account 
for how the commonly-held understanding of sovereignty as a constitutional 
principle of global international society (see Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999; 2008) emerged. 
In particular, it does not properly explain how states that were already sovereign, 
such as the Ottoman Empire, sought to secure sovereign equality in global 
international society. How the Young Turks harnessed constituent power in their 
attempts to gain recognition of the sovereignty of first the Ottoman, and 
subsequently, the Turkish state, provides an excellent case for demonstrating how 






















3. Constitutionalism and the standard of ‘civilisation’: The Young Turk 
revolution and the turmoil of post-revolutionary international politics, 




This chapter will demonstrate how the Young Turks, in the immediate period 
following the revolution of 1908, sought to secure recognition of their status as a 
sovereign state equal to that of the established European states. Current historical 
accounts have not considered the connection between the domestic and the global 
forms of constituent power. Studies have focused on the influence of the 
international standard of ‘civilisation’, which emerged in the nineteenth century and 
impacted on the Ottoman Empire (Buzan, 2014: 578 - 579). However, they have not 
concentrated on the constituent diplomacy deployed by the Young Turks in their 
attempts to gain full recognition of their equal sovereignty. The Young Turks 
employed arguments relating to the standard of ‘civilisation’ to secure sovereign 
equality. They advanced specific interpretations of the standard of ‘civilisation’ 
linking this standard to the presence of constitutional government. The Young Turks 
had developed notions of constitutionalism prior to 1908 when they were a 
transnational social movement. Soon after the revolution, the Young Turks 
persuaded European states to withdraw from overseeing reforms in the westernmost 
provinces of the empire (Tokay, 2003: 62). However, in the aftermath of the Young 
Turk revolution, the standard of ‘civilisation’ came to be mobilised by other groups, 
seeking to acquire territory from the empire, who claimed that they were more 
civilised than the Ottomans (Mirkova, 2013: 956). Different ideas on what it meant 
to be a civilised state also emerged from among the counter-revolutionaries in the 
Ottoman Empire in 1909. This opposition was crushed, but the Young Turks failed 
to prevent the loss of Ottoman territory by highlighting the empire’s purported level 





2. The Theory and History of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908: 
Constitutionalism and the Standard of ‘Civilisation’ :  
 
This section will assess the existing historiography of the Young Turk 
revolution. According to much of the literature, the revolution was motivated by the 
desire to gain recognition of the equal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire from the 
dominant states in global international society, through an understanding of 
constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’. Currently, several works, such as 
those of Kent (2005) and Bloxham (2005), point to how the period in the lead up to 
the revolution was marked by increased competition among empires. However, this 
period also witnessed the increased legalisation of global international society 
(Kingsbury, 2002: 410 – 411; Müller, 2014: 92 - 97; Reus-Smit, 1997). This was 
most clearly visible in the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Kingsbury, 2002: 
410 - 411; Reus-Smit, 1997). Much of the existing literature points to the 
Macedonian origins of the revolution, in which the Ottoman provinces in south-
eastern Europe became the centre of competition between states pursuing their 
interests in the region (Zürcher, 2003). But, this unfolding competition was 
intertwined with the emergence of global constitutional rules which impacted on the 
Young Turk revolution (Blachford, 2019). Many accounts have explained the 
reforms that the Young Turks introduced as stemming from a process of 
“Westernisation” or “modernisation” (Heper, 1976: 510). The appropriateness of 
Westernisation as a label for this process can be questioned. The Young Turks drew 
inspiration from a range of sources, including the Iranian and Russian revolutions 
and the reforms undertaken by Japan (Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). Moreover, the Ottoman 
Empire had arguably always been open to certain influences from the West, 
stemming from its position on the cusp of the Islamic and Christian worlds 
(Horowitz, 2004; Rae, 2017). The practice of intervention in the Ottoman Empire by 
the dominant states in global international society also suggests that it is difficult to 
evade the consideration of the role of global international society in the internal 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire (Rodogno, 2011a; 2011b; 2012; M. Schulz, 2011). 
The interveners, in these cases, purported to act from a universal, and hence global, 
concern with upholding “civilization” (Rodogno, 2011b: 160; 2012: 12). It is in this 
context that the Ottoman revolutionaries of 1908 sought to present constitutional rule 
as a standard of “civilization” (Worringer, 2004: 207). Here, they aimed to attain a 
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favourable position in the  emergent global normative hierarchies centred around the 
idea that there were ‘civilised’ states in a superior position in global international 
society. 
 
Accounts of the Young Turk revolution have often pointed to how it can be read 
as a moment in the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire. Modernisation is equated 
with Westernisation (Heper, 1976: 510). Many of these studies, including some 
written in Turkey, were based on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkey had been undergoing a process of modernisation (Heper, 1976). 
Modernisation theorists in Western social science examined the Ottoman and 
Turkish case to demonstrate the validity of their claim that societies experienced 
processes of social transformation (İnalcık, 1968; Karpat, 1968; İ. Kaya, 2004; 
Lerner and Robinson, 1960). These theorists sought to use sources that reinforced 
their own teleological assumption that societies were universally proceeding on the 
path to modernity113. Movements such as the Young Turks, their predecessors in the 
reforming bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire’s so-called period of reordering, or 
Tanzimat, and the mid-nineteenth-century Young Ottoman movement of 
intellectuals and activists, are portrayed as facilitators of  modernisation (Berkes, 
[1964] 1998; Bilgin, 2017; Mardin, 1971; [1962] 2000). This “modernization” is 
often understood as “Westernization” (Heper, 1976: 510). However, theories within 
the multiple modernities framework suggest that non-Western114 and non-secular115 
forms of modernity are possible (Eisenstadt, 1999; 2000; 2001; Seth, 2014: 317; 
Therborn, 2000). Nevertheless, by assuming that all societies or regions of the world 
will or can experience “modernity” understood on the basis of the European 
experience, these theories are also West-centric (Bhambra, 2011: 667; see also 
Bhambra, 2007; Hobson and Sajed, 2017: 554 - 558). This criticism of 
modernisation theory, along with its selection of sources that affirm its own 
hypothesis, can be applied to other studies that seek to situate the Young Turk 
revolution in the framework of modernity (see Göksel, 2016; Kaya and Tecmen, 
 
113 Heper (1976: 510) assumes that these reformers turned to the West. These perspectives also 
suggested that modernisation led to greater secularisation (Berkes, [1964] 1998). 
114 See Wagner (2011). 
115 See Spohn (2003: 269). 
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2011).116 For instance, Düzgün (2018a: 254 – 255; 2018b) situates the revolution in 
the context of the advance of modernity understood in the Marxist sense of the 
development of capitalism. According to Düzgün (2018a), this prompted the 
emergence of new property relations and movements for political change that 
reflected these relations. Hence, there are a number of studies of the Young Turk 
revolution which assume that modernisation can be studied as an objective social 
scientific process. 
 
Other studies of the Young Turk revolution complicate the narrative of 
‘modernisation’ or ‘Westernisation’. These draw attention to ideas and their 
meanings that were used by the revolutionaries. Such works interpret sources, as in 
the case of texts dating from the period, which were produced or read by individuals 
during the revolution (Hanioğlu, 1995; 2001; 2005; Taglia, 2015). Some accounts 
have reconstructed the context in which these ideas were developed to provide a 
more accurate sense of the meanings of these ideas, as understood by the individuals 
who used them (Özavcı, 2013; Wigen, 2015; 2018). However, certain concepts, such 
as Islam and ‘Western’ modernity, nationalism and internationalism, came to be 
interpreted by intellectual historians on the basis of how these concepts are currently 
understood.117 The supposed Turkish nationalism or Ottoman patriotism of the 
Young Turks, and their support for Islam and modernity, are understood to be in 
contradiction or in tension with each other (Öztan, 2018). But this was not 
necessarily the case (Hanioğlu, 2001: 295 – 302; Sohrabi, 2018). Hanioğlu (2001) 
and İrem (2004) go some way towards recognising the range of ideas held by the 
Young Turks. But, Hanioğlu (2001: 295 - 300) and İrem (2004: 88) assert that by 
1908 the CUP, at least, were unquestionably nationalist idealists and only pragmatic 
Ottomanists. What is necessary, as Mikhail and Phillou (2012) urge in their review 
of historical literature on the subject, is to consider how actors in the Ottoman 
Empire were global. The Young Turks developed their ideas from multiple contexts 
in which they were present as individuals. Several recent studies have touched upon 
individual thinkers, such as Ahmed Rıza, who were part of an Ottoman diaspora 
 
116 See Göçek (1996: 119 – 125, 139 - 140) for a more nuanced version of this argument, stressing 
that Western ideas and practices diffused to the Ottoman Empire at this time, creating a bifurcated 
bourgeoisie, divided in terms of ethnicity and identity.  
117 For a review and a critique of the Islam-secularism binary in the literature see Dressler (2015). For 
a review and a critique of the nationalism-Ottomanism binary see Öztan (2018).  
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within Europe and who developed ideas on issues such as positivism in a 
transnational context (Özervarlı, 2018; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 96 – 114; 2017b). A 
greater consideration of the multiple contexts that the Young Turks found 
themselves in, and the relation of these contexts to the formulation of their ideas, is 
necessary to identify and study the impact of such ideas.  
 
Although many  intellectual histories of the Young Turk revolution failed to note 
how the revolution had a global dimension, works in diplomatic and political history 
have incorporated global developments in their accounts of the events of 1908. 
These accounts noted that an important motive of the Young Turk revolution was to 
secure the interests and ensure the recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman 
state (Ahmad, [1969] 2010; Fortna, 2011). Ahmad ([1969] 2010: 2 - 3), for instance, 
points to how the meeting between Edward VII and Nicholas II in Reval in 1908 
prompted the revolution, because it raised fears that Britain and Russia had agreed to 
divide the Ottoman Empire. Intellectual historians have also focused on how the 
Young Turks disagreed over how to deal with Western intervention in the Ottoman 
Empire. These historians have suggested that the 1902 congress of the Young Turks 
resulted in a split between the followers of Prince Sabahaddin, the nephew of the 
Sultan, and those of a rival intellectual, Ahmed Rıza, over whether to accept foreign 
support to carry out the revolution (Hanioğlu, 2001: 28; Taglia, 2015). In practice, 
groups who would later be known as the CUP118, founded by the efforts of Ahmed 
Rıza, and the Young Turk faction of the League of Private Initiative and 
Decentralisation (LPID; Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti), founded 
by Sabahaddin, both sought and received external backing. Nevertheless, the CUP 
and its forerunner, the CPU, were not opposed to seeking support from the outside 
world. Hanioğlu (2001: 265) notes, for instance, how immediately prior to the 
revolution, the CUP sent a communication to the consulates of European states in 
Macedonia in which they effectively sought recognition. However, studies have 
failed to note how the Young Turks were a transnational movement, as they were 
present in and drew support from individuals from a number of states and colonies 
 
118 It is important to note that a faction of what would later become the CUP initially termed itself the 
CPU (Committee of Progress and Union) (Hanioğlu, 2001: 136) This was an organisation which had 
itself merged with the Ottoman Freedom Society in 1907 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 72). In terms of links 
with foreign actors, the CUP had established links with the government of Greece and organised 
themselves in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia (Hanioğlu, 2001: 77 - 78).  
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(Hanioğlu, 2001: 16, 28 – 32, 62 - 77; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 96 – 114; 2017b). 
Therefore, the Young Turk movement, which was transnational in its onset, was 
embedded in the Ottoman diaspora of exiled intellectuals in Europe and sought to 
utilise these connections to advance its political aims.  
 
Another strand in the historical literature focuses on the origins of the revolution 
in the three westernmost Ottoman provinces situated in Europe. Here, inter-imperial 
rivalries were felt most acutely by the Ottoman state. Three provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire, known as Macedonia by Europeans119, had been subjected to a 
regime of international reform according to the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 
(Rodogno, 2011a: 205 - 206; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25 – 28). This treaty, signed by 
Italy, Austria-Hungary, France, Britain, Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 
called for its signatories to oversee a multi-faceted reform programme in Macedonia 
to improve conditions in the region (Rodogno, 2011a; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25). The 
area had been contested by the Ottomans and the Russians, who had supported local 
elements in their desire to secure suzerainty from the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877 – 1878 (M. Schulz, 2011: 190, 203). Other European powers 
were also drawn in due to their interests (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25 – 28). Britain, France 
and Austria-Hungary, were concerned about Russian expansion in eastern Europe 
which could threaten their own interests, with Austria-Hungary especially being 
opposed to the empowerment of Russia and Russian subjects, protected under the 
capitulations, from extending their influence (Blumi, 2003a; Kent, 2005; 
Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25). The Treaty of Berlin and its subsequent revisions, such as the 
Mürzsteg agreement of 1903, required international oversight of the Ottoman state’s 
activities in Macedonia (Rodogno, 2012: 188; M. Schulz, 2011: 203 – 204; 
Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 24 – 28, 35 - 38). Extensive administrative and judicial reforms 
and the formation of a special international force to aid and monitor the Ottoman 
security forces in the territory were envisaged (Rodogno, 2012: 163; Yosmaoğlu, 
2013: 41 - 44). These policies, which amounted to an outside interference in the 
local society, could facilitate the advancement of the interests of those intervening 
within the province (Rodogno, 2012: 9). Historians of the period have also noted 
 
119 On the origins of the term “Macedonia” in late nineteenth century European cartography and its 
use of Roman place names see Yosmaoğlu (2013: 88). The Ottomans referred to this territory as 
“Rumeli” or “land of the Rum, or Romans” (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 86). 
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how most of the founders of the CUP, the ultimately predominant Young Turk 
faction, originated from Macedonia (Yosmaoğlu, 2006: 60; 2010: 160; Zürcher, 
2003). Macedonia is understood, in these accounts, as a frontier area where the 
effects of international competing interests were most intense, and where the 
Ottomans would eventually react. 
 
Historical accounts of other regions in the Ottoman Empire show how groups 
there also participated in the revolution and contributed to the emergence of a post-
revolutionary Ottoman public sphere (Campos, 2011; Der Matossian, 2014). 
Alongside agitation amongst armed groups, including Muslim and Christian bands in 
Macedonia, some of which were co-opted by or cooperated with the CUP, tax riots 
also occurred in present-day eastern Turkey in 1908, with tax revolts starting in the 
city of Erzurum in 1906 and continuing intermittently until 1908 (Hanioğlu, 2001: 
109 - 120; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 47). These riots involved coordination between 
Armenian and Kurdish local groups and Young Turk groups (Berberian, 2019). 
Unrest in eastern Anatolia had started the previous year, and these groups shared an 
opposition to the authoritarian rule of Abdülhamid II (Hanioğlu, 2001: 95 - 97). The 
coming together of these revolutionary movements would result in the emergence of 
a vibrant post-revolutionary public sphere in the Ottoman Empire (Der Matossian, 
2014; Özbek, 2005; 2007: 797). This public sphere, which centred around the 
reopening of the Ottoman parliament and the preparation for elections, involved the 
formation of associations and the creation of an active press  (Campos, 2011: 150 – 
152; L. Hudson, 2006: 164 - 167). The onset of democratic politics meant that the 
Ottoman people were understood as the sovereign who would be represented in 
parliament (Campos, 2011: 43 – 58; Moroni, 2017). A degree of popular 
sovereignty, however limited120, was therefore established for a period after the 
revolution. This new public in Ottoman society began to engage in politics 
(Karamürsel, 2016: 143 – 150; Kayalı, 1995: 271 - 273; Özbek, 2007). As Campos’s 
(2011) study of Ottoman Palestine and Jerusalem in this period demonstrates, 
different religious and ethnic communities forged new alliances and lobbied for their 
own interests, seeking often to frame them as a part of the general national interest. 
 
120 A burgeoning literature has emerged stressing how the CUP was, ultimately, deeply illiberal and 
engaged in the silencing of dissent through political assassinations and censorship, see Göçek (1996: 
130; 2008; 2011: 62 – 97), Hanioğlu (2011: 185 – 187), Sohrabi (2012) and Taglia (2015: 12). 
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The Ottoman people and the new Ottoman revolutionary state were therefore co-
constitutive of each other, in accordance with the concept of popular sovereignty 
used by the revolutionaries. 
  
Studies have not, however, focused on how constitutional developments within 
the Ottoman Empire were related to constitutional changes occurring elsewhere 
based on dominant European standards of ‘civilisation’. In considering the rise of 
anti-slavery movements and the general problematisation of slavery within the 
Ottoman Empire, Karamürsel (2016: 150) follows Weitz (2008) in acknowledging 
the significance of an international context that was more focused on outlining 
national boundaries and upholding ‘civilisation’ than on ensuring an extension of 
freedom. Further research can build on this insight to demonstrate how Ottoman 
elites and thinkers and those from other states they engaged with understood the 
standard of ‘civilisation’ and its implications. In contrast to republican or liberal 
notions of progress, which had been suppressed after the Napoleonic Wars, the idea 
of ‘civilisation’ gained the support of the influential conservative powers in Europe, 
including Russia and Austria-Hungary (Roshchin, 2017: 195). The Hague 
conferences in 1899 and 1907, which had been initiated by Russia, were important 
watersheds in the development of the idea of ‘civilisation’, as they condemned 
warfare and established an international court of tribunal (Abbenhuis, 2019; 
Kingsbury, 2002: 410 - 411; Reus-Smit, 1997: 578 - 579). Although the Ottoman 
Empire also had a delegation attending the conference, they were frequently 
interrupted by protests by Armenian movements and the Young Turks (Effynger, 
2008: 22). After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks121 would emphasise that 
the presence of constitutional rule demonstrated a state’s level of ‘civilisation’ 
(Blachford, 2019: 41; Jordheim and Neumann, 2011: 160 – 161). Theories of how 
Ottoman constitutional politics could and should unfold were produced by Ahmed 
Rıza (1907; [1922] 1990) and Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a; [1908] 1999b), before and 
during the period of the reintroduction of constitutional rule in 1908. Studying the 
impact of their theories can demonstrate whether the Young Turks, through 
introducing constitutional rule, were able to secure a general acceptance that the 
Ottoman Empire possessed a higher level of ‘civilisation’. This, in turn, can 
 
121 See Göçek (1996: 135).  
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demonstrate whether their theories facilitated the Ottoman state in its quest to gain 
recognition of its sovereign equality in global international society.   
 
3. The Young Turks and constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’: 
 
This section argues that the Young Turks developed an understanding of 
constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ to secure recognition of the 
sovereignty of their state, which they deployed in their constituent diplomacy 
following the 1908 revolution. It considers how the Young Turks developed 
different understandings of the concept of the standard of ‘civilisation’ before the 
revolution, drawing from the Ottoman and European contexts in which they were 
situated in. Various interpretations of this concept resulted in the emergence of 
separate branches of the Young Turks following the 1902 Paris conference of the 
Ottoman opposition. The relevance of these different understandings of ‘civilisation’ 
for the constituent power at both the international and the domestic level is 
discussed. The Young Turk revolution is considered as a moment of both domestic 
and global reconstitution involving the defence of sovereignty (see also Fortna, 
2011) through the idea of ‘civilisation’. This builds on accounts that have compared 
the impact of the revolution to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905122, the Russian 
Revolution of 1905 and the Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Aydın, 2007: 71 - 92; 
Hanioğlu, 2001: 318; Kurzman, 1998; 2008; Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). The section then 
focuses on how the diplomacy that the revolutionaries engaged in differed from the 
Ottoman state’s established policy of accepting European reforms in its territory. 
The Young Turks were successful in advancing their conception of sovereignty 
insofar as they secured the withdrawal of the European gendarme force from 
Macedonia. Crucially, they were able to convince the European powers to withdraw 
the military force, that had been sent to oversee the reforms and maintain peace in 
Macedonia, by claiming that their revolution heralded the onset of a new civilised 
Ottoman regime. The constitutional nature of the regime persuaded the European 
powers to withdraw their force. This section shows how constitutionalism can be 
understood as a standard of ‘civilisation’. By demonstrating that they were civilised 
actors, the Young Turks were able to normalise the position of the Ottoman state in 
 
122 See Worringer (2004: 219; 2014).  
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global international society and secure the recognition of the Ottoman Empire’s 
sovereignty over areas of policy in Macedonia.  
 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was subjected to 
considerable stigmatisation on the basis of its supposed failure to meet the standard 
of ‘civilisation’ (Ahmad, 2000). This prompted different reactions by individuals in 
the empire. The Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel had translated the texts of 
international lawyers such as Twiss, Lorimer, Westlake and Lawrence, who had 
discussed the standard of ‘civilisation’ (Genell, 2016: 269). These lawyers believed 
that international law ought to reflect what they understood to be the naturally 
occurring hierarchy of different actors according to their level of ‘civilisation’123. In 
response to the challenges of the standard of ‘civilisation’, Ottoman intellectuals and 
statesmen, such as the Islamic intellectual, Jamal-addin Afghani and other leading 
figures of Islamic authority, sought to show that the Ottoman Empire was the 
representative of a distinct, Islamic civilisation (Aydın, 2007: 448; Keddie, 1968: 30; 
Matthee, 1989: 153; Taglia, 2015: 35). In the course of his debate with the French 
thinker, Ernest Renan, Afghani attempted to portray Islam and Islamic states as 
compatible with ‘civilisation’ (Aydın, 2007: 48 - 52). Specifically, Afghani believed 
that the civilisational achievements of Islam were comparable to those of 
Christianity and stressed the role of Islam in preserving Hellenic thought, which 
Europeans saw as fundamental to Western thought and culture (Aydın, 2007: 49). 
These views also influenced intellectual leaders of the different factions of the 
Young Turks (Taglia, 2015). Ahmed Rıza, a Young Turk and a former Ottoman 
bureaucrat based in Paris, argued that the Ottomans could contribute to universal 
‘civilisation’ (Taglia, 2015: 59; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 100 - 101). He followed the 
positivist philosopher, Pierre Lafitte, in claiming that ‘civilisation’ was not limited to 
the geography of Europe (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 100 – 101). On the other hand, 
Sabahaddin, argued that ‘civilisation’ ought to be understood as complying with 
international standards (Hanioğlu, 2001: 88 - 89). Sabahaddin envisaged a greater 
level of cooperation between the Ottomans and the Great Powers to enable the 
 
123 See the discussion of Lorimer in Bowden ([2009] 2014: 15, 122, 126, 143 – 144, 187 - 188).  On 
Lawrence and Westlake, see Keal (1995: 199). For a discussion of Westlake, see also Bowden 
([2009] 2014: 117, 120, 122, 144). On Twiss and how he discussed the Ottoman Empire see Rodogno 
(2016).  
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empire to meet existing international standards, whereas Ahmed Rıza emphasised 
that the Ottomans were already ‘civilised’ by virtue of their embeddedness in Islamic 
civilisation (Hanioğlu, 2001: 88 - 89). 
 
 At the start of the twentieth century, several intellectuals from the Ottoman 
Empire advanced proposals of what could be done to enable the Ottoman Empire to 
overcome the stigma it was facing at the international level. Foremost among these 
intellectuals were Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza, who, from their base of operations 
in Paris and notwithstanding differences in their views, were united in calling for the 
reintroduction of the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (Taglia, 2015: 4). Ahmed Rıza, 
especially, suggested that the removal of arbitrary despotism and the return of a 
constitutional regime would prevent the Ottoman Empire from being stigmatised in 
global international society. The Mechveret journal, which Ahmed Rıza published 
from Paris, presented itself initially, from 1895 to 1896, as a journal that would assist 
the Ottoman Sultan, urging him to reintroduce the constitution (Taglia, 2015: 62). 
However, by 1897, following a series of territorial losses, including the loss of 
effective Ottoman control over Tunisia124 and parts of the Balkans, the Mechveret 
became far more critical of the Sultan (Taglia, 2015: 63). Ahmed Rıza, at this point, 
developed a positivist argument for the reintroduction of the constitution (Taglia, 
2015: 63). Adopting a positivist approach would allow the Ottoman Empire to 
harness what Ahmed Rıza took to be its already relatively high level of 
“civilisation”, stemming from its connection to Islamic civilisation (Taglia, 2015: 
72)125. This was because positivism entailed, as Comte (see the discussion in Taglia, 
2015: 56) suggested, a belief in progress, but did not question the achievements of 
Islamic civilisations in the past (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 101). Ahmed Rıza prepared a 
leaflet titled Crise de l’Orient (i.e. the Crisis of the Orient) and published by the 
 
124 France and Britain concluded an agreement in 1897 which consolidated France’s control over 
Tunisia, where there was already a French protectorate (M.D. Lewis, 2013: 65).  
125 Ahmed Rıza followed Afghani and other Islamic reformists, such as Namık Kemal (see Aydın, 
2007: 36; Deringil, 1993; Landen, 2006) and Rifa’a Badawi Rafi al-Tahtawi (see Taglia,2015: 35 - 
36), in defending the achievements of Islamic civilisation, in the face of criticisms. In doing this, he 
was also influenced by the arguments of the positivist thinker, Gustave Le Bon (see Taglia, 2015: 71). 
According to Turnaoğlu (2017a: 101) the ideas of the positivist Pierre Laffitte (1908: 196 – 197 as 
cited in Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 101), who published his The Positive Science of Morals: Its 
Opportuneness, Its Outlines and Its Chief Applications, in 1908, influenced Ahmed Rıza. Laffitte 
(1908) had argued here that Europe ought not to be considered the vanguard of human progress and 
that other geographies could also contribute to the evolution of humanity (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 101).  
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Paris branch of his movement in 1907, effectively opposed claims that the Ottomans 
could never be considered civilised by challenging common European arguments 
used to explain the causes of the crisis. For instance, the idea of holy war, presented 
by European commentators, such as Gustave Louis Binger, who published his Le 
Péril de l'Islam (The Peril of Islam) in 1906, as one of the practices keeping the 
Ottoman Empire behind in terms of level of ‘civilisation’, was challenged (Ahmed 
Rıza, 1907: 29). Ahmed Rıza (1907: 29) argued that holy war did not necessarily 
clash with international law. In his leaflet, Ahmed Rıza (1907: 126) argued that if the 
Ottoman Empire could develop its own constitutional system it could overcome 
many of its supposed shortcomings, identified by European commentators. 
 
 Ahmed Rıza also presented an extensive account of how removing despotism 
could lead to improvements in other areas of society and thereby address what 
European commentators referred to as the “crise” (i.e. “crisis”, see Ahmed Rıza, 
1907: 117) in the Ottoman Empire.  Here, Ahmed Rıza (1907) provided various 
explanations to account for what he believed to be the problematic state of affairs in 
the Ottoman Empire. However, instead of arguing that these were indicators of the 
low level of civilisation in the empire, Ahmed Rıza (1907) emphasised that it was 
the continuing arbitrary rule of the Sultan which corrupted institutions in the 
Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Rıza (1907) inserted quotes in his booklet from European 
thinkers and referred to episodes from European history. Fatalism, for instance, was 
presented as potentially a mark of wisdom, involving an acceptance of things that 
one cannot change, as suggested by Auguste Comte in his Cours de philosophie 
positiviste126, published in a series of texts between 1830 – 1841, from which Ahmed 
Rıza (1907: 18) cites the 28th page in defence of this point. The institution of the 
caliphate, on the other hand, was depicted as echoing Hegel’s claim that kings are 
essentially “the incarnation of the idea of the divine on Earth” 127 (Ahmed Rıza, 
1907: 19 – 20). Similarly, Ahmed Rıza (1907: 88) quoted the views of European 
thinkers, regarding the separate or unequal status of women, to justify polygamy and 
the institution of the Harem.128 Ahmed Rıza (1907: 40) claimed that the impression 
 
126 On this particular text and its context see Richard (2018). 
127 The quote that Ahmed Rıza (1907: 19 – 20) attributes to Hegel reads as follows, in its original 
French: “Le roi, c’est l’incarnation de l’idée divine sur la terre.” 
128 Ahmed Rıza (1907: 88) claimed that contemporary European thinkers, including women, such as 
Santory, de Girardin, de Saumery, as well as men, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, George Sand and 
 107 
of the “fanaticism” of Islam had been fostered by the Russian Empire and its own 
religious chauvinism, which had been discredited following Japan’s victory over 
Russia in 1905. According to Ahmed Rıza (1907: 141) the feeling of “injustice” was 
a major source of grievance of the Muslim population of the empire, who, unlike the 
revolutionary movements of their Christian compatriots, could not receive the 
support of the Great Powers in challenging the despotic state. Ahmed Rıza’s (1907: 
141) stance on this matter was summarised in his following statement;  
“Are they really braver or more miserable than the Turks? No. They revolted 
because they felt supported and pushed by a foreign Power.”129 
Ahmed Rıza (1907: 138) also stressed the importance of representative government, 
arguing that “blind and passive obedience to the whims of a despot is absolutely 
contrary to Islamic principles; many times, moreover, the Muslims have done 
themselves justice by dethroning their rebel rulers to the prescriptions of the law”130. 
Therefore, Ahmed Rıza drew upon both European ideas, and the commitment of the 
predecessors of the Young Turks, to demonstrate the ‘civilised’ nature of the 
Ottoman Empire and Islam, more generally. 
 
 Sabahaddin argued, though, that simply restoring the constitutional order of 
1876 would not be sufficient for the development of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman 
Empire. Instead, Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 66 - 67) argued that other reforms were 
required so that Ottoman society could conform to the standard of ‘civilisation’ 
envisaged by the great powers. Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 64) argued that his goals 
involved  
“demonstrating that the oppression experienced during the Abdülhamid II period 
by these Turks and the other Muslim elements of the Ottoman Empire were not 
due to one person or a group of persons, but instead surfaced because of 
lifestyles and social deficiencies.”131 
 
Napoleon Bonaparte asserted that excessive freedom was a vice, in the context of his discussion of the 
status of women in the Ottoman Empire.  
129 The original French text reads as follows: “Sont-ils réellement plus courageux ou plus malheureux 
que les Turcs? Non. Ils se sont révoltés parce qu’ils se sentaient soutenus et poussés par une 
Puissance étrangère.” (Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 141). 
130 The original French text reads as follows: “L’obéissance aveugle et passive aux caprices d’un 
despote est absolument contraire aux caprices d’un despote est absolument contraire aux principes 
islamiques; maintes fois, d’ailleurs, les Musulmans se sont fait justice en détrônant leurs souverains 
rebelles aux prescriptions de la loi.” (Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 138).  
131 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Türkler ve umumiyetle 
anasır-ı müslime-i Osmaniyye’ye karşı istibdadın bir veya bir kaç kişi tarafından değil fakat tarz-ı 
ma’işet (yaşam) ve naka’is-i ictima’iyyemizden ne’şet (meydana gelmek) ettiğini göstermek.“ 
(Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 64). 
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As one of his followers, Hersekli Satvet Lütfi ([1908] 1999: 63 - 69) pointed out, 
Sabahaddin argued that the original constitution of 1876, the Kanun-i Esasi, called 
for decentralised government (i.e. “adem-i merkeziyyet-i idari” as quoted from 
Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 62), which would have enabled provinces to use 
their own resources rather than rely on the centre. Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 64) 
also argued that any future movement to transform the Ottoman Empire would need 
to explain its goals to the “civilised world”132 and to ensure “at least part of the 
Westerners, who are almost entirely against us, ought to be won over to support our 
national cause”133. This clashed with Ahmed Rıza’s suspicious attitude towards the 
Great Powers. However, Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 74) argued that, even “if a 
nation was conquered by foreigners, the inhabitants of this nation can still regain 
their laws if their morality is not corrupted. But, nothing can save a nation if 
immorality has become embedded in them”134. In addition, to end concerns that his 
programme would result in further intervention, Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 66 - 67) 
argued that  
“because America and Europe have obvious interests in the progress of 
Turkey it is essential that all civilised countries in the world are agreed that 
the Ottomans resolve the eastern question on their own. Indeed, only this 
means of resolving the problem will not violate any interests, and will, in 
fact, contribute to transforming the bitter rivalries amongst states into 
beneficial competition, which will result in active initiatives and 
praiseworthy efforts…”135. 
Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 67) added that 
“the day the Great Powers recognise the principle of freedom-loving Turkey 
that ‘the Ottoman state belongs to the Ottomans’ will be when a general 
peace emerges” 136. 
 
132 Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 64) here uses the term “nizam-ı alem”. 
133 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “büsbütün aleyhimizde 
bulunan efkar-ı Garbiyyeden bir kısmını olsun da’va-yı millimize kazanmak” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 
1999a: 64). 
134 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Ecnebi istilasına 
uğrayan bir millet ahlakı büsbütün bozulmamışsa hukukunu yavaş yavaş istidad edebilir. Fakat 
ahlaksızlığın damarlarına işlediği bir milleti hiç bir şey kurtaramaz!” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 74). 
135 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Avrupa ile Amerika’nın 
da Türkiye’nin terakkisinde menfa’at-i azimeleri derkar olduğu için cihanın bütün mütemeddin 
devletleri şark mes’elesinin bi’z-zat Osmanlılar tarafından hallini temmeni etmelidirler. Çünki yalnız 
bu suret-i hall hiç bir menfa’ati ihlal etmeyecek, bi’l-akis devletler arasındaki mühlik rekabetleri 
yavaş yavaş nafi müsabakatlara tahvil eyeleyecek, bu müsabakatın netayic-i ameliyyesi de en fa’al 
teşebbüslerle en namus-kar gayretlerin muvafakıyyeti olacak!...  ” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 66 - 
67). 
136 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Cihan-ı medeniyyet 
bilmelidir ki ta’affün ve tefessüh eden resmi Türkiye’nin arkasında meftun-ı sa’y ve adalet bir 
içtima’i Türkiye yükselmekde! … ve hürriyyet-perver Türkiye’nin ‘Osmanlı devleti Osmanlılarındır’ 
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Therefore, Sabahaddin presented a vision of constitutionalism that differed from 
Ahmed Rıza’s. Uniquely, Sabahaddin emphasised the need to take into account the 
interests of the Great Powers and advocated decentralisation and social reform as 
two means to consolidate his programme of ‘civilisation’.  
 
 In the lead up to the Young Turk revolution, Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza 
negotiated an agreement between their two factions in 1907. This enabled them to 
cooperate with each other during and after the 1908 revolution (Hanioğlu, 2001: 261 
- 278). The revolution, orchestrated by military officers aligned with the Young 
Turks, who were mostly situated in the empire’s European territories, forced the 
Sultan to issue a declaration accepting the constitution of 1876 and the principle of 
popular sovereignty (Moroni, 2017: 267) 137. During the revolution, the CPU 
External Branch sent two communications to the consulates of European states in 
Macedonia (Hanioğlu, 2001: 265 - 271). The first of these criticised the policies of 
the Treaty of Berlin powers, singling out Russia as being more interested in the 
dismembering of the Ottoman Empire than in its rejuvenation (CPU, 1908; 
Hanioğlu, 2001: 265). This rejuvenation could only be achieved through the 
establishment of a constitutional order guaranteeing the rights of all Ottomans in the 
empire (CPU, 1908; Hanioğlu, 2001: 265). The second set of communications, on 
12138 and 22139 July, were more emphatic in underlining the universalist perspective 
of the Young Turks, stressing that they were dedicated to the establishment of a 
constitutional system that would ensure the “liberty” of all Ottoman citizens (as 
quoted in Hanioğlu, 2001: 271; Lamb, 1908)140. Because of the changes to the 
Ottoman constitution brought about by the 1908 revolution, the  representatives of 
the great powers agreed unanimously to stand down the gendarmerie force in 
 
rükn-i siyasisini düvel-i mu’azzamanın fi’len kabul ettikleri gün sulh-i umumi metinen takarrur 
eyleyecek!” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 67). 
137 Abdülhamid II gave a speech during the opening of the Ottoman Parliament where he argued that 
he would, from now on, remain committed to maintaining the constitutional order (Moroni, 2017: 
267). 
138 The CUP’s communication on 12 July, declared that Şemsi Paşa, the Ottoman commander in 
Macedonia, whom the CUP had assassinated, was in charge of an undisciplined rabble and that the 
CUP would re-establish the Ottoman constitution of 1876, see Hanioğlu (2001: 270) and Heathcote-
Smith (1908).  
139 In the communication on 22 July, the CUP argued that their reading of European history meant 
that they were dedicated to “love of liberty, equality, and justice” (as quoted in Hanioğlu, 2001: 271; 
see also Lamb, 1908). 
140 However, the Young Turks  did not send any communication to the Russian consulates in 
Macedonia (Hanioğlu, 2001: 265). 
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Macedonia (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 324 – 325; Tokay, 2003: 62; 2013: 177 - 178; 
Ünal, 1998: 141). The end of intercommunal violence in Macedonia, brought about 
by the inclusion of most armed factions in the 1908 revolution, ended the pretext for 
the presence of the gendarmerie (Brooks, 2014: 656). Therefore, the Young Turks 
presented themselves and, indeed, became the constituent power in the Ottoman 
Empire, carrying out a  ‘civilising mission’. This prompted the Europeans to 
withdraw their security presence, whereby the Young Turks moved closer to 
achieving their goal of attaining sovereign equality in global international society. 
 
4. Limits of the revolutionary constituent diplomacy and the Young Turks: 
Crete, Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
This section explains how the revolutionary constituent diplomacy of the Young 
Turks, centring on the use of the concept of civilisation to secure recognition of the 
sovereign equality Ottoman Empire, was unsuccessful in a number of cases. 
Reforming the Ottoman Empire, by presenting it as a constitutional state under 
popular sovereignty, failed to prevent the Ottomans losing control over Bulgaria, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete (Ünal, 1998). The section begins by noting how 
constitutionalism was taken to be a standard of civilisation by the Young Turks. 
However, civilisation, in this context, was a contested concept. In the post-
revolutionary Ottoman Empire, it became possible to identify Islamic and other 
understandings of ‘civilisation’. Previously, under Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman 
Empire had been promoted as the representative of Islamic civilisation (Deringil, 
1998: 44 - 67). However, several crises that occurred shortly after the revolution of 
1908 revealed how outside actors continued to view the Ottoman Empire as only 
having a legitimate claim to sovereignty over Muslim communities (Mirkova, 2013; 
Ünal, 1998). Significantly, Bulgarian representatives argued that the Ottomans could 
maintain sovereignty over a part of Bulgarian territory by administering the needs of 
the Islamic community present there (Ünal, 1998: 142 - 143). Events in Bulgaria 
inspired certain political movements in Crete to declare union with Greece on similar 
terms and thereby challenge the Ottoman claim to sovereignty (Fujinami, 2016: 322; 
Ünal, 1998: 151). Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by Austria-Hungary soon 
afterwards (Ünal, 1998: 137 – 139, 146). As a signatory of the Treaty of Berlin, 
Vienna argued that annexation was justified on the basis of its right to intervene to 
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maintain order in the province (M. Schulz, 2011: 189 – 190, 199, 204). As in the 
case of Bulgaria, the Austro-Hungarians argued that a semblance of Ottoman 
sovereignty could be maintained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the proposal that the 
Sultan may appoint religious officials jointly with the Emperor. The territorial losses 
of 1908 show how the attempts of the Young Turks to reconstitute their state and 
international society to safeguard the sovereignty of their state by appealing to 
constitutionalism as a standard of civilisation were only partially successful. 
 
In their framing of constitutionalism as a standard of civilisation, the Young 
Turks sought to alter the relations of the Ottoman state with its periphery through the 
universalist, and therefore, all-encompassing vision presented by constitutionalism. 
Abdülhamid’s regime had underlined that Islamic civilisation was separate but equal 
to Western civilisation141. In contrast, the revolutionaries claimed to be part of a 
universal civilisation and they aimed to preserve sovereignty in those areas which 
fell under Ottoman sovereignty. These areas included the provinces of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the principality of Bulgaria and the autonomous province of Crete 
(Kostopoulou, 2013; 2016). Under Articles 24 and 25 of the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the sanjak142 of Novi Pazar, were occupied by 
Austria-Hungary (M. Schulz, 2011: 204). The aim was to maintain peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina which had seen anti-Ottoman uprisings and ethno-religious violence in 
the periods 1831 - 1832 and 1875 - 1877 (Babuna, 2011; Radusic, 2011). Bulgaria 
was originally recognised as an independent state under the Treaty of San Stefano of 
1878 (Tokay, 2011: 253 - 257). However, due to the pressure of Britain, which 
opposed the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans, by the terms of the 
Treaty of Berlin Bulgaria became an autonomous principality and tributary of the 
Ottoman state (Tokay, 2011: 253 - 257). As a principality, Bulgaria could still 
conclude a military protocol with Russia in 1885 and expand its territory to include 
the province of Eastern Rumelia143 (Hacısalihoğlu, 2011: 138). The Ottoman 
 
141 See Deringil (1998) and Aydın (2007; 2017). 
142 A sanjak was an Ottoman military and political administrative unit (see Imber, [2004] 2019: 151 - 
159).  
143 The Eastern Rumelian tribute, here, referred to the funds that were expected to be paid by the 
province to the Ottoman Empire, according to Article 9 (Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, 
Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, [1878] 1908: 407). 
The province had been recognised as a tributary territory within the Ottoman Empire in 1878 under 
Article 13 of the Treaty of Berlin (Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, 
Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, [1878] 1908: 408). 
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province of Crete was also reorganised as an autonomous province  in 1898 
(Fujinami, 2013: 324). Inspired by the promise of reform, the Cretan Revolutionary 
Committee had previously revolted against the Ottoman state, before agreeing to 
extensive reforms in 1878, in the Pact of Halepa (Holland, 1999: 254). This pact 
would subsequently not be honoured by both sides (Fujinami, 2013: 324; Şenışık, 
2011)144. In 1898, in response to a revolt the previous year and after clashes with the 
Ottomans, Crete became, despite the protest of the Ottoman state145, an autonomous 
state protected by the intervening powers of Britain, France, Italy and Russia 
(Fujinami, 2013: 324; Şenışık, 2011). While still technically a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, Crete came to enjoy extensive rights of local administration (Fujinami, 
2013: 324)146. The Abdülhamid II regime had gradually come to represent the affairs 
of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria147 and Crete148. However, 
following the revolution of 1908, there emerged the view that the Ottoman subjects 
of these territories were all citizens under the constitutional order. 
 
Although the revolutionary regime stressed constitutionalism as a standard of 
‘civilisation’ to justify its claims to sovereignty, it was unable to prevent Bulgaria’s 
declaration of  independence and Crete’s decision to unite with Greece. 
Significantly, both actions were justified on the basis of the perceived 
incompatibility of continued Ottoman rule with the supposed level of ‘civilisation’ of 
the territories that were governed by the Ottomans. This contrasted with 
Sabahaddin’s ([1908] 1999a: 65) vision of how the presence of a “civilised” and 
“reformed Turkey (sic) would be of benefit even to the Balkan states who have been 
independent for a long time”149, as they could count on a reinvigorated Ottoman 
 
144 The pact was integrated into the Treaty of Berlin in Article 23 (Fujinami, 2013: 324). 
145 See Şenışık (2010: 41). 
146 Prince George of Greece was appointed a commissioner of Crete (Fujinami, 2013: 324). 
147 On how claims to sovereignty in southeast Europe in general and Bulgarian in particular came to 
be based on the perceived level of “civilization” of claimants, which, in turn, came to be understood 
as based on whether or not their religion was civilised, see Mirkova (2013: 956).  
148 The Ottoman government had first been forced, by the “Great Powers”, to appoint a Christian 
governor to the island to prevent tensions and its officials understood their goal to be the securing of 
the legitimacy of the state, but the last governor, Beroviç Paşa, fled in 1897 (Şenışık, 2010: 31). 
However, they later found themselves defending the interests of the Muslim community of the island, 
who petitioned the Ottoman government to protect them from armed Christian groups (Şenışık, 2010. 
38). 
149 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Türklerden müddet-i 
medideden beri ayrılan Balkan akvamının bile ıslah edilmiş bir Türkiye’ye ihtiyaçlarıyla sabit” 
(Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 65). 
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Empire to check the expansionist efforts of “peoples to their north”150. However,  
Bulgaria requested the post-revolutionary Ottoman government to approve the 
establishment of a council of bishops, operating under the Bulgarian Exarchate 
(Buchanan, 1908a: 1). The aim was to unite Exarchist bishops in Bulgaria with those 
in Macedonia (Buchanan, 1908a: 1). But even though Sabahaddin had argued for the 
establishment of a decentralised form of rule, the CUP, which became an influential 
post-revolutionary faction151, sought to pursue policies of centralisation152. Hence 
Bulgaria’s request was not accepted by the CUP153 and tensions escalated between 
Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Although the Bulgarian declaration was opposed 
by the Treaty of Berlin powers, because it challenged the status of Bulgaria in 
international law154, the province ultimately became independent. Tensions had 
flared up before the declaration of independence, when the Young Turks sought to 
emphasise the status of Bulgaria as a province by not inviting the chief Bulgarian 
official in Istanbul, Getchov, to an ambassadorial banquet in honour of Abdülhamid 
II’s birthday (Ünal, 1998: 141). In line with the spirit of the Treaty of Berlin, 
involving the recognition of different religions and national groups and promoting 
their development, Paprikoff, the Bulgarian military representative in Istanbul, 
stated, after the Getchov affair, that the Bulgarian authorities would only welcome 
Ottoman officials in the country to administer the affairs of the vakıfs or Islamic 
 
150 Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 65) refers to these as “akvam-i şimaliyye”. Fujinami (2013: 882) reads 
this text as justifying Ottoman rule over Balkan peoples who were still under Ottoman territorial 
sovereignty, but, as has been demonstrated, the Balkans was also a space which was shaped by global 
and international developments.  
151 The CUP had established a line of communication with Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Ottoman 
inspector of the three westernmost provinces, i.e. Macedonia (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 18). Hilmi Paşa 
would later use his influence to ensure that Said Paşa, Abdülhamid II’s pre-revolutionary Grand 
Vizier, was dismissed and replaced by Kamil Paşa (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 18; Fujinami, 2013: 889). 
Kamil Paşa was later compelled to accept Recep Paşa as the Minister of War by the CUP (Ahmad, 
[1969] 2010: 18).  
152 Bahaeddin Şakir, one of the leaders of the CPU, which would subsequently be renamed the CUP, 
argued against Sabahaddin’s programme of granting local autonomy (Hanioğlu, 2001: 89). Although 
Şakir did not criticise the dedication of Sabahaddin’s movement to “international law” he nonetheless 
was eager to avoid autonomy, which he believed would result in the emergence of spaces of shared 
sovereignty between the Ottomans and other actors (Hanioğlu, 2001: 89). 
153 The issue of ending religious conflict between the Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches, which 
also shaped and fuelled their conflict in Macedonia and the Balkans more generally, was taken 
seriously by the CUP, who would later introduce a Church Law of 1910 that defined the identity of 
the Patriarchate of Constantinople as “Rum”, meaning Eastern Roman, as opposed to Greek 
(Fujinami, 2007: 108).  
154 Britain’s representative in Sophia, Buchanan (1908b: f 87) argued that the Ottomans were acting 
on the basis of their “Treaty rights”. Both Austria-Hungary and Germany urged Bulgaria to avoid 
provoking the Ottomans (Lowther, 1908g).  
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associations (Buchanan, 1908c; Ünal, 1998: 143, 157).155 On 20 September 1908, 
following a dispute between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire concerning the 
Oriental Railway in Eastern Rumelia, Bulgarian troops acted independently of the 
Ottoman Empire, taking control of the railway156 (Ünal, 1998: 143). In opposition to 
Sabahaddin’s vision, Bulgaria stressed that the Ottoman Empire was not entitled to 
rule over any aspects of its politics aside from overseeing the affairs of its Muslims 
(Buchanan, 1908c). This echoed the Abdülhamid II regime’s approach of sustaining 
the empire through empowering the Islamic element, even though the connection 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslims was now used to justify Bulgaria’s 
independence. 
 
The significance of religious arguments in Bulgaria’s declaration of 
independence was evidence that the Young Turk’s efforts to present 
constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ had not succeeded. Sabahaddin 
([1908] 1999b: 100) had argued, in an article clarifying his position, that 
decentralised rule would enable the Ottoman Empire to maintain control of Ottoman 
territories, such as the “islands in the Mediterranean”, because of the military 
benefits it would provide (Fujinami, 2013: 882)157. This was because, according to 
Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999b: 100),158 decentralisation would be conducive to 
“teşebbüs-i şahsi”, which can be translated as “private initiative”, which would, in 
turn, produce wealth that could be taxed for the purposes of funding military 
activities. However, ultimately, constitutional rule frustrated Bulgaria’s goal of 
gaining international support for and encouraging local armed groups seeking 
autonomy in Macedonia (Bechev, 2017: 45 – 47; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 14 – 16). 
Autonomy could also enable the Ottoman Empire to maintain a limited form of 
sovereignty, in the form of quasi-sovereignty, also termed “suzerainty”, (see Bechev, 
 
155 Simultaneously, a railway strike along the border between Bulgaria and the remainder of the 
empire resulted in both sides mobilising their troops (Mentzel, 2003). 
156 This was to eventually lead Bulgaria to formally declare its independence on 5 October 1908 
(Ünal, 1998: 146 - 147). Ünal (1996: 39) notes how Ahmed Rıza told Austro-Hungarian officials that 
their annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina encouraged Bulgaria to declare independence.   
157 See also Fujinami’s (2013: 882) discussion of this article, where he points to how it played a 
crucial role in distinguishing between administrative decentralisation (“adem-i merkeziyet-i idari” as 
quoted from Fujinami, 2013: 881) and political decentralisation (“adem-i merkeziyet-i siyasi” as 
quoted from Fujinami, 2013: 881). Sabahaddin argued for administrative decentralisation, distinct 
from the existing forms of sovereignty in Crete and Eastern Rumelia, that Kostopoulou (2013) defines 
as shared, and Mirkova (2013: 970) understands as “quasi-sovereignty” (Fujinami, 2013: 881).  
158 See also the discussion in Fujinami (2013: 882). 
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2017: 46; Ünal, 1998: 142) which would take the form of the empire representing 
and administering the interests of Muslims. The responses of various signatories of 
the Treaty of Berlin to the declaration of Bulgarian independence did not amount to 
a defence of Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans (Ünal, 1998). On 22 September, 
Russia’s Acting Foreign Minister and the British ambassador in Russia, Nicolson 
(1908a), with whom he communicated, both believed that Bulgaria and the Ottoman 
Empire would need to be warned to act with moderation159. The Russian acting 
minister also added that Russia and the other powers could suggest that the planned 
withdrawal of the gendarmerie force, maintained in Macedonia by the signatories of 
the Treaty of Berlin, could be halted (Nicolson, 1908a). Six days later, Russia’s 
ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Tcharykoff, told Nicolson (1908b) that all of the 
signatories of the Treaty of Berlin should devise a means of responding to the 
declaration of independence. However, Tcharykoff also told Nicolson (1908b) that 
Bulgaria’s actions in occupying Eastern Rumelia had not been unlawful, since 
Bulgaria already held control over Eastern Rumelia, in contrast to the situation 
envisaged in 1878.160 With the Berlin powers divided on the nature of Ottoman 
sovereignty over Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria was poised to declare its independence, 
while allowing the Ottomans to maintain some control over the Muslim populations’ 
affairs. This reflected the view that had been expressed in the Treaty of Berlin, 
according to which the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire were to be treated as if they 
were a distinct nation or minority, represented internationally by the Ottomans. 
 
The Ottoman government responded to the declaration of independence by 
proposing a policy that would permit the Ottomans to maintain a degree of control 
over Bulgaria. The Grand Vizier, protesting at the declaration and Bulgaria’s seizing 
of the Oriental Railway161, called for Ottoman sovereignty to be maintained under a 
 
159 Lowther (1908b) was informed by the British Consul at Serres that bands near Perin would fight 
alongside Bulgaria in the event of a war with the aim of seizing the strategically important Kresna 
Pass.  
160 Although Eastern Rumelia was originally considered a separate administrative unit to Bulgaria, it 
had been accepted as a part of the then-Principality of Bulgaria in 1885, after which the Ottomans 
also recognised the Bulgarian Prince as the governor of Eastern Rumelia in the Tophane Agreement 
(Prévost, 2012: 30). 
161 The Oriental Railway was a railway line situated between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, 
where, in the lead up to Bulgarian independence, a strike of workers, which the Bulgarians and 
Ottomans claimed the other had instigated, prompted Bulgarian troops to assume control of the line 
(Mentzel, 2003). 
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regime of international protection modelled on Crete, according to Lowther (1908f), 
the British ambassador in Istanbul. The Grand Vizier demanded that a similar system 
be introduced in the province of Eastern Rumelia, which included parts of eastern 
Bulgaria, in order to maintain Ottoman sovereignty over at least part of Bulgaria 
(Lowther, 1908f). The Ottoman Ambassador in London argued that Britain should 
not accept the Ottoman loss of Eastern Rumelia, but the British Foreign Secretary, 
Sir Edward Grey (1908i: 1; 1908j: f 275) sought to reach an agreement with Russia 
on the fate of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. According to Lowther (1908f), the 
Grand Vizier intended Eastern Rumelia to become a buffer zone to defend the 
Ottoman Empire against possible encroachments by armed groups from Bulgaria. 
The Grand Vizier further added, in his communication to Lowther (1908f: f 239), 
that he believed that Articles 23 and 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which restricted 
Ottoman sovereignty, as well as the capitulations, had “lapse[d] automatically as a 
result of the establishment of the Constitution.” Grey (1908l) later reported, how in 
the interests of calculating the tribute owed by Bulgaria to the Ottoman Empire, 
Rifat Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador in London, had stated that Eastern Rumelia 
should be considered separately from Bulgaria. By stressing that the Ottomans were 
entitled to tribute payments under the Treaty of Berlin, from Bulgaria and Eastern 
Rumelia, Rifat Paşa had essentially accepted that the province was no longer a part 
of the empire, but a tributary of it (Grey, 1908l). Ottoman arguments for retaining 
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, on the basis of their constitutional and hence 
‘civilised’ regime162, were unsuccessful and the independence of Bulgaria provided a 
template for other states seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire. The 
declaration of Bulgarian independence provoked Crete to declare its union with 
Greece, which was not initially recognised officially by Greece (Ünal, 1998: 151). 
However the prominent Greek international lawyer, Georgios Streit, believed that it 
was justified because of Greece’s higher level of “civilization”, stemming from its 
adherence to the Christian religion (Fujinami, 2016: 333). Arguments highlighting 
the purported civilisational inferiority of the Ottomans were used to rule out any 
form of continued Ottoman sovereignty for territories aiming to secede, even after 
the revolution of 1908. 
 
162 Buchanan (1908a: 2), a British diplomat, informed Grey that the independence of Bulgaria could 
be considered as a means of resolving the unrest in Macedonia, since it meant that Bulgaria could 
“content herself with the development of her internal resources”. 
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The Young Turks also failed to convince other states that they were ‘civilised’ 
enough to govern the Ottoman Empire when appealing to constitutionalism as a 
standard of ‘civilisation’ in the context of the Bosnian crisis. Austria-Hungary 
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was formally still a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, although it was occupied by Austria-Hungary since 1876. In 1881, during a 
meeting of the emperors of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, Austria-
Hungary’s right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina was acknowledged (B. Schmitt, 
1937: 3). To justify annexation, which ran counter to the Treaty of Berlin, references 
were made to the purported “civilizing” mission of Austria-Hungary (Francis Joseph 
I, 1908: 3; see also Goschen, 1908b). According to Goschen (1908b: 1), the British 
Ambassador in Vienna, the annexation involved the creation of a “third divisional 
territory” in the form of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be added to the two 
existing territories of Austria and Hungary. Customs duties were to be abolished 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other territories, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was to be granted its own parliament, or Diet (Goschen, 1908b: 1). 
Describing its ongoing role as one of “civilizing”, Austria-Hungary argued that the 
level of development of the two provinces required that they be annexed by Austria-
Hungary as part of their natural evolution (Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3). The  Young 
Turks’ support for a constitution for the Ottoman Empire did not prevent the Dual 
Monarchy from claiming that it was annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide it 
with a constitution (Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3 - 4). In his communication to Grey on 
7 October 1908, Goschen (1908b) enclosed a translated speech by the Austro-
Hungarian Emperor Francis Joseph I (1908: 3), explaining the reasons for the 
annexation. It read as follows:  
“To raise Bosnia and Herzegovina to a higher level of political life, we have 
determined to grant these two lands a constitutional system, which will make 
allowance for their present condition and general interests, and so create a 
legal basis for the representation of their wishes and needs. You shall have a 
voice in the settlement of the affairs of your country, which shall, as before, 
have its separate Administration”. 
Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian Empire referred to constitutionalism to advance 
its claim that it had reached a level of ‘civilisation’ that gave it the right to govern 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was when the Young Turks were deploying similar 
arguments to attempt to maintain control over their territory. 
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Prior to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, autonomous Islamic 
foundations had been established in the two provinces. The leadership of these 
foundations was to be determined by the ulema, meaning the Sunni Muslim religious 
officials of the Ottoman Empire and by local authorities (Goschen, 1908a). The 
Bosnian Muslims had, in fact, lobbied the Austro-Hungarian government for greater 
autonomy in 1900 (Goschen, 1908a). Following the annexation, they were granted 
the right to appoint three candidates for the position of Reis-ul-ulema, meaning the 
leader of the Muslim clergy in the territory, who would be approved by the Emperor 
of Austria-Hungary and confirmed by the Sheikh-ul Islam, the highest religious 
official under the Sultan (Goschen, 1908a). With the annexation of the provinces, 
Francis Joseph I (1908: 4) stated that the Dual Monarchy envisaged the “protection 
of spiritual welfare” and the “equal protection of all religious faiths” which would be 
guaranteed by the new constitutional arrangement. This meant that the sole role of 
the Ottoman state was to continue to provide joint leadership of the Islamic 
foundations. In the declaration of the annexation of the provinces, Francis Joseph I 
(1908: 4) stressed that Austria-Hungary would defend the “material and spiritual 
welfare” and progress of all subjects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by building on the 
fact “that the civilizing influence of improved education has made itself felt”163 (as 
quoted in Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3). In response, the Ottomans emphasised the 
illegality of the action164, but the convincing165 legal points they made in their 
defence were overridden by concerns regarding the level of ‘civilisation’ in the 
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was not considered to be an equal sovereign 
able to protest against the actions of Austria-Hungary. In a speech by the Austro-
Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron d’Aehrenthal (1908: 2 - 3) to his colleagues in the 
 
163 Lowther (1908d) reported that the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople also informed the Sultan 
that Austria would withdraw its troops from Novi Bazar in recognition of the Ottoman government’s 
good intentions after the revolution. 
164 See Grey (1908c) for the Ottoman protest. The Ottomans had responded by demanding an 
international conference to be held on the Treaty of Berlin, but Grey (1908g) noted that such a 
conference would only be possible if the contents of the proposed conference were discussed 
beforehand. Lowther (1908e) argued that the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, had 
stated that the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was meant to be temporary, in 
accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. See also Goschen (1908c) conveying a message to 
this effect, from Baron d’Aehrenthal, and Grey’s (1908a; 1908b) replies. 
165 Grey (1908b: 1) argued that the Permanent Undersecretary, Sir Charles Hardinge, had noted that 
Austria-Hungary had pledged on 17 January 1908 to make no changes to the Treaty of Berlin without 
first informing the Ottoman Empire or the other signatories, and that the Preamble of the Austrian 
Convention with Turkey of 1879 had stated that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Austria-Hungary would not have an impact on “the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan” 
over the provinces. 
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Ballhausplatz, which Goschen acquired, it was made clear that the reason why 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ought to be annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire was 
that it had  
“maintained order and tranquillity, has considerably raised the educational and 
political level of the population and has brought up a generation imbued with 
modern ideas. The moment has now come to draw the consequences from these 
results of our administrative activity, to allow the inhabitants to participate in the 
government…”.  
Because Austria-Hungary’s civilizational achievements were believed to be superior 
under the dominant interpretation of the standard of ‘civilisation’, the Ottoman 
Empire was deemed to have only very limited rights over the Muslim community of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
5. Failure of constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’: contested 
justifications of sovereignty 
 
 This section demonstrates how the Young Turk project of reorganising the 
Ottoman Empire along constitutional lines, based on viewing constitutionalism as a 
standard of ‘civilisation’, fell apart as the Young Turks split into different political 
factions. New political disagreements emerged among the CUP, the Grand Vizier 
Kamil Paşa, the LPID and the ultimately counterrevolutionary Mohammedan Union 
(Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 - 36; Farhi, 1971). These disagreements also amounted to 
different means of advancing the interests and securing the sovereign equality of the 
Ottoman state in global international society. This meant that the forms of 
constitutive diplomacy that they promoted for the Ottoman Empire differed 
significantly. In the election of late 1908, the CUP advanced a notion of national 
sovereignty that was challenged by Sabahaddin, who argued for a system based on 
decentralisation and educational reform (Fujinami, 2013: 880 - 881). Following the 
counterrevolution of April 1909, the Mohammedan Union presented an Islamic 
vision of constitutionalism (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 - 41). This was in line with 
Islamic theories of sovereignty that emphasised the Sultan’s position as the Caliph of 
Islam and stressed the central role of the ulema in an Islamic state (Vahdeti [1909] 
1992a). The Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906 was suggested as a model, 
since it maintained and empowered the ulema under a constitutional framework 
(Vahdeti, [1909] 1992a). The constituent diplomacy advocated by the Mohammedan 
Union involved supporting other Islamic movements, such as the Iranian 
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revolutionaries and Central Asian Muslims, while also supporting the attempts of 
Kamil Paşa, the Grand Vizier, to secure good relations with Britain (M. Ali ([1909] 
1992). Although Kamil Paşa was dismissed and the counterrevolution, led by the 
Mohammedan Union was crushed (see Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 38 - 41), by the end of 
1909 the CUP were confronted by the fact that their initial approach to constituent 
diplomacy had been only partially successful. Even though internal challenges to 
their particular vision of ‘civilisation’ had been overcome, the loss of territory in the 
aftermath of the revolution meant that they would need to pursue a new approach to 
constituent diplomacy. 
 
 The revolution of 1908 saw an end to some of the reforms that had been 
imposed on the Ottoman Empire and which were perceived, by the Ottomans, as 
threatening their sovereignty. These reforms included the gendarmerie and the 
Financial Commission. The Financial Commission166 had been established by the 
signatories of the Treaty of Berlin in 1905, to manage the finances of the provinces 
(Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 44 - 47). Immediately after the revolution, the Berlin signatories, 
despite some disagreement, decided to end the presence of the gendarmerie force 
(Lange-Akhund, 1998: 324 – 325; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 48). Nicolson (1908a), the 
British ambassador in St. Petersburg, was informed, by Russian authorities, that they 
were opposed to the planned withdrawal of the gendarmerie officers from 
Macedonia, after the Bulgarian deployment along the Oriental Railway, if tensions 
between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire persisted. The outbreak of war was a 
possibility as the Üsküb (present-day Skopje) branch of the CUP called for war with 
Bulgaria, even though this was challenged by the Monastir (present-day Bitola) and 
Salonica167 (present-day Thessaloniki) branches of the CUP (Lowther, 1908h).The 
continued possibility of conflict, highlighted by the rise in tensions, had been 
understood, by Grey (1908m) as well, as an argument that could be used by the 
advocates of maintaining the gendarmerie force. Two days earlier, Lowther (1908g) 
 
166 Initially, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Ottoman inspector of Macedonia, had requested an increase of 
customs duties, from 8 to 11 per cent, to fund the Macedonian provinces (Tokay, 2003: 57). In 
response to Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’s demands, the Financial Commission had been imposed on the 
Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Berlin powers, excluding Germany, engaged in a naval 
demonstration of force off the Ottoman coast, together with the Greek navy (Tokay, 2003: 57). 
167 The British consular official, Elliot (1908) reported to Grey that the Salonica branch of the CUP 
were requesting weapons from the Ottoman and Greek governments, to defend themselves in the 
event of a Bulgarian attack.  
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argued that the gendarmerie officers ought to be maintained in Macedonia, given 
ongoing tensions between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, but Grey (1908m) 
countered that this could be perceived as a threat by the Ottomans. Significantly, 
immediately after the crisis, Kamil Paşa had actively sought to defuse tensions 
between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, in contrast to those who were keen on 
escalating the situation (Lowther, 1908a; 1908f; Ünal, 1998: 137, 166 - 167). 
Ultimately, the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin would judge that the Financial 
Commission was also no longer needed168 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 48). Therefore, the 
possibility of the outbreak of war between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, which 
some members of the CUP wished, but which Kamil Paşa opposed, almost prevented 
the withdrawal of the gendarmes and the end of the reform process.  
 
The executors of the brief counterrevolution of 1909 presented an alternative 
vision of ‘civilisation’ and sovereignty to that of the revolutionaries of 1908. The 
counterrevolutionaries believed that the nature of the constituent power ought to be 
based on Islamic principles (Farhi, 1971). In the elections of November and 
December 1908, which had been called by the revolutionaries, there were debates 
over the nature of the Ottoman nation (Sencer, 2004: 41 - 42). The issue of how 
different groups claiming to be nations within the Ottoman Empire could be 
represented became especially pressing following the territorial losses of 1908, with 
the representatives of different Christian communities claiming allegiance to 
“imagined communities” beyond the empire169 (Sencer, 2004: 54). In principle, the 
CUP, and Hüseyin Cahit, the editor-in-chief of the CUP’s mouthpiece journal, 
Tanin, which could freely be published and distributed after the revolution, were not 
opposed to the representation of different ethnic groups in the Ottoman parliament 
(Fujinami, 2013: 883 - 885; Sancaktar, 2009: 175 – 178, 263). However, Hüseyin 
Cahit ultimately advocated recognising a single nation, namely the Muslims, as the 
dominant nation within the Ottoman Empire, claiming that their interests were 
identical with those of the state (Reynolds, 2011: 23 – 24; Sancaktar, 2009: 261 - 
262). This concept of the dominant nation, or “millet-i hakime”, was similar to the 
 
168 The financial commission established by the Great Powers in Macedonia would cease its 
operations on May 1909 (Tokay, 2013: 176).  
169 Many deputies, such as the Greek deputy, Kozmidi, stressed the loyalty of the Greek element to 
the Ottoman Empire, while still arguing that the Bulgarians had challenged the interests of the Greeks 
in Macedonia (Sencer, 2004: 53 - 54).  
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Austro-Hungarian idea of considering the Germans of the empire the dominant 
nationality (Reynolds, 2011: 23). Relatedly, Hüseyin Cahid was critical of 
Sabahaddin’s idea of decentralisation, arguing that “those outside of the Islamic 
element attach great importance”170 to Sabahaddin’s political programme (Hersekli 
Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 80). Even though Fujinami (2013: 881 - 882) argues that 
Sabahaddin distinguished between political and administrative autonomy and argued 
for the latter, Hüseyin Cahit, according to Hersekli Satvet Lütfi ([1908] 1999: 80) 
disagreed171, claimed that decentralisation would result in other islands following the 
fate of Crete (Fujinami, 2013: 880 - 881). Therefore, according to the CUP, the 
policy of the League, amounted to a change in the constituent power and threatened 
the national basis of the CUP’s project of constitutionalism. It was perceived as 
challenging the claim of the Ottoman Empire to be a civilised state, and was, thereby 
understood as threatening to break up the empire. 
 
The views of the leading counterrevolutionary figures were summarised in 
Volkan, a newspaper of the time, which has not been studied extensively by 
intellectual historians. One of the columnists of the paper, Derviş Vahdeti, the cleric 
and later leader of the short-lived political party known as the İttihad-ı Muhammedi 
(Mohammedan Union), presented a vision of constitutional politics that challenged 
the CUP and the LPID (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 – 36; Farhi, 1971). Arguing from 
his interpretation of Islam, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4 - 5) asserted that European 
nationalism was an aberration from the principles around which Ottoman society 
would need to be constructed. The manifesto of the counterrevolution accordingly 
suggested that: 
“[j]ust as it is in people’s nature to progress from being savages to nomads, 
from being nomadic to civilised, and from being civilised to becoming free, 
people contain the sacred gift of having a tendency to follow the path from 
individualism, which advances to collectivism, which then advances to 
tribalism and finally ends with the nation…”172 (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992c: 4). 
 
170 The transliterated Ottoman text reads as follows: “gayr-i anasır İslamiyyenin … Sabahaddin Beğ’e 
karşı bu fikirlerinden dolayı gösterdikleri merbutiyet” (Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 80). 
171 Hüseyin Cahid equated it with “muhtariyyet-i idare”, which can be translated as “local 
government” (Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 80). 
172 The Turkish transliteration of the Ottoman text reads as: “İnsanlar fıtrat itibariyle vahşetten 
bedeviyyete, bedeviyyetten medeniyyete, medeniyyetten hürriyyete irtika ettiği gibi, ferdiyetten 
ma’şeriyyete, ma’şeriyyetten kavmiyyete, kavmiyetten millete i’tila edebilecek hasail-i aliye ile 
mütehalliktirler” (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992c: 4). 
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However, Derviş Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) here distinguished between the concept 
of a “tribe” (“kavmiyetçilik”), which he understood as entailing “arbitrary” (“keyfi”) 
rule, whereas the concept of “nation” (“milliyet”) entailed “subjecting different 
people to the same law”. Therefore, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) echoed the ideas of 
‘hierarchy’, ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’ and argued that these were represented by 
Britain, France and Germany, who had embraced national politics. A column also 
appeared in Volkan that defended Sabahaddin’s official visit to the Greek 
Patriarchate in Istanbul, against Hüseyin Cahid’s criticism that claimed it was 
furthering the cause of Greek separatism (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992a: 3).  Vahdeti 
([1908] 1992a: 3) argued that Hüseyin Cahid falsely suggested that Sabahaddin 
kissed the hand of the Patriarch of Constantinople, even though he was greeting him 
in a respectful manner, in order to dissuade Muslims from voting for the League. 
Sabahaddin’s policy proposal of decentralised rule was also praised by Vahdeti 
([1908] 1992a: 3) as allowing greater freedom (“hürriyet”)173. Vahdeti ([1908] 
1992a: 3) argued that the constitution of 1876 was compatible with Islamic sharia 
law174, expressed his happiness at the end of “tribal” politics, and the birth of 
“national” politics after the Young Turk revolution. Crucially though, Vahdeti 
([1908] 1992c: 4) argued against adopting French or German constitutional norms at 
the expense of maintaining the sharia. This vision challenged the CUP’s idea of 
constitutional, and hence civilised government, being that of the ‘millet-i hakime’, 
and Sabahaddin’s claim that supporting different religious communities in the 
empire would enable decentralisation.  
 
As an alternative to national sovereignty and other ideas adopted from 
Europe, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c) argued for the unity of Muslims throughout the 
world under the Sultan. Although Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) praised the virtues of 
‘civilisation’, he ultimately believed in “higher” and “lower” human natures175 and 
that “the lesser form of humanity is the nation and the higher form of humanity takes 
 
173 Karamürsel (2016: 142) identifies the concept of “hürriyet” as coming to refer to the absence of 
slavery in the late Ottoman Empire (see also Karamürsel, 2017: 708; Toledano, 1993).   
174 On 20 February 1909, Ömer Ziyaeddin, one of Vahdeti’s followers, suggested that this was the 
case (Vahdeti, [1909] 1992b: 243 - 244). 
175 Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) uses the terms “insaniyyet-i sugra”, which can be translated as “lesser 
humanity”, whereas “insaniyyet-i kübra”, which can be translated as “higher humanity”. 
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the form of Islam.”176 The need to maintain the unity of Islam resulted in the 
counterrevolution seeking to empower the ulema, meaning the religious clerics of 
the Ottoman Empire. The Mohammedan Union also viewed the participation of the 
ulema in the 1906 Iranian Revolution as a model to be emulated (Vahdeti, [1909] 
1992a: 271 -272). Vahdeti ([1909] 1992a: 271 -272) praised the Iranian ulema’s use 
of the principle of ijtihad, or interpretation, to support the revolution in Iran, but 
argued that ijtihad could also result in arguments for absolutism being advanced. 
Ultimately, the Mohammedan Union received the support of many members of the 
ulama and soldiers throughout the empire, during the counterrevolution (Ahmad, 
[1969] 2010: 35 – 36; Farhi, 1971). The Mohammedan Union also opposed the 
policies of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, which they were informed, by 
Russian Muslims who wrote in Volkan such as Muhyiddin Bin Hacı Emin Uşi 
([1909] 1992: 491 - 493) that Russian policies were discriminating against Muslims. 
Vahdeti ([1908] 1992b: 6 -7) also promoted good relations between Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire and hence praised the policy of  the Grand Vizier, Kamil Paşa. The 
Grand Vizier challenged the CUP, which was more suspicious of the intentions of 
the dominant European states177, and this resulted in his dismissal. In the lead up to 
the counterrevolution, a Volkan columnist, M. Ali ([1909] 1992: 341 - 342), 
suggested that the CUP’s dismissal of Kamil Paşa on 14 February 1909, had resulted 
in Britain pursuing a more distant policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Kamil Paşa 
was here presented as a skilful diplomat, who could ensure that Britain pursued a 
policy that was favourable to the Ottoman Empire (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992b: 6 -7). 
The Mohammedan Union was focused on securing the status of the Ottoman Empire 
within global international society. It had believed that cooperation with Britain 
would help secure this objective, thereby empowering Islam and the Union’s 
interpretation of ‘civilisation’.  
 
The counterrevolution challenged the idea of nationalism and national 
sovereignty that the Young Turk presentation of constitutionalism as a standard of 
‘civilisation’ entailed. An argument promoting an Islamic vision of constitutionalism 
and sovereignty was provided. Though swiftly defeated by the Ottoman Third Army, 
 
176 The Turkish transliteration of the Ottoman text reads as: “insaniyyet-i suğra la’alettayin (milliyet), 
insaniyyet-i kübra ise İslamiyettir” Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4). 
177 See Ünal (1996).  
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which was loyal to the CUP, the counterrevolution had revealed the different ways in 
which the standard of ‘civilisation’ continued to be understood in the Ottoman 
context (Ahmad [1969] 2010: 40). Different interpretations of how to reconstitute 
the Ottoman Empire, implying different interpretations of the constituent power were 
at play. Prior to the counterrevolution, the CUP argued, especially in its 
communications to European powers, for considering the Ottoman nation as a whole 
as the constituent power within the Ottoman Empire (Hanioğlu, 2001: 271). 
However, the elections of 1908, and the views of the counterrevolutionaries, led to  
different perspectives being advanced by the CUP, which now promoted the idea of 
a sovereign nation or “millet-i hakime” that was distinct from the autonomist groups 
pursuing their own interests in the parliament (Sancaktar, 2009: 261). The LPID, 
however, still believed that the Ottoman nation as a whole was the constituent 
power, insofar as it was now empowered in the assembly and would be able to 
overcome the challenges of international stigmatisation (Fujinami, 2013: 881). The 
Mohammedan Union, on the other hand, saw the constituent power as embracing the 
ulema, following the Iranian example (Vahdeti [1909] 1992a: 271 - 272). Although 
they were unsuccessful, the views of the Union shaped subsequent developments in 
the empire (Farhi, 1971). Prior to the counterrevolution, the CUP had cooperated 
extensively with Armenian political movements in the eastern provinces of the 
empire, but the counterrevolutionaries in Adana massacred members of the 
Armenian community (Der Matossian, 2011). The CUP promised to investigate the 
cause of these attacks178, but they instead restricted political freedoms through 
repressive laws, such as the law on associations of 1909, which restricted the rights 
of citizens to form associations, if they were deemed not to be conducive to the 
public good (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 55). This made it difficult for alternative visions 
of the identity of the Ottoman nation to be expressed which ran counter to the views 
of the CUP. The revolution and counterrevolution of 1908 and 1909 demonstrate 
how the Young Turks and other groups attempted to make use of local and global 
 
178 An initial tribunal held to investigate these developments was highly lenient towards the local CUP 
members and military officials who partook in the massacres (Der Matossian, 2011: 164). In spite of 
this, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation continued to cooperate with the CUP to consolidate 
constitutional rule in the empire (Berberian, 2019: 120). As Reynolds (2011: 62 - 63) and Kaligian 
(2008) note, the CUP had successfully disarmed the Armenian population after the revolution, but the 
Kurdish Hamidian Light Cavalry Brigades formed by Abdülhamid II as an irregular force to resist 
future Russian expansion into the eastern provinces of the empire, which had also carried out several 
massacres of Armenians (see J. Klein, 2011: 138, 143 - 144) had been reorganised rather than being 
disbanded. 
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forms of constituent power to gain recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a sovereign 
equal to the established states in global international society  
 
6. Conclusion:  
 
The revolutionaries of 1908 aimed to secure the sovereign equality for their state 
in global international society. What was not foreseen was that the revolution would 
result in the proliferation of different means to pursue the advance of ‘civilisation’ 
within the Ottoman Empire. As a result of the revolution, different Young Turk 
factions reopened the Ottoman Parliament that had briefly been in session in 1876 
prior to its suspension by Abdülhamid II (Moroni, 2017). The intention of the 
revolutionaries to civilise the Ottoman Empire, did not prevent arguments 
concerning ‘civilisation’ being made by independence movements, such as those in 
Bulgaria and Crete, and by other empires, such as Austria-Hungary. These 
arguments challenged the revolutionaries’ claims regarding the extent of Ottoman 
sovereignty and argued that Ottoman rule over these territories ought to be limited to 
governing the affairs of their Muslim inhabitants. Both Sabahaddin’s ([1908] 1999a: 
66 – 67; see also Fujinami, 2013: 881 - 883) decentralising and Ahmed Rıza’s (1907; 
see also Taglia, 2015: 122) centralising visions of constitutionalism, therefore, failed 
to legitimise Ottoman sovereignty and prevent the territorial losses of 1908. 
However, states responsible for overseeing reforms in Macedonia decided that their 
presence was no longer required given the emergence of a ‘civilised’ administration 
within the Ottoman Empire that was dedicated to constitutional rule (Lange-Akhund, 
1998: 324 – 325). In their attempts to portray the Ottoman Empire as a civilised 
state, various Young Turk factions embraced different conceptions of the constituent 
power. The counterrevolutionaries pressed for an Islamic form of ‘civilisation’ and 
constitutionalism, focused on enforcing Islamic sharia law (Farhi, 1971). They 
sought to empower the ulema as a constituent power to further the development of 
‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire (Vahdeti, [1909] 1992a: 271 - 272). The 
concept of ‘civilisation’ was internally contested, and this influenced subsequent 
understandings of the constituent power in the Ottoman Empire. As Ahmad ([1969] 
2010: 55) demonstrates, by 1909 the CUP opposed rival political projects concerning 
the future orientation of the Ottoman Empire, and in so doing they consolidated their 
control over the state. 
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4. War and standards of ‘civilisation’: Alliances, war and the construction 
of sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, 1909 - 1918 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
 This chapter examines how the Young Turks’ initial post-revolutionary 
struggle for the recognition of their sovereignty faced further obstacles with the 
emergence of different understandings of sovereignty among states that were 
consolidating competing alliances. The first section reviews the literature in history 
and International Relations which suggests that the sovereignty of an individual state 
can be secured through international alliances. In practice, these alliances also 
provide a means by which constitutional principles that form the basis of external 
sovereignty can be enforced or promoted. In the case of the Ottoman Empire after 
the 1908 revolution, the Young Turk leaders found that there was no one conception 
of ‘civilisation’ that was widely accepted. Instead, as the second section illustrates, 
seeking to convene a meeting of the states which had signed the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878 to secure a revision of the treaty, the leaders of the CUP discovered that the 
Great Powers were no longer united in their approach towards discerning the level of 
‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire. Following successive outside interventions, the 
Ottomans found that European powers asserted their own interests within the empire 
while claiming to be acting to secure humanitarian concerns (M. Kaya, 2014; 
Rodogno, 2012). The third section considers how the defeat of the Ottomans in 
Libya and in the Balkans resulted in a change in the constituent diplomacy pursued 
by the Young Turks to secure recognition of their sovereign equality in global 
international society. The fourth section examines how Ottoman governments, in the 
lead up to and during the Second Balkan War and the First World War, sought to 
introduce reforms stressing the ‘national’ nature of Ottoman sovereignty to ensure 
that they were recognised as ‘civilised’. This marked a shift away from their earlier 
approach that involved seeking support from the Great Powers through 
demonstrating their adherence to standards of ‘civilisation’. Ottoman membership in 
the Triple Alliance was, in turn, intended to contribute, through the use and threat of 
the use of force, to the reconstitution of the constitutional rules of international 
society. Changing the rules of international society to allow national sovereignty to 
be recognised as a constitutional principle would allow the Young Turks to attain 
 128 
their goal of securing the Ottoman Empire as a sovereign state equal to other nations 
in global international society. 
 
2. The ‘standards’ of ‘civilisation’ and the Ottoman Empire in the First World 
War 
 
This section reviews the existing historiography with regard to how the Ottoman 
Empire entered the First World War. This process can be studied as one in which the 
Ottomans sought to enter into an alliance with a prominent state or group of states, 
which could be considered one of the “great powers”179, meaning the prominent 
European states in global international society, to secure the sovereignty of their 
state (Kent, 2005: 1). Discussions about what was meant by ‘civilisation’ played a 
key role in this process, as developing alliances of states advanced different 
assessments of the level of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire in their diplomatic 
communications. Focusing on how arguments about ‘civilisation’ were used to 
justify or consolidate membership in an alliance adds to existing studies in 
international history that have highlighted the roles of the Triple Entente and the 
Triple Alliance immediately prior to the First World War. The literature on 
nationalism, with its focus on developments within states, has also been employed to 
explain the First World War and the participation of the Ottomans within it 
(Aksakal, 2004; 2008: 2 – 3, 13 – 14; Ginio, 2016). However, at this time, the idea of 
the standard of ‘civilisation’ provided a set of criteria to assess the place of states in 
an international “normative hierarchy” (Kayaoğlu, 2010b: 202). Distinct assessments 
of the level of ‘civilisation’ came to be deployed by the representatives of states to 
justify their stances towards the Ottoman Empire. Regardless of how the positions of 
these states and their alliances may also be understood as based on the struggle for 
power (see Bloxham, 2005; Kent, 2005), normative visions of international order 
based on the idea of ‘civilisation’ played a key role in justifying the actions of these 
alliances, including their decisions to declare war. As Bartelson (2018) 
demonstrated, war has been justified by referring to, and is, indeed, intertwined with 
the concepts of sovereignty and ‘civilisation’. Specifically, war can be understood as 
 
179 These referred to the powerful European states in global international society who had 
commitments to the Ottoman Empire under international treaties, such as the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878, the Pact of Halepa of the same year, and their subsequent iterations (Kent, 2005: 1 - 5).  
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being an expression of constituent power at the global level, if those engaged in it 
see themselves as removing, replacing or enforcing the constitutional principles of 
global international society (Reus-Smit180, 2013b). The Ottoman Empire, denied 
sovereign equality under the pre-war international order, sought to exploit the First 
World War to reshape the constitutional rules of international order to secure equal 
treatment in international society. 
 
Traditional explanations in International Relations of the origins and causes of 
the First World War focused almost exclusively on changes in power relations 
amongst states. Bain (2003) argues, for instance, in a way that Buzan (2014: 591) 
interprets as demonstrating the relevance of the standard of “civilisation” in the post-
First World War period, that the victors of the war presented themselves as civilised 
states which could and ought to “develop” (see Buzan, 2014: 591) other states. Such 
accounts therefore view the idea of the standard of ‘civilisation’ as fundamentally 
epiphenomenal to the power relations that emerged before and crystallised after the 
First World War. These explanations, including those seeking to explain how the 
Ottoman Empire became involved in the First World War, such as Reynolds’s 
(2011) study of geopolitical developments on the borders of the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires181, have generally not considered the role of ideas182 alongside 
changes brought about by victory or defeat. They have tended to concentrate on how 
perceived interests led the Ottoman Empire to enter the conflict (Kut, 2016: 116 - 
118). In practice, the Young Turks encountered an international order that was 
divided between rival alliances183. The presence of these blocs meant that different 
 
180 Reus-Smit (2013b) suggests that a similar logic is present in wars of intervention.  
181 Reynolds (2011: 4 - 6) argues, that it is necessary to follow Tilly (1975; 1985; [1990] 1992) to 
consider the interactions of states and other actors, without focusing on ideas, such as those of 
nationalism, in providing an account of the interaction between the two empires in the course of their 
collapse. This approach can, indeed, help demonstrate the role of the state and other actors in this 
process, but, like Tilly’s ([1990] 1992) account, it overlooks the significance of ideas, such as those of 
legitimacy and “social meaning”, in explaining the emergence of contemporary states (Steinmetz, 
2010: 326).  
182 Koskenniemi (2001: 291 - 297) provides a history of the ideas developed by international lawyers 
to make sense of historical developments in the lead up to, and after, the First World War, but does 
not focus on the connection between ideas and the historical events that international lawyers sought 
to understand. Separately, Johnson (2018: 143) notes that “ideology” motivated the participation of 
the Ottoman Empire in the First World War but merely focuses on its role in facilitating militarism 
and massacres.  
183 Bobroff (2006) has reviewed the historiography on formation of rival blocs over control of the 
Straits connecting the Aegean to the Black Sea, and suggested that Russia acted, in the lead up to the 
First World War, to contain German control over the Straits.  
 130 
understandings of ‘civilisation’ could be advanced by these blocs to further the 
interests of their alliance. Even if this was so, these disagreements nonetheless had 
consequences for how ‘civilisation’ was understood, and how sovereignty was 
constructed and justified through reference to the idea of ‘civilisation’. Unlike the 
unified international society the Ottomans confronted in the Treaty of Berlin of 
1878184, the Young Turks were faced with the lack of a unified international society 
(Housden, 2014: 29). This meant that it was not enough for the Young Turks to rely 
solely on arguments stressing their adherence to norms of ‘civilisation’ to secure the 
recognition of their sovereign equality. Historians have noted how the desire to 
secure the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire, resulted in  the Ottoman 
decision to enter the First World War (Kayaoğlu, 2010a; Kut, 2016: 122). However, 
the background to this decision, involving discussions among the Young Turks about 
the different ideas of ‘civilisation’ held by various states, and the implications of this 
for the recognition of Ottoman sovereign equality, have been largely overlooked. 
 
Rising nationalism has also been highlighted as a cause of the First World War 
and a reason for the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the conflict, which 
subsequently came to be embraced as part of the wartime propaganda of the Ottoman 
state. In their studies of nationalism, Aksakal (2004; 2008) and Ginio (2005; 2016) 
have pointed to how the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 resulted in the growth of 
nationalism in the lead up to the First World War. They argued that the Ottoman 
defeat in the Balkan Wars led to the development of a more Islamic and Turkish 
form of nationalism. This was based on a narrative that suggested that the treachery 
of non-Muslims, in particular, was responsible for the defeat (Ginio, 2005; 2016). 
However, Öztan (2018) and Hanioğlu (2001: 40 - 41) have contended that there was 
more continuity in the CUP’s nationalism, prior to and after the Balkan Wars. 
According to Öztan (2018: 71 - 75), the CUP persisted in promoting Ottomanism as 
a form of nationalism even after defeat in the Balkan Wars. Hanioğlu (2001: 40 - 
41), on the other hand, claims that the CUP from 1907 onwards was interested in 
advancing a Turkish nationalist agenda, which emphasised the supposed treachery of 
non-Muslims, but they concealed this by ostensibly promoting Ottoman nationalism 
 
184 On the standard of civilisation and the Treaty of Berlin see Housden (2014: 29) and Matthias 
Schulz (2011). 
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to maintain control of the empire. Gingeras (2009: 92) has focused on how the 
nationalism of the Young Turks changed after 1912, when the Ottoman state’s 
Special Organisation (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) targeted Christians in the Balkans. The 
Ottoman defeat in 1912 prompted the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to focus its attention on 
removing or controlling the Christian population who were perceived as potentially 
acting as a fifth column for a future Greek invasion (Gingeras, 2009: 97). Therefore, 
the forms of nationalism that were pioneered by the Young Turks after the Balkan 
Wars were shaped by their responses to the conflict. The loss of territories populated 
by non-Muslims and peoples who were not Turks, removed the pretext for 
continuing to pursue a policy based on Ottomanism.  
 
 The rise of nationalism was also driven by the desire of the Young Turks to 
gain recognition as a civilised power in global international society. Crucially, 
through defining how the nation or the people who held sovereignty were understood 
and represented internationally, theories of nationalism came to shape the Ottoman 
state (Özkırımlı and Sofos, 2008: 2). As theories of nationalism were adopted in 
many Western states that were understood to be “civilized”, starting with France, 
nationalism, including the national movements in the late Ottoman Empire, came to 
be interpreted as a “civilized” means to reconstitute a state (Mazower, 2001: 71; 
Özkırımlı and Sofos, 2008: 17; see also Sofos and Özkırımlı, 2009: 77). The Young 
Turks were especially influenced by two different intellectual tendencies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, which shaped their particular understanding 
of nationalism. Many of the Young Turks in Paris, either as exiles or as students, 
such as Ahmed Agayev (later Ahmet Ağaoğlu)185, and Yusuf Akçura186, were 
influenced by French nationalism187; a revanchist form of which came to be adopted 
 
185 See Berkes ([1964] 1998: 347). 
186 See Akçura (1998) and the discussion of his and similar ideas of nationalism in Özkırımlı and 
Sofos (2008: 27 – 30; see also Sofos and Özkırımlı, 2009: 85 - 97). Özkırımlı and Sofos (2008: 27 – 
30; see also Sofos and Özkırımlı, 2009: 85 - 97) show how Turkish nationalism within the Ottoman 
Empire emerged as political and bureaucratic elites sought to empower the state by fostering a loyal 
populace. In 1904, Akçura considered Ottomanism, a dedication to the Ottoman state regardless of 
one’s national or religious identity, and Pan-Islamism, as two possible policies for the state to pursue, 
but later opted for Turkish nationalism, which appeared more feasible given what he considered to be 
the relatively greater loyalty of the Turks to the Ottoman state (Eissenstat, 2015: 429 – 431; 
Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 150; Üngör and Lohr, 2014: 501). Like Ağaoğlu, Turnaoğlu (2017a: 159; 2019: 
228) has demonstrated how Akçura was also influenced by the idea of social revolution, which he 
termed “içtimai inkılab”, although the source of Akçura’s inspiration was Albert Sorel. 
187 As Özavcı (2013: 650) suggests, Ağaoğlu viewed the “West” and “East” as distinct identities, 
owing to his Orientalist education (see also Kadıoğlu, 2004: 205; 2007: 174 and Dalacoura, 2017: 
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by many intellectuals and political movements after the Franco-Prussian War 
(Özavcı, 2013: 22). At this time, nationalism was presented by French conservative 
thinkers such as Henri Bergson, as a means to curtail what were perceived to be the 
universalist excesses of the French Revolution (Hanioğlu, 2005: 63 - 65). The Young 
Turks were also influenced by Slavic socialist movements, whose ideas of social and 
popular revolution they were exposed to as Russian citizens prior to arriving in the 
Ottoman Empire, or through contact with such movements when in exile (Meyer, 
2014: 104 – 105, 152; Reynolds188, 2011: 129- 131). These movements combined an 
idealisation of the peasants in their societies and their folk culture with a 
commitment to extensive social reform and/or revolution (Meyer, 2014: 67). 
Although Shissler (2003: 63 - 77) and Meyer (2014) have noted how both Russian 
populism and French nationalism influenced the ideas of the Young Turks, the 
question of how these ideas were adopted as a part of the broader strategy of the 
Young Turks to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of their state in global 
international society remains. 
 
An awareness of how alliances can morph into international societies that are 
sub-global or global in scope can also demonstrate how ‘civilisation’ is connected to 
the idea of nationalism and warfare. Holsti (1991; 1996: 19 - 41), Phillips (2010) and 
Devetak and Tannock (2017: 135 - 144) have looked upon wars as periods that 
resulted in the emergence of different forms of international order. Although 
identifying the ends of wars as “major events” can seem arbitrary, as Holsti (2002: 
27) later suggests, they point to moments when institutions may be created and 
relations forged through peace settlements. The “ontogenetic” theory of war, 
presented by Bartelson (2018: 24), also demonstrates how war can be understood as 
a means of creating a new reality, through destroying, altering and replacing existing 
institutions and practices189. However, Barkawi and Brighton (2019: 103) have noted 
 
2067 – 2068). Ağaoğlu had also been influenced, during his time as a student in Tbilisi, by the 
Armenian Hnchak and Dashnak parties and other parties dedicated to social revolution in the Russian 
Empire (Shissler, 2003: 54 - 56). Both of these theorists were enrolled in the École Libre des Sciences 
Politiques (Zürcher, 2005: 24). Ziya Gökalp is another significant nationalist social theorist and 
sociologist from this period, who is often grouped together with Akçura and Ağaoğlu, but who, unlike 
them, completed his education in the Ottoman Empire (Özavcı, 2013: 27). 
188 Reynolds (2011: 129 – 131) here focuses especially on the activities of Yusuf Akçura in first the 
Russian and later the Young Turk revolutions.   
189 See also Holsti (2004: 290 - 291), who recognises the role of ideas in shaping how war is 
understood and fought. 
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that it is necessary to distinguish between the “instrumental” and generative 
dimensions of war. “Instrumental” conceptions of war refer to the intentions of 
actors that are engaged in war-making (Barkawi and Brighton, 2019: 103 )190.The 
generative component refers to how war-making as an activity generates new 
realities beyond what was originally envisaged by those engaged in war (Barkawi 
and Brighton, 2019: 103). Studying the instrumental component of the ideas of the 
Young Turks, in particular, can demonstrate the significance of ‘civilisation’191 as a 
means of empowering the state and enabling it to be recognised as sovereign. 
Among the justifications and claims advanced by the Young Turks in the First World 
War and the conflicts immediately preceding it, the idea of “civilization” featured 
prominently (Aksakal, 2008: 36). Adopting the features of a ‘civilised’ state was 
understood as crucial for the Ottoman state to prepare for war through entering an 
alliance192 and, once victorious, for it to reshape the constitutional rules of 
international society together with other members of the alliance (Aksakal, 2004: 
528 – 531; 2008: 36 - 37, 201). Prior to and during the First World War, arguments 
concerning the idea of ‘civilisation’, and the related concept of nationhood, were 
used to consolidate the external position of the Ottoman Empire, by anchoring the 
CUP as a ‘civilised’ force that could contribute to alliances of which they were a 
member. 
 
Studying the texts of Ottoman thinkers in this period, one can discern how the 
Young Turks developed a vision of ‘civilised’ statehood. The Ottoman experience of 
“hierarchy in international society”, as expressed by Bilgin (2017: 129)193, meant 
that the Young Turks sought to situate the Ottoman state within an alliance, to 
advance constitutional rules of international society which were favourable to the 
Ottomans. Specifically, they sought, in the lead up to the First World War, to situate 
themselves in an alliance that would, if victorious, recognise the sovereign equality 
 
190 For a similar understanding of the impact of war see Malesevic (2012: 43). 
191 On the use of the concept of ‘civilisation’ to enable or challenge war in a separate context see 
Phillips (2012).  
192 As Buzan (1993: 342) argues, alliances between states can serve to produce institutions in an 
international society that are held to be "common" by states in an alliance. Later studies, such as 
Holsti (1997), Finnemore (1996) and Schouenborg (2012) have demonstrated how the interests of 
states are defined by alliances.  
193 See also Donnelly (2006) and Clark (2011: 30), who develop the idea of hierarchy in international 
society, which is arguably also expressed by Bull ([1977] 2012: 123) in his idea of the international 
institution of “great power management”. 
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of the Ottoman state. Before the First World War, the initial attempts of the Young 
Turks to present themselves as a ‘civilised’ elite capable of reforming the Ottoman 
Empire were not successful. This was because the emergence of different blocs and 
the collapse of the Concert system in Europe resulted in the breakdown of consensus 
over what was meant by ‘civilisation’194. A series of crises also transformed the 
Ottoman Empire and shaped the CUP’s ideas of national sovereignty (Ülker, 2005). 
Regardless of the absence or presence of Turkish nationalism as a state policy prior 
to the Balkan Wars, the period of conflict that began in 1909, following the Albanian 
and Yemeni uprisings, ushered in constitutional changes within the empire (Blumi, 
2003a; 2012: 102, 157)195. These uprisings, together with the later Balkan Wars, 
resulted in the CUP government abandoning attempts to adopt an Ottomanist 
perspective (Ülker, 2005: 617). Instead, the government focused on curtailing or 
excluding the expression of alternative visions of the role of the state that clashed 
with their perspective (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 54 - 56). The CUP also believed, even 
before the revolution196, in the need to ensure that the empire was integrated into an 
international alliance (Trumpener, 1968: 16 – 20; Zürcher, 2019: 904 - 909). This 
could then enable them to resist calls for internationally-overseen reforms to be 
implemented in the empire (Kieser, 2011: 393; Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015). 
Warfare, ultimately, came to be a means by which the Ottoman alliance with the 
Central Powers could allow the CUP to wield global constituent power, in an attempt 
to alter the rules of international society (Aksakal, 2004; 2008; Kieser, 2011). 
Specifically, the Central Powers pledged to end the capitulations, and the Ottomans 
aimed to regain recent territorial losses. The Ottomans, therefore, sought to re-
engineer global international society by advancing a particular conception of 
‘civilisation’ within the empire and in global international society more broadly, in 
order to gain recognition of their sovereign equality. 
 
 
194 Ottoman propaganda prior to the First World War, and after the Balkan Wars, stressed how 
European states had disregarded the atrocities that occurred in the Balkans, in contrast to their avowed 
dedication to upholding “civilization” (Çetinkaya, 2015: 83). 
195 After the counterrevolution of 1909, the CUP introduced a “law of associations” that allowed it to 
ban associations in civil society on the grounds of security (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 55). This law 
resulted in the closure of many non-Muslim and non-Turkish associations, thereby effectively 
curtailing the vibrant post-revolutionary public sphere (Ülker, 2005: 617). 
196 Ünal (1996) has demonstrated how the CUP especially sought to secure alliances from any of the 
European powers.  
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3. The Young Turks’ confrontation with the standard of ‘civilisation’: 1908 - 
1912 
 
This section shows how the Young Turks, in their post-revolutionary diplomacy, 
engaged with various conceptions of what constituted ‘civilised’ statehood, in order 
to gain recognition as an equal sovereign in global international society. Following 
the rise to power of the Young Turks, and the Ottoman Empire’s loss of Crete, 
Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the signatory states of the Treaty of Berlin 
considered convening a conference to decide whether the treaty ought to be revised 
(Lowther, 1908c). The signatory states, therefore, mobilised themselves as a 
constituent power to decide how the constitutional principles of international society 
should be applied in the changing circumstances. The CUP hoped that the 
conference would allow them to seek recognition of their claim to sovereign equality 
from the European powers (Macfie, 1981: 321 – 322, 324 ). This is because they 
intended it to include securing the abolition of the capitulations (Macfie, 1981: 321 – 
322, 324). Discussions over the possible holding of the conference enabled the 
representatives of different states to advance their positions (Macfie, 1981). Russia 
sought support for an agreement to compel the Ottomans to allow the free passage of 
its warships through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits (Bobroff, 2006; 
Macfie, 1981). In turn, Russia was willing to recognise the Ottoman claim for 
sovereign equality (Macfie, 1981). On other issues, such as the status of Crete, 
seeking to further their interests within the Ottoman Empire, different states took 
certain positions on the level of civilisation supposedly attained by the Ottomans 
(Grey, 1908f). However, in 1910 and 1911, with the Lynch Concession and the 
Italian invasion of Libya, the Young Turks mobilised the Ottoman people to oppose 
the granting of concessions and further foreign economic penetration, which they 
believed laid the foundations for future colonisation of the empire (Childs, 1990: 98; 
Kayalı, 1997: 101). A more suspicious perspective was taken towards the idea of 
seeking concessions to develop the Ottoman state and thereby enable it to be 
recognised as sovereign in global international society (Üngör and Lohr, 2014: 500 - 
501). The conflict in Libya, and later in the Balkans,  marked a period when the 
Ottomans found that they had lost their ability to persuade the great powers to 
recognise what they took to be their sovereign rights by simply appealing to 
arguments based on ‘civilisation’.  
 136 
 
The call for a conference by the Berlin signatory powers was prompted by the 
failure of these states to reconcile their disagreements about whether provisions of 
the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 had been violated with the territorial changes made in 
1908 (Lowther, 1908c). The global constituent power of the states of the Concert of 
Europe had been challenged. At this point, the Ottomans again sought to secure 
sovereign equality by calling for an end to the capitulations which were preventing 
them from imposing customs tariffs on trade (Geyikdağı, 2011: 378 - 379). The 
capitulations allowed European powers to set the laws dictating commerce (Ahmad, 
2000: 9). A leading intellectual, Ahmet Midhat Efendi, had argued that the Ottomans 
needed to impose tariffs to provide resources to ensure the survival of the state 
(Geyikdağı, 2011: 378 - 379). This view was shared by the CUP’s finance minister, 
Cavid Bey, who, according to Üngör and Lohr (2014: 500) argued that such 
investments were necessary to develop “civilization”. Imposing customs duties 
would compel foreign businesses to produce goods within the empire and thereby 
force them to invest in its economy (Geyikdağı, 2011: 381). By August 1908, the 
post-revolutionary press in the Ottoman Empire debated the abrogation of the 
capitulations (Ahmad, 2000: 11). Already in 1902, the Young Turk journal Şura-yı 
Ümmet had criticised the capitulations and pointed out how they were facilitating 
intervention by foreign states (Hanioğlu, 2001: 34). The capitulations were depicted 
as contrary to the sovereign equality and the sovereign right of territoriality of the 
empire (Kaya, 2014: 128). At the start of November, in the context of the Bosnian 
and Bulgarian crises, members of the CUP, including Nazım and the military officer, 
Ahmed Cemal, travelled to Paris and argued for the end of the capitulations and 
articles 23 and 61 of the Treaty of Berlin (Ünal, 1996: 39). As Andrew Ryan (1951: 
68 – 69), Britain’s expert and translator (dragoman) in the embassy in Istanbul 
argued, Britain was willing to accept the introduction of the constitution as a 
precondition for the abrogation of the capitulations (Ahmad, 2000: 11). The 
convergence of the desires of the Young Turks to obtain sovereign equality and the 
concerns of the signatories of the Berlin treaty to secure stability provided an 
opportunity for the Young Turks to achieve their objective (Macfie, 1981: 321 – 322, 
324). It was believed that demonstrating the civilised and liberal credentials of the 




The Berlin signatory powers could not agree on what issues should be discussed 
at the planned conference. Britain and the Ottoman Empire were the leading 
advocates of the proposed meeting (Lowther, 1908c). Italy (see Grey, 1908d) and 
Germany were also supportive (see Lascelles, 1908b; Lowther, 1908f; Lascelles, 
1908a). But, Britain and Russia clashed over Russia’s efforts to secure a deal with 
the Ottoman Empire which would allow the Russian navy to use the Dardanelles and 
the Bosphorus Straits to access the Mediterranean (Grey, 1908h). This threatened 
Britain’s naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean (Grey, 1908h). Moreover, 
Grey (1908h) stated that he had expected that the agreement between Russia and 
Britain on 1908 would result in growing trust between the two powers, including in 
matters concerning the Ottoman Empire. However, Grey (1908h) stated that this 
trust had been hampered by the anti-Russian sentiment generated in Britain, 
following Russian collusion in the suppression of the constitutional regime in Iran. 
Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, countered that Russia wished a powerful 
Ottoman Empire to check Austria-Hungary’s possible expansionist ambitions in the 
Balkans (Grey, 1908h). Consequently, Grey (1908n) demanded an overview of the 
conference programme and urged Rifat Pasha, an Ottoman diplomat, to ensure that 
the rights of the Ottoman Empire were not threatened by Russia. Britain argued that 
it was defending the interests of the Ottomans. Nicolson (1908c), Britain’s 
ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that Tcharykoff believed that it would be 
difficult to reach an agreement with the Ottomans on the question of the Straits. Grey 
(1908l) informed Rifat Paşa that Britain believed that pressure should not be placed 
on the Ottomans to consent to discussing the issue of the Straits. The unity of the 
great powers, which had been instrumental in achieving a settlement in 1878, could 
not be maintained with the territorial changes in 1908 (Sweet, 1977: 192). Aiming to 
pursue their separate interests, the ‘great powers’ could not agree on a united 
approach towards the Ottoman Empire. Seeking to secure the recognition of their 
sovereign equality, the Ottomans would not be able to attract the support of all 
states. 
 
The disagreements between Britain and Russia over the Straits became 
intertwined with the issue of the capitulations and whether they should be abolished. 
Grey (1908n) noted how the Russian foreign minister, Isvolsky, suggested that 
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Russia would urge Britain and the other powers to push for an arrangement 
favourable to Russia in the Straits. Grey (1908i: 1) later claimed that Isvolsky 
indicated how Russia would pay for the Eastern Rumelian tribute and Bulgaria’s 
compensation for declaring independence (Ünal, 1998: 163). Britain was more 
concerned with securing recognition of the CUP’s moves towards establishing a 
constitutional regime which could allow Article 23 and Article 61 of the Treaty of 
Berlin to be rescinded (Grey, 1908f: 1; 1908k: f 143). Article 23 had provisions for 
intervention in the Ottoman Empire for the purposes of reform, and Article 61 
referred to this possibility with particular regard to the Armenian provinces (Treaty 
between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the 
Settlement of Affairs in the East, [1878] 1908: 422). Grey (1908k: f 143) further 
suggested that the capitulations could be removed and argued that “[t]reaties such as 
exist between other European states would be drawn up in the place of the 
Capitulations when the Constitution and other administrative reforms in Turkey 
appear to us to be satisfactorily applied and established”. Thus, the Russian 
ambassador in Istanbul, Tcharykoff,  promised to support the Ottoman state in 
removing the capitulations provided it granted Russia’s navy the freedom to use the 
Straits (Macfie, 1981: 325). Therefore, whether or not the Ottoman Empire had met 
the standard of ‘civilisation’ no longer came to be premised on the general 
understanding that the Ottomans had attained such a standard. Instead, the 
recognition that the Ottoman Empire was sufficiently ‘civilised’, so that it would no 
longer be subject to the capitulations and would thereby become an equal sovereign, 
came to be conditional on the interests of external powers.  
 
Italy and Austria-Hungary also pursued their own interests in the discussions 
over whether to convene the conference of the Berlin signatory powers. Eager to 
maintain its alliance with Austria-Hungary, with whom it had close historical ties as 
a mainly Catholic state, Italy was concerned over what it perceived to be the 
expansionist goals of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and in the Aegean 
(McMeekin, 2015: 62; Tokay, 2018: 105). Italy, therefore, argued that Austria-
Hungary would have to renounce its rights of intervention in the Ottoman Empire, 
under Articles 25 and 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, in order to participate in the 
conference (Grey, 1908d). However, the Italians were concerned that Austria-
Hungary would not participate in the conference if it was decided that the status of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina would be debated  (Grey, 1908d). Grey (1908f) also argued 
that it was impossible for Britain to accept the status quo created by Austria-Hungary 
and that it would be necessary to for the Ottoman Empire to be compensated. 
Further, Grey (1908f: 1) repeated his call for articles 23 and 61 of the Treaty of 
Berlin to be “revised”, provided the Ottoman Empire “established constitutional 
government and satisfactorily applied the principle of equality and modern methods 
of administration”.  Austria-Hungary’s foreign minister, Metternich, argued that 
Austria-Hungary were not opposed to a conference, since this would allow them to 
demonstrate Austria-Hungary’s goodwill by evacuating its garrison in Novi Bazar 
and to negotiate the compensation of the Ottoman Empire for the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Grey, 1908f: 1). However, Metternich and Grey (1908f: 2) 
disagreed with each other over the inclusion of Crete in the conference programme, 
with Metternich arguing that the Ottoman Empire’s “authority in Crete had really 
disappeared”. However, Grey (1908f: 2) argued that this was a separate matter, 
which ought to be considered by the Ottoman Empire and the “four Powers” who 
had been recognised, in previous treaties, as the protectors of the island. 
Additionally, the Italian Foreign Secretary, Tittoni, argued that it would be necessary 
to include Crete in the conference to discuss the issue of properly compensating the 
Ottoman Empire for its losses (Grey, 1908e). Grey (1908f: 2) argued though that 
Britain could not argue that it was supporting Austria-Hungary in seeking for the 
discussion of Crete in the conference, since this would be an “insult” to “the new 
Government in Turkey (sic)”197. As Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, a lawyer and politician 
aligned with the CUP, was to argue, Crete was still technically a part of the Ottoman 
Empire (Fujinami, 2016: 328). Therefore, the conference could not be convened 
because of how states, such as Italy, Austria-Hungary and Britain, disagreeing on 
whether to include discussions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete in its programme.  
 
The CUP-led Ottoman state, however, also needed to maintain good relations 
with at least some of the Great Powers as it needed to grant concessions to foreign 
companies to develop parts of Ottoman infrastructure and hence be able to exercise 
its internal sovereignty, in line with the principle of centralisation. This placed the 
Young Turks in a difficult position. This was because these foreign companies were 
 
197 See also the discussion of Britain’s stance towards Crete in Sweet (1977: 180).  
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understood as often working in tandem with their own governments, and hence 
serving to further the interests of their countries of origin, which could run counter to 
the CUP’s desire to consolidate Ottoman sovereignty (Cole, 2018; Çetinsaya, 2003; 
Haddad, 1991; Kayalı, 1997: 101 - 102). Different states also often competed to 
secure concessions. For instance, in 1911, the willingness of Ottoman officials to 
extend the German-supported Baghdad railway198 towards Alexandretta was 
opposed by Grey, because this would damage British interests (Earle, 1923: 259). 
The increase in customs duties that the Ottomans demanded to fund the project was 
accordingly rejected by Britain (Earle, 1923: 259). Some members of the CUP and 
other Young Turk factions argued that the awarding of concessions ran contrary to 
the idea of promoting the sovereignty of the people or the nation. The disagreement 
over the Lynch concession in 1910, granted to a British company to provide 
navigation for vessels in the rivers in Mesopotamia, was a case in point (Kayalı, 
1997: 101). There was a suspicion, on the part of local MPs, including Babanzade 
İsmail Hakkı from the CUP, that the Lynch concession was part of a British scheme 
to economically penetrate Mesopotamia and undermine Ottoman authority in the 
region199  (Kayalı, 1997: 101). The calls for the British Indian Office to provide free 
postal services in Mesopotamia were also opposed, because of how this offer was 
seen as a means of extending Indian, and hence British, influence into Iraq (Cole, 
2018). Boycotts of Italian goods were initiated and increased opposition to 
concessions were expressed after the Italian invasion of Libya (Gingeras, 2016: 74 – 
75). The Italians argued that the invasion was necessary to defend economic interests 
in the province200, but Italy had been eager to pursue a policy of expansionism to be 
recognised as a great power (Childs, 1990: 11). At this time, the CUP drew on their 
experience of boycotting Austro-Hungarian goods, following the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina201 with all Iraqi politicians and the Ottoman people 
mobilising in protest against Britain in Iraq (Kayalı, 1997: 102). Ottoman society, 
therefore, was mobilised to oppose concessions and other aspects of foreign 
economic influence which they believed were allowing foreign states to become 
 
198 The Berlin - Baghdad Railway was a railway concession granted to Germany in 1888 to construct 
a railway line from Istanbul to Baghdad (Landau, [1971] 2016: 10; McMeekin, 2015: 28 - 29).  
199 Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Grand Vizier, resigned after losing the vote in favour of the Lynch 
concession (Kayalı, 1997: 101). Cole (2016) has also demonstrated how British influence spread in 
Iraq through the granting of concessions to navigate its rivers.  
200 See Gingeras (2016: 55, 61 - 63). 
201 See Kayalı (1997: 63) and Çetinkaya (2014). 
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increasingly influential within the geography of the empire. If such extending of 
foreign influence through infrastructure, which was understood as a precursor to 
colonialism, was not challenged, it could frustrate the CUP’s efforts to constitute the 
Ottoman Empire as a centralised nation-state. 
 
Subsequently, as a result of the First Balkan War, which occurred after the states 
of the Balkan League attacked the empire in 1912, Ottoman territories in Europe 
were reduced to a foothold around Istanbul.202 The Russians had initially sought to 
mobilise the Ottomans with the other Balkan states to form a defensive alliance to 
check the expansionist ambitions of Austria-Hungary (Hardinge, 1913). Russia, 
under its foreign minister, Sazonov, also sought to pursue a Pan-Slavic policy in the 
Balkans and in south-eastern Europe (Tokay 2018: 102). However, given how 
Ottoman top-down reforms had angered the Balkan populations, the Ottomans were 
ultimately excluded from Russia’s proposed alliance (Hardinge, 1913)203. Buchanan 
(1913: 19 - 20), the British representative at Sofia, added that the Bulgarians had 
sought an alliance with other Balkan states in the course of the Italo-Turkish War, to 
prevent Italian and Austro-Hungarian expansion. The former Bulgarian 
representative in Istanbul, Getchov, contacted Naby Bey, an Ottoman bureaucrat in 
the Macedonian region, urging him to implement new reforms to improve the 
conditions of what he deemed to be the Bulgarian population of the province 
(Buchanan, 1913: 19 - 20). However, violence persisted in Macedonia, with killings 
that were attributed to Bulgarian armed organisations resulting in a massacre of 
Bulgarians in Shtip. The subsequent Kochana massacre, which resulted in the death 
of many Bulgarians, led to the start of the First Balkan War, which would drastically 
alter the approach of the Ottoman Empire to securing its sovereign equality (R.C. 
Hall, 1992: 238; Tokay, 2018: 101).  
 
Aware of the chaotic situation within the province, in the lead up to the First 
Balkan War, the Ottoman government “offered to put into force the ‘law of the 
Vilayets’, drawn up in 1880 by an International Commission, but never carried into 
effect” (Buchanan, 1913: 29).  In response to the massacre, Getchov, who was now 
 
202 For an overview of the impact of the First Balkan War see R.C. Hall (2000) and Ginio (2016).  
203 This text appears as a minute in a despatch by Buchanan (1913), the British ambassador in Sofia. 
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the Minister President of Bulgaria, called for the Ottoman Empire to implement 
autonomy in Macedonia, in accordance with article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin (R.C. 
Hall, 1992: 239). Bulgaria was joined in these proposals by Serbia and Greece, on 
October 13, who also called for a representative of the Great Powers and the “Balkan 
states” to oversee this process (Buchanan, 1913: 29 - 30). This prompted the 
Ottomans to conclude a peace treaty with Italy at Ouchy, which resulted in an 
acceptance of Italian control over the Dodecanese Islands, on 18 October 1912 
(Carabott, 1993: 307). Italy claimed that it would maintain these territories, which 
did not become Italian colonies, but, instead fell under the control of the Italian 
Foreign Ministry, until the Italians were convinced that the Ottomans had withdrawn 
their irregular forces from Libya (Carabott, 1993: 307 - 308). As they expressed to 
the then-chief British dragoman, Fitzmaurice (1912) the Grand Vizier and the 
Sheikh-ul-Islam favoured an agreement with Italy, but they also feared that 
involving European powers in the settlement, at a later date, would result in the loss 
of further sovereignty. The framing of the demands of the Balkan states provoked 
the Ottomans into attacking Bulgaria204, which provoked a retaliation by Greece205, 
Serbia and Montenegro, all of which could claim to be advancing the ‘civilising’ 
mission of the Treaty of Berlin (R.C. Hall, 2000: 14). This pointed to how appealing 
to ‘civilisation’ was not sufficient to secure the sovereign equality of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 
4. The collapse of ‘civilisation’-based constituent diplomacy and the onset of 
war, 1911 – 1913 
 
This section illustrates how the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, and the later Balkan 
Wars, forced Ottoman elites to revise their constituent diplomacy, which had been 
geared towards the recognition of their sovereign equality. The efforts of the Young 
Turks to present themselves as a ‘civilised’ state had failed to convince the European 
great powers to restrain the Balkan League and Italy. This meant that the great 
powers were unwilling to defend the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire under 
the Treaty of Berlin. The Balkan states argued that they were expanding their 
territories in the interests of security and order (R.C. Hall, 2000: 14). The Ottoman 
 
204 See Buchanan (1913: 30). 
205 Greece also welcomed delegates from Crete to its parliament at this time (R.C. Hall, 2000: 14). 
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government, headed by the recently formed Freedom and Accord Party, after the 
initial military defeat in 1911, engaged in diplomacy, seeking to argue that the status 
of the Ottoman Empire as a sovereign state with rights in global international society 
justified its claims to lose territories (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 102 - 104). Rivalries 
amongst the great powers persisted during and after the Balkan Wars and prevented 
the emergence of a united response to the Ottoman claims, which pointed to the 
reality of the change to the settlement envisaged in the Treaty of Berlin. Following 
these military defeats, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999) revised his vision to revive the 
Ottoman Empire. This marked a shift from his previous suggestion that the Ottomans 
should align themselves with Britain and France to empower the state through loans. 
Instead, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999) argued that the Ottoman Empire needed to follow 
the trajectory of European states, rather than directly adopting practices and ideas 
from Europe. A military coup then ensued, led by the CUP member, Enver Paşa. 
Following the Second Balkan War of 1913, the former Ottoman territories in south-
eastern Europe were retaken by the Ottomans through the projection of their power 
and their diplomacy with the Triple Alliance (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 107). This 
involved them conceding to some of their suggestions on the revision of the Treaty 
of Berlin of 1878. This combined projection of power and diplomacy allowed the 
CUP government to regain Edirne and formed the basis of their later attempts to gain 
recognition of their sovereign equality through situating their empire in the Triple 
Alliance. 
 
 Although the Balkan Wars are often interpreted as signalling a break from 
the Ottomanism espoused by the CUP after the revolution (see Ginio, 2005), the 
wars can be said to have resulted in the suspension of earlier methods of diplomacy 
employed by the CUP. Öztan (2018) has suggested that the CUP continued to 
believe in Ottomanism as a means of maintaining the integrity of the empire and 
securing its recognition. However, there was a change in the methods deployed by 
the CUP following the negotiations that ended the First Balkan War. In discussions 
with the Balkan League in London in 1913, the priority of the Ottoman officials was 
to secure the return of Edirne, the former capital, which had been taken by the 
Bulgarian army (McMeekin, 2015: 76 - 77). Although many European powers, such 
as France and Britain, acknowledged that the actions of the Balkan League were 
illegal, their priority was to maintain the ceasefire and prevent the escalation of the 
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conflict into a European wide war.. In a message to Lowther, the British ambassador 
in Istanbul,  Grey (1912b) noted that Tevfik Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador in 
London, and Sir A. Nicolson, the British ambassador in Russia, were both agreed 
that a Europe-wide conference should be held to ease tensions. Although Ottoman 
officials, such as Kamil206, Nazım and Reşid Paşas, came to believe in the need for 
an armistice207 between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empire, they also 
stressed that Edirne and “Dedeagatch” (Cavalla) should remain part of the Ottoman 
Empire (Grey, 1912c). Grey (1912c) insisted208 that the question of the future of 
Edirne should be discussed in a conference209 between the ambassadors of different 
Balkan states in London, but Nazım and Reşid opposed this plan.  On the 29 
November 1912, the Ottoman foreign minister, Gabriel Nouradongian, claimed in a 
communication to Grey (1912a) that the Bulgarians sought to retain Scutari and 
Edirne in any future negotiations. This meant that the negotiations were stalled 
(Grey, 1912a). In contrast to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the great powers had 
failed to act in unison to interpret and implement global constitutional principles. 
The conflict between the Balkan League and the Ottomans continued.  
 
The members of the Ottoman government who were overseeing negotiations 
were executed or removed by a coup d’état carried out by the CUP on the 23 January 
1913. Led by Enver Paşa, the coup became known as the “storming of the Sublime 
Porte” (Wasti, 2002: 94). The government was brought down while the cabinet was 
in session (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 76 - 78). As a result of the coup, a new approach 
was adopted by the CUP to secure recognition of their claims to sovereignty and 
 
206 Lowther (1912a) reported that the Turkish Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on November 
21st to say that Kamil Pasha had to say that Kamil Pasha had proposed to the Allies an Armistice and 
the discussion of preliminaries of peace. However, as Lowther (1912e) previously noted, the 
Ottomans were eager to combine armistice negotiations with peace terms. 
207 Bax-Ironside (1912a), a British Foreign official based in Sofia, reported that the Ottomans and the 
Bulgarians were agreed on the need for an armistice, but Greece was not “willing to raise Aegean 
blockade” and Greece objected to the ceding of its claim to the province of Janina. Lowther (1913b: 
2) later claimed that, during a meeting of the Grand Council at Dolmabahçe Palace, Nazım Paşa 
argued that the army “was fully prepared to do its patriotic duty. But unfortunately armies required 
other things besides ‘morale’.” 
208 Bax-Ironside (1912d) noted that the Bulgarian PM, Daneff, was contacting the German Foreign 
Minister in Berlin to arrange for him to persuade the Ottomans to accept the annexation of Edirne in 
return for peace. Bax-Ironside (1912c) also earlier stated that Bulgarian politicians had debated 
whether an armistice was necessary to ensure that the Bulgarians could bring more troops into 
Macedonia and Edirne.  
209 Tevfik Paşa later telegraphed the British ambassador in Russia, Sir A. Nicolson, to inquire about 
whether a conference would be held (Grey, 1912b). Nicolson responded that a conference could be 
held in a European capital to diffuse tensions (Grey, 1912b). 
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alleviate the military threat which threatened the continuation of their sovereignty.  
The former grand vizier, Hakkı Paşa held discussions with Nicolson in London 
(Mallet, 1913b). In line with the suggestion of the French foreign minister, Aristide 
Briand, it was proposed that all the Treaty of Berlin powers should be included in 
discussions (Mallet, 1913b). In this context, it was suggested that the basis of 
Ottoman sovereignty should be renegotiated by addressing the question of the 
Baghdad Railway and Ottoman rights in the Persian Gulf (Mallet, 1913b). Nicolson 
replied that “the Powers would be ready … to enter into communication with the 
Allies [the Balkan League] if the Porte accepted the advice of the Powers” (Mallet, 
1913b: 2). Tevfik Paşa, an Ottoman diplomat in London, subsequently informed 
Grey (1913g) that it was therefore necessary for the powers, including Russia, to 
bring about a settlement210. Reşid Paşa, the Ottoman negotiator, who was threatening 
to abandon the talks, also argued that the great powers should intervene to allow the 
Ottomans to maintain Edirne. He was told by Grey (1913d) that this was unrealistic 
and that the Bulgarian government had been urged to act moderately211. Following 
the military coup, Said Halim Paşa (1913b), speaking on behalf of the government, 
accepted the inclusion of the powers in the peace process (Grey, 1913b; Lowther, 
1913e). The new Ottoman government prepared a set of demands, which included 
calls for the abolition of the capitulations and foreign post offices. The government 
protested at the taking of territory, with Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 3) arguing that the 
Ottoman Empire sought to enter into treaties on the basis of  
“des principes du droit modern et à l’application à l’égard de leurs sujets des lois 
fiscales Ottomanes”212 (see also Lowther, 1913c; 1913d). 
The initial post-coup diplomacy continued, therefore, to stress Ottoman claims in the 
Balkans, but Said Halim Paşa also used the opportunity to initiate discussions on 
broader issues pertaining to the desire to attain sovereign equality for the empire. 
 
Rather than rely on appeals to ‘civilisation’ to gain recognition of their sovereign 
equality, the Ottomans contemplated using force if other states did not acknowledge 
 
210 Grey (1913d) had also told Reşit Paşa that, by insisting on regaining Edirne and seeking support 
from the Great Powers, the Ottomans were risking losing even more territory by not contributing to a 
stable peace.  
211 Prominent members of the CUP, such as the general, Cemal Paşa, argued that the Ottomans 
needed to retake and maintain Edirne, owing to the significance of its status as an important city in 
Islamic history, its Muslim population and its strategic importance (Gingeras, 2015: 361). 
212 The French original text can be translated into English as follows: “principles of modern law and 
the application of Ottoman tax laws to their subjects” (Said Halim Paşa, 1913a: 3). 
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what they took to be their rights. Present in London for peace talks, Tevfik, Reşid 
and Osman Nizami Paşas, acting as the Ottoman delegation, agreed with the British 
official, Crawford, who proposed, in reference to Edirne, that “full trade and other 
commercial and industrial facilities were accorded to Bulgaria, while the town itself 
remained under Ottoman sovereignty” (Grey, 1913c: 2). Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 3) 
also conceded to the demand for a four per cent increase in customs duties in the 
Ottoman Empire. Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 3) therefore used the peace negotiations 
as a platform to push for changes to the existing customs regime that was maintained 
as a corollary of the capitulations. In arguing for the Ottoman Empire’s continued 
sovereignty over territories lost in the Balkans, these diplomats were echoing the 
views of Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, a CUP politician and writer who focused on 
international and domestic constitutional legal issues (Fujinami, 2013: 328). He had 
argued that the Ottoman Empire continued to have rights over Crete because enosis 
had not yet been recognised by the international community (Fujinami, 2013: 328). 
However, Reşid Paşa’s statement that the Ottoman state would seek to negotiate the 
fate of Edirne resulted in Grey (1913f: 2) concluding that the future of Edirne “must 
be decided by war”, as the talks would not include Edirne. Tevfik Paşa also believed 
that it was essential for the Ottomans to seek mediation with the powers (Mallet, 
1913a). At the same time, Bax-Ironside (1913: 42), Britain’s ambassador to 
Bulgaria, reported that following France’s proposal, Britain, Russia, Italy and 
Austria-Hungary agreed that the border between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria 
would run along the Maritsa River. The constituent power of the Great Powers was 
therefore wielded in an attempt to provide a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
However, the great powers thereby refused to accept the demands of the Ottoman 
diplomats. 
 
The Ottoman government continued to press for at least a degree of Ottoman 
sovereignty over Edirne, which they believed they were entitled to, given the view 
that conquest was illegal under the sovereign rights of the empire and the importance 
of the city for Islam. Reşid and Osman Nizami Paşas had earlier contacted Grey 
(1913e: 1) and argued that unless their instructions were supported by the powers, 
further instability could occur in the Balkans and within the empire. Said Halim 
Paşa, (1913a), the Grand Vizier, had also proposed that the Ottomans should 
maintain a degree of sovereignty over Edirne. Said Halim (1913a: 2) argued that 
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placing the eastern part of Edirne under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire 
would ensure the protection of Islamic artefacts and buildings. This argument was 
similar to the practices of shared sovereignty implemented before 1908 in territories 
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Crete and Bulgaria. Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 1) further 
contended that the Aegean Islands occupied by Greece were vital for the defence of 
Asia Minor and made the following statement:  
“[l]e Gouvernement Impériale est persuadé que les Grandes Puissances, dans 
leur esprit de justice et d'équité, voudront bien reconnaitre l'étendue des 
sacrifices déjà consenties, et convenir que la Sublime Porte serait en droit de 
rejeter toutes nouvelles exigences ou prétentions qui éventuellement 
pourraient être soulevées par les allies balcaniques.”213  
Said Halim Paşa’s proposal was dismissed by the Balkan League (Grey, 1913c). 
Nevertheless, the Bulgarian diplomat, Daneff, informed the Ottomans that Bulgaria 
would accept a straight line as a border stretching from Enos to Imidia, which did 
not follow the Maritsa River214. This was, in turn, dismissed by the Ottomans (Grey, 
1913a). The negotiations reached a standstill. The Ottoman desire to gain 
international recognition of a degree of sovereignty, in line with what they took to be 
the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire, was irreconcilable with the Bulgarian 
desire to enforce their own territoriality over Edirne.  
 
In the wake of Ottoman defeats in Libya and in the Balkans, Sabahaddin 
advanced a new set of proposals for the Ottoman state to overcome the challenges 
faced by the empire. Here, he extended his earlier thoughts on decentralisation and 
constitutionalism. Sabahaddin had previously called for close cooperation between 
the Ottoman Empire and a powerful state to support the empire’s development. In 
1913, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999) prepared a book, titled Türkiye Nasıl 
Kurtarılabilir? (How can Turkey be saved?), where he argued that the Ottoman 
Empire could be empowered by encouraging the individual initiative of its 
citizens215. Sabahaddin ([1913]: 1999: 30) argued that hitherto, owing to “geography, 
 
213 The English translation of this communication reads as follows: "The Imperial Government is 
persuaded that the Great Powers, in their spirit of justice and equity, will be willing to recognize the 
extent of the sacrifices already made, and to agree that the Sublime Porte would be entitled to reject 
any new requirements or claims that could possibly be raised by the Balkan allies" (Said Halim Paşa, 
1913a: 1). 
214 In addition, this communication stressed that the Ottomans ought to give up completely their claim 
to Crete (Lowther, 1913a). 
215 Sabahaddin began work on this book in 1913 (see Özavcı, 2013: 647), but it was eventually 
published in Istanbul in 1918 (see Taglia, 2015: 88).  
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society, and the absence of approaches basing the sciences on observation (the spirit 
of induction)” it has not been possible for the East to  
“align itself with ideas and social currents that have come from Western 
Europe; namely, to find a foundational direction and see the reasons for 
moving society in that direction, in the absence of an awareness of social 
science”216.  
Sabahaddin foresaw that the political programme of decentralisation could be 
supplemented by encouraging independent-minded individuals to develop the local 
wealth of the empire. As Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 26) emphasised at the start of his 
treatise, this would involve challenging the practice of seeking to import or imitate 
Western ideas and practices, stating that the 
“the issue is to be able to possess this power, this ability. If we continue to 
adopt or try to mimic the products of civilisation as they appear to our eyes, 
we will, far from being able to reach contemporary civilisation, move 
increasingly away from it. ”217 
Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 40) emphasised this would be possible through focusing 
on agriculture and enabling the farmers of the empire to move away from sustenance 
towards commercial farming. Unless such reforms occurred, Sabahaddin ([1913] 
1999: 40) argued that the  
“result would be upsetting weakness, economic captivity, brought about by 
focusing on maintaining our political independence purely on administration 
and military measures, and the political captivity that this would give birth 
to.”218 
Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 26 - 27) argued that this was the best way to ensure that 
the Ottoman Empire could follow the same trajectory of development of European 
powers and thereby become ‘civilised’ without empowering Europe, by noting how 
“we must not forget that we are still dependent the West’s financial strength 
to adopt the tools of contemporary civilisation. Receiving this financial 
support is inevitably dependent on us demonstrating the urbane nature of our 
society, meaning that it involves imposing the demands of social life on 
private life. This, in turn, means that these initiatives appear as though they 
 
216 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Avrupa’yı Garbi’den 
aktar-ı sa’irye müteveccih, cereyan-ı ictima’inin mahiyyeti ta’ayyün etmeden; hülasa ilm-i içtima’ın 
keşfiyattından istifade edilmeden ıslahat içün bir istikamet-i esasiyye bulmak ve cem’iyyeti o tarika 
sevk edebilecek avamili görmek mümkün değildi.” (Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 30). 
217 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Mes’ele işte bu 
kabiliyyete, bu kudrete temellük edebilmede! Yoksa bugünkü medeniyyetin yalnız göz önündeki 
eserlerini tanzir ve taklid etmekle onun derecesine varmak hatta yaklaşmak şöyle dursun bi’l-akis 
uzaklaşmada devamımız zaruri!” (Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 26). 
218 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “[n]etice, 
memleketimizin asırlardan beri yaşadığı bu za’f-ı elim, istikal-i siyasimizi yalnız vesa’it-i askeriyye 
ve idariyye ile muhafazayı çalıştığımız halde hedef-i istilası olmaktan kurtulmak mümkün olamayan 
esaret-i iktisadiyye ve bunun zaruri olarak tevlid edeceği esaret siyasiyye…” (Sabhaddin, [1913] 
1999: 40). 
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are owned and enacted by the government, while, in fact, being the 
West’s.”’219. 
That Sabahaddin wrote his Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?, after Ottoman defeat in 
Libya and the Balkans suggests how these crises and the lack of faith in the great 
powers to support the Ottoman Empire moved him to turn to the idea of developing 
the self-sufficiency of the Ottoman people. 
 
In the course of the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, the competition between 
states seeking to establish more influence in the Ottoman Empire intensified. This 
had an impact on how the Ottomans presented their claims to sovereign rights with a 
shift away from seeking recognition as a ‘civilised’ state220. Lowther (1912b) and his 
French colleague had urged the Ottomans to moderate their demands to the Balkan 
League, claiming that the Triple Alliance was also pushing for moderation (see also 
Bax-Ironside, 1912c221). The Ottoman desire to develop closer relations with Italy 
and its allies, Austria-Hungary and Germany, had begun when news reached the 
Ottomans of an alliance between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in the Balkans (Tokay, 
2018: 98 - 99). A new cabinet headed by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, who advocated 
establishing close relations with the Italians, replaced the cabinet of Said Halim 
Paşa, who was held responsible for the defeat at the hands of the Italians in north 
Africa (Tokay, 2018: 98 - 99). Lowther (1913c) remarked that the new Ottoman 
government, in its communications to the Great Powers, sought to secure 
“Adrianople and the Aegean Islands” and that it had taken care, possibly under the 
advice of Austro-Hungarian diplomats in Istanbul, to distinguish between islands in 
the Aegean that were “occupied by the Allies” and those that were occupied by 
 
219 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows:  “Unutmayalım ki 
memleketimizi vesa’it-i hazıra-i medeniyye ile techiz edebilmek için yine Garb’ın mu’avenet-i 
maliyyesine müraca’ata mecburuz. Bu müraca’at şera’it-i hazıra-i ictima’iyyemiz dahilinde” 
(Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 26 - 27). 
220 See Boeckh and Rutar (2018: 219) for how Western historiography has traditionally viewed the 
Balkan Wars from the perspective of Balkan exceptionalism (see Biondich, 2011 for an example and 
Todorova, 1997, for a critique) or has merely focused on the military history of the wars (see 
Erickson, 2003). New historical studies need to consider the non-military aspects of the conflict.  
221 Bax-Ironside (1912c) argued that the Ottoman proposal for an armistice was “without doubt the 
combined work of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Governments drawn up with German 
approval”, and stated further that “if Ottoman government refuse to cede all Macedonia together with 
Adrianople to the Allies, the war will be continued.” Relatedly, Bax-Ironside (1912b) had reported 
that the representatives of the Triple Alliance in Sofia had misinterpreted the Bulgarians’ intentions as 
being driven by the desire to reach a peace with the Ottomans.  
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Italy.222 Tokay (2018: 104) also notes that the Ottomans sought to use Crete as a 
bargaining chip, whereby they would abandon Crete in return for the recognition of 
the Ottomans as sovereign over the other islands. This plan, which had been devised 
by the earlier Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Nouradongian (see Lowther, 
1913c), failed. Lowther (1913c) also predicted that Italy would probably abandon the 
Sporades Islands, which it had occupied in the course of the Italo-Turkish War, in 
order to “show the Turks that the Triple Alliance is more favourable to Ottoman 
interests in the matter than the Triple Entente”. Ultimately, the Ottomans saw a 
possibility of attaining international recognition of their sovereign equality by 
gaining the support of the Triple Alliance, which also offered the prospect of 
securing the recognition of the Ottoman claim to Edirne. 
 
The CUP government aimed to gain recognition of its sovereign equality by a 
combination of diplomacy and warfare, made possible by the support of the Triple 
Alliance. The CUP’s demand for the end of the four-percent increase on customs 
duties, which would allow the Ottoman state to develop its sovereign capacity in the 
face of the economic challenges posed by the capitulations, was met positively by 
the Triple Alliance (Lowther, 1913c) Italy agreed to this as part of its peace terms 
with the Ottomans. Germany’s control over the Baghdad Railway concession was 
recognised by the Ottomans, and Austria-Hungary secured the end of Ottoman 
claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina in return for supporting the increase on customs duties 
(Lowther, 1913c: 3). In the Balkans, the Ottomans benefitted from the onset of 
clashes between Bulgaria and Greece 223 (Gingeras, 2016: 82 – 92). Enver deployed 
an irregular force, known as the Special Organisation, or Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, 
previously formed in the Italo-Turkish War, which was now tasked with waging an 
insurgency against Greek forces in western Thrace (Pelt, 2010: 236). The force 
established a de facto state, known as the Turkish Republic of Thrace, by exploiting 
divisions amongst Bulgarians and Greeks, but the form of sovereignty of this state 
 
222 Gabriel Nouradongian had played an earlier role in preparing the legal defence of Ottoman 
sovereignty, starting from the period of the founding of the Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel, which 
was tasked with translating texts in international law (Genell, 2016: 262). 
223 Lowther (1912d: f 286) notes that although the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gabriel 
Nouradongian,  recognised “the necessity of ceding Adrianople,” he argued that “in peace conditions 
it was quite impossible to persuade their military authorities that its retention was not indefensible.” 
See also Lowther (1912c), where Mahmud Şevket Paşa, a prominent Ottoman general (see Zürcher, 
2010: 92), stressed that it was necessary to recognise that the defence of Istanbul required the 
Ottomans to maintain Edirne. 
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was unclear and it did not enjoy international recognition (Gingeras, 2009: 91 - 92). 
The Turkish Republic of Thrace was dismantled following further peace negotiations 
in London, where the Balkan states recognised Edirne as a part of Ottoman territory 
(Gingeras, 2009: 91 – 92). In the meantime, former Ottoman officials and units in 
the westernmost part of the Balkan territories were able, through diplomacy, to be 
recognised as the state of Albania (Blumi and Yavuz, 2013: 53, 55 – 56; Sezgin, 
2013: 437). This resulted in the end of Ottoman sovereignty in this territory. 
Although their long-standing goal of ending the capitulations was not achieved, 
Ottoman officials had pursued a successful constituent diplomacy, insofar as they 
obtained approval from the Great Powers to regain control of Edirne and to negotiate 
a customs increase.  
 
5. Warfare as a means of reconstituting international society: sovereignty, war 
and the CUP, 1914 - 1918 
 
 This section argues that by entering the First World War on the side of the 
Triple Alliance, the CUP sought to reconstitute international order along lines that 
would be more favourable to the recognition of their sovereign equality. How 
intellectuals affiliated with the CUP developed different social and political theories 
to situate their state in what they understood to be a more deserving position within 
global international society is demonstrated. At the eve of the war, these intellectuals 
no longer considered “civilization” as an idea that could be used to persuade the 
Great Powers to accept the empire as an equal sovereign (Aksakal, 2008: 37). 
Instead, thinkers such as Ağaoğlu and Ziya Gökalp, viewed civilisation as a concept 
that denoted empowerment of their state and society and the means by which their 
power could be projected internationally (Grassi, 2015224; Özavcı, 2013). In this 
context, developing a Turkish nation within the Ottoman Empire was seen as 
essential (Aksakal, 2004; 2008: 36; Özavcı, 2013; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: chs. 6 and 7). 
The First World War also saw the Ottoman state revoke all of the capitulations 
(Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 104). Thinkers advising the Ottoman state, such as Parvus Efendi, 
viewed the war as an opportunity to engage in extensive homegrown social, 
 
224 Grassi (2015) adds that, in addition to Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and Munis Tekinalp were also 
significant Turkish nationalist intellectuals who sought to justify the involvement of the Ottoman 
Empire in the First World War.  
 152 
economic and political reform that would empower the empire (Kieser, 2011). 
Defeating Russia, in particular, was seen as essential to avoid reforms from being 
imposed from outside that could curtail the territoriality of the empire (Kieser, 
2011). This would, in turn, further consolidate the empire’s position in global 
international society, as an ally of the Central Powers. The threat posed by Tsarist 
Russia to the sovereignty and sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
nationalist goal of supporting Turkish movements, drove the Ottoman Empire to 
enter into an alliance with the Central Powers (Kieser, 2011; Trumpener, 1968). 
Ultimately, the doctrines of national sovereignty that were adopted during the war 
formed the basis of the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Ottoman Empire, 
following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918 (Grassi, 2015: 185). 
 
In the context of their struggle to gain equal recognition of the sovereignty of 
the Ottoman Empire, the CUP had established ties with thinkers who sought to bring 
about a transformation of forms of hierarchy throughout the globe. One of the main 
motives for the CUP to turn to the advice of the thinker, Parvus, and to enter the First 
World War, was to prevent a reform process being undertaken with international 
supervision in the eastern provinces under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin (Kieser, 
Polatel and Schmutz, 2015: 285 - 287). Kayaoğlu (2010a: 104 - 105) argues that it 
was primarily the need to end extraterritoriality that led to the entry of the Ottomans 
to the First World War and that their successful state-building meant that they could 
now end extraterritoriality. However, extraterritoriality was only ended with the 
support of the Central Powers – i.e. the Triple Alliance – only being granted after the 
war had been declared (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 104 - 105). Germany sought to prevent the 
expansion of Russian influence in the Armenian regions earmarked for reform 
(Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015: 290, 294 - 296). Following the Balkan Wars, 
Russia had suggested  that a Christian governor be jointly appointed by European 
states and the Ottoman Empire to oversee these regions (Kieser, Polatel and 
Schmutz, 2015: 290, 294 - 296). The capitulations would also be abolished by the 
Ottoman state, with Germany and Austria-Hungary later supporting them, thereby 
normalising the Ottoman state in global international society and ending the 
persistence of forms of international hierarchy and stigmatisation (Kieser, Polatel 
and Schmutz, 2015: 298). The ideas of Alexander-Helphand Parvus, a German 
Social Democrat, Marxist theorist and businessman in Istanbul, who developed close 
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ties with the German and Ottoman states, provided justifications for the actions of 
the CUP at this time (Karaömerlioğlu, 2004; Kieser, 2011). Parvus, who wrote in the 
CUP-affiliated Turkish nationalist journal, Türk Yurdu, sought to reconcile the 
interests of the Ottoman Empire with Marx’s theory of the inevitability of a world 
revolution, which he believed could be achieved by Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
the Ottoman Empire jointly toppling Russia’s autocratic government (Kieser, 2011: 
389 – 390, 398 - 401). Parvus ([1914] 2013a: 213) hence argued that  
“[a]ny future government in Turkey (sic) must be the current Ottoman 
government. If Turkey aptly uses its ability to choose a civilised government 
of a new style and pursues this strength and ability, it will fulfil a historical 
role worthy of its responsibility and prevent Russia’s expansion and 
domination of Asia”.225  
By presenting a theory of history, Parvus was one of the thinkers affiliated with the 
CUP who questioned the existing rules of global international society by challenging 
the states that upheld these principles.  His views would be realised in 1914, when 
the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers 
by carrying out a naval assault on Russian ports in the Black Sea.  
 
Parvus ([1914] 2014), claimed that the standard of ‘civilisation’ could be 
used as a concept to assess the level of development of the economy and society of 
the Ottoman Empire. Parvus ([1914] 2014: 130) expressed this view by stating:  
“Esteemed readers, when we mention European civilisation it is necessary to 
note how it is not present to the same extent in every country. Therefore, 
whenever a state intends to implement military science, parliamentarism, and 
agrarian or industrial techniques from Europe, it is necessary to closely study 
the differences in civilisation amongst states.”226 
The solution for the Ottoman Empire, according to Parvus ([1914] 2014: 13 - 14), 
was to encourage the development of the productive forces of the Ottoman economy 
and to challenge the capitulations and other restrictions on the economy that had 
resulted in the empire accumulating vast amounts of debt. Parvus called for the 
 
225 The Turkish transliteration and simplification of the original Ottoman text reads as follows, 
“Türkiye kendi kendini yeni bir tarz ve medeni bir hükümet şekil ve kalıbına dökecek kadar kuvvet ve 
kabiliyete sahip olup da bu kudret ve kabiliyetini iyi kullanmak yolunu bilir ve tutar ise 
sorumluluğuna dayanan bir tarihi vazife yapmış ve böylece Rusya’nın Asya’daki yayılma girişimleri 
ve hakim olma hareketlerine karşı bir engel koymuş olacaktır” (Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 213). 
226 The translation provided above is from the following passage in Parvus ([1914] 2014: 130): 
“Kari’in-i kiram Avrupa medeniyetinden bahs ediliği zaman bunun her bir memlekette aynı derecede 
olmadığını görüyor. Binaenaleyh kendi memleketine gerek fenn-i askeri ve gerek parlementarizm, 
gerek ziraat ve gerek sanayie dair Avrupa usulü ithal edileceği zaman her devlet arasında medeniyetçe 
olan fark iyice tetkik edilmelidir.” 
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creation of a “National Economy”, along the lines proposed by the economist 
Friedrich List (see Toprak, 2012: 44), in which wealth would be held by the majority 
of the people within the Ottoman Empire, who constituted the dominant nation 
(Karaömerlioğlu, 2004: 153; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 157 - 158). This idea was also 
adopted by Munis Tekinalp (formerly Moise Cohen), a writer in a CUP-aligned 
journal called Genç Kalemler (The Young Pens), founded in Salonica in 1891 
(Akçam, 2004: 67). Tekinalp not only believed in the necessity of creating a national 
economy, based on the ideas held by the German Social Democratic Party, but also 
came to believe, on the basis of the ideas of the right wing French thinker, Comte de 
Gobineau, that nations were themselves founded upon “race[s]” (Akçam, 2004: 67; 
see also Toprak, 2013: 297 - 301). The creation of such a national economy, 
according to its proponents, would ensure that the Ottoman Empire could harness its 
productive capacity and make the transition from state to national sovereignty. 
Tekinalp227 most clearly articulated this view, arguing that the Ottomans needed to 
create a ‘national economy’ and adopt irredentist Turkish nationalism to gain more 
global influence (Grassi, 2015; Landau, [1981] 1995: 34 – 35). This, in turn, could 
empower the Ottoman state and allow it to shape the constitutional rules of 
international society, through its alliances, to secure recognition of its sovereign 
rights in global international society. 
 
Parvus’s views on ‘civilisation’, informed by his Marxist and Social 
Democratic perspective, coalesced with those of Turkish nationalist thinkers, who 
saw the war as an opportunity to realise their own political goals. Both Parvus and 
these nationalist thinkers, many of whom were associated with the CUP or sought to 
complement the CUP’s constitutional revolution with a Turkish national awakening, 
supported the idea of the “national economy” and saw the war as an opportunity to 
create it (Karaömerlioğlu, 2004:153; see also Kieser, 2011; Toprak, 2012). Ağaoğlu, 
a member of the CUP who had immigrated to the Ottoman Empire from the Russian 
Empire, did not share Parvus’s Marxism, but he nonetheless believed in a concept of 
universal “civilization” which denoted a level of development (Özavcı, 2013: 22, see 
 
227 Tekinalp’s equation of Turkism and Pan-Turkist irredentism was mirrored in the views of Celal 
Nuri, a journalist and intellectual, who stressed that the two ideas had become intertwined (Landau, 
[1981] 1995: 34). As Turnaoğlu (2017a: 251) demonstrates, Celal Nuri was an advocate of 
“civilisation.” 
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also Shissler, 2003: 158). Sharing the late nineteenth century French conservative 
critique of schemes of universal emancipation, associated with thinkers such as the 
Comte de Gobineau, Ernest Renan and Gustave Le Bon, Ağaoğlu argued that nations 
and individuals were the only relevant forces in history (Shissler, 2003: 69 - 70). 
However, Ağaoğlu believed that the path of development of European societies 
could be emulated in the context of the Ottoman Empire (Özavcı, 2013: 22). Ziya 
Gökalp, another intellectual aligned with the CUP, came to argue that the Ottoman 
Empire needed to secure its own position within Western civilisation to empower 
itself. On 14 January 1915, Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41) argued that “the highest form 
of civilisation… is ‘capital civilisation’”, which he claimed emerged in “composite 
societies228, in which the different components of these societies select and send 
representatives to confederal assemblies in the capital city of their country, thereby 
gaining a national character”229. Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41) concluded that “the 
greatest nations of Europe are taking this shape”230. All these thinkers, therefore, 
presented arguments which echoed previous references to the standard of 
‘civilisation’. They explicitly referred to the established European states as paragons 
of national development, to be emulated by the Ottoman Empire, but did not argue 
for proving the ‘civilised’ nature of the Ottoman Empire to the great powers, as a 
means of securing the recognition of sovereign equality. 
 
Parvus was not a nationalist and remained committed to world revolution, 
believing that war could advance the cause of world revolution. But, both Ağaoğlu 
and Gökalp believed that ‘civilisation’ could be attained through nationalism 
(Özavcı, 2013). This is illustrated in how Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 42) argued that the 
“Turkish nation” was a part of “communal societies”, but was “a candidate to being 
 
228 Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 38) advanced terms such as “uzvi tesanüt”, which corresponded roughly to 
Durkheim’s concept of “organic solidarity”, present in primitive societies, and the concept of 
“mihaniki tesanüt” corresponded to Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity, present in societies 
with more complex forms of the division of labour (Parla, 1985: 55). 
229 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as: “Heyeti cemiyetlerde … bu 
camialara mensup heyetler paytahtta intihap ettikleri murahhaslardan mürekkep konfederasyon 
meclislerine malik olarak milli bir mahiyet alırlar. Medeniyetin bu şekline ‘paytaht medeniyeti’ 
denilebilir. Ve medeniyetin en yüksek şekli budur” (Gökalp, [1915] 1981b: 41). 
230 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as “Avrupa’nın en yüksek 
milletleri bu şekle doğru ilerlemektedir” (Gökalp, [1915] 1981b: 41). 
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considered amongst composite societies”231, which included the foremost European 
states. Gökalp ([1915] 1981b) argued for a typology of five different societies, each 
of which displayed greater complexity than the other and included the “zeami” 
(feudal) (see Gökalp [1915] 1981b: 40), “camiavi” (communal) (see Gökalp [1915] 
1981b: 40),“medine” (urban) ) (see Gökalp [1915] 1981b: 40),, “muzaaf” (layered) 
(see Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41), and, finally “heyeti” (composite) (see Gökalp 
([1915] 1981b: 41), societies. Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 38) had developed a social 
theory to explain these societies, based on the ideas of the French sociologist, Emile 
Durkheim (Topal, 2017: 288). Accordingly, each of these societies had a different 
form of division of labour, which became more complex as the society advanced, 
and which was sustained through ties of solidarity amongst the members of the 
society. Ağaoğlu, on the other hand, believed in an ontology in which there was only 
room for nations and individuals, where national cultures would form the basis for 
the expression of individual rights. However, both Ağaoğlu and Gökalp contended 
that nationalism in the Ottoman Empire would need to draw upon local and 
European ideas. Commenting on the CUP’s annual 1916 conference, Gökalp ([1916] 
1981a: 60) summarised his perspective as follows:  
“[a]s a result of the religious debates that were held in the CUP Congress this 
year, a sincere opinion was expressed, which stressed how Islam and modern 
civilisation are entirely compatible with one another”. 
Arguing that the Young Ottomans and politicians, such as Namık Kemal and Cevdet 
Paşa had previously voiced this opinion (see Gökalp [1916] 1981a: 60), Gökalp 
([1916] 1981a: 61) argued that the mistake of the Tanzimat had been to assign the 
Sultan the status of the leader of the Muslim community in the empire.232 This 
institutional arrangement meant that the Sultan was both the sovereign of the whole 
of the empire and the representative of a particular religious group (Gökalp [1916] 
1981a: 61 - 62). To end this situation, Gökalp ([1916] 1981a: 61) agreed with “Imam 
Mawardi, who stated in his ‘Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniia’, that the caliphate could not be 
considered separately from the sultanate.”233 Gökalp ([1916] 1981b: 67 - 69) added 
 
231 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as: “Bu tasnife göre Türk 
milletinin camiavi cemiyetler nev’ine dahil olduğu ve istikbalde heyeti cemiyetler arasına girmeye 
namzet bulunduğu anlaşılıyor” (Gökalp, [1915] 1981b: 42). 
232 The Tanzimat reforms had resulted in communal autonomy for different religious groups in the 
empire, with each group ultimately answering to the Sultan as the sovereign (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a). 
233 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as: “Saltanat, İmam-ı Maverdi’nin 
‘Ahkam-ı Sultaniyyesi’nden anlatıldığı vecihle, hilafetin sıfat-i hükümranisi (souveraineté) olup 
katiyen ondan ayrı şey değildi” (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a: 61). 
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that this confusion meant that the Islamic community in the Ottoman Empire was 
reduced to the status of being one of the religious communities, such as the 
Armenians, over which the Sultan would be considered sovereign. This, in turn, for 
Gökalp ([1916] 1981b: 69) would have the effect of  
“preventing the Islamic state from being recognised as a contemporary state, 
hence preventing its independence both internally and externally. In this 
condition, we would also have no right to remove the capitulations.”234 
This meant that the Sultan and therefore the state could always be said to be 
privileging Muslims and hence the capitulations could be maintained in perpetuity. 
Therefore, even though Gökalp and Ağaoğlu prescribed separate means for the state 
to become more civilised, they both agreed that the Ottoman state should adopt 
Turkish nationalism (Özavcı, 2013). According to them, this would enable the 
Ottoman state to project its constituent power internally and internationally and 
thereby allow the Ottoman state to follow in the path of the ‘civilised’ and 
‘advanced’ European Great Powers. 
 
In addition to considerations of social and political theory, the CUP focused 
on reaping the perceived advantages of the geography of the empire to justify 
entering the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. If the Ottomans 
could exploit their unique geographic position, these thinkers reasoned that the 
Ottomans would thereby be empowered and would succeed in gaining recognition of 
their demands for equal sovereignty. Cami Bey (later Cami Baykurt) was one such 
intellectual, who was also a former deputy of the Ottoman Parliament and founder of 
the “Turkish nationalist” National Constitutional Party (Aksakal, 2008: 33). He 
argued that the empire could not be considered a European state on the basis of its 
location and that its former European territories had been mere colonies that had 
burdened it for some time (Aksakal, 2004: 526; 2008: 33 - 36). Gökalp ([1917] 
1981: 119) situated the Ottoman Empire culturally within both Europe and Asia. 
However, Gökalp ([1917] 1981: 119) contended that both the Ottomans and the 
Germans were “in the process of purifying themselves from the influences of foreign 
countries in the fields of religion, morality, their legal consciences, their literature 
 
234 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as “O halde İslam devleti 
ötedenberi bazı Avrupa ülemasının idda ettiği vechile hiçbir zaman asir bir devlet mahiyetini 
alamayacak, binaenaleyh ne dahilen, ne de haricen müstakil olmayacaktı. Bu takdirce kapitülasyonları 
kaldırmaya da hiçbir hakkımız bulunmayacaktı” (Gökalp, [1916] 1981b: 69). 
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and linguistic tastes and their scientific and economic practices”235, even though both 
were a part of “European civilisation.” Focusing more on the specific location of the 
Ottoman Empire, Parvus ([1914] 2013a: 212) argued that it could challenge Russia 
through “controlling the keys to the only door that leads to the Black Sea”236 and 
also challenge Britain’s presence in Egypt (see Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 214). Parvus 
([1914] 2013a: 213) argued that such an empowerment of the Ottoman state would 
enable it to defend its sovereignty, while also challenging Britain’s predominant 
position in the globe, making it “a natural ally of Germany and Austria in their fight 
against the Russian presence”237. Parvus ([1914] 2013b) further developed his views 
in a separate article, which discussed the possible outcomes if Britain emerged 
victorious from the war. Here, Parvus ([1914] 2013b: 223) argued that the 
maintenance of the status quo in terms of the level of development of states and their 
economies was centred around “desiring Turkey (sic) and China remaining 
backward both politically and economically”. Therefore, Parvus ([1914] 2013b: 223) 
suggested that the defence of Ottoman sovereign equality, which was already 
threatened by economic concessions that were conditional on the Ottomans 
relinquishing control of their finances, necessitated the defeat of Britain in the World 
War. Consequently, a view emerged that because of its geopolitical position, the 
most effective means for the Ottoman Empire to ensure its sovereign equality would 
be an alliance with Germany. This alliance materialised in the course of international 
calls for reforms in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
These thinkers also referred to the need to forge an alliance with the Central 
Powers in war-time in order to change international and local constitutional rules. 
Although Gökalp and Ağaoğlu did not have an explicit theory of how the globe 
ought to be ordered, they nonetheless stressed that nations were to be the main units 
that composed it. In the course of the First World War, the Ottoman state and 
 
235 The original Ottoman text reads as follows in the Turkish transliteration available in Gökalp 
([1917] 1981: 119): “Alman milleti, kendine mahsus olan dini, ahlaki, hukuki vicdanları, bedii ve 
lisani zevki, ilmi ve iktisadi usulleri, diğer milletlerin bu gibi amillerinden temyize çıkarmaktadır.” 
Gökalp ([1917] 1981: 119) later adds that the Ottomans are engaged in the same process that he here 
ascribes to the Germans. 
236 The Turkish transliteration and simplification of the original text reads as follows, “Karadeniz’e 
yol veren tek anahtarlarının Türkiye’nin elinde bulunması…” (Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 212). 
237 The Turkish transliteration and simplification of the original text reads as follows, referring to the 
Ottoman Empire: “…, Almanya ve Avusturya’nın Rus varlığına karşı giriştikleri kavga ve güreşte bu 
iki devletin en emin ve en doğal bir müttefiki olurdu” (Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 213).  
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intellectuals affiliated with it promoted the idea of creating a Turkic and Islamic 
empire from territories conquered from the Russian Empire (Grassi, 2015). Parvus 
([1914] 2013a: 213) believed that the defeat of Russia was a necessary step in the 
advance of history towards a world revolution. After these hopes were put on hold 
following the defeat of the Ottoman forces led by Enver Paşa in 1915, Gökalp 
([1918] 2007) sought to support Turkish and Islamic peoples in the former Russian 
Empire, who sought to secure their sovereignty after the Russian Revolution of 
1917. This was evident in his 1918 article addressed to the Turks of Russia. Here, 
Gökalp ([1918] 2007: 35) argued for the promotion of the “Idea of Muslim 
Turkishness”238, as the Turks of the Russian Empire had an opportunity to constitute 
their own societies after the collapse of the Tsarist regime. Challenging the policies 
of the Bolsheviks, which sought only to recognise class differences among 
individuals, Gökalp ([1918] 2007: 34) argued for national solidarity and the 
establishment of  
“rulers, who can either have absolute or constitutionally limited power or 
operate in the context of republics. However, they must nonetheless not 
follow a political cause that privileges one class and threatens another”239.  
Therefore, even though the CUP had failed during the war to restructure 
international society with the weakening of Russia, they nonetheless continued to 
argue for the national sovereignty of Turkish and Muslim peoples (Khalid, 2011). By 
encouraging these revolutionary Turkish and Islamic nationalist movements that 
emerged after the Russian Revolution, and reconstituting the Ottoman Empire as a 
nation-state, the Young Turks believed that they could also empower and extend the 
influence of the Ottoman state (Reynolds, 2009). This would enable the empire to 
overcome external challenges to its sovereignty and assert its sovereign equality.  
  
The focus on the instrumental conception of war, as exemplified in the 
justifications provided by the Young Turk intellectuals for involvement in the First 
World War to secure the recognition of sovereign equality, overlooks the unintended 
“consequences” of conflict (Barkawi and Brighton, 2019: 101). The use of 
nationalism, and the need to secure national sovereignty, had a tangible effect on the 
 
238 The exact phrase that Gökap ([1918] 2007: 35) uses in this text is “Müslüman Türk Mefküresi”. 
239 The original text in Gökalp ([1918] 2007: 34) reads “[r]eisler, ister mutlak ister meşruti ister 
cumhuri reisler olabilirler. Yalnız, nahiyenin takib edeceği siyasi meslek, bir sınıfın lehine diğer 
sınıfın aleyhine olmaladır.” 
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nature and the extent of Ottoman sovereignty at the end of the war. The arguments of 
Parvus ([1914] 2014) and his followers, stressing that it was necessary for the 
Ottoman Empire to reconstitute itself as a national economy to secure its 
sovereignty, and Ağaoğlu’s (see Özavcı, 2013; Shissler, 2003: 161 - 162) belief that 
the borders of the state should be co-terminus with those of the nation, left their 
mark on the empire. As a result of the war, the Ottoman Empire increasingly 
resembled a national economy, with the position of non-Muslims in the economy 
and in the empire diminished through forced expulsions and massacres resulting in 
national homogenisation (Akçam, 2004: 67; Rae, 2002; Üngör, 2008; 2011). 
Territorial gains were achieved through diplomacy and military operations which 
focused on establishing ties with Turkish populations to the east of the empire. 
Following the exit of Russia from the war in 1917 and the signing of the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, where the Turkish nationalist, Akçura, represented 
the Ottoman state, the Ottomans secured the return of the eastern provinces that had 
been conquered by Russia in 1878 (Grassi, 2015: 185). However, the Ottoman 
Empire would soon be forced to surrender to the Allied powers. The Armistice of 
Moudros was signed on 30 October 1918 (Gingeras, 2016: 248). This was after Talat 
Paşa, the Grand Vizier, had argued that the collapse of Ottoman armies on several 
fronts necessitated suing for peace on the terms that had been set out by US 
President Woodrow Wilson (Gingeras, 2016: 247). Significantly, among Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points for Peace was the call in point XII for the recognition of the “secure 
sovereignty” of the “Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire” (Wilson, 1918 
quoted in Smith, 2009: 57). Point XIV, on the other hand, recognised the equality of 
“the political independence and territorial integrity” for “great and small states alike” 
(Wilson, 1918 quoted in Throntveit, 2017: 471). Consequently, the Ottoman Empire 
had been transformed, through the constituent power of the CUP, along the lines of 
Turkish and Islamic nationalism that had been articulated by intellectuals who had 
called for the empire to enter the war.  
 
6. Conclusion:  
 
 The Great Powers failed to provide a united response to the Balkan states, 
following the invasion and annexation of Ottoman territory in the Italo-Turkish and 
First Balkan Wars. The European states had previously acted as a constituent power 
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to ensure that the interests of “civilisation” were ensured through reforms envisaged 
in the Treaty of Berlin (M. Schulz, 2011: 203). However, they failed to agree on how 
the treaty could be restructured after the changes that had occurred after the 
revolution of 1908. In these circumstances, some of the Young Turks concluded that 
instituting a constitutional regime would not lead to states accepting that the 
Ottomans had met the standard of ‘civilisation’. After a military coup by the CUP in 
1913, the Young Turks came to equate the level of ‘civilisation’ in the empire with 
social power alongside normative power. Calls by certain Berlin signatory powers 
for reforms to be introduced in the eastern provinces of the empire pushed the CUP 
to opt for an alliance with Germany to challenge Russia’s perceived expansionism 
(Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015). As the 1916 conference of the CUP 
demonstrates, Islamic civilisation was presented as being compatible with the 
contemporary standard of ‘civilisation’ (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b). 
Hence, civilisation came to be understood as denoting universal, rather than merely 
Islamic civilisation (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b). This allowed the CUP to 
place their state on an equal footing with the other Great Powers, claiming that they 
were a civilised state and not merely an Islamic state (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a; [1916] 
1981b). ‘Civilisation’, in turn, was equated with transforming society along national 
lines and through securing the recognition of the equal sovereignty of the state 
through alliances. Ottoman participation in the First World War was therefore an 
attempt to alter the constitutional rules of global international society to enable the 
sovereign equality of the state to be secured. Although the Ottomans were ultimately 
defeated, this concern with securing sovereign equality motivated them to enter into 








5. Sovereignty and the return of the standard of ‘civilisation’: struggles for the 
recognition of sovereign equality in the Ottoman Empire, 1918 – 1921 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
This chapter focuses on how events at the end of the First World War led to 
attempts to reorder international society. The Paris Peace Conference resulted in the 
development of new forms of global normative hierarchy. Key ideas articulated in 
the conference had previously been voiced by Woodrow Wilson in his efforts to end 
the war. Both Wilson and the Russian revolutionary leader, Vladimir Lenin 
developed their ideas of self-determination at the end of the First World War 
(Throntveit, 2011a; 2017: 246 - 249). The first section reviews the literature on 
International Relations and history in the period immediately after the First World 
War. Both Lenin and Wilson claimed to be opponents of imperialism (Manela, 2007: 
38). This meant that the standard of ‘civilisation’ was no longer tied to the civilising 
missions of empires. It came to be associated with an outcome that would be brought 
about by the Paris Peace Conference and the institutions that it generated (Linklater, 
2016). These included the practice of establishing mandates and the use of 
commissions to determine the fate of territories (Pedersen, 2015). States could be 
recognised as conforming to different categories along the normative hierarchy 
envisaged by the new standard of ‘civilisation’ (Anghie, 2002; 2005: ch. 3). In the 
post-war period, the recognition of states as fully sovereign continued to be 
conditional on them being acknowledged as having attained a specific level of 
‘civilisation’ (Mazower, 2006). The second section considers how Ottoman political 
elites responded to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by employing various methods 
to secure their recognition as an equal sovereign to the established states in global 
international society, in accordance with the new form of the standard of 
‘civilisation’. The third section explains how, in this process, these elites overcame 
the challenge posed by the new conception of crimes against humanity, which was 
threatened to be used as a justification for the denial of sovereign equality. The 
fourth section examines how the National Movement, which emerged in Anatolia, 
organised a constituent assembly and government in Ankara, that enabled it to create 
the Turkish people as a constituent power that challenged the territorial settlement 
planned by the Allies. 
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2. The end of the First World War and the Ottoman Empire: theorising responses to 
hierarchy  
 
Reviewing the existing literature, this section considers the development of 
ideas, such as those promoted by Wilson and Lenin, for the maintenance of peace 
after the war and the reordering of international society (Throntveit, 2011a). In place 
of the pre-war form of global hierarchy, centred around empires and their colonies, 
there emerged a new form of normative hierarchy that was facilitated by the system 
of mandates and commissions (Spanu, 2019a: 250; 2019b). Those who devised the 
new understandings of global hierarchy were not intent on extending equal treatment 
to all actors after the war, but as Manela (2001; 2007) notes, their anti-imperial 
stance nonetheless generated expectations, especially with regard to those 
challenging pre-war forms of hierarchy. The employment of the mandate system was 
especially significant in the context of the former Ottoman Empire, as several of its 
territories were deemed mandates to be entrusted to the League of Nations (Haas, 
1952; Kedourie, 1968; Matz, 2005; Sluglett, 2008). In the former Ottoman context 
and in Eastern Europe, which partially overlapped with the former territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, the novel post-war conceptions of hierarchy shaped processes of 
social and political transformation, which were relevant to how sovereignty came to 
be asserted and recognised (Anghie, 2005: 115 - 195; Sluglett, 2008; 2014; Smith, 
2019; Weitz, 2008: 1314). Historians, such as Gelvin (1998),  Provence (2005; 2011; 
2017: 56 - 100) and Gorgas (2018), have noted how in many parts of Europe, and in 
territories in the Middle East, there was a lack of formal state control and the 
presence of de facto states and movements for independence or self-determination. 
These entities, which were also classed as legitimate or illegitimate under the new 
conception of the standard of “civilization”, sought to secure recognition as 
sovereign states, in accordance with the standard of “civilization” (Anghie, 2002: 
524; Smith, 2019: 565). Actors sought recognition of their sovereignty in an 
international context that contained new, tiered conceptions of sovereignty, as seen 
in the case of the mandate system. Adopting an approach based on the history of 
ideas, enables one to focus on the arguments over conceptions of sovereignty used 
by these actors within the defeated Ottoman Empire. Developing a theory of how 
these actors understood and deployed arguments based on sovereignty can provide a 
 164 
clearer picture of the forms of constituent diplomacy engaged in by such actors in 
their efforts to secure recognition of their sovereignty. 
 
Wilson’s post-war agenda has been interpreted in a variety of different ways, 
with Throntveit (2011a; 2017) and Manela (2001; 2006; 2007) arguing that it 
involved a reassertion of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Recently, though, noting how 
Wilson and Lenin advocated extensive changes to the post-war international order, 
commentators have argued that both drew upon each other’s conception of national 
self-determination240 (Abulof, 2016: 538 – 539: Chernev, 2011; Throntveit, 2017: 
249). However, Wilson and Lenin had different perceptions of the end of national 
self-determination (Throntveit, 2011a; 2017: 246). The Wilsonian vision of national 
self-determination was, in many respects, still committed to the nineteenth century 
one of international society as a collection of ‘civilised’ states (Throtveit, 2017: 142 
- 149). Wilson, for instance, praised the British Empire’s mode of organisation with 
its dominions and colonies (Throntveit, 2017: 102). He argued that the world should 
be organised so that there would be various types of states having different degrees 
of freedom in line with their level of purported development. This new standard of 
‘civilisation’ upheld by Wilson demonstrated his adherence to a racial or ethnic 
conception of hierarchy, which viewed Britain and the USA displaying the highest 
level of human development (Anghie, 2006; Harrison, 2013: 194; Manela, 2007: 25; 
Niva, 1999: 156 - 160; Vitalis, 2015: 172 - 173). Until the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917, Lenin had opposed both the state and the nation (Throntveit, 2017: 246). 
However, after the revolution, Lenin believed that national self-determination and, 
consequently, national sovereignty, when wielded by “oppressed nations”, could 
frustrate the ambitions of imperial powers (Throntveit, 2017: 246). Imperialism, 
which represented the current stage of capitalism that the Bolsheviks sought to 
destroy241, could be disrupted through facilitating the establishment of different 
sovereign states (Throntveit, 2017: 246). Wilson, who differed from Lenin, was not 
opposed to self-determination, but believed that it only ought to be accepted in cases 
where he believed a people had developed a “civilized” character (Manela, 2007: 
 
240 Throntveit (2017: 249) argues that Wilson did not endorse Lenin’s principle of “self-
determination”, instead supporting the idea of “autonomous development”, which he had argued for 
different national groups in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. 
241 See Lenin ([1917] 2003).  
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25). This would be demonstrated in one of Wilson’s speeches, where he defended 
Russian self-determination on 8 January 1918242 (Manela, 2007: 36; Schild, 1995: 
81). Thus, national self-determination was promoted by Wilson and Lenin for 
different ends. National self-determination shaped what Smith (2018: 17) termed the 
“discursive structure” of the immediate post-war period, because it was an idea that 
actors could use in speech and language to justify their actions. 
 
For both Wilson and Lenin, self-determination placed an emphasis on the nation 
as the proper locus of sovereignty (Throntveit, 2011a). Aside from acting as a 
normative theory explaining how the world ought to be, the theories of national self-
determination of Wilson and Lenin were also understood as being appropriate 
responses to post-war circumstances (Throntveit, 2011a). With the collapse of the 
Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, numerous political groups 
claiming to represent different ethnic groups seeking independence, such as the 
Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Syrians, had opportunities to achieve their goal (Manela, 
2001; 2006; 2007; Smith, 2018: 31 – 50, 121, 150) . Wilson regarded the 
organisation and empowering of such new nation-states as a duty which would allow 
“civilization”243 to advance (Throntveit, 2017: 69). Lenin, on the other hand, saw 
their empowerment as the means to dismantle the empires, which he believed 
represented the last stage of capitalism (Throntveit, 2011a: 457). In many territories 
that had experienced war, such as the Ottoman Empire, with the flight of refugees 
and the massacre of individuals because of their ethnicity or religion, the population 
became more homogenous (Rae, 2002: 127). Because of the inability of states in 
these territories to maintain order, ethnic and revolutionary conflicts erupted as 
violent groups sought to fill the void (Smith, 2018: 180 - 221). Wilson and the other 
Allied architects of the post-war international order believed that these problems 
could be handled (Smith, 2009). They argued that the League of Nations should 
focus on minority rights and, where necessary, engineer territorial divisions to 
 
242 Schild (1995: 81) adds that this speech was made after the Bolsheviks suggested that parts of the 
Russian Empire, such as Finland could secede, suggesting that Wilson sought to prevent the Russian 
Empire from fracturing. 
243 Smith (2019: 572) suggests that Article 22 of the League of Nations, which argued for the 
consideration of the level of civilisation in territories before allowing them to govern themselves 
amounted to a focus on the “population” (see Smith, 2019: 569) of mandated territories, and whether 
they could be considered “civilized”,  alongside the distribution of “territory” (quoted from Smith, 
2019: 571; see also Smith, 2018: 128 – 131).  
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prevent further conflict, as was the case in the defeated Ottoman Empire, where the 
new state of Turkey had been founded (Mazower, 1997; Smith, 2018: 53 – 58, 156 - 
165). Plebiscites, in particular, became a means to determine boundary disputes in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Ottoman Empire (Smith, 2018: 55, 83, 
144 - 156). In the territories that once composed the Ottoman Empire, plebiscites 
were considered as a means of delineating Turkish territory, as in the case of Izmir 
(Smith, 2018: 55). The League of Nations came to promote a conception of 
sovereignty that focused on the nation, while also making the recognition of national 
sovereignty conditional on the acceptance of certain rights for minorities.  
 
As a result of the “discursive structure” shaped by Wilson and Lenin in the 
interwar years, the League of Nations, which Wilson advocated, heralded the 
emergence of a new set of institutions in global international society (Smith, 2018: 
17). These institutions were not only geared towards constructing a world organised 
on the basis of sovereign nation-states, but also involved a strong dedication to 
humanitarian principles (Watenpaugh, 2010; 2015a; 2015b). It was therefore 
understood that the League would assign mandatory status to certain territories and 
their populations for their protection (Watenpaugh, 2015a; 2015b; Wheatley, 2015a; 
2015b). Measures to facilitate justice and reparations for war crimes would also be 
enforced in the post-war context by the League (Bass, 2000: chs. 2 – 3). 
Commissions of experts were tasked with investigating what arrangements should be 
put in place by the League for certain territories (Pedersen, 2015; Smith, 2009). The 
mandate system was premised on a view of global hierarchy. Three types of 
mandates, known as A, B and C mandates, were imagined, in which descending 
degrees of control were granted to the inhabitants of the territories in question 
(Sluglett, 2014). Historical studies, such as those by Grant (2005), Ribi (2011: 94) 
and Pedersen (2007) noted that the mandate system advanced the cause of 
‘civilisation’ through preventing slavery and enforcing labour standards. However, 
as Quincy Wright244 (1923) suggested, the exact location of sovereignty in the 
mandates was unclear. It was uncertain whether sovereignty resided in the 
population of the mandate, the League or with the state that had been entrusted the 
 
244 See also Throntveit’s (2011b) demonstration of the influence of Quincy Wright and his ideas on 
Woodrow Wilson and subsequent American foreign policy. 
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mandate by the League (Smith, 2018: 59; Wright, 1923). According to Pedersen 
(2015: 403), the mandate system “began as a project of imperial reconciliation and 
legitimization”. But, in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Covenant 
of the League recognised that certain territories could soon become self-governing 
(Smith, 2018: 59). Agreements made by Allied powers during the war, though, 
meant that these commissions and mandates could not prevent the Allies dividing 
occupied territories among themselves (Smith, 2009: 57; 2014: 267 - 269). Studies 
of the mandates, commissions and other bodies associated with the League have not 
sufficiently considered how various actors sought to secure their sovereign rights 
within the emerging institutions and global constitutional structures.  
 
Historical studies have pointed to how the institutions of Wilsonian international 
order either supported a new type of imperialism, securing of the interests of the 
victors, or backed a form of anti-imperialism (Manela, 2007). Only recently have 
works, including Wheatley’s (2015a; 2015b) study of movements in Palestine, 
focused on actors who were seeking recognition of their sovereignty by attempting 
to align themselves with Wilson’s ideas. In the territories of the defeated empires, 
groups lobbied the Allies to be recognised as sovereign (Gelvin, 1998; Wheatley, 
2015a; 2015b). The different local political movements also used violence to 
advance their political goals (Gerwarth and Manela, 2014; Provence, 2011). Actors, 
therefore, responded in specific ways to the normative hierarchy envisaged by 
Wilson. Their response depended on the position they found themselves within the 
emerging hierarchy (Spanu, 2019a; 2019b). This hierarchy was sustained by the 
economic and military power245 of the victorious Allies. The response and impact of 
the challenges made to hierarchy by the defeated were shaped by their own power 
(Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b; Zarakol, 2011). The defeated Ottoman and German states, 
for instance, still had considerable fighting capacity (Smith, 2018: 17 - 18). Rustow 
(1959) demonstrates the difficulties involved in the Ottoman government’s attempts 
to demobilise its armed forces and their role in the formation of the state of Turkey. 
The emergence of the Bolsheviks, who pursued an independent foreign policy from 
the Allies, was also a challenge to the establishment of a new international society 
structured on the basis of the wishes of the Allies (Chernev, 2011l; 2017; Göl, 2013). 
 
245 On the rise of American power as a result of the war see Tooze (2015: 3 – 4, 515 - 516).  
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Movements opposing the Allies sought to forge alliances and shared ideas on how to 
tackle emerging forms of hierarchy (Aydın, 2007: 106 - 110; Manjapra, 2014: 127). 
A study of these movements, such as those in what remained of the Ottoman Empire, 
who resisted forms of hierarchy through wielding their constituent power, can 
demonstrate the limits of post-war forms of hierarchy that the victors of the war 
sought to impose.  
 
 At the end of the First World War, the Allies could not reach a consensus on 
how to deal with the Ottoman Empire. The empire was an established state in 
international society, but it had also been subject to forms of exclusion from this 
society. In what Manela (2007: 1) terms the “Wilsonian moment”, worldwide 
victims of colonisation anticipated that Wilson would help in their emancipation. 
Their immediate hopes were shattered by the introduction of the mandate system 
(Manela, 2001; 2006; 2007). In the context of the former Ottoman Empire, the 
application of the mandate system quickly turned into a discussion on the proper 
boundary of Europe, which was understood to be synonymous with the ‘civilised’ 
world (Anghie, 2006: 747. Negotiations also focused on examining the identity or 
the “self” of those claiming self-determination (Smith, 2018: 169). For example, the 
Council of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, convened by the Allies, argued that 
the Ottomans as “Muslims” and “Orientals” had oppressed the Greeks and others 
(Smith, 2018: 122). The French delegation246, influenced by human geography, 
decided that the Ottoman Empire would be partitioned according to its different 
populations (Smith, 2018: 167, 174). The American delegation, responsible for 
preparing proposals to the conference, concluded that Christian peoples needed to be 
supported and that missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire should be encouraged 
(Smith, 2018: 169). Although the Armistice of Moudros of 1918 was preceded by 
Wilson’s announcement of his Fourteen Points and the Ottoman acceptance of these 
principles, Wilson himself also considered the possibility of the fragmentation of the 
Ottoman Empire (Zarakol, 2011: 126; Zürcher, 1998). In what remained of the 
Ottoman Empire, Wilson’s ideas remained influential and a Wilson Prensipleri 
 
246 A prominent French geographer, de Martonne, prepared maps that he claimed denoted the 
boundaries of “nationalities”, which he defined as emerging from social relations (Smith, 2018: 135). 
These were distinct from the maps of “races” provided by the South African leader, Jan Smuts 
(Smith, 2018: 129).  
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Cemiyeti (Association for the Promotion of Wilsonian Principles) was formed 
(Bajalan, 2019; Erimtan, 2008; Gürel, 2015). As will be demonstrated, the large 
number of petitions delivered by groups within what was once the Ottoman Empire 
to the Allies, shows how these groups sought recognition of their sovereign equality 
during the ‘Wilsonian Moment’. 
 
It is a central contention of this thesis that the processes whereby international 
society and its rules were reconstituted also influenced processes of reconstitution in 
established states. At the end of the First World War, several established states 
altered their constitutions in line with emerging conceptions of sovereignty. The end 
of Wilhelmine Germany and its reconstitution as the Weimar Republic was one such 
example247. Another case involved the rise to power of the National Movement in 
what remained of the Ottoman Empire, through the support of former Ottoman 
officials and members of the CUP (Zürcher, 1984; 2010). To a far greater extent than 
the other Central Powers, much of the Ottoman Empire’s remaining territories, 
including areas close to its capital, were contested by other actors on the basis of 
nationality (Criss, 1999; Gingeras, 2009; Kamouzis, 2013). This meant that the 
‘selves’248 seeking determination could not clearly be associated with a single 
territory. Considering how ‘determination’ was understood by both those seeking it 
and those granting it in this context can point to how the fate of these territories was 
decided249. Pedersen’s (2008; 2015) study of the communications of League officials 
working in the Mandate Commission, indicates how the meaning of ‘determination’ 
was imposed by the League. Yet Pedersen (2007: 1101 – 1107; 2012) also 
acknowledges the relevance of petitions in possibly challenging the decisions of the 
League officials, particularly in relation to the recognised right of populations in 
mandates to voice their own views under Article 22 of the Covenant. Pedersen 
(2007: 1101 – 1107; 2012: 231) notes, though, that such petitions were rarely 
 
247 Ambrosius (2002: 101 - 112) and Larsen (2013) explain how Wilson promoted his own political 
ideas as a template for Germany. Caldwell (1997: 1) demonstrates how the idea of “popular 
sovereignty” played a role in the politics and constitutional law of the Weimar Republic. Chickering 
(1968) points to how these understandings of sovereignty shaped conflicts in Weimar Germany.  
248 See Smith (2018: 6) for how the “self” entitled to self-determination was constructed. Macmillan 
and Quinton-Brown (2019) demonstrate how historical arguments were used to argue for self-
determination.  
249 See also Lavi (2013) and Rifkin (2017), who argue that actors seeking self-determination engage 
in performances intended to strengthen their claims to self-determination by serving to present 
themselves as nations entitled to self-determination.  
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considered by League officials. In the Ottoman Empire, different understandings of 
self-determination, pointing to various understandings of the ‘self’ and the goal of 
self-determination, were advanced by the Young Turks and their successors. These 
actors sought recognition of their sovereign equality, based on what they took to be 
their right to self-determination, through engaging in constituent diplomacy with the 
victorious Allied states and the League.  
 
3. ‘Civilisation’ and the constituent diplomacy of actors in the defeated Ottoman 
Empire, 1918 - 1919 
 
This section considers how the remnants of the Young Turk factions and other 
groups, in what remained of the Ottoman Empire, engaged in constituent diplomacy 
to secure recognition from the powerful states in international society. Determining 
which parts of the Ottoman Empire would be assigned mandatory status proved to be 
problematic because of the agreements Allied powers had concluded with each other 
in the war (Bein, 2017: 8). Many Ottoman politicians came to believe that accepting 
mandatory status would be the best option to secure a degree of control over what 
remained of the Ottoman Empire (Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). This was because the mandate 
system appeared to be premised on accepting a degree of national and popular 
sovereignty. Mandates were organised along what were taken to be pre-existing 
national boundaries and were presented as vehicles through which populations could 
gradually become fully independent (Smith, 2009). Many, subjected to the mandate 
system, believed that it would enable them to eventually gain recognition of their 
sovereign equality (Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). Others, sought to pursue their self-
determination more directly by securing immediate independence (Provence, 2005). 
Movements seeking recognition as sovereigns emerged, such as the group 
surrounding Emir Feisal in Syria. The movement for Thracian independence was 
another example of such a movement. Although these movements challenged the 
Ottoman Empire, they were supported by many former Ottoman officials and 
intellectuals (Balistreri, 2015; 2016). In the remaining and former territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, actors sought to mobilise history to substantiate their claims. For 
example, the Thracians claimed an identity that stretched back to antiquity. 
Movements claimed that they had established identities as ‘nations’, which were 
entitled to ‘self-determination’. History was mobilised both by those movements 
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seeking mandatory rule for parts or all of the Ottoman Empire, and by those groups 
aiming to resist mandatory rule to secure sovereignty and sovereign equality.   
 
With the end of the First World War and the launching of the League of 
Nations, the victorious Allies wielded global constituent power. The Allies had to 
decide how to assign mandates to states from territories within the Ottoman Empire. 
The British Foreign Office official and advisor, Arnold J. Toynbee (1919c), noted 
that it was unclear how the influence of the League of Nations in the Middle East 
would develop through the distribution of mandates by international commissions. 
Toynbee (1919c; 1919e) suggested that mandates could be introduced by 
commissions which were specifically tasked with studying conditions in the Middle 
East. In practice, commissions did not play a key role, even though Britain and 
France declared, in November 1918, that,  
“[f]ar from wishing to impose on the populations of those regions any 
particular institutions, they [the British and the French] are only concerned to 
ensure by their support, and by adequate assistance, the regular working of 
Governments and administration freely chosen by the populations 
themselves; to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the 
economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local 
initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to the 
dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited. Such is the task 
which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated territories” 
(France and Great Britain, 1918 as cited in Smith, 2009: 57 – 58). 
Eventually, mandates were allocated in line with earlier agreements concluded 
between the Allied powers, such as the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and 
France, involving the division of eastern Ottoman territory (Bein, 2017: 8). 
Therefore, when the US decided to send a commission to recommend assigning 
mandates in the Middle East, France and Britain, despite arguing that they supported 
popular sovereignty, did not send their commissioners to join the commission 
founded by the US and headed by American experts King and Crane (Smith, 2009: 
58). Developing an approach towards the Armenian state proved to be especially 
problematic (Fisher, 1997: 72). Britain had established a presence in the Caucasus at 
the end of the First World War, which had been enabled by the French taking a 
position in present-day northern Syria (Fisher, 1997: 72). France needed, according 
to Andrew Bonar Law, to develop a pro-Armenian policy, to allow Britain to retain 
its military position, supported by the Allied French presence in the south (Fisher, 
1997: 72). Although the King-Crane Commission recommended the establishment of 
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an independent Armenian state, the United States did not have any military power to 
enable its will to be realised (Smith, 2009: 65). In contrast, Britain and France held 
constituent power over areas they occupied. In 1919, both states were victors in the 
First World War with sizeable military forces in the Ottoman Empire who, although 
needing to refer to the principle of popular sovereignty, held sway over how it was 
implemented. 
 
The British found it difficult to reconcile wartime agreements with Wilson’s 
idea of peace and therefore ultimately did not participate in the Interallied 
Commission, seeking to maintain their close relations with France. However, even 
though Britain did not participate in the King-Crane Commission, it provided 
logistical support and advice to the commissioners (Smith, 2009: 65). Shuckburgh 
(1919), the Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, argued that “every 
possible care will be exercised in selection of personnel and definition of their 
functions, in order that they may work in close co-operation with local British 
authorities”. Commenting on the intention of the US to send commissioners to the 
territories under Allied military control in present-day Syria and Iraq, Toynbee 
(1919f), noted the inclusion of Palestine within the boundaries of the area allotted to 
the commission. Toynbee (1919f) stated that it was wrong to assume “that the 
Commissioners are directed to frame their advice upon the wishes of the existing 
inhabitants of the country they are going to visit.” Wilson had stressed the 
importance of national or popular sovereignty. But, as Toynbee (1919f) seemed to 
suggest, national sovereignty did not necessarily need to be based on popular 
sovereignty. This was congruent with the then widespread view that nations were 
objective facts, which could be studied through the use of history, rather than entities 
which emerged from the will of individuals (Macmillan and Quinton-Brown, 2019; 
Sluga, 2001: chs 1 – 2; 2006: 8 – 36). Although Wilson argued for national self-
determination, he also believed in the idea of distinct national characters, which 
could be observed empirically (Smith, 2009: 56). The American members of the 
commission argued that recognition would be premised on the presence of an 
identifiable “people”, which would have developed or have the ability to develop a 
certain degree of character (Smith, 2009: 56). Those failing to meet this standard 
would, as in the previous case of the standard of “civilization”, be subject to stigma 
from the League of Nations, until they could prove their advanced character (Smith, 
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2009: 61). Even though Britain and France withdrew from the commission that was 
sent to determine the future of the Arab territories of the empire, they cautiously 
agreed that this understanding of the standard of ‘civilisation’ (see France and Great 
Britain, 1918; as also discussed by Smith, 2009: 57), pioneered by Wilson and 
American diplomats and experts, should become a constitutional principle of post-
war international society, and this principle would later be adopted by other Allies.  
 
Following the Moudros armistice, Ottoman notables, including politicians, 
activists and military officers reacted to the emergence of this new standard of 
‘civilisation’ by seeking to establish close ties with the victorious Allies. Referring to 
the promises made by Wilson in his Fourteen Points, the Ottomans aimed to secure 
immediate recognition of their status as a nation, as promised in Wilson’s twelfth 
point (Smith, 2009: 56).  Failing this, they sought to obtain recognition by becoming 
a mandate of the League of Nations or by establishing close relations with the Allies, 
which could take the form of tutelage or guidance (Göl, 2013: 87 - 89). If this status 
of securing close relations with the victorious Allies was achieved, it was believed 
that it could be a stepping stone to later being recognised as an equal sovereign state 
in global international society. For example, the journalist Ali Kemal Bey, the 
religious cleric Sait Molla (see Calthorpe, 1919b) and Reschid Bey, the Interior 
Minister of the Ottoman Empire (see Hardinge, 1919 and Mallet, 1919d), were 
prominent Ottoman intellectuals who founded the Association of the Friends of 
Britain (İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti). Talat Paşa, the wartime Grand Vizier of the 
empire, when interviewed by a British intelligence officer in Berlin, argued that he 
would be willing to agree to an independent and “united Turkey” with very close 
relations with Britain (Malcolm, 1919). The Sultan, the Grand Vizier Tevfik Paşa 
and Halil Paşa, a former provincial Ottoman governor, (see Blaker, 1919; British 
Embassy, Washington, 1919; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1919) explicitly 
requested a British mandate from Louis Mallet (1919a; 1919b), the British 
ambassador in Istanbul (see also British Delegation to Peace Conference, 1919). On 
the other hand, Satvet Lütfi, the associate of Sabahaddin, travelled to Paris, with the 
assistance of France, seeking to participate in the Paris Peace Conference by 
submitting a memorandum, partially prepared by the French Embassy’s dragoman, 
Ledoux (Rumbold, 1919). Toynbee (1919b) judged that the French were trying to 
develop a group of their own supporters in the Ottoman Empire and suspected that 
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Italy was also seeking to cooperate with the remnants of the CUP. Toynbee (1919b) 
also argued that “this points to the importance of getting the future of Turkey (sic) 
settled by the Conference, before such settlement is forestalled by private intrigues 
of different powers”. Therefore, individuals associated with the Ottoman government 
and the CUP, sought for the Ottoman Empire to be accepted as a ‘civilised’ state, 
within the post-war order (Gingeras, 2009: 251 – 253; Wigen, 2014; 2018; Zarakol, 
2011). Formal efforts to define this relationship in conferences, in which the powers 
would constitute and apply the new constitutional rules of global international 
society provided one means to do this, alongside making informal arrangements to 
facilitate such diplomatic participation.  
 
Other Ottoman groups and individuals appealed directly to the emerging 
constitutional principle of national self-determination to gain recognition of their 
sovereign equality. They argued that the Ottoman Empire, or parts of it, were 
national in character, and therefore, ought to be granted full independence without 
going through a period of mandatory rule. In mid-1919, the Ottoman naval cabinet 
minister, Mahmud Mukhtar Paşa (1919), in a communication to the British Foreign 
Office, pressed for a special relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. 
He noted how the Ottomans, as an Islamic state, could act as a bulwark against 
Bolshevism. Clearer statements for the recognition of Ottoman sovereignty, on the 
basis of national self-determination, included presentations made by the official 
Ottoman Delegation (1919) to the Paris peace conference. A Turkish Congress, 
which met in Geneva on 16 January 1919, formed of Ottoman officials and 
intellectuals, received support from other individuals from different geographies, 
including in Egypt, where a communication in support of the Congress was 
submitted to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George250 (Stevenson, 1919). The 
Congress made a number of demands, including the securing of Istanbul as a part of 
the Ottoman Empire in any future settlement (Stevenson, 1919). These movements, 
which also included the League for the Defence of the Rights of Ottomans (1919), 
pressed for keeping Istanbul under Ottoman jurisdiction on the basis of national 
sovereignty. However, the Ottoman Delegation (1919) in Paris also declared that 
 
250 Stevenson (1919), the private secretary of the Foreign Office, forwarded a petition to the British 
Prime Minister, which contained 39 signatures of prominent Ottoman politicians and military officers.  
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they were open to their demands being considered alongside those of “toutes les 
éléments ethniques de la Turquie” (i.e. “all of the ethnic elements of Turkey”). The 
delegation claimed to be sincerely dedicated to the principle of self-determination, 
implying that Istanbul and most of the Ottoman Empire ought to be independent 
because of the Turkish national character (Ottoman Delegation, 1919). The delegates 
also argued that those territories which had a different national character could 
pursue their own right to self-determination (Ottoman Delegation, 1919). 
Consequently, individuals closely affiliated with the Ottoman government, who had 
maintained throughout the First World War an avowed commitment to Ottomanism, 
appeared to have abandoned this stance (Ottoman Delegation, 1919). Members of 
political movements, such as the CUP, supported Turkish251 or Arab252 nationalism 
(Provence, 2017). With the rise of Wilsonian and Leninist nationalism, these 
individuals argued in national terms for the recognition of the sovereignty and 
sovereign rights of their state.  
 
There were also groups in the Ottoman Empire, including the Arab forces of 
the Emir Feisal, the son of the Ottoman notable, Sharif Hussein, and former CUP 
members, who by the end of the war acted independently of the central Ottoman 
government. They pressed the Allies to grant a form of mandatory status, which, 
they believed, would gradually enable them to secure their sovereign equality in the 
emerging post-war international society. Feisal (1919a), backed by former CUP 
members (see Gelvin, 1998: 110; Provence, 2011; 2017: 33, 208), sought a British 
mandate over Syria, as a step towards obtaining independence (Gelvin, 1998: 25). 
He opposed the idea of giving Syria to France (see Vansittart, 1919a) and argued that 
the Syrians and Arabs wished to avoid having “their country partitioned or divided 
into zones of influence among the Powers” (as quoted from Feisal, 1919a: 334). 
Following rumours that the French would sabotage or not participate in the Inter-
Allied Commission dealing with Syria (see Gelvin, 1998: 34), with the implication 
 
251 For instance, having originally argued for an Islamic Ottoman nationalism after the Balkan Wars, 
the former officer and politician, Cami Bey, came to argue for the establishment of a smaller and 
more homogenous Turkish nation-state (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 108).  
252 Sati al-Husri, a thinker influenced by Gökalp, shifted from being a proponent of Ottoman 
nationalism to becoming an Arab nationalist (Cleveland, 1971). Şekip Arslan, a Druze leader from 
Beirut, was also a staunch Pan-Islamist and Ottomanist, who was later expelled from the mandate of 
Lebanon by the French authorities and supported Arab nationalist causes for the rest of his life (Atçıl, 
2013; Cleveland, 1985; Haddad, 2004).  
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that an independent Arab state or an Arab state mandated to Britain would not then 
be established, Feisal (1919b) issued a threat. Referring directly to the promises and 
goodwill displayed by the Allies in the past, who had pledged to support an Arab 
Kingdom, Feisal (1919b) warned that “the blood of innocent people, babies and 
women… would be upon the civilised nations who annulled their decision”. Seeking 
eventual independence, Feisal, therefore, sought to secure a British, rather than a 
French, mandate in Syria on the basis of the principle of self-determination and the 
pledges made to his movement by the Allies during the First World War. 
 
Movements advocating an independent Thracian state spanning present day 
Edirne and western Thrace, also lobbied for ‘Thrace’ to be given mandatory status 
by the League of Nations. According to the British intelligence official, A.J. Wilson 
(1919: 1), the Thrace Committee aimed to “convince the European powers that 
Thrace was originally a Turkish country and as such should be governed by Turks 
and Turks alone”. This did not, however, mean that movements within Thrace were 
opposed to a mandate that could serve as the first stage in the attainment of their full 
independence. For instance, in a message signed by “Le Comité de la représentation 
politique” (1919), which included the Mufti of Edirne, Mertan, the mayor of Edirne, 
Cevket Bey, the deputy of western Thrace, Mehmed Djelah and the notables of 
Edirne, Xanthi and Dimotika, there was a call for Britain to assume a mandate for 
Thrace (Le Comité de la représentation politique, 1919). This letter argued that 
Thrace should be granted British mandatory or protectorate status, as a step towards 
securing full independence on the basis of national sovereignty. The message added 
that an American mandate would be inappropriate because the local population 
opposed republicanism (Le Comité de la représentation politique, 1919). According 
to British officials, the Thracian movement was also arming the population in 
Thrace, and was preparing to take action in the event of their wish for a British 
mandate for Thrace being declined (Crowe, 1919a; D.M.I (Director of Military 
Intelligence), 1919; Le Comité de la représentation politique, 1919; Mallet, 1919e; 
Nicolson, 1919; Samson, 1919). The prospect of becoming a mandate, as a stage 
towards the ultimate goal of attaining full independence in line with the doctrine of 
national sovereignty, was vigorously pressed in the constituent diplomacy of 
movements in the defeated Ottoman Empire, spanning from Syria to Thrace (Göl, 
2013: 87 – 90; Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). As with the Syrians, the Thracian 
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movement also threatened to use force if their constituent diplomacy with the Allies 
was unsuccessful.  
 
In the context of claims for the recognition of national sovereignty and calls for 
the establishment of mandates, historical arguments were frequently employed by 
actors, engaged in constituent diplomacy, to demonstrate the historical presence of a 
collective ‘self’. Sources that have hitherto been largely neglected demonstrate this 
in the post-Ottoman context. Concerning Syria, for instance, Feisal (1919a: 334) 
claimed that a certain “Blue Book of 1858 “ written by “a prominent English 
statesman” had identified the presence of “secret societies formed under the former 
regime”. By referring to these societies, whose activities had culminated in “the 
Arab Conference held in Paris seven years ago”, Feisal (1919a: 334) aimed to 
demonstrate that these Arab national political organisations indicated the existence 
of an historic Arab nation. Historical arguments were also similarly used by a group 
of notables, including members of the Islamic clergy, from Van and the surrounding 
area in south-eastern Anatolia (Zia-ed-din et al, 1919). These individuals lobbied the 
Allies and the Ottoman state253 to exclude them from a future Armenian state, by 
advancing demographic, “historical” and “geographic” arguments to prove that the 
area around Van was essentially Muslim (Zia-ed-din et al, 1919). Feisal (1919a) had 
likewise claimed that Syria was basically Arab (Zia-ed-din et al, 1919). The 
Thracian Muslim movement used historical arguments to claim that the Thracians 
constituted a distinct nation, separate from other Muslims, Greeks and Bulgarians, 
and that they were thus entitled to their own state (Calthorpe, 1919g; Kassim Faik 
and H. Tahrim, 1919; Moslem Committee of Thrace, 1919). The British Foreign 
Office received several communications, which were signed by groups claiming to 
be the Thrace Committee or the Moslem Committee of Thrace (Moslem Committee 
of Thrace, 1919). These communications cited earlier references to Thrace, as in the 
work of the Carnegie Commission, established by the famous American 
philanthropist to investigate the cause of the Balkan Wars, which had concluded that 
Bulgarian demands in the region were illegitimate (Moslem Committee of Thrace, 
1919). However, the Moslem Committee of Thrace (1919) also claimed that they 
 
253 See also Calthorpe (1919c; 1919d), Webb (1919a) and La Ligue pour la Défense des Droits 
Nationaux de Trébizonde (1919).  
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represented the ancient Thracian people, who had converted to Islam with the 
Ottoman conquest of the region centuries ago. Consequently, actors throughout the 
Ottoman Empire sought recognition of their status as representatives of nations that 
had supposedly existed in history, as a means to gain recognition under the post-war 
constitutional rules of global international society. Under these rules, the conferral of 
sovereign equality was conditional on proof of  ‘civilised’ nationhood. 
 
 4. ‘Crimes against humanity’ as an affront to ‘civilisation’, national sovereignty and 
enforcing global constitutional principles in the post-war Ottoman Empire, 1919 - 
1920 
 
In the post-armistice period, those affiliated with the Ottoman state faced an 
unprecedented challenge to their sovereignty given how the Allies considered them 
responsible for war crimes committed during the war, including the killing of large 
numbers of Ottoman Armenian civilians (Bass, 2000: 118 - 119). An association 
with such war crimes would have a serious negative impact on any claim to be 
recognised as “civilized” (Mazower, 2006: 556). Ottoman elites could choose to 
distance themselves from wartime policies or stress that their claims to national 
sovereignty were valid regardless of past war crimes. Many argued that the 
leadership of the CUP were responsible for the war crimes. Hence, the post-war 
Ottoman government cooperated with the Allies to apprehend members of the CUP 
who had been declared war criminals (Bass, 2000: 146; Gingeras, 2009: 251 - 253). 
The situation was complicated, though by the presence of other groups, such as the 
Greek and Armenian nationalists, who were seeking to secede from the Ottoman 
Empire (Hovannisian, 1971; Kamouzis, 2013). These political movements were in 
competition with the Ottoman state and with organisations promoting Turkish and 
Islamic nationalism. With reports of massacres of civilians in the territory around 
Izmir, the Allies considered organising a commission to investigate what happened 
during the Greek invasion of 1919 and to address any issues of injustice (Buzanski, 
1963). Therefore, both the Ottoman and Greek states and their representatives, were 
confronted with possible war crimes which seriously endangered the prospects for 
securing the recognition of sovereign rights. Here, the constituent power of the 
victorious Allies, who were arguing for the trial of war crimes to be considered as a 
constitutional rule of global international society, was being used to curtail the 
ambitions of the Ottoman and Greek states.  
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The Ottoman Empire had agreed to the Armistice of Moudros and the CUP 
leadership had fled the country. But, the Ottoman state had not been fully defeated, 
so it could still be held responsible for war crimes. The novel use by the Allies of the 
concept of ‘crimes against humanity’, to define the deportation and killing of many 
Ottoman civilians, especially Armenians, posed a challenge to Ottoman sovereignty. 
The Allies claimed universal jurisdiction for the trial of these crimes against 
humanity. The idea of universal jurisdiction clashed with the principle that each 
sovereign had jurisdiction over its own state (Bass, 2000: 146). The concept of war 
crimes was a product of the Hague conferences and had been accepted by the 
Ottomans. But, the concept of “crimes against humanity” emerged to comprehend 
the killing of large numbers of Ottoman civilians (Mazower, 2009: 127). Britain had 
originally considered terming such crimes, “crimes against Christendom”, because 
mostly Assyrians, Greeks and Armenians had been targeted (Mazower, 2006: 556). 
However, it was believed that such a concept could offend the Muslim population of 
the empire (Mazower, 2006: 556; Tusan, 2014: 52). The new concept of “crimes 
against humanity” (see Tusan, 2014: 52) subsequently influenced the efforts of the 
Allies and the Ottoman government, to apprehend and detain CUP officials charged 
with participating in war crimes (Bass, 2000: 118). These officials, including 
Gökalp, were sent to Malta to await trial (Parla, 1985: 6 - 7). After leading members 
of the CUP fled the country in late 1918, those who considered themselves affiliated 
with the Ottoman state claimed that the CUP and not the Ottoman state, was 
responsible for war crimes. For instance, a group called the “Women of Turkey” 
(1919) contacted the British High Commissioner. They sought to deflect 
responsibility for the killing of the Armenians and other wartime atrocities from the 
state or “Turks” as a whole, by claiming that it was the CUP that was responsible for 
entering the war and for committing the later war crimes (Women of Turkey, 1919). 
The emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity, that was also tied to the 
emerging humanitarian understanding of ‘civilisation’, consequently posed new 
challenges to the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Post-war Ottoman governments, with more moderate CUP members holding the 
office of grand vizier, such as Ahmet İzzet Paşa (14 October 1918 – 8 November 
1918), Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (11 November 1918 – 3 March 1919) and Damad Ferid 
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Paşa (4 March 1919 – 2 October 1919)254, also failed to deflect responsibility away 
from the state and lay the blame for war crimes on individuals who were in positions 
of responsibility during the war (Aktar, 2007; Gingeras, 2009: 253). The Ottoman 
government sought to hand over many CUP members to await trial (Calthorpe, 
1919b). Damad Ferid Paşa (1919a), requested that Germany comply with articles 
228 and 229 of the post-war Treaty of Versailles, and hand over to the Allied 
authorities the leaders of the CUP, Cemal, Talat and Enver. The Ottoman delegation 
to the Paris peace conference stressed that the Ottoman state had been guilty of 
aggression towards the Entente Powers, and had perpetrated violence towards 
civilians during the war, but declared that the Ottoman people should not be blamed 
for such atrocities (Damad Ferid Paşa, 1919b; Şerif Paşa, 1919).  However, the 
representatives of Britain, with the approval of the Council of the Principal Allied 
and Associated Powers, formed during the Paris Peace Conference, believed that the 
current Ottoman state should be held responsible (British Empire Delegation, 1919). 
Balfour (1919b), the British Foreign Secretary, later noted how it was impossible to 
absolve the Ottoman government of its responsibility for conduct during the war 
because “[t]here was no revolution in Turkey comparable to the Russian revolution”. 
He then added:  
“The new had been in power many years before the war, was diplomatically 
recognised by every other Power, and, as far as I can judge, was quite as 
representative of the Turk as any of its predecessors” (Balfour, 1919b: 1). 
In the eyes of the victorious Allies, the post-war changes in government were not 
sufficient to free the post-war Ottoman state from responsibility for the war crimes. 
 
Those seeking to maintain the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire continued to 
argue that the empire was not to blame for the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity that had been committed during the First World War. In early 1919, a 
petition was prepared by the League for the Defence of the Eastern Provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. Members of the League included the former governor of the 
Hidjaz, Ahmed Nedim255, the governor of Beirut, Ismail Hakkı, the former governor 
of Baghdad, Suleyman Nazif, and  three former members of the Ottoman Parliament. 
The League contended that the CUP government had entered the war to secure 
 
254 See Bernard Lewis ([1961] 1968: 239 - 293). 
255 Ahmed Nedim was also the president of the League (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919).  
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profits by cooperating with German imperialism (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). In the 
petition, it was suggested that the Muslim population of the eastern provinces should 
not be held responsible for the war crimes  because they were not in control of the 
state at the time, which was being governed by the CUP’s dictatorship (Ahmed 
Nedim et al, 1919). Ahmed Rıza (1919: 3 - 4), who, in addition to now being a 
senior member of the Ottoman parliament, also headed an organisation called the 
League of Ottoman National Unity and called for an investigation, to be carried out 
by “the Great Entente Powers and the United States of America”. This investigation 
would seek, according to Ahmed Rıza (1919: 3 - 4), to ascertain claims  
“that the Armenian population has suffered at the hands of Turkish gangs during 
the deportations decreed by the Military Authorities”256.257 
Ahmed Rıza echoed these views in his speeches in the Ottoman Parliament, where 
he argued that CUP leaders ought to be tried, but the Ottoman Empire as a whole 
should not be punished for their crimes (Aktar, 2007: 260 - 261). In line with the 
standard of ‘civilisation’ argument, Ahmed Rıza and Ahmed Nedim’s organisations 
were both attempting to prevent the curtailment of the sovereignty of the Ottoman 
state on the grounds that it had failed to prevent the committing of atrocities and 
hence infringed its responsibility as a sovereign, implied in the concept of war 
crimes.  
  
The Ottoman state was also confronted by new political and armed movements 
that sought recognition of sovereignty for minorities within the empire. An 
Armenian state, intent on securing territories in the eastern Ottoman Empire, was 
established following the announcement that the Provisional Government in Russia 
would support the right to self-determination of national groups within the Russian 
Empire (Calthorpe, 1919e; Hovannisian, 1971). The Allies called for the military 
evacuation of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire and decided to delineate 
the border for a future Armenian state, which could include parts of what were once 
the Ottoman Empire (Hovannisian, 1971; Rustow, 1959: 534). As can be observed 
from communications submitted to the Allies, the Greek armed separatist movement 
 
256 The French original of the text reads: “que la population arménienne a bu à souffrir de la par des 
Comitadjis turcs lors de déportations décretées par les Autorités Militaires” (Ahmed Rıza, 1919: 3 – 
4). 
257 Toynbee (1919a) remarked that the League of Ottoman National Unity’s demands were essentially 
the same as those that had been made by the Ottoman government.  
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in the Black Sea region opposed both the Ottoman government, which had 
committed atrocities against them during the war, and the Armenian Republic, which 
sought to include the Greeks within its territory (Candidis, 1919; Constantinides, 
1919a; 1919b; 1919c; Thoidis, 1919). Ahmed Rıza (1919: 3), speaking on behalf of 
the League of Ottoman National Unity, argued that “the allocation to the Republic of 
Armenia existing in the Caucasus of a certain portion of territory for Armenians who 
wish to settle there could also be envisaged, taking into account their number and the 
land they currently own in Turkey”. However, Ahmed Rıza (1919: 4) pointed to how 
Armenian groups had also carried out crimes, suggesting that “the Armenian 
Comitadjis who, after having committed so many crimes, walk freely in the 
Caucasus or elsewhere be also punished”258. The Greek invasion of Izmir, was 
another instance of a clash between different claims to national sovereignty, which 
saw the emergence of the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights and other 
societies (Göl, 2013: 88 - 90; Provence, 2017: 203 – 206, 211 - 212; Tanör, 1985). 
These societies had been secretly formed by the CUP, through Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa 
operatives such as Kara Vasıf and Kara Kemal, to act as focal points of resistance 
which would mobilise Muslims in the event of the conquest of the Ottoman Empire 
(Avedian, 2012: 807 – 809; Hovannisian, 1973: 137). They would come under the 
control of the National Movement headed by Mustafa Kemal (Zürcher, 1984). 
Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman general, took a firm hold over these societies by 
organising a series of conferences, held in locations were tensions between Muslims 
and Christians were most pronounced (Adam, 1919; Calthorpe, 1919e).  
 
Responding to these challenges, several Ottoman officials argued that even 
though war crimes had been perpetrated in the eastern provinces of the empire, the 
right to self-determination of the current populations in those provinces should not 
be considered. In a statement that arguably indicates the extent to which national 
sovereignty was not only a normative but also an analytical concept in this period, 
the League for the Defence of the Eastern Provinces of the Ottoman Empire sent a 
communication  to the Allied forces, claiming that the eastern provinces were 
essentially Kurdish and Turkish (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). The League 
 
258The French original reads: “que la connaissance publique réclame que les Comitadji Arméniens 
qui, après avoir commis tant de crimes se promènent librement au Caucase ou ailleurs soient 
également punis” (Ahmed Rıza, 1919: 4).  
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acknowledged the acts committed by the Ottoman state against non-Muslim and 
especially Armenian citizens, but continued to espouse a conception of national 
sovereignty, arguing that the majority of the population of the provinces was Muslim 
and desired to be a part of the Ottoman Empire (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919).  
However, the League sought to present themselves as representatives of the people 
of these provinces, which had become overwhelmingly populated by Muslims after 
the war. But, while the organisation saw the Russian Empire’s meddling in the 
Ottoman Empire as responsible for the wartime devastation of the eastern Ottoman 
provinces, it did not rule out trials for those CUP members responsible for war 
crimes (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). The demands of the League for the Defence of 
the Eastern Provinces were ignored. The League of Ottoman National Unity also 
submitted a petition, penned by Ahmed Rıza (1919), to the British Commissioner in 
Istanbul, Sir Richard Webb (1919b), which argued against ceding Ottoman territory 
in the west to Greece and in the eastern provinces to Armenia on the basis of the 
“Turkish” character of these territories. Ahmed Rıza’s (1919: 4) here echoed Wilson 
by arguing that each of these groups constituted a “minorité” (e.g. “minority”), 
which ought to be given rights, provided Turkish minorities living elsewhere were 
also given rights. Relying on the concept of national sovereignty, the League for the 
Defence of the Eastern Provinces had continued to advance territorial claims to 
provinces whose populations had become more homogenous in the course of the war 
through state violence. In these circumstances, both Sir W. Ramsay (1919) and 
Arnold J. Toynbee (1919d), experts on Anatolia and advisers to the British Foreign 
Office, signed a minute in a Foreign Office document stating that “in the interests of 
humanity”, the “Armenian vilayets259” should be detached from the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 
The protests of the Ottoman government over the treatment of the Muslim 
population in Izmir and its environs by the Greek forces demonstrated how the 
concept of war crimes could potentially be used to defend Ottoman sovereignty. 
Even though the victors of the First World War, who had originally developed the 
practice of enforcing war crimes, were able to ensure that Greece’s interests were 
secured. Following reports of massacres presented to them by the Grand Vizier, 
 
259 Vilayet was the Ottoman word for province. 
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Damad Ferid Paşa (1919b), the Allies recognised the need to set up a commission to 
investigate these claims (Mallet, 1919f; Vansittart, 1919b). The British Admiral de 
Robeck (1919a) supported the establishment of a commission to ensure stability in 
the Ottoman Empire and secure the sympathy of the Islamic world. Because many of 
the world’s Muslims were British subjects, de Robeck (1919a) believed that Britain 
was  the “greatest Moslem power”. The British General Milne, commanding the 
forces occupying present-day eastern Turkey, reported that he would have 
“difficulty” in controlling Turkey if a “body actually representing the Peace 
Conference” were not despatched to Izmir (de Robeck, 1919b). However, Greek 
officials objected to an Ottoman colonel being accorded the same status as his Greek 
counterpart, Colonel Markakis, on this commission (Buzanski, 1963: 329). 
Vansittart (1919b), the British expert in the Foreign Office, argued that it would be 
best if neither Turkish nor Greek officials were included in the commission. An 
agreement was later reached whereby the Allied Forces in Izmir would be 
commanded by British officers. A body, calling itself the Ottoman League, contacted 
the Foreign Office to give its backing to this decision (Berne, 1919). However, the 
Supreme Council of the Allies, to whom the report would be presented, would 
ultimately issue a decision on the basis of the commission’s report.  
 
Even though the Ottomans were able to voice their concerns on the occupation of 
Smyrna, the commission was ultimately presented to the Supreme Council of the 
Allies, who would use their constituent power, stemming from their status as 
occupants, to determine its implications. The proposal to allow British officers to 
control the occupation was not followed through because it was ignored in a later 
agreement between Italy and Greece over their zones of occupation (Balfour, 1919a). 
In addition, the poor lines of communication meant that a message to the Greek 
forces stating that they could only proceed beyond a certain line under the command 
of a British admiral could not be delivered (Balfour, 1919a). Therefore, as a Foreign 
Office (1919a) instruction sent to de Robeck noted, because of the absence of other 
Allied troops to enforce the terms of the armistice, Greece was allowed to occupy 
Izmir regardless of the result of the commission. The commission’s findings were 
presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies, where Sir Eyre Crowe, Britain’s 
representative, expressed opposition at how the commission had studied the 
legitimacy of the Greek occupation, alongside considering crimes they had 
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committed (Helmreich, 1974: 170). The Supreme Council ultimately argued that it 
was right that Greece had acted to punish its military officers who had engaged in 
atrocities in the environs of İzmir and recommended, but did not call for, a smaller 
interallied force to replace Greece’s forces (Helmreich, 1974: 169). Colonel 
Markakis260 added that Greece should be commended to have brought order to the 
regions it was controlling, even though Italy and France were emphatic in pointing to 
how Greece’s presence had also caused reprisals (Helmreich, 1974: 170). The 
Council added that it would not decide whether the Greek presence was acceptable 
but would not press the matter of Greek atrocities any further, which Buzanski 
(1963: 325 - 326) and Helmreich (1974: 170) suggest was due to the desire of 
France, Britain and Wilson to prevent Italian forces from replacing Greece’s forces 
in the region. The Allies therefore acted as a constituent power to argue for the 
punishment of troops responsible for atrocities. Nonetheless, they disregarded 
Ottoman claims that the invasion as a whole was illegal, owing to France, Britain 
and the USA’s concerns with spreading Italian influence and because of how the 
Ottomans, as a defeated enemy, had no say on the Supreme Council. 
 
5. Constituent diplomacy, internal and external constituent power and the gradual 
recognition of the Ankara government, 1920 – 1921 
 
In the context of the emergence of new forms of normative hierarchy in the post-
First World War period, this section shows how the remnants of the Young Turks 
sought, with a degree of success, to mobilise different forms of constituent power. 
On the one hand, actors associated with the Young Turks aimed to reconstitute their 
society in line with ideas of national sovereignty which were promoted by the 
constituent power of the victorious Allies after the end of the war. By invoking local 
forms of constituent power, these actors sought to situate their polity in post-war 
international society. However, the successors of the Young Turks also opposed and 
attempted to reshape the emerging constitutional rules of post-war international 
society. This section also considers how the Allied occupation forces, in response to 
the unstable situation in the Ottoman Empire, acted as a constituent power within the 
empire. The Allies organised several conferences to consider the nature and the 
 
260 See also the report of the Supreme Council, made available by the United States Government 
Printing Office (1919) and the discussion in Helmreich (1974: 170).  
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extent to which the Ottoman state’s sovereignty and sovereign equality would be 
recognised in post-war international society. The period following the Armistice of 
Moudros was one in which political parties and other actors, including armed 
movements, advanced various schemes to secure their international recognition as 
sovereigns and secure their sovereign equality in global international society. In the 
San Remo and London conferences, and on other occasions when the successors of 
the Young Turks engaged in diplomacy, various theories of sovereignty were drawn 
upon, which were congruent with the post-war standard of ‘civilisation’ (Macfie, 
1983: 67 - 73). However, while the successors of the Young Turks sought to 
reconstitute what remained of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the new post-war 
conceptions of ‘civilisation’ and national sovereignty, at the same time they also 
attempted to challenge how these new constitutional rules were applied. The Ankara 
government sought to gain recognition as a sovereign state, equal to others in global 
international society, and used both normative power, in the form of diplomacy, and 
social power, in the form of their military power, to achieve this goal.  
 
With the Ottoman Empire greatly weakened after its defeat, individuals and 
groups aimed to secede and secure international recognition as protectorates of the 
victorious Allies in global international society. Assyrian and Lebanese261 
movements sought to become British and French protectorates (Foreign Office, 
1919b). Several Lebanese officials contacted the French to secure their position as 
administrators in a future French protectorate (Watenpaugh, 2003: 258 - 259). The 
Assyrian military leader, Agha Petros, utilising his influence gained through the 
previous support of the  Russian Empire in the First World War, deployed military 
power to challenge other Assyrian leaders and the church establishment 
(Anzerlioğlu, 2010: 51 – 52; Reynolds, 2011: 158 - 159). Shamsie (1919), an 
Assyrian representative, also declared that the Assyrians wished to be considered a 
British protectorate. In Mardin, the local notable, Abdulkadir Bey, arranged for a 
meeting between the representatives of different national movements, to determine 
the future of the region (Buckley, 1919). Chaldean Assyrians, including the 
Archbishop Gabriel Tapponi, argued for an Allied protectorate for the region, but 
representatives of the Assyrian Jacobite community, a denomination within the 
 
261 See Wratislaw (1920). 
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Assyrian Christians, believed that some form of Ottoman rule was still needed 
(Buckley, 1919). However, the Kurds who attended the meeting, favoured the 
establishment of Kurdistan (Buckley, 1919). A protectorate enjoyed a direct 
connection to another state, whereas a mandatory regime implied that the other state 
which controlled the affairs of the mandate would be acting on behalf of the League 
of Nations’ objective of advancing civilisation in that space (Wheatley, 2017: 760 - 
762). The Assyrian leadership would later seek to and be granted considerable 
military power as an internal security force in areas under the control of Britain, such 
as the mandate of Iraq (Bein, 2017: 31). In Syria and Lebanon, France sought to 
establish ties with the Maronite Christians, with missionaries consolidating their ties 
with some of the leaders of the Church (Thompson, 2000: 60). Groups seeking to 
secure the status of a protectorate of one of the victors of the First World War 
therefore sought to ensure that they were granted some status or position within the 
emerging post-war global international order and hence sought to influence how its 
constitutional principles were applied towards them. 
 
However, the main challenge to the Ottoman state came from its own bureaucrats 
and officers, including those who had been members of the CUP and its paramilitary 
units. Seeking to secure the recognition of what they took to be the rights of the 
Muslim and Turkish sections of the empire, several Ottoman officers262 partook in 
the process by which Muslims and Turks formed local assemblies to challenge the 
claims of other states, such as Greece. Some of these efforts, including the formation 
of the Islamic Council of Kars (Kars İslam Şurası), which later became the Republic 
of the Southwest Caucasus (Cenub-i Garbi Kafasya Cumhuriyesi), produced entities 
that could be compared to states in terms of their characteristics (Göl, 2013: 89). 
This republic had state-like features because it combined de facto military control 
over territory with a parliament in Kars legislating in the name of the Muslim 
Ottoman nation (Delegation of the South West Caucasus Republic, 1919; Fahreddin 
Bey, 1919; Göl, 2013: 898). However, the republic, which provided an example for 
later attempts by the National Movement to establish a similar representative 
 
262 Many of the individuals who organised these groups, known as the Association for the Defence of 
Rights (Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), were previously affiliated with the CUP and Ottoman 
intelligence services, but they now sought to present themselves as heads of national movements 
(Provence, 2017: 205, 211; Zürcher, 1984). 
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structure, failed to be recognised by the Allies as a sovereign state. As Toynbee  
(1919g: f 216) noted in a comment on a petition by the Islamic shura, “there is only a 
homogenous Moslem element in Kars because Armenians have been expelled” (see 
also Mallet, 1919c: f 222). The emphasis on presenting the Republic of the 
Southwest Caucasus as defending the interests of the Muslims of Kars in the face of 
the threat they perceived from the neighbouring Armenians, consequently backfired 
as the republic’s leaders were eventually arrested (see C.O.C. in Constantinople, 
1919; Calthorpe, 1919f; Fahreddin Bey, 1919). Abdullah (1919), the representative 
of the League for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces in 
Sivas, similarly failed to secure international recognition for his organisation. After 
the Greek occupation of Izmir, various CUP-affiliated armed organisations organised 
the Muslim and Turkish population of the remaining territories of the empire to 
become a comprehensive resistance movement (Zürcher, 1984). Building on the 
template provided by the Southwest Caucasus Republic, these movements, aided by 
elements of the Ottoman state, established a rival government in Ankara (Göl, 2013: 
88 - 91). The Ankara government resisted the Greek expeditionary force and acted as 
a constituent assembly that would represent and unite the many local assemblies and 
associations that had emerged in response to the invasion.  
 
 Different ideas concerning how the sovereign equality of the state could be 
secured were presented by Ottoman political parties in the elections held at the end 
of 1919. The rival governments in Istanbul and Ankara had reached a compromise to 
allow the elections to take place. Parties were formed, such as the Milli Ahrar 
Fırkası, or the National Liberation Party, under Cami Bey263, to lobby the Allies to 
secure the recognition of the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire (E. Yılmaz, 
2018: 39 - 42). According to Cami Bey, he and Mahir Sabit, an Ottoman officer, had 
established their party to apply Wilson’s principles of national sovereignty in the 
Ottoman Empire (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 68). Other parties, such as the ruling Freedom 
and Accord Party, argued for the closest possible cooperation with the Allies, 
including accepting the Treaty of Sèvres (Gingeras, 2016: 261; Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). 
These parties hoped that Ottoman rule could be maintained through gaining the 
 
263 After the armistice, Cami had become the interior minister of the short-lived Tevfik Paşa 
government (11 November 1918 – 3 March 1919), which had come to power following the flight of 
Talat Paşa and other prominent government figures (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 39 - 42). 
 189 
favour of the Allies and, in particular, the US, which was perceived as not 
harbouring imperial ambitions (Gingeras, 2016: 261; Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). However, 
after the Ankara government’s National Movement won the elections, the Ottoman 
parliament was closed by the Allies in March 1920 (Gawrych, 1988: 329). At this 
point, many MPs, including Cami Bey, fled to the assembly in Ankara (E. Yılmaz, 
2018: 41). The official gazette of the Ankara government, known as Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye264 (The Sovereignty of the People), published a number of articles revealing 
how the Ankara government sought external recognition of its sovereignty by 
continuing to appeal to Wilson’s principle of national self-determination “even while 
European politics are now being driven by imperialism”265 (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 
[1920] 2004d: 22). Both Cami and his Milli Ahrar Party (see E. Yılmaz, 2018: 204) 
and Hakimiyet-i Milliye ([1920] 2004d: 22) also defended granting sovereignty in the 
Arabic-speaking parts of the empire to the local Arab populations. Following the 
election, the idea of national sovereignty came to be embraced by all the popular 
political actors within the Ottoman Empire, even though support for national 
sovereignty was not permitted by the Allied occupation.  
 
Given continuing conflict, and the opposition to the Ottoman government’s 
cooperation with the Allies, Japan, Britain, France, and Italy, with the US 
participating as an observer, organised the San Remo conference in 1920 to consider 
alternative arrangements for the future of the Ottoman Empire (Göl, 2013: 115). This 
conference involved efforts on the part of the victors of the First World War to bring 
about a settlement in the Ottoman Empire, which they claimed would allow the 
constitutional rules of international society, namely of national and popular 
sovereignty to be respected (Göl, 2013: 115). This allowed groups within the empire 
to organise their own constituent assemblies which were timed to correspond with 
the San Remo conference. Both the Ankara and Damascus assemblies argued for the 
right to self-determination over their respective regions (Gelvin, 1998: 47; Provence, 
 
264 These writings were overseen by Mustafa Kemal, but were produced by various contributors, 
including Ahmed Agayev (later known as Ahmet Ağaoğlu), a former member of the CUP (Shissler, 
2003: 186). 
265 The transliterated and simplified text from the collection of Hakimiyet-i Milliye ([1920] 2004d: 
22), edited by Bolluk and Güran, reads: “Wilson prensiplerinin, artık Avrupa siyasetinde etken olan 
emperyalizme karşı hayatını muhafaza edemeyeceğini de iddia edemeyiz”, which translates as: “We 
cannot assume that Wilson’s principles will continue to live in the context of imperialism, which now 
shapes European politics.” 
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2017: 116 - 120). Feisal, who had previously supported the Allies, boycotted the San 
Remo conference, after the Allied powers refused to grant Britain a  mandate over 
Syria (Helmreich, 1974: 273). As in the case of Feisal’s supporters, Mustafa Kemal’s 
nationalist movement contained many former CUP members and Ottoman officers 
(Zürcher, 2010). In contrast to Feisal, Mustafa Kemal was not invited to San Remo 
(Provence, 2017; Zürcher, 1984; 2010). In order to secure the legitimacy of the 
Syrian National Congress, which convened in Damascus, Feisal (1920) informed the 
Allies that it had met previously and was an established “constitutional body” (see 
also Young, 1920b). Although British officials could not corroborate this (see 
Young, 1920a), Feisal (1920: 1) nonetheless claimed that the convening of the 
congress was in line with Wilson’s views, as expressed in Wilson’s Mount Vernon 
speech of 4 July 1918. As the representative, Aouni Abdul Hadi (1920) stressed, the 
congress would unite Syrians, in line with Wilson’s principle of allowing all 
“political or governmental” questions “to be solved in accordance with the liberal 
acceptance of the people directly interested in the case” (quoted from Feisal, 1920: 
1). Feisal also informed the British that he would negotiate with a general Iraqi 
congress that had declared an independent Arab state  
“from the north of Mosul Vilayet to [the] Persian Gulf with political and 
economic union with an independent Syria” (Meinertzhagen, 1920: f 4). 
Feisal (1920: 2) stressed how the Allies had de facto recognised the Arab nation in 
their statement of 14 February 1918, which had acknowledged the Arabs as partners 
in the First World War. However, the Syrian National Congress was unable to 
prevent the assignment of a French mandate to Syria in the San Remo conference, 
alongside the delineation and assignment of mandates to Palestine and Iraq (Gelvin, 
1998: 47; Provence, 2017: 124 - 126). The global constituent power of the San Remo 
conference prevailed over the local constituent powers of the assemblies in Ankara 
and Damascus. Even though Feisal’s movement was defeated, following the arrival 
of French forces in Syria, the Ankara government would later be able to harness its 
social power to ensure that it represented what remained of the Ottoman Empire. 
  
 Excluded from the diplomatic efforts of the Allies after the First World War 
to reconstitute post-war global international society, the Ankara government sought 
support from the Bolsheviks. The disillusionment of the Ottomans with the Allies 
began with the King-Crane Commission, which was tasked by Wilson to develop 
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proposals for the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire in 1919 (Smith, 2009: 58). It 
toured the Arab-speaking parts of the former Ottoman Empire from June – July 1919 
and presented its findings to the Supreme Allied Council in August 1919 (Smith, 
2009: 58 - 59). Divisions emerged among those Ottoman officials who 
communicated with representatives of the Commission. According to Howard’s 
(1963: 165) study of  the King-Crane Commission, and later claims made by 
Mustafa Kemal, the Milli Ahrar Fırkası was prepared to cede territories in the east to 
Armenia, in return for the recognition of the sovereignty of an Ottoman state (E. 
Yılmaz, 2018: 104 - 106). The issue of the granting of territory to Armenia became 
an issue of further disagreement among the Ottomans, following the signing of the 
Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 104 - 105). At Sèvres, the Allies agreed 
to cede Ottoman territory to Armenia and Greece and backed the establishment of a 
Kurdish state (Göl, 2013: 88). Three days after the treaty’s signing on 10 August 
1920 by an Ottoman delegation composed of Hadi Paşa, Rıza Tevfik and Reşad 
Halis, Hakimiyet-i Milliye ([1920] 2004b) produced an article. The article stated that 
the “Treaty of Versailles, which is the product of Britain and France, has hurt both 
the worker and the capitalist with the same level of violence and cruelty”266 
(Hakimiyet-i Milliye, [1920] 2004c: 88 - 89). The same article stressed, in a manner 
that pointed out the challenges facing the Allies, that “the movement in Poland is 
moving towards Central Europe, with Poland being the broader gateway to Central 
Europe” and “the Bolsheviks are preparing to advance into the Balkans, from one 
side, and into Europe, on the other”267 (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, [1920] 2004c: 89). This 
article suggested that if the right of nations to be recognised as equal sovereigns was 
denied in global international society, then the social power of these movements 
would ensure that this right would be realised. Separately, in July 1920, the 
Hakimiyet-i Milliye ([1920] 2004b: 79) declared that “the greatest enemy”268 of the 
Ankara government and, indeed, all nations was capitalism, which was the root 
cause of the capitulations. This approach formed the basis of the subsequent 
 
266 The text in the book edited by Bolluk and Güran reads as follows: “İngiltere ile Fransa ‘nın eseri 
olan Versay Antlaşması, Almanya’da ameleyi de sermayedarı da aynı şiddetle ve aynı gaddarlıkla 
vurdu.” (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, [1920] 2004c: 88 - 89).  
267 The text in the volume edited by Bolluk and Güran reads as follows: “… Bolşeviklik bir taraftan 
Balkanlara doğru inmeye hazırlanırken, diğer taraftan da merkezi Avrupa’ya doğru yürümektedir… 
Lehistan hareketi, merkezi Avrupa’ya yönelmiştir ve bizzat Lehistan, merkezi Avrupa’nın kapısı 
demektir” (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, [1920] 2004c: 89).  
268 The article was titled “En Büyük Düşman”, meaning “the greatest enemy” (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 
[1920] 2004b: 79). 
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diplomatic efforts of the Ankara government, which sought to exploit divisions 
among the Allied powers and secure the support of the Bolsheviks to gain 
recognition of their sovereign equality in global international society. 
 
By asserting its social power militarily and using it to reconstitute the areas it 
controlled, the Ankara government became a significant force that could not be 
ignored. This allowed the Ankara government to push its case for the recognition of 
its sovereignty as a condition for it to cooperate with other states. Through this 
approach, the Ankara government and the Bolsheviks established close relations. 
They concluded an agreement in 1921, which brought an end to the capitulations 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (Göl, 2013: 117). While the Milli Ahrar 
Fırkası may have envisaged relinquishing territory to comply with the principle of 
national self-determination, the Ankara government later claimed that defeating 
Armenia would enable the Bolsheviks and the Ankara government to challenge 
imperialism and thereby advance the cause of national self-determination 
(Hakimiyet-i Milliye, [1920] 2004a: 113 - 115). Military cooperation between the 
Ankara government and the Bolsheviks resulted in the former withdrawing its forces 
from Azerbaijan, in return for cooperation against Armenia (Göl, 2013: 100 - 102). 
Armenia became a Bolshevik state, after the Red Army defeated government forces 
in Armenia (Göl, 2013: 118). This established a corridor through which the 
Bolsheviks could deliver military and monetary support to the Ankara government 
(Göl, 2013: 100 - 102). Prior to the victory of the Ankara government and the 
Bolsheviks, Allied forces and movements opposed to the extension of Bolshevik 
influence, had threatened the Bolsheviks in the region. The Bolsheviks cooperated 
with the Ankara government to delineate the national boundaries of different groups 
in the region to curtail the ambitions of anti-Bolshevik elements (Göl, 2013: 111 - 
129). The Ankara government received valuable military support to allow it to 
harness its social power and overcome rivals in the territories it hoped to govern in 
the future. 
 
 Hostilities between Greece and the Ankara government continued, in spite of 
the Treaty of Sèvres. This forced the Allies to consider alternative arrangements with 
regard to issues of sovereignty for what remained of the Ottoman Empire. Divisions 
between the Allies led to the convening of the London Conference in 1921 to 
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reconsider the Treaty of Sèvres (Macfie, 1983: 76). France, whose financial sector 
had interests in the Ottoman Empire, had challenged the British decision to remove 
the Sultan from Istanbul (Crowe, 1919b) and would later have an impact on the 
claims for recognition advanced by the Ankara government. Subsequently, France 
recognised the Ankara government’s claim to the region of Cilicia. The French 
withdrew their forces from the region by 1921, in return for the Ankara government 
ending its support for the Syrian movement which challenged French mandatory rule 
in Syria (Provence, 2017: 119 - 120). By 1921, British officials were referring to the 
need for an arrangement maintaining “Turkish Sovereignty” but also installing a 
“Christian Governor appointed by League of Nations and assisted by elected 
Assembly and Council” over Izmir (Foreign Office, 1921: 4). The Ottoman 
government in Istanbul also argued that the Greek decision to implement Greek law 
within the occupied areas ran counter to both “international law and the inalienable 
rights of Turkey” and urged all Allied governments to protest against Greece 
(Rumbold, 1921). In his capacity as the head of the Izmir branch of the Association 
for the Defence of Rights, Cami Bey had earlier established contact with Count 
Sforza, the Italian commissioner, who represented Italy in the occupation of the 
Ottoman Empire (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 73 - 76, 160 - 164). These contacts resulted in 
the Italians recognising the de facto sovereignty of the Ankara government over 
territories under the government’s control in return for protecting Italy’s trade 
interests (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 160 - 164). The Ankara government’s consolidation of 
power had prompted Italy and France to recognise its sovereignty and had pressured 
Britain to enter into negotiations with the Ankara government, which it had initially 
considered illegitimate. The idea that the Ankara government was becoming an 
established force would, subsequently, result in a change in how the Allies as a 
whole approached its claims to sovereignty and sovereign equality.  
 
6. Conclusion:  
 
 This chapter has demonstrated how the Young Turks’ successors were 
confronted with a new form of the standard of ‘civilisation’. This emerged from the 
statements of Wilson and Lenin in which the nation-state was presented as the unit 
of post-war international society. Wilson’s ideas resulted in the emergence of a 
tiered form of international society which was divided into different mandates. 
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Groups within the Ottoman Empire responded to the Allied debate about how to 
apply the new constitutional principles, based on the new understanding of 
‘civilisation’. Some sought closer cooperation with the Allies to ensure that a 
specific state would become a mandatory power to control part or all of the empire’s 
territory. The challenges faced by the political elites of the defeated Ottoman Empire 
were compounded by the fact that they were accused of being guilty of war crimes 
and ‘crimes against humanity’. This made it more difficult for their state to be 
recognised as ‘civilised’ and hence an equal sovereign to the established states in 
global international society. Other states, such as Greece, could also be seen to be 
guilty of similar crimes, but the defeated Ottoman state did not have the power to 
make the case for the Allies to recognise this. Instead, the reports of wartime 
atrocities committed by the Ottomans encouraged other movements to seek 
recognition of their sovereignty. They argued that such recognition was vital to 
protect their interests, because these atrocities had ended any possibility of them 
being included within an inclusive Ottoman nationalism. The Grand National 
Assembly of the Ankara government mobilised its own social power through 
centralising the power of the Muslim and/or Turkish assemblies throughout the 
Ottoman Empire. It received support from the Bolsheviks, and became a force that 
could not be ignored by other states which were forced to engage in diplomacy with 












6. Diplomacy, ‘civilisation’, and the normalisation of the sovereignty of the 




This chapter explains how the Ankara government was recognised as an 
equal sovereign, with full control over its territory, in the Treaty of Lausanne of 
1923. In practice, though, the Ankara government had already gained recognition of 
its de facto sovereignty through a process of normalisation. The Treaty of Lausanne 
advanced conditions for the recognition of Turkish sovereignty, but this largely 
provided international legal recognition of what was a fait accompli. The Ankara 
government  secured de facto sovereignty over what was left of the Ottoman Empire, 
prior to the conference at Lausanne, through harnessing military, political and 
ideological power as a form of constituent power. The Lausanne conference revealed 
that nationalism had emerged as an idea that served to constitute international 
society. İsmet Paşa (1922a, 1922b), the Ankara government’s negotiator, and his 
Allied counterpart, Lord Curzon (see MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 781), both used 
arguments based on nationalism, and this resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne 
reflecting the principle of national sovereignty. The idea of nationalism was 
promoted for separate ends by İsmet Paşa and Lord Curzon, but it nevertheless acted 
as a form of global constituent power that contributed to the reconstitution of post-
war international society. The Ankara government at Lausanne sought to secure the 
recognition of its sovereignty from the established powers by presenting itself as a 
body that complied with notions that formed the constitutional rules of post-war 
global international society. Emphasising their supposed compliance with the post-
war standard of ‘civilisation’,  the Ankara government also pursued a form of 
statehood that harked back to earlier understandings of sovereignty. This was 
because the Treaty of Lausanne stipulated the conditions for the acceptance of 
Turkey as an equal sovereign to other sovereigns in global international society. 
These conditions crucially allowed the new Republic of Turkey to draw upon local 
and global ideas of sovereignty in order to be accepted internationally. 
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2. Sovereignty in the inter-war years: global and local state-building and 
conditional sovereignty in international society 
 
 This section reviews the literature on state-building in the inter-war period. 
Turkey is taken as a case study to analyse how sovereignty was recognised. The 
section notes the contribution of the literature that identifies the significance of 
different theories of the state which were presented by the victors and other actors in 
the post-war peace. It points to how notions of the role of the state and the nature of 
sovereignty provided ideas that informed processes of local and global 
reconstitution, carried out by local and global actors in the post-war period. Existing 
studies (see Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Philpott, 1997) have avoided focusing on how 
these ideas influenced the expression of the constituent power. This would involve 
examining the role of ideas in facilitating the international recognition of 
sovereignty. With the League of Nations and its promotion of democracy and 
liberalism under a new standard of ‘civilisation’, international actors assumed a key 
role in state-building. However, local actors also arguably invoked forms of 
constituent power when they were engaged in practices of de facto state-building. In 
some cases, this was preceded by revolutions which overthrew governments and 
challenged their established conceptions of dynastic sovereignty. In the post-war 
context, states drew upon local forms of constituent power, in the form of their 
mobilised populations and militaries, without necessarily seeking recognition from 
external actors. In the face of these state-building efforts, international actors offered 
conditional support, based on the emerging post-war normative hierarchy, and 
imposed demands on state-builders to secure their own interests. However, this 
support, premised on the recognition of these states as equal sovereigns, was based 
on the perception that they complied with post-war understandings of the standard of 
‘civilisation’. Such perceptions were not always based on reality. Appeals to national 
sovereignty and liberalism could mask the actual ideas and practices which came to 
form the basis of sovereignty in different local contexts. 
 
 At the end of the First World War, different theories emerged about the state 
and whether states should be restructured or eliminated, allowing humanity to move 
to other forms of social organisation. As Bartelson (2001: 95) and Smith (2009: 70) 
suggest, the First World War had been defined by a clash between two distinct 
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understandings of the state held by Wilson and Lenin, on the one hand, and the 
Central Powers on the other. The German conception of the state, contrasted with the 
liberal conception, was presented as stressing its autonomy from its society 
(Bartelson, 2001: 95; Smith, 2009: 70). American experts sent to determine the fate 
of the Ottoman Empire, King and Crane, also argued that the killing of the 
Armenians by the Ottomans suggested that they had a similar understanding that 
valued the state over human life (Smith, 2009: 70). It was suggested that this 
understanding of the state, labelled alternatively as German or “Oriental”, required 
reshaping by the Allies, who believed that it had contributed to causing the war 
(Smith, 2009: 70). However, Lenin ([1917] 2014), in The State and Revolution, had 
briefly challenged the very idea of the state, suggesting that the state could be 
abolished. But, with the expected world revolution no longer imminent, Lenin began 
focusing on how to manage the Bolshevik socialist state (Armstrong, 1993: 112 - 
157; Göl, 2013: 79). Both Lenin and Wilson developed an instrumental view of the 
state. Lenin came to see the state as a tool of revolution and socioeconomic 
development269, Wilson believed that  the institution of the democratic state would 
assume the character of the population over whom it governed (Thorsen, 1988: 25, 
171; Throntveit, 2011a: 452). In the absence of state institutions, the well-being of 
peoples could be entrusted to external forms of administration. These included the 
international administrations of regions such as the Saar and the city of Danzig by 
the League of Nations, and the establishment of the mandate system of the League 
(Pedersen, 2007: 1092). Both the Leninist and Wilsonian conceptions of the state 
emphasised cooperation at the global level, through revolution or cooperation 
through institutions, as a means to reconstitute international society through state-
building  
 
 The conception of the state promoted by Wilson and Lenin had global appeal 
because they provided alternative means to reconstitute local constitutional orders.  
Their normative ideas especially resonated in the context of revolution and the 
collapsing  of empires in Central and Eastern Europe (Gerwarth, 2016; Roshwald, 
2001). Although the Central Powers had been defeated, their defeat was not total and 
state institutions, including military command structures and armies, remained in the 
 
269 See Suny and Martin (2001).  
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territories they once controlled (Smith, 2018: 15). A wave of nationalist and socialist 
revolutions swept through areas previously governed by the Central powers 
(Gerwarth, 2016; Roshwald, 2001). These revolutions were attracted to the 
nationalist and liberal ideals of Wilson or the socialist views of Lenin (Albert, 2015; 
Smith, 2018: ch. 5). In these circumstances, local social forces could be harnessed as 
forms of constituent power, to rebuild and/or amend political institutions. Similar 
contestations over what form political institutions ought to take also occurred in the 
conquered territories of the Ottoman Empire, in what is now known as the Middle 
East (Provence, 2017; Tauber, 1994; Yenen, 2016). This was when the League of 
Nations intervened as a constituent power, through commissions and plebiscites, to 
determine the boundaries of states (Smith, 2018; Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). The rise 
of nationalism also resulted in actors, including irredentist states, framing the nation 
as a constituent power to extend their control over more territory (Gerwarth, 2016). 
States, therefore, sought to govern on behalf of their populations, which were 
understood as being nations, in accordance with the ideas of self-determination and 
national sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 119 - 122). Global forms of 
constituent power, based on international constitutional principles informed by the 
ideas of Wilson and Lenin could be mobilised, although there were disagreements 
about how these principles should be applied in local contexts. This resulted in an 
interplay between local and global forms of constituent power, with those seeking 
recognition of their sovereign equality seeking to draw upon both these forms of 
constituent power.  
 
 Instead of merely recognising states as having control over territories, the 
League of Nations argued for conditional sovereignty in the territories it 
administered directly or in those areas it had entrusted to other powers as mandates. 
Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant noted that mandatory rule would be 
maintained as long as the standard of “civilization”, in the territories governed by the 
mandates, was deemed to be insufficiently developed (Anghie, 2002: 524). 
Historical and theoretical studies of international state-building have pointed out 
how the form of liberal democracy promotion pioneered by Wilson in the post-war 
context, influenced subsequent global efforts to promote democracy (Chandler, 
2006: 476; Jahn, 2007: 88; Knock, 1992). The architects of the League did not make 
clear if ‘civilisation’ was a virtue that would eventually be recognised throughout the 
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world by the victorious Allied powers (Anghie, 2002; 2005: ch. 3; Smith, 2019). 
Given that civilisation was one of the conditions for the recognition of sovereignty, 
there was a danger that actors may be effectively condemned to perpetual sovereign 
inequality in global international society. An African conference, organised by 
prominent intellectuals such as W.E.B. DuBois, was convened at the same time as 
the Paris Peace Conference (Sluga, 2013: 51 - 52; Smith, 2018: 181). It drew 
attention to the global problems of racial inequality and colonialism (Smith, 2018: 
181). However, racial inequality was not taken seriously by all of the participants in 
Paris (Vitalis, 2015: 67). The Japanese delegation’s proposal for the inclusion of a 
racial equality clause was rejected (Vitalis, 2015: 67). The mandate system of the 
League of Nations introduced a form of hierarchy that privileged European notions 
of ‘civilisation’ as the criteria for granting sovereignty to states that were, in theory, 
being developed in territories in Asia and Africa (Hobson, 2012: 47; Mazower, 
2009: 28 - 65). Although Wilson, together with Lenin, had argued for national self-
determination, in practice the League of Nations contended that the sovereign 
equality of states could only become a reality once states had met certain conditions 
which demonstrated that they were sufficiently ‘civilised’. 
 
Recognition by external actors that a state had met the conditions for full 
sovereignty was seen to be crucial. This meant that ideas of what constituted a state 
worthy of being recognised as sovereign came to be adopted as a template by groups 
seeking such recognition. However, different ideas with regard to how a state should 
be organised led to the adoption of alternative templates, based on various ideas of 
sovereignty, by different groups seeking to gain independence for their state and 
recognition of its sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Philpott, 1997: 30 - 41). 
These different templates were also informed by how those who were then governed 
by mandates and seeking recognition of their sovereign statehood were subjected to 
new standards of “civilization”270 (Philpott, 1997: 42 see also Anghie, 2002). For 
example, in the Arab-populated territories that were once a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, ideas such as Bolshevism, liberalism, democracy and nationalism, and also 
Zionism and Pan-Arabism came to be advanced by local actors seeking recognition 
 
270 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League stressed that mandatory status was temporary and 
intended to last only until the level of “civilization” in a mandate was improved (Anghie, 2002: 524). 
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as equal sovereigns in international society (Kelly, 2017; Tauber, 1994; Wheatley, 
2015a, 2015b). Tunaya ([1984] 2000: 237) has noted how, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Armistice of Moudros, numerous political parties and associations 
were formed, which presented different visions of the status of the future Ottoman 
state in the emerging post-war international society (see also Zürcher, 1998). These 
groups sought not only to gain recognition on the basis of the post-war standard of 
‘civilisation’. They also saw themselves as interlocutors in debates concerning the 
implications of these standards of ‘civilisation’ for the recognition of their equal 
sovereignty and attempted to influence how these standards were applied to them 
(Canefe, 2002; Zürcher, 1999).   
 
 Weitz’s (2008) influential article suggests that “civilization” (see Weitz, 
2008: 1314) and progress were adopted as templates by states throughout the world, 
following the emergence of what he terms a new “Paris” (see Weitz, 2008: 1313) 
system, which replaced the “Vienna” (see Weitz, 2008: 1313) system of diplomacy 
that had been put in place after the Napoleonic Wars. However, the attempt to place 
this moment in a unidirectional process of progress or development can be criticised 
for confusing a process contingent on the beliefs and actions of individuals with an 
objective process of history (Cooper, 2005: ch. 5). At the end of the First World 
War, intellectuals questioned the very ideas of civilisation and progress (see 
Ifversen, 2002), and they challenged the argument that progress and modernisation 
were adopted by social movements worldwide. Berkes’s ([1964] 1998) earlier study 
of the emergence of the Republic of Turkey from the remaining territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, stressed the importance of Westernisation and secularisation. 
Importantly, the recognition of the state of Turkey as an equal sovereign by the 
Allies and the Bolshevik government by 1923 involved the state being recognised as 
“civilized” (B. Lewis, [1961] 1968: 292). This narrative is also reinforced by Turkish 
historiography. Intellectuals who later supported the new state of Turkey, such as 
Halide Edip, saw the process of the establishment of Turkey as one which involved 
the spread of liberal principles (Gürel, 2015). However, others have described this 
process as being based on Western ideas of corporatism271 or fascism272. More 
 
271 See Parla and Davison (2004).  
272 See Adanır (2001) and Ter Matevosyan (2015).  
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recently, Göl (2013: 167 - 174) has complemented existing accounts of the narrative 
of the founding of Turkey, which focus on the relations of the Ankara government 
with the West, by focusing on Turkey’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. Göl’s 
(2013: 26 - 34) account, however, focuses on modernisation as an objective process 
that the Soviets and the Turkish government in Ankara needed to respond to. But a 
study of ideas associated with ‘modernity’, and similar concepts, such as 
‘civilisation’, can demonstrate how these were contested concepts. Consequently, 
although commentators have recognised how ideas of the state and ‘civilisation’, 
served to facilitate the recognition of the sovereignty of Turkey, they have only 
recently begun to note the role of ideas and politics at the local and global level in 
this process.  
 
A certain strand of the historiography of Turkey and the Arab successor 
states of the Ottoman Empire has focused on the role of post-war nationalist and/or 
revolutionary regimes  to explain how these states gained their political 
independence and came to be recognised as equal sovereigns in global international 
society (see Kandiyoti, 1991; B. Lewis, [1961] 1968: 239 – 293; Zürcher, [1993] 
2017: 133). However, the developments that resulted in the post-war independence 
of these states which began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has 
largely been overlooked273. Throughout this period, the ideas used by those wielding 
constituent power in these different states were shaped by a variety of different 
international and local sources. This has not been considered in studies, such as those 
of Bernard Lewis ([1961] 1968) and Zürcher ([1993] 2017), which focus on the 
spread of Western ideas and practices. Arab or Turkish nationalism, though, drew 
upon a range of Western and Eastern ideas, including Islam, Bolshevism and a form 
of nationalism centring on the idea of self-determination (Akal, 2013: 108; 
Demirkent, 2017: 97 – 100, 142; Göl, 2013: ch. 3; Toprak, 2013: chs. 9 and 11; 
Turnaoğlu, 2017a; 2017b). However, in their relations with the Western Powers and 
the Soviets, the successor states of the Ottoman Empire also attempted to emphasise 
the supposed progressive nature of their regimes. As Wigen (2018) demonstrates, 
even when the early Turkish elites were translating ideas from European sources, 
they made connections between these ideas and local practices and institutions. 
 
273 However, see the account of Göçek (1996). 
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Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) argues that the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code 
demonstrates how legal competence formed the basis of state-building, which 
resulted in the end of extraterritoriality in Turkey. In particular, the adoption of the 
Swiss Civil Code in Turkey has been interpreted as pointing to the spread of Western 
legal norms (Özsu, 2010: 64). However, as Özsu (2010: 64) notes, the Swiss Civil 
Code was translated and enacted in a manner that incorporated pre-existing sharia-
based principles. Therefore, Turkey’s acceptance as an equal sovereign in global 
international society, which has often been understood as a process of 
Westernisation, can also be read as an instance of the normalisation of Turkey’ s 
conceptions of sovereignty by international society.  
 
3. The Ankara government’s consolidation of de facto statehood and the 
normalisation of national sovereignty prior to the Armistice of Mudanya, 1922 
 
This section focuses on how the Ankara government utilised its military and 
political power to assert its de facto sovereignty. Prior to assuming control over 
Istanbul in 1922, the Ankara government had relied on many of the former personnel 
of the Ottoman state who had defected to the nationalist movement. Following 
military success against the Greek Expeditionary Force, the Ankara government 
secured the release of more former Ottoman personnel who were being tried for war 
crimes. By preventing the enforcement of war crimes, the Ankara government 
challenged the emerging global normative hierarchy. After the forces of the Ankara 
government  entered the “Straits zone”274, the military governor of Istanbul, Rafet 
Paşa, introduced a number of sovereign practices in Istanbul (Montgomery, 1972: 
781). These included controlling the customs administration of the ports and issuing 
passports (Henderson, 1922e). The introduction of such practices was opposed by 
those based in Istanbul who disagreed with the Turkish nationalist ideas of the 
Ankara government (MacArthur-Seal, 2018). However, because of disagreements 
among Allied powers, even after the Ankara government had assumed control of 
Istanbul, the Allies could not unite to challenge the Ankara government. Here, the 
Ankara government relied upon a global form of constituent power, by aligning itself 
 
274 The “Straits zone” referred to a demilitarised zone that had been created around the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles Straits, under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (Macfie, 1983: 83; Montgomery, 1972: 
781). 
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with those who looked towards a peaceful post-war international society. A new 
armistice was concluded and a conference arranged to revise the Treaty of Sèvres 
(Gingeras, 2016: 291). Prior to this conference, the Ankara government abolished 
the sultanate and transferred the powers of the caliphate to the Grand National 
Assembly (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 18). This allowed the Assembly to claim to be the 
sole representative of the remaining territories of the empire (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 
18). In this period, therefore, exploiting divisions among the Allies, the Ankara 
government engaged in sovereign practices before being recognised as an equal 
sovereign. 
 
The Ankara government’s eventual success in being recognised as the sole 
sovereign representative of the remaining territories that were formerly part of the 
Ottoman Empire was in part due to it mobilising what remained of the personnel and 
the institutions of the Ottoman state (Nezir-Akmeşe, 2005, Rustow, 1959). As early 
as 1919, the support the Ankara government received here was crucial to allow it to 
consolidate control (Nezir-Akmeşe, 2005; Rustow, 1959). This involved drawing on 
Turkish nationalism, appealing to religious solidarity and, at times, encouraging 
Kurdish nationalism. A number of  “Committees for Turco-Kurdish Independence”,  
established along the Iraqi-Kurdish border, received the support of Ottoman 
bureaucrats, such as Kadri Efendi, the governor of Van (Gorgas, 2018: 816). The 
expansion of the Ankara government’s influence, while leading to violent clashes, 
often involved officials previously loyal to the Ottoman state choosing to ignore 
orders to confront the National Movement. For example, upon Mustafa Kemal’s 
arrival in Samsun, the Ottoman Commander of the Third Army Corps which was 
stationed in the vicinity, Colonel Rıfat, defied instructions to challenge Mustafa 
Kemal (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). The colonel stated that “he no longer accept[ed] 
responsibility for public order in Samsun” (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). Colonel Rıfat also 
refused to authorise the occupying authorities to send British elite Ghurkha troops to 
challenge the unauthorised landing of Mustafa Kemal in Samsun (Calthorpe, 1919a: 
1). This led to the colonel’s resignation and his replacement by Colonel Selahaddin 
Bey, who was brought to Samsun aboard a British destroyer (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). A 
British intelligence report by Brigadier General Spears (1919), suggested that the 
officers in the Samsun region were continuing to obey the CUP and that most of 
them were deserting their units. The Ankara government came to acquire significant 
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social power, chiefly in the form of manpower, as a result of securing the loyalty of 
local populations. This allowed it to challenge the Greek expeditionary force in 
Western Anatolia. 
 
The defeat of the Greek expeditionary force by military forces aligned with the 
Ankara government, made possible by the support of Ottoman officials, resulted in 
the Allies revising their policy towards the Ankara government. One hundred and 
seventeen Hellenist associations in Istanbul275 had lobbied for the advance of the 
Greek military in Anatolia (British Delegation, 1922). The British Prime Minister, 
Lloyd George, had agreed to lend support to the Greek expeditionary force in 
Anatolia, which Greece had justified on the grounds that it was enforcing the Treaty 
of Sèvres. According to Gökalp ([1922] 1982c: 151), who had been imprisoned in 
Malta before escaping, Britain and other European powers sought to exploit for 
economic gain the ‘civilised’ workers of Turkey. Gökalp ([1922] 1982c: 151) argued 
that being successful in modern forms of “agriculture and industry” required “the 
attainment of a high level of civilisation”276. Islamic territories possessed such an 
economy, but, in contrast to Far East Asia, these territories were not well-defended. 
Gökalp ([1922] 1982c: 153) also stated that to make way for settler colonialism, the 
“Greeks wanted to deprive us from not only our political but also our social 
homeland”277. From 1921, some in the Foreign Office (1921) no longer pursued a 
policy exclusively tied to supporting Greece. Significantly, following the military 
successes of the Ankara government, Britain began to implement an agreement, 
finalised with Cami Bey, who was in Rome as the representative of the Ankara 
government (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 153 - 154). This concerned the transfer of remaining 
prisoners of war in Malta to the Ankara government, in return for British prisoners 
held by the Ankara government  (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 153 - 154)278. The victory of the 
Ottoman forces at the Battle of Sakarya resulted in the release of more prisoners 
after a meeting of the British High Commissioner, Sir Horace Rumbold and Hamit 
(Hasancan) of the Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti (the Ottoman Red Crescent) on 
 
275 See Kamouzis (2013: 34). 
276 The transliteration of this text reads as “[z]iraatin ve sanayiin bugünkü şeklinde iyi bir amele 
olmak için yüksek bir medeni seviyeye çıkmış olmak lazım” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982c: 151) 
277 The transliteration of the text reads as “Yunanlılar bizi yalnız siyasi vatandan değil, içtimai 
vatandan da mahrum etmek istiyorlardı” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982c: 153).  
278 The British informed Cami Bey that they would free forty of the 64 Ottoman prisoners they were 
keeping in Malta (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 154).  
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23 October 1921 (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 153). Arguably, the military successes of the 
Ankara government signalled to the Allies that they should open negotiations with 
the government. Utilising their social constituent power, the Ankara government had 
challenged the emerging concept of war crimes and removed one of the obstacles to 
the recognition of their state as a sovereign state equal to others in international 
society. 
 
Following the entry of the Ankara government’s troops into the Straits Zone, the 
forces under the command of Rafet Paşa consolidated control over Istanbul. These 
forces  implemented policies that can be characterised as practices that served to 
establish de facto sovereignty. Rafet Paşa issued orders that “all correspondence 
connected with Anatolian railway and Port of Haidar now under military control is to 
be sent to him” and he denied entry to Allied officers to Ottoman war materiel 
(Henderson279, 1922c). The National Movement stated that they had powers of 
jurisdiction over individuals present in the occupation zone within Istanbul, but 
could not carry out arrests (Henderson, 1922c). This clashed with attempts on the 
part of the Allies to introduce new forms of extraterritoriality in occupied Istanbul 
(MacArthur-Seal, 2018).  Many states, including Greece, had signed a series of 
agreements with Britain, which replaced the capitulations with British martial law 
(MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 778).  However, the Ankara government sought to make 
companies conform to the Ottoman “company law of 1914” (Henderson, 1922d), 
which introduced new requirements that challenged their privileged status in the 
capitulations, such as necessitating the use of Turkish in company papers (see 
Toprak, 2012: 197 - 201). According to a report of the British General Commanding 
Officer in Constantinople, forwarded by Henderson (1922e), Rafet Paşa had 
disagreed with Allied commanders over the issue of passports. The Greek and 
Armenian Patriarchates had been issuing passports to Greeks and Armenians in the 
city who wished to leave (Henderson, 1922e). Rafet argued that these passports were 
void (Henderson, 1922e). He stated that the only valid passports would be those 
officially approved by the Ankara government, which would be issued following a 
payment of 100 liras by all males of “military age” (Henderson, 1922e). Following a 
 
279 Sir Nevile Henderson was a Foreign Office diplomat attached to the embassy in Istanbul (Jeffrey 
and Sharp, 1993: 83).  
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four hour conference with Rafet Paşa, the Allied generals only secured a verbal 
promise that the nationalists would not extort Armenians and Greeks who were 
seeking to obtain passports to leave (Henderson, 1922e). Therefore, prior to the 
external recognition of its sovereignty, the Ankara government was able to 
implement policies to secure control over the Straits zone.  
 
According to  the terms of the occupation, the Allied forces were tasked with 
resisting any incursion into the Straits Zone. But, divisions among the Allies, and an 
unwillingness to engage in more fighting, enabled the Ankara government’s forces 
to enter the Straits zone and dictate terms (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 39 - 40). In the 
cases of Italy, Britain and France, these divisions were exacerbated by domestic 
constituencies who opposed war with the Ankara government (Demirci, [2005] 
2010: 32, 39 – 40). Italy and France were also eager to trade with the Ankara 
government (Güçlü, 2001: 593; E. Yılmaz, 2018: 155 - 156). The British dominions 
of Australia and New Zealand also opposed despatching troops to enforce the Straits 
zone280 and the Conservative opposition forced the Lloyd George government to 
resign281. Britain could neither rely on Italy nor France for support against the forces 
of the Ankara government (Busch, 1976: 340 - 350; Demirci, [2005] 2010: 39 – 41; 
Macfie, 1979a: 341). Harrington, the British General, realised that the nationalists 
could easily overwhelm the British forces if they launched an attack on Istanbul 
together with “Turkish elements within the city” (Ryan, 1922). The French failed to 
comply with the British request that they supply troops to the Asian side of Istanbul 
(British Delegation, 1923; Henderson, 1922f). Opposing Rafet Paşa’s moves to 
assume control of Istanbul as part of the national boundaries of the Ankara 
government, the British pressed the Italian and French governments for support 
(Henderson, 1922c). The British delegation noted how “non-Ottomans” needed to be 
protected by the Allies (Henderson, 1922b). Hence, the Ankara government assumed 
control over what it deemed to be its territorial jurisdiction in the Straits zone 
without being challenged by the Allies. Here, the government used its social power 
 
280 See Sales (1971: 398) and Steiner (2005: 114 – 118). 
281 See Demirci ([2005] 2010: 40 - 42) and Steiner (2005: 114 - 116) for how the Conservative Party, 
headed by Andrew Bonar Law, refused to deploy British troops to challenge the advance of the 
Ankara government’s forces into the Straits.  
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as a form of constituent power to challenge the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 
and seek to establish a state on the basis of the principle of national sovereignty. 
 
These actions violated agreements that the Istanbul government had agreed with 
the Allies, which had extended the forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction granted under 
the capitulations (MacArthur-Seal, 2018).  Following the arrival of the forces of 
Rafet Paşa, the Allied generals allowed joint management of “sanitary”282 
governance in Istanbul and were willing to permit the creation of a Turkish police 
force under the control of the Allies (British Delegation, 1922: f 43). Such 
arrangements were to be maintained until the peace conference in Lausanne decided 
the future arrangement of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul (British Delegation, 
1922). However, Henderson (1922b: f 50) notes how Rafet Paşa had approached the 
Allied generals with a view to extend the jurisdiction of the Ankara government’s 
police force to include “Hellenes” and Russians in Istanbul. Rafet Paşa sought to 
realise the vision of territorial sovereignty, as defined in the National Pact, which 
envisaged the Ankara government ruling Istanbul and eastern Thrace283. In response, 
the British pressed the Italian and French governments to oppose Rafet Paşa (see 
Henderson, 1922c). The British delegation noted how “non-Ottomans” needed to be 
protected by the Allies (Henderson, 1922b: f 50). Rafet Paşa had attempted to arrest 
the incoming Greek High Commissioner in Istanbul, General Katchakis, and the 
British feared that the National Movement would arrest the Russian diplomatic 
mission in Istanbul and replace them with Bolsheviks (Foreign Office, 1922; 
Henderson, 1922b). On 11 December 1922, Gökalp ([1922] 1982b: 149), arguing 
that the dominance of Christianity had resulted in “Crusader attacks and the 
compromises of the capitulations”284, wrote that the Ankara government should 
recognise the importance of socialism as 
 
282 Following the occupation of Istanbul, a “Sanitary Commission” was formed with “one 
representative from each Allied Power, one Greek, and the medical officer from USS St. Louis” 
(Criss, 1999: 39) . 
283 Eastern Thrace was considered a part of the National Pact and a referendum was called to 
determine the status of Western Thrace (Gingeras, 2015: 391). 
284 The terms used by Gökalp ([1922] 1982b: 149) here, when transliterated into Turkish, reads as 
“ehl-i salip hücumları ve kapitülasyon imtiyazları”.  
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“…it would be beneficial for us for socialism to be dominant over the whole of 
Europe. Because, as socialism has the characteristic of a new religion, it is not 
subject to the logic of the Church.”285 
Rumbold (1922b), the British Commissioner in Istanbul, accepted the Ankara 
government’s call for Ottoman subjects to be tried by Turkish courts in Istanbul. 
However, Rumbold (1922b) argued that it was crucial that non-Ottoman Russians 
and Greeks should not be tried in Turkish courts. By exploiting divisions among the 
Allies, Rafet Paşa and the Ankara government overturned the forms of 
extraterritorial legislation that had been established in Istanbul with the previous 
consent of the Istanbul government.  
 
  The collapse of the legitimacy of the overlapping institutions of the caliphate 
and the sultanate established the conditions for the Ankara government to be 
recognised internally within what remained of the Ottoman Empire and externally, 
on the basis of national sovereignty. The Armistice of Moudros had been signed, in 
part, on the basis of the commitment of the Ankara government to allowing free 
passage to other states from the Straits, as called for by Woodrow Wilson (Demirci, 
[2005] 2010: 18; Dyer, 1972: 153 – 156). Following the signing of the Armistice of 
Moudros, the Ottoman government became a partner in what British officials termed 
the “freedom of the Straits” (as quoted in Nicolson, 1922; Macfie, 1979b). The 
arrival of the Ankara government’s forces in the Straits Zone threatened this 
agreement. Gökalp ([1922] 1982a: 136 - 137) noted that although “Britain claims to 
be defending the freedom of the Straits” the “true goal of [the British] is to deny 
political and economic freedoms to Turkey, Russia and all Black Sea nations”286.  
Reporting from Paris, the British diplomat, Hardinge (1922: f 62), stated that “there 
are considerable sects of Mohammedans who do not recognise the Caliph as their 
spiritual head.” Still divided, the Allies could not decide on whether they should 
declare a siege of the city on 4 November 1922, after Rafet Paşa had gained full 
control of Istanbul (British Delegation, 1922). The French response to the “flight of 
the Sultan from Constantinople” seemed to be one of “relief” because of how he 
 
285 The transliteration of this text reads as “… sosyalizmin bütün Avrupa’da hakim olması bizim için 
faydalu olacaktır. Çünkü, sosyalizm yeni bir din mahiyetinde olduğu için kilisenin mantığına tabi 
değidir” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982b: 149). 
286 The transliteration of the text reads as follows: “İngiliz siyaseti ortaya ‘Boğazlar’ın Serbestisi’ 
kaidesini atıyorlar… Bundaki hakiki maksat, Türkiye ile Rusya’yı ve hatta bütün Karadeniz 
milletlerini siyasi ve iktisadi hürriyetlerinden mahrum etmektir.” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982a: 136 - 137). 
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“was regarded as a mere puppet in the hands of His Majesty’s Government” 
(Hardinge, 1922: f 62). This sentiment was also shared by actors affiliated with the 
Ankara government, such as Gökalp  ([1922] 1982f: 145), who claimed, 
“the British… took control over the institutions of the caliphate and that of the 
sheikh ul-Islam. First, using the authority of the Caliph, they dissolved the 
Ottoman Parliament without providing a date for it to reconvene. They then used 
the sheikh ul-Islam’s authority to issue fatwas [i.e. religious rulings] against the 
National Forces attempting to liberate İzmir.”287 
At this stage, the views of British diplomats had shifted radically. They no longer 
assumed that the Ankara government was pursuing a Pan-Islamist policy. Rather, 
they had come to believe that the Ankara government had adopted the idea of 
national sovereignty (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 55 – 56; Macfie, 1979b: 211). After the 
defeat of the Greek military, the Allies therefore signed an Armistice at Mudanya of 
1922 (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 30). This agreement did not change the juridical status 
of the occupation of Istanbul (Henderson, 1922a). However, with the Bolsheviks to 
be observers, the Allies scheduled a conference to be held at Lausanne to determine 
the status of the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire (Demirci, [2005] 2010). 
Both the Ankara and Istanbul governments were invited to attend. Even though 
social forces, including the military power of the Ankara government, had changed 
the actual political situation, the recognition of the Ankara government as an equal 
sovereign by the dominant members of international society was not yet a reality.  
 
4. The interaction of global and local constituent powers in the Lausanne conference 
of 1923 and the scrutiny of the Ankara Grand National Assembly 
 
 In the negotiations that led to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the 
delegation of the Ankara government focused on revising the Treaty of Sèvres. The 
Ankara government was aiming to achieve its longstanding goal of securing the 
recognition of its state as an equal sovereign in international society, as expressed in 
its dedication to the National Pact (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61 - 63). Although the 
national sovereignty of the Ankara government would be accepted by the Allies, the 
exact nature of the sovereignty of the state of Turkey was debated in the course of 
the conference. Turkey’s chief negotiator, the former intelligence officer, İsmet Paşa, 
 
287 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “İngilizler… Hilafet ve 
Meşihat makamlarını ele geçirmişlerdi. Evvela, halifenin bir emriyle, Meclis-i Mebusan’ı toplanacağı 
zamanı bildirmeksizin dağıttı. İzmir’i kurtarmaya çalışan Kuvay-ı Milliye aleyhine şeyhülislamdan 
fetvalar aldı.” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982f: 145). 
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argued that given its past political ties within the Ottoman Empire, according to the 
principle of self-determination Mosul should be considered a part of the new state of 
Turkey (Coşar and Demirci, 2006: 125). However, his counterpart, Lord Curzon, 
insisted that Turkey should accept borders that reflected its status as a national state 
(Venn, 2009: 419). The Allies, therefore, encouraged the Ankara government, which 
was by that time the only government in the Ottoman Empire, to withdraw its claim 
to Mosul and its environs in return for accepting a share in the oil production from 
the province (Venn, 2009). However, the Ankara government insisted that its 
territorial demands were grounded on national claims rather than on self-interest. 
The Ankara government also argued that it would respect the rights of minorities, by 
which it meant the remaining non-Muslim population within the empire, provided its 
demands for sovereign equality and territoriality were met (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 
6). The Ankara government’s negotiators, though, faced scrutiny from the Grand 
National Assembly (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 127 – 130; Demirkent, 2017: 180 - 185). 
The Assembly opposed territorial concessions and stressed the Islamic and Turkish 
nature of the Assembly as the constituent power of the new state (Demirci, [2005] 
2010: 127 - 130; Demirkent, 2017: 180 - 185). A consensus emerged, however, 
between the Allies and the Ankara government concerning the national nature of the 
sovereignty of the new state, which resulted in the displacement of the Greek 
population. The Ankara government had already put in practice policies to advance 
national sovereignty prior to their formal international. However, the Lausanne 
Conference, and its scrutiny by the Grand National Assembly, demonstrated how 
forms of global and local constituent power resulted in the recognition and hence the 
normalisation of the national sovereignty of the Ankara government.  
 
 The recognition of the Ankara government as the sole representative of the 
remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire was a result of the decision of the 
government to abolish the sultanate on 1 November 1922 (Ardıç, 2012b: 254 – 255; 
Demirci, [2005] 2010: 66 – 68). At this point, the Allies and particularly Britain, 
were torn between recognising the Ankara government or the Istanbul government 
(Demirci, [2005] 2010: 66 - 68). Following the declaration of the end of the 
sultanate, the deposed Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahideddin, informed the British 
commissioner in Istanbul, Rumbold (1922a), that the declaration amounted to the 
Grand National Assembly of the Ankara government claiming the power of the 
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caliphate. The new decree passed by the Assembly, asserting its constituent power, 
argued that the sultanate was abolished and that the Assembly would, from now on, 
elect the caliph, who would act as the leader of Muslims throughout the world. The 
deposed Sultan suggested to Rumbold (1922a) that this declaration could have 
implications for Britain’s Muslim subjects in India and this prompted Rumbold to 
make inquiries (Oliphant, 1922). However, with the removal of the sultanate and the 
vesting of the power to elect the caliphate being granted to the Grand National 
Assembly, the Assembly and, arguably its leader, Mustafa Kemal288, claimed to 
represent the Islamic world and duly elected Abdülmecid II, a relative of the 
previous Sultan, as caliph (Aydın, 2007: 135 - 136). Gökalp ([1922] 1982d: 179) 
also stated that, 
“[U]ntil now, the religious jurisdiction of the Ottoman caliphs extended only 
as far as their Muslim populations within their domains. The caliphate could 
not extend their religious guidance to the Muslim populations of states that 
had their own political sovereignty because of the obstruction of these 
states…However, as the caliph is no longer a sovereign of a state, the caliph 
can now be in communion with muftis from the whole world.”289 
Hence, Gökalp ([1922] 1982d: 179; [1922] 1982e: 183) argued that the Ottoman 
caliphate could have a renewed global role, detached from the position of a political 
sovereign, but nonetheless involving “the Sheikh-ul Islam of each state being subject 
to the office of the caliphate“290. A clash therefore occurred between local forms of 
constituent power, invoked by the Grand National Assembly, and global forms of 
constituent power, envisaged by the mandate system and promoted by the victorious 
Allies. 
 
Confronted with the territorial claims of the Ankara government, the Allies 
sought to counter them by offering material incentives. British negotiators aimed to 
resolve the Mosul question by offering the future state of Turkey joint control of the 
 
288 Adam (1922b) suggested, in response to Hardinge’s (1922) view that the new caliph was pro-
French, that it was highly unlikely that the Muslims of the world were taking a stance on the basis of 
the caliph’s orientation, but were rather “too much impressed by the doughty deeds of Mustapha 
Kemal” to object to the caliph elected by the Ankara government.  
289 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “Şimdiye kadar, Osmanlı halifelerinin dini 
nezaretleri yalnız siyasi metbuları arasında bulunan Müslümanlara münhasırdı. Başka devletlere tabi 
bulunan Müslümanlara Osmanlı halifelerinin dini nezarete siyasi emellerin karışmayacağına emin 
olamazlardı. Şimdi ise, Halife Hazretleri hiçbir devletin hususi siyasetine merbut bulunmadığından, 
bütün alemdeki İslam müftüleriyle alenen muhabere edebilecektir” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982d: 179). 
290 The Turkish transliteration of the text reads as follows: “Bütün milletlerin Şeyhülislamları da 
hilafet makamına merbut olmalıdır.” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982e: 183). 
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profits of a petroleum company which would exploit the oil reserves located there 
(Venn, 2009). Immediately following the end of the war, the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company took over 40 per cent, and the Shell oil company obtained more than 12 
per cent, of the Turkish Petroleum Company (Adam, 1922a). The Turkish Petroleum 
Company had been formed in 1912 as a consortium seeking to acquire a concession 
for exploring oil in the Ottoman Empire (Venn, 2009: 421). The San Remo 
conference of 1920 had decided, following Germany’s defeat, that France would 
acquire the share of the Deutsche Bank within this consortium with the French 
thereby receiving 25 per cent of the Turkish Petroleum Company (Adam, 1922a). 
Adam (1922a) of the Foreign Office challenged the Colonial Office’s argument that 
the Turks should not be permitted to participate in a concession of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company to explore oil in Arab territories (Venn, 2009: 419). Adam 
(1923c) called for the Ankara government to be sounded out on whether it wanted to 
participate in the oil company or receive any shares. This could allow the Ankara 
government to withdraw its claim to Mosul.  
 
Curzon sought to encourage the Turkish government to accept shares of the 
profit to be made from oil, or oil itself, provided it withdrew its claim to sovereignty 
over Mosul (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61; Venn, 2009: 421). Curzon, therefore, 
supported the suggestion advanced by the Ankara government’s negotiator, İsmet 
Paşa, that Turkey could own some shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61). The Ankara government had sought to extend its 
territorial control to Mosul, through appealing to national sovereignty, which its 
diplomats were expected to uphold (Demirkent, 2017: 180 – 185; Coşar and 
Demirci, 2006). After İsmet Paşa left Lausanne in February 1923, he and the other 
delegates were scrutinised by the Grand National Assembly and its leader, Mustafa 
Kemal, who argued, in response to criticism from some members of the Assembly, 
that the Ankara government, known as Turkey, ought not to go to war over Mosul, 
but could regain Mosul through diplomatic means at a later date (Demirci, [2005] 
2010: 125 – 130). Curzon had responded by proposing, instead, an arrangement 
whereby Turkey would share in the profits of oil production in the territory 
(Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61; Venn, 2009: 421). The local constituent power of the 
nation, represented in the Grand National Assembly, was successful in imposing 
constitutional rules on domestic society and its representatives, who now embraced 
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national sovereignty (Bayar, 2014a: 124 - 125; Demirkent, 2017: 164 – 171). 
However, the Ankara government’s negotiators could not prevent the Allied 
negotiators from restricting the boundaries of the territory of the new Turkish state 
on the basis of this very principle of national sovereignty. 
 
Curzon also sought to deny Mosul to the Ankara government by claiming 
that the area  was largely populated by Kurds (MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 781). During 
the Lausanne negotiations, İsmet Paşa (1922a: 4) argued that Iraq, and especially 
Mosul, had been integral parts of the Ottoman Empire. İsmet Paşa (1922a: 4) 
opposed the imposition of a British mandate over Iraq, which would include Mosul, 
because  
“(l)a situation des personnes qui vivent dans notre patrie et qui jusqu’aux 
confirme les plus recules du pays participent, comme citoyens, a tous les 
droits et a toutes les responsabilités, ne peut être comparée à la situation des 
habitants d’une sorte de colonie”.291 
İsmet Paşa (1922a: 4; 1922b: 5) stressed that Mosul had not been a “colony”, but 
was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, represented in its parliament and hence 
had ties to the Turks represented by the Ankara government. İsmet Paşa (1922b: 4) 
then produced  a memorandum which he declared contained “ethnographic” proof 
that Mosul should be considered part of Turkey, because it was populated by “Turcs 
et .. Kurdes”, who had close ties to the Arab population. İsmet Paşa (1922b) claimed 
this information had been compiled before the war and thus could not have been 
manipulated to strengthen the Ankara government’s claim to the province. İsmet 
Paşa (1922b: 5) further referred to how the Iraqis had rebelled against Britain in 
1920 – 1921 and dismissed the 1914 Bitlis uprising against the Ottomans as the 
agitation of “consuls”. However, British negotiators continued to dismiss these 
arguments. (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 103 - 109) This has been interpreted as a 
deliberate attempt to force the Ankara government’s delegates to leave the 
negotiations and thereby allow Britain to maintain its mandate over Iraq (Demirci, 
[2005] 2010: 103 - 109). The American negotiators at Lausanne believed that 
Curzon (1922c) had adopted an uncompromising attitude (Venn, 1990). They 
believed that the British dismissed arguments based on the concept of national 
 
291The French text can be translated into English as follows: "The situation of the people who live in 
our homeland and who, including  in the distant parts of the country, participate, as citizens, in all the 
rights and responsibilities, cannot be compared to the situation of the inhabitants of a kind of colony” 
(İsmet Paşa, 1922a: 4). 
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sovereignty in order to encourage the Ankara government to break off negotiations 
(MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 781). In this context, on 5 February 1923, Gökalp ([1923] 
1982: 157) wrote that Curzon’s opposition to the Kurdish MPs, who had argued for 
the inclusion of Mosul within Turkey, had been met by opposition with “the whole 
of the Islamic world commending the Kurdish MPs” who had “become a nuisance to 
the British Foreign Minister”292. Nationalism, therefore, was used by Curzon and the 
Ankara government to bolster their positions with regard to justifying claims to 
sovereignty. However, both disagreed about the exact nature of the Turkish nation. 
 
Britain argued that because the Ankara government might not respect 
minority rights it would require international supervision and this would restrict its 
sovereignty. This argument was used to oppose the Ankara government’s demands 
to extend its sovereignty to territories in Iraq, which were populated by Assyrians, 
Kurds and Arabs, as well as Turks. Adam (1923a; see also Anonymous, 1923) noted 
how Kurdish notables had sought to engineer an alliance with the Ankara 
government. These notables had contacted İsmet Paşa to establish ties with the 
Ankara government in order to control Mosul and to secure autonomy for the Van 
province. Sheikh Mahmud, a notable in Mosul, had sent three representatives to the 
Grand National Assembly at Ankara (Ali, 1997: 525). Some in the National 
Movement, such as Rafet Paşa, clamoured that “Mosul is Turkish” (Coşar and 
Demirci, 2006: 125). Adam (1923b) later reported that Curzon favoured informing 
Agha Petros, the leader of the Assyrians, and the Ankara government that the Mosul 
issue should be handled by the League of Nations. Curzon could have been aiming to 
prevent the Ankara government and the Assyrians reaching an agreement on Mosul. 
Curzon (1922a: 2) had also informed İsmet Paşa that the granting of Mosul directly 
to Turkey “is not even consistent with the first article of the National Pact to which 
he consistently appeals as Magna Carta of now Turkey.” The article had stated that 
areas which were inhabited by an Arab majority at the time of the Armistice 
Moudros would have their fate determined by a plebiscite (Hale, 2000: 47). The fate 
of Mosul, however, remained unresolved and Curzon and İsmet later agreed to 
discuss it at a further conference organised by the League of Nations (Coşar and 
 
292 The transliteration of the original text reads as “Bütün İslam alemi, bugün Kürt mebuslarını tebcil 
ediyor. Bu zatlar, İngiliz Hariciye Nazırı’nın mezmumi olmakla, İslam ümmeti nazarında en büyük 
hürmete mazhar oldular” (Gökalp, [1923] 1982: 157). 
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Demirci, 2006). İsmet Paşa, therefore, reiterated the commitment of the Ankara 
government to respect minority rights and guarantee political representation, which 
were post-war constitutional rules of global international society, thereby 
normalising the sovereignty of Ankara government in global international society. 
 
The British delegation to Lausanne had decided, prior to the conference, that 
the issue of a future Kurdish state, which had featured in the Treaty of Sèvres, would 
be shelved. The issue of a Kurdish state, called for in the Treaty of Sèvres, would not 
be on the agenda (Ali, 1997: 522 – 524). Britain believed that the western frontier of 
Iran should be determined and Iraq should be empowered to prevent the spread of 
Bolshevism (Ali, 1997: 522 – 524; Schofield, 2008). Although the Ankara 
government failed to come to terms with representatives of other ethnic groups over 
autonomy arrangements, it eventually agreed to extend minority rights to some non-
Muslims. Tyrrell (1922) noted that İsmet Paşa sought to distinguish between the 
Armenian and Greek populations. İsmet Paşa believed that the latter  “will always be 
irredentists”, and so he would “reach an understanding with the Armenian national 
delegation to keep the Armenians in Turkey” (Tyrrell, 1922). But, Curzon (1922b: 
11) was quick to point out that the Ankara government had already declared that it 
would support minority rights in Eastern Thrace, in its claim to extend its 
sovereignty to the region made on February 17, 1920. Curzon (1922b: 11) also 
noted, that on 4 October 1921 the Ankara government recognised “[t]he liberty of 
the Straits on the condition of assuring the security of Constantinople and of the Sea 
of Marmora, as well as the safeguarding of the rights of minorities in the limits in 
which it is compatible with the independence and the sovereignty of Turkey”. 
Curzon (1922b: 11) indicated how the Ankara government, in its declaration 
concerning the Straits, had noted that “minorities have a right to protection” and that 
“the treaty of peace must contain special provisions to that effect”. Religious 
identities were taken as the basis of ethnicity by the Ankara government, thereby 
allowing emphasis to be placed on an Islamic Turkish nation and Christian 
minorities (Barkey and Gavrilis, 2016; Bayar, 2014b; Oran, 2007: 35). Therefore, 
the recognition of minority rights in Turkey reflected a combination of the concerns 
of the Allies and the particular views of the Turkish negotiators.  
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 The Treaty of Lausanne therefore formalised the de facto emergence of 
national communities, which had occurred through the violent displacement of the 
non-Muslim population, particularly the Greeks, in  territories controlled by the 
Ankara government. The population transfer, which the Turkish delegation justified 
on the grounds that it would prevent the Greek minority from seeking to unite with 
Greece, was welcomed by international actors (Özsu, 2015: 14 - 20). Here, attempts 
to reorder the international after the end of the war, which, as mentioned previously, 
owed much to the pre-war idea of the standard of “civilization” and nationalism, 
shaped local forms of constituent power (Özsu, 2015: 45). There was a process of 
what Özsu (2015: 20) terms the “formalization” of displacement, whereby the 
transfer of populations between Greece and the Ankara government, came to be 
legally sanctioned. Following Greece’s defeat, attention also focused on whether 
Thrace should remain part of Turkish territory (Coşar and Demirci, 2006: 125; 
Gingeras, 2015: 374 - 378). The Ottoman Empire, whose elites had now 
reconstituted themselves as the state of Turkey, had previously been perceived as a 
distinctly un-European power and hence its control of Thrace was deemed 
problematic (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Yosmaoğlu, 
2013: 11). However, after the entry of the National Movement into Istanbul 
population transfer was viewed as a second-best solution to the question of Turkey’s 
status within Europe (Özsu, 2015: 72 - 73). Özsu (2015) documents the desire 
amongst international lawyers and the League of Nations for such a solution. Prior to 
such displacement being “formalized” in the manner suggested by Özsu (2015: 15) 
many Greeks were already being forcefully removed from Turkey. In light of this, 
the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos (1922; 1923; see also Curzon, 1923) asked the 
Allies to pressure the Ankara government to postpone the ongoing forced removal of 
the Greek population of Anatolia, which preceded its official sanctioning in 1923 
(Rumbold, 1922c; 1923; Toynbee, 1922; 1923).  Because of economic imperatives, 
the Greek population of Istanbul was largely maintained, on the insistence of 
Nansen, the Norwegian expert who oversaw the transfer, alongside the Turkish 
population of Western Thrace293, now in Greece, who were exempt from the transfer 
(Ross, 2015: 144 - 145). Therefore, the Treaty of Lausanne saw international actors 
 
293 The Western Thracians were recognised as a minority in Greece who could possibly cede to 
Turkey in a future plebiscite, as originally called for by the Ankara government (Coşar and Demirci, 
2006: 125; Ross, 2015: 144). 
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and the representatives of Turkey and Greece applying the principle of national 
sovereignty to determine the extent of the sovereignty of the two states (Ross, 2015: 
144 - 145). This was understood as an expression of national sovereignty which was 
regarded as an institution in international society at that time, but it was preceded by 
the de facto practices of national sovereignty engaged in by the Ankara government.  
 
5. The Treaty of Lausanne and the global and local constitution of national 
sovereignty in Turkey and international society   
 
The Ankara government eventually secured recognition as an equal member of 
international society. This was achieved by skilful diplomacy in which 
representatives of the government spoke of having the potential to meet the standard 
of ‘civilisation’. Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the caliphate was 
abolished on 3 March 1924, signalling that Turkey would be a secular state (Nafi, 
2015: 31). The position had been recently filled by Abdülmecid I, a member of the 
ruling House of Osman, who was elected by the Grand National Assembly (Ardıç, 
2012b: 273). This had shown how the Grand National Assembly had become one of 
the constituent powers over the new state of Turkey, alongside legal advisers294 and 
observers who had been despatched to Turkey in line with the Treaty of Lausanne of 
1923. An extensive programme of legal reform, involving the translation of 
numerous law codes was undertaken in the name of the people by the Grand 
National Assembly (Özman, 2010: 73; Özsu, 2010). This borrowing of legal codes 
occurred in the context of a rival form of constituent power to that of the Grand 
National Assembly, in the form of the caliphate, being eliminated. An argument for 
changing the role of the caliphate had earlier been made by Gökalp ([1916] 1981a; 
[1916] 1981b), who had spoken of combining political and religious authority in the 
Ottoman Empire, which now allowed the Ankara government to abolish the 
caliphate. This subsequently enabled the Ankara government, which became the 
Republic of Turkey, to accept legal reform, in accordance with globally accepted 
legal standards, in order to obtain the recognition of its equal sovereignty. In 
practice, this meant temporarily accepting an external constituent power, in the form 
of legal advisers from neutral states, who would oversee reforms (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 
145). The activities of these legal advisers has not, however, been properly studied. 
 
294 On the legal advisers assigned to Turkey see Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) and M.O. Hudson (1927: 5). 
 218 
One adviser, Sauser-Hall (1913), developed an approach to the historical and 
comparative study of constitutions, which arguably sheds light on how these legal 
changes occurring in Turkey were understood. This theory noted that it was possible 
for states to develop hybrid constitutions, drawing upon different legal traditions. 
These constitutions stemmed from different constituent powers, which corresponded 
to actual international and domestic social forces, and would therefore result in the 
reconstitution of both international society and domestic society. 
 
The emergence of global norms of nationalism, and the view that their adoption 
would empower the Ottoman Empire, resulted in the abolition of the caliphate. The 
decision to abolish the caliphate was arguably a culmination of the division of labour 
between the interpretation of religion, i.e. “diyanet”, and enforcement of religion, i.e. 
“din” (Dressler, 2015: 522). Traditionally, both of these functions had been overseen 
by the Sultan and the caliph, but, Gökalp ([1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b) argued that 
the Tanzimat reformers had assumed that they were one and the same when they 
developed a conception of the sultanate and the caliphate that framed the person of 
the Sultan and the caliph as the leader of the Muslims in the empire. During the First 
World War, Gökalp ([1915] 1981a) had argued that a division of labour concerning 
the interpretation and enforcement of religion was required because of the demands 
placed on the caliphate during the war, when state resources were scarce (Dressler, 
2015: 513, 517 - 519). The proper task of the ulema was to engage in matters of 
“diyanet”, meaning guidance, whereas matters of “kaza”, meaning the enforcement 
of laws, needed to be separated from their purview (Gökalp, [1915] 1981a: 46). The 
religious authority of the caliphate, on the other hand, ought, according to Gökalp 
([1916] 1981a: 62) to be understood as stemming from the power of the caliph295 to 
uphold the law, expressed in the notion of “kaza” and facilitated by subaltern 
officials, known as “kadıs”.  
 
Subsequently, after the sultanate was abolished prior to the Lausanne conference, 
tensions emerged over whether the Grand National Assembly could be considered 
merely a national assembly, or whether it was a body which could speak for the 
 
295 Gökalp ([1916] 1981a: 61) uses the French word for sovereignty, “souveraineté”, to describe this 
status.  
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Islamic world, because it held the power to elect the caliphate (Ardıç, 2012b: 259 - 
262; Guida, 2008: 282 - 284). Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 311) recognised the national 
nature of the Ankara government’s sovereignty, and insisted that the seat of the 
caliphate should be in Turkey:   
“as the caliphate cannot emerge from a non-Muslim country, it must be from a 
fighting Islamic state that has a strong army and is completely free. For many 
centuries, Turkey [sic] was the state that had these properties and, today, the new 
Turkey is the only state that possesses these properties.” 
However, Sultan Mehmed Vahideddin, who had fled Istanbul as forces of the 
Ankara government arrived there, planned to organise his return as the caliph 
(Teitelbaum, 2000: 417 – 418). There were also moves to introduce an Arab 
caliphate with Emir Hussein, the Hashemite Arab leader and Sharif, or ruler, of 
Mecca, seeking recognition as the caliph (Haddad, 1997: 273; Teitelbaum, 2000: 422 
– 423)296. Teitelbaum (2000: 424) claims that the Ankara government initially 
supported efforts to get Hussein recognised as the caliph. But, following the defeat 
of Hussein by the forces of Ibn Saud, a powerful family in Arabia, the Ankara 
government moved to abolish the institution of the caliphate (Teitelbaum, 2000: 422 
- 423). The government later transformed itself into the Republic of Turkey on 29 
October 1923. A special commission was formed to draft a new constitution, 
following the declaration of the republic (Demirkent, 2017: 190). Many members of 
the Grand National Assembly, such as Tunalı Hilmi, who was a former member of 
the CUP (see Ateş, 2009) and Sheikh Servet, defined the new regime as a “halk 
cumhuriyeti” (“people’s republic”) (Demirkent, 2017: 190). This was reflected in the 
1924 constitution, which stressed that the nation was the sole source of sovereignty 
(Demirkent, 2017: 190 - 192). Islamic concepts, such as those used in the theories of 
Ibn Khaldun, which equated the form of solidarity or “asabiyya” of a people with 
their capacity to rule as caliph, also overlapped with national and racial thinking, 
according to the Islamist cleric Rashid Rida297 (Ardıç, 2012a: 315; see also Haddad, 
1997: 273). As Celal Nuri, a delegate of the republic’s assembly suggested, this 
meant that if there was to be a caliph, he could only be elected by representatives 
from all Muslim nations (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 229 - 230). This ended any claim that 
the Ottoman state had sovereignty over the Islamic world. 
 
296 Throughout this period, the Indian Khilafat movement sought to maintain the institution of the 
caliphate and lobbied Britain to this end (see Gökalp, [1922] 1982g: 190).  
297 Rashid Rida himself opposed this line of thinking (Haddad, 1997: 273). 
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The Ankara government had been perceived as a Pan-Islamist movement, which 
might cooperate with the Bolsheviks to lead a worldwide anti-colonial, and Islamic 
uprising. Perceptions changed with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. 
Throughout the period from 1918 to the abolition of the caliphate, Britain believed 
that the National Movement and the government it formed in Ankara had an Islamic 
character (Yenen, 2018: 788). Intelligence and Foreign Office officials were wary of 
any threat posed to Britain’s colonies in Egypt and India and Britain’s presence in 
what is now termed the Middle East (Aydın, 2007: 135 – 136; Yenen, 2018: 77). The 
Ankara government had, indeed, sought to cooperate with the Bolsheviks, but the 
latter were more interested in working with other groups who were remnants of the 
CUP (Göl, 2013: 136 - 143; Yenen, 2016: 258 - 295). Enver Paşa was killed in 
August 1922 while leading an Islamist rebellion against the Bolsheviks, having 
previously sought to engineer cooperation between Central Asian Muslims, Turks 
and the Bolsheviks against British India (Ş. Yılmaz, 1999). The removal of the CUP 
further solidified the pre-existing ties between the Ankara government and the 
Bolsheviks, since the Ankara government no longer feared Soviet support of  the 
CUP  (Gökay, 1997: 120 - 122). In theory, both Pan-Islamism298 and Bolshevism299 
corresponded to sets of universal ideas which were incompatible with the notion of 
having sovereignty over a specific area. In practice, the Ankara government and the 
Bolshevik regime limited their revolutions to territories over which they would 
exercise control. The Bolsheviks, for instance, did not protest at the assassination of 
the leadership of the Communist Party of Turkey in suspicious circumstances 
(Gökay, 1993: 221). The Ankara government adopted a territorial conception of 
nationalism, stressing Anatolia300 as the homeland of the Turks, rather than adopting 
Turkish irredentism (Durgun301, 2011: 111 – 117; Erimtan, 2008; Özkan, 2012). The 
 
298 Aydın (2017: 181) points to how Pan-Islamism previously allowed the Ottomans to claim 
“spiritual sovereignty” over the Islamic world. See also Kia (1996).   
299 The Bolsheviks sought to start a “world revolution”, during the First World War, to spread 
communism throughout the world (Thomas, 2015: 284; see also Lih, 2016). 
300 The pre-Islamic ancient civilisations of Anatolia were presented as the primordial Turks (Erimtan, 
2008). 
301 Believing that a nation was ultimately a construct that nationalists ought to defend and develop, 
Halide Edip challenged the arguments of Fuat Köprülü, a fellow nationalist and member of the 
Turkish Hearths, a nationalist association originally established by the CUP, just prior to the Balkan 
Wars (Durgun, 2011: 111 - 117). Köprülü had argued that the new state of Turkey ought to be 
recognised as representing all ethnic Turks worldwide (Durgun, 2011: 111). However, Halide Edip 
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constituent power in both polities, was consequently limited through a recognition of 
each other’s territory and the principle of non-interference. 
 
Although the Ankara government relied on Islamist and Muslim elements to 
challenge the Allied occupation, the government increasingly came to adopt more 
nationalist characteristics and shifted from Muslim nationalism to Turkish 
nationalism. This was a product of how the Ankara government emerged from social 
and revolutionary movements seeking to represent the largely Turkish-speaking 
Muslim population of Anatolia in international peace conferences held after the First 
World War (Balistreri, 2015; Demirkent, 2017: 97). The Grand National Assembly 
claimed to represent the Muslim population and restricted suffrage to Muslim men302 
(Demirkent, 2017: 117). However, its basic law of 1921 had directly referred to the 
Wilsonian and Leninist concept of self-determination (Demirkent, 2017: 94). 
Significantly, the 1923 constitution, amended after the Treaty of Lausanne, 
maintained the nationalist nature of the Ankara government, which was now known 
as the Republic of Turkey. But, instead of a conception of nationalism which equated 
being Muslim with being a member of the nation, the new constitution recognised 
Turkishness as the defining aspect. The end of the caliphate in 1924, which Gökalp 
([1923] 1977a: 20) argued had “worked against Turkishness”303, meant that it was 
necessary to organise a political party to bring about the required social changes for 
the survival of national sovereignty. Gökalp ([1923] 1977e: 68) argued that even 
though he considered the “Turkish nation” to be the “most civilised of all Islamic 
nations”, he nonetheless believed that the “social division of labour” and the “ability 
to recognise value” of the Turkish nation needed to be improved.304 In this context, 
 
argued that it ought instead to be considered to be sovereign over the territory of Anatolia and the 
remaining Ottoman territories in Thrace (Durgun, 2011: 111). 
302 Non-Muslims were initially not allowed to vote in the elections for the constituent assembly, and 
were only allowed to vote when it was decided that it would be illegal, under existing Ottoman laws, 
to deny them from participating (Demirkent, 2017: 117). 
303 This phrase is transliterated as “halifelik…Türklüğün zararına çalışmıştır” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977a: 
20). 
304 The transliterated text where these claims are made reads as follows: “[G]örülüyor ki, Türk milleti, 
en medeni milletlerle musabakaya girecek derecede mütekamil bir içtimai bünyeye maliktir. 
Türkler’in, Müslüman milletlerin en medenisi olması ve medenilik yolunda onlara örneklik rolünü 
yapması bundan geliyor… Demokrat bir cemiyet olmak itibariyle Avrupa milletlerinden hiç de geri 
kalmadığımız halde, medeniyetçe, onlardan henüz çok geride bulunduğumuz, inkarı mümkün 
olmayan bir hakikattir...Bugün medeni milletlerin tealisine sebep olup ta, bizde bulunmıyan bilhassa 
iki meziyet vardır: Bunlardan birincisi (İçtimai iş bölümü), ikincisi (kıymetlerin tefazulu) dur” (This 
text translates to English as follows: “It is obvious that the Turkish nation contains a social body that 
means it can compete with some of the most civilised states. This is the reason why the Turks are 
 222 
Gökalp ([1923] 1977e: 68) argued that recognising value meant  that the tasks and 
duties of individuals produced and sustained by the division of labour should be 
respected. Images of nudity, for instance, could be great works of art and hence 
contribute to the development of this sphere of society, whilst being offensive in a 
religious context (Gökalp, [1923] 1977e 68). This turn to civilisation led to Gökalp 
([1923] 1977e), as well as Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 21) arguing for a balancing of 
Eastern and Western influences. Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 21), in particular, 
believed that it was necessary to balance European and Islamic influences, arguing 
that he had personally 
“worked to combat this hostility of the official Turkey of Abdul Hamid and to 
show, especially in the Turkish edition of this organ, the good sides of the 
European institutions, in order to attract the sympathy of my compatriots to true 
civilization.305” 
Therefore, the remnants of the CUP, had organised the Muslim and Turkish 
population of what remained of the Ottoman Empire, to secure their participation in 
conferences that would facilitate the building of post-war institutions of international 
society (Demirkent, 2017: chs. 1 and 2). While these conferences, which ended with 
the Treaty of Lausanne, can be characterised as processes in which the constitutional 
rules of international society were invoked and/or established, the domestic society 
of Turkey also came to be established and altered in the same process.  
 
According to Gökalp, state and society could be strengthened through the agency 
of a political party asserting the national rights of the nation. With the exception of 
Parla and Davison’s (2004: 116) and Topal’s (2017: 284) indirect focus on how 
Gökalp’s intellectual output was motivated by the need to ensure that the Ottoman 
Empire, and subsequently Turkey, could secure its place internationally following 
defeat, there is no study of Gökalp’s views on sovereignty and its internal and 
external dimensions. However, as a theorist of the new republic at the time of its 
founding, studying Gökalp’s ([1923] 1977a: 13) ideas can demonstrate how he 
 
considered the most civilised among the Muslim countries and why it plays the role of setting an 
example for them… Although we are no different from other European nations insofar as we are 
democratic, we cannot deny that we are far behind them in terms of our level of civilisation… Today 
there are two virtues that civilised states possess and which we lack: The first of these is the social 
division of labour and the second is the ability to recognise value” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977e: 68). 
305 The original French text reads as follows: “j’ai travaillé à combattre cette hostilité de la Turquie 
officielle d’Abdul Hamid et à montrer, particulièrement dans l’édition turque de cet organe, les bonne 
côtés des institutions européennes, afin d’attirer la sympathie de mes compatriotes vers la vraie 
civilisation” (Ahmed Rıza, [1922] 1990: 21). 
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believed that “national sovereignty” in Turkey could only be enabled by the presence 
of a political vanguard. Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 305) argued that the vanguard was 
“the Peoples’ Party”, which would promote “internal politics… based on the 
principle of the self-government of the people, free from the sultanate”306. According 
to Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 13) under a system of “national sovereignty”307 such a 
political party was necessary. This was “because the people themselves do not have 
a mind or nervous system of their own and hence do not have a pure social 
conscience“308, which each individual conscience must embrace (Gökalp [1923] 
1977a: 13). Such a party could also, according to Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 14), “act as 
a lightning rod that can alleviate the negative effect of the individualism that may be 
fostered by a constitutional order”309. Moreover, Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) argued 
that “national sovereignty” did entail responsibilities from a nation towards the 
individual, but noted that  
“this moral responsibility cannot be suggested or forced upon it [i.e., the nation] 
by an outside force... That the only thing limiting a force is that force itself, does 
not pose an obstacle to its freedom and independence. Rather, because such a 
force would operate under the bounds of reason and logic, it enjoys an additional 
degree of freedom and independence. Reason and logic have an international 
sovereignty that is superior over political sovereignties. Alfred Fouillée thus 
refers to ‘logic’ as the ‘sovereign of the sovereigns.’ All forms of sovereignty 
must bow down before logic.”310 
According to Parla (1985: 82), Gökalp did not oppose the formation of a party, even 
though he feared that the presence of different parties would encourage 
“sectarianism and internationalism”. Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) also stressed how 
national sovereignty, which forms the basis of the Peoples Party’s platform, will 
 
306 The Turkish transliteration of this passage reads as follows: “Halk Fırkası’nın dahili siyasetindeki 
esas, milleitn ferdi saltanattan azade olarak kendi kendini idare etmesidir.” (Gökalp, [1923] 2007: 
305). 
307 Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 13) here uses the term “milli hakimiyet” to refer to national sovereignty.  
308 The Turkish transliteration of this phrase reads as follows: “Milletin kendisine mahsus bir dimağı, 
kendisine mahsus bir sinir manzumesi, (cümle-i asabiyesi) bulunmadığı için, içtimai vicdanı 
karşımamış, saf bir halde bulamayız” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977a: 13). 
309 The Turkish transliteration in … reads as follows: “…fırka teşkilatının cemiyetçiliği kanun-u 
esasilerin ferdiyetçiliğinden doğacak mahzurlara karşı bir yıldırım siperi (siper-i saika) hükmüne 
geçer” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977a: 14) 
310 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “… bu ahlaki mükellefiyeti ona harici bir 
kuvvet teklif ve tahmi edemez... Bir kuvvetin kendi kendini tahdid etmesi hürriyet ve istiklaline 
münafi değildir. Bilakis, akıl ve mantık dairesinde hareket ettiği için, fazla olarak ruhi bir hürriyet ve 
istiklale de malik demektir. Bundan dolayıdır ki Alfred Fouillée ismindeki feylesof, ‘mantık’a 
‘hakimler hakimi’ unvanını veriyor. Her hakimiyet mantık karşısında ser-füru etmek 
mecburiyetindedir.” (Gökalp, [1923] 2007: 306). 
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challenge threats to sovereignty from “external capitulations311”, “internal 
capitulations312”, the “sultanate” and “reactionaries313”. The defence of national 
sovereignty, for Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306), in turn, would enable the emergence of 
a national will, with a “rationality” and “logic” of its own, which would allow it to 
govern most effectively in accordance with universal principles.  
 
Turkey’s inclusion in global international society as an equal sovereign was 
facilitated by its conformity to the standard of ‘civilisation’. But, the recognition of 
Turkey meeting this standard was arguably tentative as Turkey still had to deal with 
its Ottoman legacy. A political party could enable solidarity between the state and 
society and thereby also allow the Turkish state to achieve its goal of situating its 
society within Western civilisation. Gökalp’s distinction between culture and 
civilisation is relevant in this instance. Gökalp ([1923] 1977b: 43) asserted that 
“culture is national and civilisation is international”, 314 after having suggested earlier 
(see Gökalp, [1923] 1977b: 42) that “for civilisation to enter into a country, it must 
first be imbued into its culture”315. This phrase summarises Gökalp’s view of the 
international and the local. Although Nomer (2017: 416) argues that Gökalp saw 
states and national cultures as shaped by their interactions with different 
civilisations, the above phrase suggests that Gökalp actually believed that a state 
could only become ‘civilised’ through the values of a “civilization” first becoming 
adopted by a nation. Gökalp ([1923] 1977b: 42), together with Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 
1990: 121), who had cited Auguste Comte and Gustave Le Bon’s praise of the 
achievements of Arabic culture, then argued that the Tanzimat reforms of the 
nineteenth century were justified in order to adopt the values of European 
civilisation. They contended, though, that these values had actually been developed 
by Muslims at an earlier date. However, Gökalp ([1923] 1977b: 42), noted that the 
Tanzimat reforms had failed because they had not been imbued into the national 
 
311 Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) understands these as the forms of extraterritorial legislation that grant 
privileges to foreigners. 
312 These, for Gökalp, referred to the privileges accorded to non-Muslim religious communities. 
313 Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) defined these groups and individuals as those “who try to use religion 
in politics” (“Dini siyasete alet etmek isteyen mürteciler”). 
314 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “hars millidir, medeniyet beynelmileldir” 
(Gökalp, [1923] 1977b: 43). 
315 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “Bir millette, medeniyet, tabii surette 
memlekete girebilmek için, mutlaka harse aşılanmalıdır; hars millidir, medeniyet beynelmilleldir” 
(Gökalp, [1923] 1977b: 42). 
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culture. Gökalp ([1923] 1977f: 50), therefore, promoted “abandoning Ottoman 
civilisation and discovering and promoting Turkish culture”316 in the new Turkey. 
Here, Turkey would join other nations that seceded from the Ottoman Empire (see 
Gökalp, [1923] 1977d: 56). Gökalp ([1923] 1977d: 56) noted that:  
“other nations left the Ottoman community in a cultured, civilised and wealthy 
manner, whereas the poor Turks, with a broken sword in their hands, have been 
unable to secure any inheritance apart from an old plough.” 317 
Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) believed that Turkey could survive and secure its 
sovereignty, through positioning Turkey as an Islamic state within Western 
civilisation. But, in this regard, Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) also referred to Japan as a 
template, since Japan had preserved its own culture in the context of its inclusion in 
global international society. Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 11), presented a similar 
argument, insofar as he recognised “the splendid results it [i.e. European civilisation] 
has brought in the material field”, but stated that one “must not forget the moral 
qualities of the ‘savages’, of which many civilised people today are sometimes 
deprived”. Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) believed that the “Japanese and the Jews”318 
were included as a part of the civilised world by Europeans, even though they were 
not Christian. This led Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) to conclude that the Turkish 
people could be recognised as a part of Western civilisation. Such recognition would 
enable Turkey to be recognised as equal to other nation-states within this civilisation.  
 
However, the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne demanded specific conditions 
for the recognition of Turkey’s sovereign equality, including the meeting of certain 
legal standards by the judiciary. Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) has argued that the efforts of 
Turkish state elites to engage in state-building enabled Turkey to be recognised as an 
equal sovereign by established states in international society. Kayaoğlu (2010a:145)  
stresses that creating a state capable of enforcing laws removed any pretext for the 
continuation of extraterritorial practices, which had previously threatened the 
 
316 The transliterated text where Gökalp ([1923] 1977f: 50) asserts this, reads as follows: “Osmanlı 
medeniyetini terk ederek Türk harsını bulmağa ve yükseltmeğe”. 
317 The transliterated text where Gökalp ([1923] 1977d: 56) asserts this, reads as follows: “[d]iğer 
kavimler, Osmanlı camiasından irfanlı, medeniyetli ve zengin bir halde ayrılırken, zavallı Türkler, 
ellerinde kırık bir kılınçla, eski bir sabandan başka bir mirasa nail olamadılar.” 
318 The Turkish transliteration of the full sentence, in which this phrase is quoted from, reads as 
follows: “Bugünkü Avrupa medeniyeti, Avrupa beynelmilliyeti, bu iki enmuzecin intikal devresinde 
bulunuyor. Avrupa beynelmilliyeti, Japonlar’la Yahudiler’i müsavi şeriatle kendi medeniyetine 
mensup saydığı için, dini bir medeniyetten ve dini bir beynelmilliyyetten çıkmak istediğini ima 
ediyor” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977c: 63). 
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Ottoman Empire from enjoying a form of sovereignty equal to that of other 
established states. However, one of the conditions of the granting of sovereign 
equality in the Treaty of Lausanne was the need for several legal advisers from 
neutral states to oversee legal reforms within Turkey (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 145; Özsu, 
2011: 842 - 843). These advisers would ensure that Turkey’s legal system conformed 
to international judicial standards which required moving away from a judicial 
system that appeared to be based largely on religious law. Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) 
has also noted, following İsmet İnönü’s memoirs, that the advisers assigned to 
Turkey under Lausanne did not play a significant role in reforming the Turkish legal 
system. However, the constitutional theories developed by Georges Sauser-Hall, a 
Swiss legal adviser and jurist, would appear to mirror the actual process of 
constitutional reform in Turkey. Advocating a comparative approach to the study of 
law, which he believed mirrored the “evolution of life”, Sauser-Hall (1913: 100) 
believed that it is 
 “necessary to divide the legal institutions into three groups - including of course 
a large number of subdivisions - some originating from savage peoples, the 
others corresponding to that state of semi-barbarism which the internationalists 
have accustomed to denominate by the name of Asian civilization, the last 
including the legislative documents of the Western States whose degree of 
culture is similar.”319 
Further, commenting on the emergence of European constitutions, Sauser-Hall 
(1913: 96), had argued that:  
“[a]n institution frequently arises spontaneously among several peoples; 
sometimes, it owes its appearance only to a phenomenon of imitation; this 
genesis of legal rules, their adaptation to the genius of this or that race, the 
reasons for their transformation or destruction; it will be up to him [i.e. the 
scholar of comparative law] to make the distinction between the two elements 
that are present in each legal system: the native element and the foreign element; 
often, by striking contrasts, he will reveal the root causes of legal diversity."320 
 
319 The original French text reads as follows: “Il faudrait alors diviser les institutions juridiques en 
trois groupes – comprenant cela va de soi un grand nombre de subdivisions - , les unes émanant de 
peuples sauvages, les autres correspondant à cet état de demi-barbarie que les internationalistes ont 
accoutume de désigner par le nom de civilisation asiatique, les derniers comprenant les documents 
législatifs des États occidentaux dont le degré de culture est à peuples semblable” (Sauser-Hall, 1913: 
100). 
320 The original French text reads as follows: “Une institution surgit fréquemment avec spontanéité 
chez plusieurs peuples; parfois, elle ne doit son apparition qu’a un phénomène d’imitation; ce genèse 
des règles juridiques, leur adaptation au génie de telle ou telle race, les raisons de leur transformation 
ou de leur destruction; il lui appartiendra de faire la part des deux éléments qui se disputent tout 
système juridique: l’élément indigène et l’élément étranger; souvent, par de saisissants contrastes, il 
saura révéler les causes profondes des diversités juridiques” (Sauser-Hall, 1913: 96). 
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Bearing in mind the above, as Miller (2000: 352 – 353) and Özsu (2010: 74) argue, 
articles 140 and 132 in the Swiss and Turkish Civil Codes, respectively, both dealt 
with the procedures for divorce but differed in terms of the period of separation they 
recognised as legitimate for one partner to ask for a divorce in a marriage. Although 
the Swiss Code argued that this was six months, the Turkish Civil Code, on the basis 
of earlier requirements in the sharia, argued that this period could only be four 
months (Miller, 2000: 352 – 353; Özsu, 2010: 74). As Özsu (2010: 74) notes, 
Sauser-Hall (1926: 34), remarking on the translation of the code, was pleased with 
how it maintained “the spirit, the ordinance, the text and, finally, other respects”321 
of the Swiss Civil Code. Consequently, arguably both global and local constituent 
powers, in the form of officials acting on behalf of the Grand National Assembly and 
outside legal advisers, played a role in the constitutional changes that were required 
for ending extraterritoriality In Turkey. 
 
6. Conclusion:  
 
 This chapter has demonstrated how the Ankara government, which became 
the Republic of Turkey, gained recognition of its sovereign equality through firstly 
consolidating state control over territory and population, by means such as the 
issuing of passports. Subsequently, the Treaty of Lausanne enabled the Ankara 
government to gain conditional acceptance of its sovereign equality as the new state 
of Turkey. In the lead up to the Lausanne conference, the Ankara government had 
assumed de facto control over Istanbul and had exploited divisions amongst the 
Allied powers. These powers were unable to challenge the Ankara government or 
rely on their local supporters to do so. Instead, the Allies signed an armistice with the 
Ankara government. At Lausanne, the Turkish negotiators and the Allies made use 
of the national boundaries that had emerged after the end of the war and legally 
formalised the ongoing process of the displacement of populations. Both Turkey and 
the Allies used national sovereignty to advance their claims and counterclaims. This 
was because national sovereignty could be exploited to deny or to extend 
territoriality. However, the Allies also insisted that extraterritoriality within Turkey 
should end on condition that the legal system within Turkey conformed to ‘civilised’ 
 
321 The original text, as quoted in Özsu (2010: 74) reads as follows: “l’esprit, l’ordonnance, le texte de 
ce dernier ont été respectés” (Sauser-Hall, 1926: 34).  
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practices. This resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne requiring certain advisers to 
oversee the legal reform of the constitution of Turkey. These practitioners and 
theorists helped translate and apply the Swiss Civil Code which was perceived as 
providing the foundation for the removal of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Turkey. 
Turkey also voluntarily abolished the institution of the caliphate, which had 
previously functioned as one of the sources of law. However, even in the Ottoman 
period, some functions of the caliphate had been transferred to ministries. Turkish 
officials also ensured that the Swiss Civil Code was translated and applied in a 
manner that maintained elements of the previous legal system which was based on 
principles deriving from sharia law. Consequently, the recognition of Turkey as an 
equal sovereign in international society was made possible by the imposition of 
conditions that required a degree of conformity with international legal standards, 
while still allowing local forms of constitutionalism to remain. In this way, Turkey 
was normalised and accepted as a sovereign equal to the established states in global 


















7. Conclusion:  
 
1. Introduction:  
 
This chapter presents a summary of the findings of the thesis. It highlights 
how the thesis contributes to International Relations theory and to historical studies 
of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. The first section argues that two tendencies can 
be identified from the empirical account of the struggles of the Young Turks to gain 
recognition of their sovereign equality in the period 1908 – 1923. In both 1908 to 
1911 and 1918 to 1922, the Young Turks sought to gain recognition of the sovereign 
equality of their state, in line with widespread interpretations of the constitutional 
rules of global international society. Between 1911 - 1918 and late 1922 - 1923, on 
the other hand, different strands of the Young Turks sought to influence how the 
constitutional principles of international society were applied towards their state. 
They sought to secure recognition of their state as a sovereign, equal to other 
sovereigns in global international society. In the period 1911 - 1918, this involved 
attempting to alter, remove or replace the rules of international society through 
normative and social power. In late 1922-1923, the Ankara government brought 
about a legal system that appeared to be in conformity with international standards. 
The second section demonstrates how the concept of constituent power best explains 
how states such as Turkey came to be recognised as sovereigns that were equals to 
other sovereign states in global international society. The third section assesses how 
the argument of this thesis, based on the concept of constituent power, points to the 
weaknesses of earlier explanations of how the current global international society of 
sovereign states emerged. The broader implications of this for International 
Relations theory, intellectual history, and the relationship between theory and history 
are discussed in the fourth section. It is argued that this thesis can help develop non-
ideal theories to explain changes in international society, through studying how 
changes to the constitutional rules of global international society involve interactions 




2. The struggle of the ‘Young Turks’ and their successors for sovereign 
equality: confronting the constitutional principles of global international 
society, 1908 – 1923 
 
The history of the period from 1908 to 1923 is one in which the Young Turks 
and their successors adopted two approaches to secure the sovereign equality of their 
state. Between 1908 - 1911 and 1918 - 1922, the Young Turks attempted to gain 
recognition of their sovereign equality through demonstrating their adherence to 
various standards of ‘civilisation’. These standards of ‘civilisation’ involved 
different forms of criteria that highlighted which states could be considered 
‘civilised’, and hence worthy of being recognised as an equal sovereign by the 
established states in global international society. After 1918, singular vision of 
‘civilisation’, tied to Lenin and Wilson’s schemes for post-war global international 
society, provided the means for the recognition of sovereign equality under the 
framework of the idea of national self-determination. The nature of global 
international society in the period 1908 – 1911 was vastly different from global 
international society from 1918 - 1922. However, in both instances the idea of 
‘civilisation’ came to be deployed as an argument by the Great Powers, to engage in 
gatekeeping and prevent other states in international society from being recognised 
as an equal sovereign, according to the constitutional rules of global international 
society. In the periods, 1911 – 1918 and 1922 – 1923, the Young Turks challenged 
how these principles of global international society were applied in the case of their 
own state. They also attempted to influence how these principles were applied more 
generally. In the period 1911 – 1918, the Young Turks, adopted an understanding of 
‘civilisation’ that was closely tied to the concept of the nation. This allowed them to 
participate in attempts to reorder global international society. A convincing case was 
thus able to be made for the recognition of the sovereign equality of Turkey in the 
Treaty of Lausanne. 
 
Immediately following the Young Turk revolution, internationally overseen 
reforms that had been envisaged in the Treaty of Berlin were abandoned by the 
signatories to the treaty. Building on Hanioğlu (2001) and several others, this thesis 
has demonstrated how the Young Turks, in the lead up to and after the revolution, 
presented themselves as a group of elites who could implement a ‘civilising’ process 
similar to that being carried out by European states within their own empires. In 
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contrast to the arbitrary reign of Abdülhamid II, parliamentary and constitutional 
rule was introduced by the Young Turks in an attempt to hold together and ‘civilise’ 
the empire in the face of groups who were threatening to secede. The centralisation 
of state power and the promise of reforms allowed the CUP to persuade the 
European states to terminate certain internationally overseen reforms within the 
empire. Although international commissions overseeing the security and finances of 
Macedonia and the foreign military presence, were brought to an end by 1909, the 
capitulations persisted (Tokay, 2013: 177 - 178). In addition, the declaration of 
Bulgarian independence, Cretan union with Greece, and the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, were justified on the basis of the concept of 
‘civilisation’. Those challenging Ottoman rule, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Bulgaria, suggested that the Ottomans could be allowed only a degree of 
sovereignty to oversee religious services for Muslims. The Ottoman government was 
recognised as a civilised state insofar as it was governed constitutionally, but the 
concept of ‘civilisation’ was also used to challenge Ottoman control over certain 
territories.  
 
Between 1911 and 1918, the Young Turks made use of alliances and warfare to 
attempt to assert their sovereign equality in global international society. They not 
only challenged rival conceptions of the constitutional principles of global 
international society but also waged war against states and other actors that they 
deemed to be promoting them. The Young Turks sought assistance from external 
powers to realise their sovereign equality after it became clear to them that mere 
appeals to principle were insufficient to gain sovereign equality in global 
international society. It had become harder for the Young Turks to secure 
recognition of the sovereign equality of their state in global international society 
through appealing to the idea of ‘civilisation’ because this society was fracturing into 
rival alliances. Following defeat in the Balkan Wars, Ottoman officials found that 
their claims for sovereignty over conquered territories were dismissed by dominant 
states. These states deployed the concept of ‘civilisation’ to promote their own 
interests. In such circumstances, the Ottomans aligned themselves with Germany and 
the other Central Powers in the First World War and later unilaterally abrogated the 
capitulations. The concept of ‘civilisation’ was interpreted less as a normative 
concept and more as a means of enhancing Ottoman state and society. This could 
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provide an opportunity for the Young Turks to transform global international society 
by being in a position to change its constitutional rules. Young Turk-affiliated social 
theorists, including Ağaoğlu, Sabahaddin, Parvus, Cami and Gökalp, developed an 
understanding of ‘civilisation’ as a tool that could be used to empower the Ottoman 
state. The military power of the state could be harnessed to reconstitute global 
international society and its rules. However, the CUP’s attempt to change the rules of 
global international society by participating in the First World War failed given that 
Germany and her allies were defeated. 
 
Following defeat in 1918, different political and military factions, filling the void 
left by the Ottoman state, sought to secure the global international society’s 
recognition of their claims for sovereign equality. As in the case of the pre-war 
years, the post-war period was marked by the emergence of a global hierarchy based 
on a renewed concept of ‘civilisation’. This new hierarchy centred around the ideas 
promoted by Wilson and Lenin, and the League of Nations and the concepts and 
institutions it promoted, such as national self-determination and the mandate system. 
The ideas of Lenin and Wilson provided opportunities for actors seeking recognition 
of their sovereign status (Manela, 2007: 37 - 38; Pedersen, 2015). However, these 
actors quickly encountered new forms of gatekeeping, on the part of the Allied 
victors and the Bolsheviks, who sought to control which claims to sovereignty and 
sovereign equality could be accepted (Göl, 2013: 138 - 155; Pedersen, 2015). As a 
result, many actors seeking recognition of their sovereignty found themselves in 
emerging global hierarchies based on a new standard of ‘civilisation’. The mandate 
system and its tiered vision of global international society was a clear manifestation 
of such hierarchy (Anghie, 2002). The Bolsheviks also found themselves favouring 
different national movements to pursue the goal of the world revolution. When the 
world revolution did not occur, the Bolsheviks backed movements which were 
seeking recognition of their sovereign equality on the basis of the right to self-
determination. However, the interests of the Bolsheviks dictated which movements 
were granted such recognition  (Göl, 2013: 138 - 155). In this context, as a result of 
their long history of interaction with Europe, the defeated Ottomans were faced with 
different possible outcomes regarding their position in international society. The 
possibility of accepting mandatory rule for parts or the whole of the empire, which 
would entail control by different states, was discussed. However, by presenting itself 
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as a movement expressing national sovereignty, along the lines promoted by Wilson 
and Lenin, and by using force against rival claimants to sovereignty over its 
geography, the Ankara government came to be recognised as an equal sovereign by 
other states in global international society in 1923. 
 
The sovereign equality of Turkey was recognised by the Treaty of Lausanne. 
The treaty was signed after negotiations with the Ankara government following 
victory over the occupying Greek forces. The Ankara government was a successor of 
the military and political elites of the Ottoman Empire. Employing arguments based 
on national sovereignty and using military and political force, the Ankara 
government became recognised as the sole representative of the remaining parts of 
the Ottoman Empire (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 66 - 68). Through presenting itself as a 
government based on national sovereignty, the Ankara government won support 
from those who believed that what remained of the Ottoman Empire could attain a 
level of ‘civilisation’ that would enable it to be recognised as an equal sovereign. 
Force was deployed to challenge those who argued that the Ankara government 
should not be recognised as an equal sovereign state. When the Ankara government 
started talks with the Allied powers, their negotiators stressed their status as 
nationalists, but they also presented themselves as complying with ‘civilised’ 
standards of law. In reality, though, the legal system that emerged in Turkey 
contained many aspects of the previous Ottoman system (Özsu, 2010). The Swiss 
Civil Code was adopted, but traces of the Ottoman legal system remained. The end 
result of the reforms of the Turkish leaders mirrored the suggestions of the legal 
advisor, Sauser-Hall. Sauser-Hall (1913) had demonstrated how legal systems could 
draw upon and integrate laws developed in other contexts, provided they were fused 
with local legislation. Turkish officials thereby secured the recognition of Turkey as 
a sovereign state that was equal to the other members of international society and 
which was no longer subject to extraterritoriality. They achieved this by giving the 
impression that they complied with international standards, although in practice 
institutions in Turkey maintained some features from the previous legal system, 
which had previously been criticised for not meeting the standard of ‘civilisation’. 
 
In the periods, 1908 - 1911 and 1918 -1922, the Young Turks adopted similar 
approaches based on global normative understandings of hierarchy to attempt to gain 
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recognition of their sovereign equality. In the first period, the Young Turks 
presented their constitutional project as ‘civilising’ the Ottoman empire. They 
persuaded the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to end forms of extraterritoriality 
introduced in the empire’s westernmost provinces. This was achieved through the 
efforts of Young Turk ideologues, such as Ahmed Rıza (1907) and Sabahaddin 
([1908] 1999a), who argued that a constitutional revolution would facilitate the 
development of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire. Significantly, the opposition to 
the CUP from the PMU and Derviş Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c; [1909] 1992b) did not 
challenge the principle of constitutional rule or civilisation, but argued for an Islamic 
form of civilisation and constitutionalism. The global context after 1918 differed 
from that of 1908. Instead of empires justifying their conduct by reference to the idea 
of civilisation, international institutions and ideas emerged, centred around the 
League of Nations and the idea of national self-determination. Self-determination 
involved determining both the ‘selves’ that would be granted “self-determination” 
(see Smith, 2018: 6) and the form of ‘determination’ that they sought. As a result, 
different movements, both within what remained of the Ottoman Empire and 
throughout the world, referred to historical narratives to justify their claim to 
forming a “self” that could be considered as having a right to self-determination (see 
Smith, 2018: 6). However, these movements also referred to different constitutional 
rules in global international society. In the defeated Ottoman Empire, the writers of 
Hakimiyet-i Milliye ([1920] 2004d) sought to demonstrate how the Ankara 
government was committed to advancing the anti-imperial goals of Wilson and 
Lenin. Others, such as Gökalp ([1923] 1977c; [1923] 1977f) and Ahmed Rıza 
([1922] 1990) stressed the Ankara government’s dedication to ‘Western civilisation’. 
The differences in the nature of global international society in the periods, 1908 – 
1911 and 1918 – 1922, led to the use of differing strategies and ideas by the Young 
Turks and their successors. However, in both periods, these actors secured a degree 
of recognition of the sovereign equality of their state.  
 
The recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state, with rights of territoriality similar 
to other states in global international society, was achieved following the ending of 
extraterritoriality in the Treaty of Lausanne. This was made possible by the Ankara 
government exerting influence over how global constitutional principles were 
applied in the context of Turkey. A similar approach had been attempted in the 
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period between 1911 and- 1918. In this earlier period, the CUP had aimed to situate 
the Ottoman Empire in alliances with other states and to reorder the Ottoman Empire 
as a nation-state with a national economy, as suggested by Munis Tekinalp, Ağaoğlu, 
Parvus and Akçura (Özavcı, 2013; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 157 - 158). The hope was that 
these alliances would project Ottoman power that would allow the Young Turks to 
influence the content and application of the constitutional principles of global 
international society, thereby facilitating the recognition of the sovereign equality of 
the Ottoman state. Variants of this approach were advocated by theorists such as 
Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999), Gökalp ([1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b; [1917] 1981; 
[1918] 2007) and Parvus ([1914] 2013a; [1914] 2013b; [1914] 2014). But, the defeat 
of the Ottomans in 1918 ended their hopes of changing not only the rules of global 
international society but also the power relations within the existing international 
system. The attendance of the Ankara government at Lausanne allowed it to secure 
sovereign equality. Prior to the Lausanne negotiations, the Ankara government 
imposed military and political control over Istanbul to prevent the Istanbul 
government from also attending Lausanne. Entering talks from a strong position, the 
Ankara government ensured that the Allies called for favourable conditions to end 
extraterritoriality. The Ankara government guaranteed that the constitutional 
principles of global international society were applied in a flexible manner in the 
case of Turkey. Legal reforms undertaken by Turkey, including the reception and 
adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, ensured that Turkey was recognised as an equal 
sovereign to other states in global international society under the terms of the 
Lausanne treaty. 
 
3. The recognition of sovereign equality in global international society and 
global and local constituent power 
 
 This section demonstrates how the Ottoman/Turkish case shows that states 
not initially recognised as fully sovereign in global international society can come to 
be recognised as such through the invocation of local and global constituent powers. 
It begins by outlining which actors were involved in this process, including states 
and non-state entities who wielded constituent power to gain recognition of their 
sovereign equality. It then considers the role of ideas of sovereignty in the attempts 
of these actors to gain recognition of their sovereign equality within global 
 236 
international society. Two different sets of processes are then identified. The first 
involved efforts, of those engaged in constituent diplomacy, to appeal to the 
dominant interpretations of sovereignty as a constitutional principle in global 
international society. The second set of processes involved attempts by these actors 
to remove or replace the existing constitutional principles of global international 
society. These attempts could involve the use of social and normative power by 
those advancing new interpretations of sovereignty. They could also entail efforts to 
ensure that a specific understanding of sovereignty was recognised, through means 
such as the inclusion of certain provisions in an international agreement. Both sets of 
processes may include features of stigmatisation and normalisation. Efforts to gain 
recognition of the sovereign equality of one’s state may be frustrated by 
stigmatisation from powerful state actors. But those who are sufficiently powerful 
can overcome this stigmatisation. In such instances, sovereign equality is recognised 
and thereby normalised. The eventual recognition of Turkey as an equal sovereign 
shows that both sets of processes involve changes that impact on domestic and 
international societies. 
 
This thesis has shown how the concept of constituent power can be used to 
explain how states that were sovereign, but subject to forms of hierarchy and 
inequality, could attain a position of greater equality with other states in global 
international society. According to Reus-Smit (1997: 556; 1999: 30), the 
“constitutional” principles present in international society can outline the proper 
means of conduct for states. They arise from interactions between states that result in 
the emergence of ideas which point to acceptable standards of “norms” of behaviour 
for states internationally (Reus-Smit, 1997: 556). These principles themselves are 
not formal, in the sense that they are not always derived from established forms of 
international law. However, through influencing states or assuming control of states, 
non-state actors may play an important role in the building of the constitutional 
principles of international society, including sovereignty (de Carvalho and Paras, 
2015). Prior to 1908, the Young Turks maintained ties with the Ottoman homeland, 
but  they had also become a transnational network, with widespread support in the 
former Ottoman territories of the Balkans and Egypt. The movement was influenced 
by European and Asian intellectual trends, such as Pan-Islamism and positivism. 
This was because of its transnational ties, stemming from its presence in North 
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Africa, the Middle East, Iran, the Americas, Europe, the Russian Empire and 
elsewhere (Berberian, 2019; Meyer, 2014). The CUP sought to exploit such ties 
during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Various individual theorists, 
transnational social movements, states and alliances hence played a crucial role in 
the construction of global international society and the securing of the Ottoman 
Empire/Turkey’s place within it. 
 
Ideas of sovereignty also played a crucial role in the eventual recognition of 
the sovereign equality of states which had initially not been recognised as equal in 
international society. Individuals aligned with the Young Turks and the movements 
that succeeded them, engaged with globally widespread ideas of sovereignty to make 
a case for the recognition of their sovereign rights. These actors aimed to develop 
theories that sought to justify what they took to be their claim to equal sovereign 
status alongside the established states in global international society. This was a 
process that did not solely involve the translation of the globally widespread ideas of 
sovereignty into their own immediate context (Wigen, 2018). Instead, drawing upon 
their presence in local and global contexts, the Young Turks developed their own 
conceptions of how the sovereignty of their state should be understood. In the 
theories that they produced and in their constituent diplomacy, the members of the 
post-revolutionary elite in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey defended the unique 
aspects of Ottoman sovereignty, such as its ties to the caliphate (see, for instance, 
Gökalp, [1922] 1982f). Defending the practices of the Ottoman/Turkish state, also 
meant that the Young Turks and their successors sought to mitigate the stigma faced 
by the Ottoman state. They attempted to demonstrate how the practices of the 
Ottoman state corresponded to similar practices in states deemed to be “civilised” 
actors in international society (Özavcı, 2013: 32). The exact ideas of what 
constituted a ‘civilised’ state fluctuated  throughout the period  1908 – 1923. This 
meant that the Young Turks needed to develop new ideas of sovereignty that could 
draw upon new globally widespread ideas. The rise of the salience of national 
sovereignty is a case in point (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 157 – 158; Üngör and Lohr, 2014). 
 
The processes of normalisation and stigmatisation, as well as the constituent 
diplomacy of actors seeking recognition of sovereign equality, also help explain the 
emergence of global international society. Stigmatisation presents a compelling 
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account of how states were excluded from being equals in global international 
society (Adler-Nissen, 2014b; Zarakol, 2011: 29 - 108). “Normalization” explains 
how states that were excluded later came to be included (Smetana, 2020: 48). The 
arguments of the Young Turks to justify their claim to equal sovereignty in the 
periods 1908 – 1911 and 1918 – 1922 were successful insofar as they highlighted 
several of the contradictions involved in the stigmatising arguments directed towards 
the Ottoman/Turkish elites. However, the Young Turks had also faced stigmatisation 
after the Balkan Wars. The demands of the Young Turks for the recognition of their 
sovereignty over conquered territories resulted in European powers questioning  
their earlier view that the Ottomans should maintain sovereignty at least with regard 
to the religious affairs of Muslims. The Ottomans entered the First World War with 
the intention of becoming a sovereign state with full control over its territory, 
thereby securing its sovereign equality. But defeat in 1918 led to new forms of 
stigma. In particular, the war crimes that were carried out by the Ottoman state 
resulted in calls for it to be dismembered and disempowered in the Treaty of Sèvres. 
This was justified by the victorious Allies as the best means of enabling the 
realisation of the principle of national sovereignty in the post-war context of the 
Ottoman Empire (Smith, 2009). However, ultimately, through a combination of 
social and normative power, the Ankara government challenged this stigmatisation 
and was recognised as sovereign in accordance with theories of national sovereignty. 
This enabled the government to influence the terms of the recognition of its 
sovereignty. At Lausanne, the Ankara government exerted its influence in order to 
secure legal reforms that would lead to the normalisation of the sovereign status of 
Turkey.   
 
 The forms of stigmatisation and normalisation that were considered in this 
thesis also entailed intentional and unintentional forms of recognition, being granted 
to the states seeking recognition of their sovereign equality from the great powers. 
With stigmatisation, the sovereignty of the state in question was often considered to 
fall short of the standard of ‘civilisation’ exemplified by the established European 
states of global international society (Aalberts, 2014; Zarakol, 2018b). The level of 
‘civilisation’ of a state was measured by various contentious means including, for 
example, the nature of the political and legal system, the role of religion, and the 
presence or absence of nationalism (Blachford, 2019; Gong, 1984). The gatekeeping 
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action of the established states in global international society, when they decided 
whether a state could be recognised as an equal sovereign was a form of recognition. 
Stigmatisation was an active process that required the gatekeeping states to 
repeatedly frustrate the efforts of the representatives of states seeking recognition as 
equal sovereigns (Adler-Nissen, 2014b). Normalisation can occur as an unconscious 
process, in which states that were previously stigmatised are no longer stigmatised 
by gatekeepers (Smetana, 2020: 48; Smetana and Onderco, 2018). This can occur if 
the originally stigmatised state can come to control how it is perceived by the 
gatekeepers. Therefore, normalisation may proceed through an act of misrecognition, 
wherein an actor that was once stigmatised may appear to be normal to the 
gatekeepers, but, upon closer analysis, it may only have managed to produce such an 
impression.  
 
Normalisation may involve changes to the constitutional rules of both 
international and local society. In these processes of reconstitution, that enabled 
states to be considered equal sovereigns by other sovereigns in global international 
society, constituent power operated at both levels. For example, during the Young 
Turk revolution, local constituent power was activated by the revolutionaries, but 
they themselves were also influenced by a global constituent power, in the form of 
the revolutionary wave of constitutional revolutions in the early twentieth century 
(Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). Because of their presence in different geographies, the Young 
Turks were influenced by different schemes for transforming local societies that 
would also inspire the Chinese, Russian and Iranian revolutions in this period 
(Hanioğlu, 2001: 317 - 318; Sohrabi, 1995; 2001). By reintroducing their local 
constitution, the Young Turks hoped to be recognised as one of the ‘civilised’ states 
who were advancing ‘civilisation’ throughout the world. The Young Turks were 
partially successful in that they were able to gain recognition of some of their desired 
sovereign rights by convincing the European powers to withdraw from overseeing 
reforms in Macedonia. However, they had been unable to prevent the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the secession of Bulgaria and Crete. 
The remnants and successors of the Young Turks later implemented further reforms 
and engaged in international diplomacy when seeking to align themselves with the 
new form of global constituent power centring around the League of Nations and the 
new understanding of civilisation. Ultimately, the Young Turks were able to secure 
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Turkey’s acceptance as sovereign in international society, based on the perception of 
the Ankara government as a modernising and ‘civilising’ force. The concept of 
constituent power, therefore, demonstrates the connections between the changes that 
occurred as the Ottoman/Turkish constitution and the constitutional norms of 
sovereignty in global international society underwent transformation. 
 
 The forms of local and global constituent powers presented in Chapters 3 – 6 
of this thesis contained varying degrees of social and normative power. These were 
used by and against those seeking to secure recognition of what they understood to 
be their rights as sovereign states in global international society. Normative power 
concerned the ability of those seeking to secure recognition of their sovereign 
equality to convince actors in global international society that they ought to be 
recognised as possessing sovereign rights (Kavalski, 2013). The references to the 
idea of civilisation in the diplomacy of the Young Turks and their successors, 
following the revolution of 1908 and in the aftermath of the First World War, were 
attempts on the part of these actors to exert their normative power. These moments 
in which they wielded normative power allowed them to partially achieve their goal 
of gaining recognition of their sovereign equality. Social power refers to the 
mobilisation of resources to realise one’s will over society (Mann, 1986: 1 - 30). The 
CUP mobilised social power to attempt to transform local and global societies in the 
First World War and to exert de facto control over the geography they deemed to be 
part of their future state. The Ankara government also used social power to enact the 
reform programme it saw as necessary to ensure that it would gain recognition as an 
equal sovereign state in global international society. In these instances, the Young 
Turks and their successors also faced the challenge posed by rival forms of 
normative and social power held by states seeking to enforce the norms of global 
international society. However, through harnessing global and local forms of 
constituent power, in which elements of social and normative power were present, 






4. Global constitution-building as a superior approach to the diffusionist and 
realist perspectives of the spread of sovereignty  
 
This thesis stresses that an approach building on the concept of constituent power 
offers a compelling way to explain how states secure the recognition of their 
sovereign equality. Two other prominent explanations have attempted to account for 
this recognition. The first of these points to the role of ideas and practices originating 
from Europe at a time when the contemporary global international society of equal 
sovereign states was emerging (Boli, 2001; Nardin, 2015). In this context, European 
practices, such as intervention (see Keene, 2013a; Reus-Smit, 2013b), and ideas 
related to sovereignty spread to other parts of the world, thereby creating the current 
global international society (Bull and Watson, 1984). These arguments highlighted 
the significance of worldwide connections that resulted in the emergence of global 
international society. More recent studies have focused on the hierarchical context in 
which these connections were established (Bilgin, 2017). However, these arguments 
have not been able to explain how different actors throughout the globe actively 
contributed to the emergence of global international society. Specifically, they do not 
consider that international society may have emerged as a result of the exercise of 
the sovereignty of states (James, 1999). Similarly, Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) 
argue that states used their power to bring about a global international society 
composed of different sovereign states (see also Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011). 
However, as will be demonstrated below, focusing on local and global constituent 
powers can show how the insights of the diffusionist and power-based accounts of 
the emergence of sovereignty in global international society can be combined and 
their shortcomings overcome. This, in turn, can produce a more convincing account 
of the emergence of global international society.  
 
The ‘diffusion’ of sovereignty that Boli (2001) and Nardin (2015) point to can be 
said to have occurred indirectly through intermediaries or directly through 
colonialism. However, as the Ottoman Empire as a whole was not subject to colonial 
rule, studies focusing on the diffusion of external ideas of sovereignty have tended to 
focus instead on other explanations in the context of the Ottoman Empire. Studies 
inspired by the English School, for instance, concentrate on how diplomats and 
national elites adopted the ideas and institutions of global international society 
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(Wigen, 2014). The history of the Ottoman Empire leading up to its collapse, has 
been looked upon as a period when the spread of European ideas and the 
replacement or removal of local ideas and institutions culminated in the founding of 
the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Bilgin, 2017; Turnaoğlu, 2017a; Wigen, 2018). 
Scholars pointing to how ideas were translated from one context to another have 
echoed the insights of the earlier modernisation school, arguing that European ideas 
were translated into the Ottoman context by reformers (Wigen, 2015; 2018). There is 
a disagreement here, though, with regard to what extent the Ottomans were subjected 
to the diffusion of Western ideas against their will, or whether the Ottoman and later 
Turkish elites facilitated the diffusion of these ideas to their subjects and citizens. 
Those focusing on the economic position of the Ottoman elites, such as world 
systems scholars (see İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977) and others influenced by 
postcolonialism (see Çapan and Zarakol, 2017: 196 - 198), have argued that the 
Ottomans were an empire in name only given how they were threatened by the 
capitulations and European intervention. On the other hand, there are those who 
contend that the expansion of the institutions and ideas present in Europe can be 
understood through the spread of the conditions that gave rise to them, which are 
often referred to as modernity (Göksel, 2016; Göl, 2013; Kaya and Tecmen, 2011). 
This diffusionist perspective, focused either on the spread of ideas of sovereignty, 
and the role of intervention and colonialism in this process, remains the dominant 
theory to account for the emergence of global international society and the place of 
the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, within it. 
 
The diffusionist perspective is able to explain certain historical developments 
involving the emergence of global international society, as it provides a means of 
understanding how ideas from one context come to be adopted and modified in other 
contexts. As Wigen (2018) and Kayaoğlu (2010a: 101 - 105) have demonstrated, the 
Ottomans and the Turks translated and adopted institutions and ideas from Europe in 
the late Ottoman and early republican period. The leading Young Turks were 
influenced by ideas that were of European origin, including ideas of national 
sovereignty and changing understandings of civilisation. For example, Ağaoğlu and 
Akçura were influenced by ideas of national sovereignty developed in Russia and 
Paris (Shissler, 2003; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 150). Throughout the period 1908 – 1923, 
the Young Turks and their successors sought to learn and adapt to changing concepts 
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in international society. Initially, the Young Turks advanced their own 
interpretations of civilisation to gain recognition of their sovereign equality after the 
revolution of 1908.  Subsequently, the Young Turks embraced the alliance-based 
diplomacy in the lead up to and the course of the First World War and sought to 
shape the constitutional principles of global international society through warfare 
and alliances. This involved them advancing their own interpretation of the concept 
of the ‘nation’ as a constitutional principle in international society. Separately, the 
adoption of significant parts of the Swiss Civil Code in the context of the legal 
reforms demanded at Lausanne in 1923, provides an example of how the successors 
of the Young Turks adopted to changing circumstances. The Ottoman Empire, and 
its transformation into the Republic of Turkey, can therefore be understood as an 
example of diffusion, insofar as this process involved the translation of ideas and the 
adoption of institutions present in global international society. 
 
However, the diffusionist account of the spread of institutions has its limitations. 
These stem from the assumption that ideas and institutions associated with global 
international society wholly transform the contexts that they travel to. This 
perspective is problematic because it overlooks how elements of previously existing 
ideas and institutions continue to be present within such contexts that become a part 
of global international society (see Topal, 2017). As much as the Young Turks and 
their successors adopted ideas from Europe throughout the period 1908 – 1923, they 
also challenged and changed these ideas and maintained and developed their own 
traditions of thought. Even when the Young Turks were in exile, many of them, such 
as Ahmed Rıza (1907), sought to defend the value of Islamic ideas and institutions, 
by pointing to historical examples of them serving the goal of ‘progress’. The Young 
Turks’ project of securing the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire also 
involved reforming and defending its constitutional institutions, such as the caliphate 
and the sultanate. However, studies focusing on the translation of concepts from 
global international society have not considered how these concepts were present 
within the context prior to and after their translation. As the process of the translation 
of the Swiss Civil Code demonstrates, even when it appeared that Islamic institutions 
were being replaced, the Turkish political elites, many of whom were Young Turks, 
were able to ensure that their own ideas and institutions were maintained. The 
leaders of the CUP also sought to diffuse their own particular understandings of the 
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constitutional principles of global international society. This is demonstrated by the 
promotion of Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist concepts during the First World War. 
Therefore, in the case of the Ottoman – Turkish transition, the diffusionist approach 
overlooks how actors situated in local contexts maintained some of their institutions, 
while at the same time adopting or moderating ideas prominent throughout the globe. 
 
Another perspective, that has sought to explain the emergence of global 
international society, focused on the ability of groups to assert their sovereignty 
through force or the threat of force, instead of adopting existing ideas of sovereignty. 
This perspective concentrated on the abilities of states to assert power within their 
jurisdictions and how this enabled them to gain recognition externally (James, 1986; 
1999; Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011; Chowdhury and Duvall, 2014). This allows 
states to recognise each other as sovereign even when common interpretations of the 
meaning of sovereignty are absent. However, this thin level of consensus can be 
challenged by proposing that different constitutional principles are constantly 
advanced by various actors in global international society. This recognition of 
multiple visions of global international society advanced by different state and non-
state actors, points to how the power of actors to promote their own interpretations of 
the constitutional rules of global international society helped establish these rules. In 
addition, the development of new technologies, such as map-making technologies 
and novel military means of asserting state power have been identified as 
contributing to the assertion of sovereign power (Branch, 2013; 2016; Duvall and 
Havercroft, 2008; Hobson, 2009). They have also been viewed as contributing to the 
growth and competition of international societies, including the rise of Islamic and 
European international societies (Bennison, 2009). These different international 
societies had their own understandings of sovereignty which stemmed from the 
ability of their members to assert and justify their sovereignty. Accordingly, it would 
appear that a perspective focusing on the role of power could be useful in explaining 
how states that are already sovereign, in the sense of having authority over their own 
jurisdictions, came to have their sovereign equality recognised.  
 
The emphasis on the role of power in the emergence of a global international 
society of sovereign states addresses some of the difficulties faced by diffusionist 
approaches. Specifically, a focus on power can reveal forms of resistance and can 
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show alternative forms of the spread of ideas and institutions, instead of merely 
focusing on their spread from the West or Europe (Bilgin, 2017). This approach can 
incorporate the often-neglected agency and ideas of non-European actors, who are 
invariably presented as passive recipients of processes of expansion that have their 
origin in Europe (Hobson and Sajed, 2017). Göl (2013) focuses on the role of power 
in the emergence of different sovereign entities within global international societies. 
This account focuses on how alternative paths to “modernity” allowed the 
emergence of the Ankara government, which collaborated with the Bolsheviks who 
were also challenging the established states in international society (Göl, 2013: 1). In 
addition, resistance against what was deemed to be Western colonialism and 
imperialism was also facilitated by Young Turks, such as Celal Nuri (Aydın, 2007: 
102 - 103; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 169 - 170). This perspective is correct in stressing the 
local nature of the resistance against the West in the Ottoman Empire, both before 
and after the First World War. However, it fails to note how the Young Turks and 
their successors were also advancing their own ideas about the nature of global 
international society (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 169). As this thesis has demonstrated, 
numerous intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkey drew upon ideas 
present in their own context, but they also engaged with globally widespread ideas 
used to justify sovereign equality. Therefore, the Young Turks and their successors 
firstly resisted the diffusion of the Western ideas of global international society. 
However, as interlocutors, they later engaged with the dominant views concerning 
the constitutional principles of  global international society and advanced their own 
views and proposals concerning these constitutional principles.  
 
Insofar as the Young Turks and movements that emerged from them 
presented alternative constitutional principles of global international society, they 
were also able to alter the form of global international society and could negotiate 
their inclusion within it as sovereigns entitled to the same rights as other sovereign 
states. In so doing, they also sought to ensure that their ideas were intelligible to 
other prominent actors in global international society. For example, the legal reforms 
enacted by the Ankara government insisted on considering Turkey as not only equal 
but also similar to the established states within the emerging global international 
society. This differed markedly from the Islamist approach of Abdülhamid II, 
Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c) and others, which emphasised that the Ottoman Empire was 
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different but equal to the other Great Powers. This approach continued to an extent 
after the end of the Abdülhamid II regime, with Ahmed Rıza (1907; [1922] 1990) 
and Gökalp ([1923] 1977f) advocating respectively a recognition of Islamic 
civilisation and culture. Significantly, Ahmed Rıza (1907; [1922] 1990) believed in 
the possibility of a universal civilisation and claimed that Islam had contributed to 
this culture in the past, and could do so in the future. Gökalp ([1923] 1977f), on the 
other hand, sought to ensure that Turkey would become a part of Western 
civilisation while maintaining its Islamic religion and Turkish culture. Adopting an 
organic view of society, Gökalp ([1923] 1977b; [1923] 1977f) argued that Turkey 
could balance the three elements of Islamic religion, Western civilisation and 
Turkish culture. Gökalp ([1923] 1977b; [1923] 1977f) deemed that this was essential 
for Turkey to survive and thrive in the post-war international realm.  This suggests 
that thinkers aligned with the CUP and the Ankara government, such as Gökalp 
([1923] 1977b; [1923] 1977f), argued for some diffusion of ideas regarding 
sovereignty and they also actively sought to foster a ‘thin’ level of consensus 
between Turkey and the established states in global international society. This 
consensus over values would subsequently enable Turkey to control how it was 
perceived and recognised by the post-war gatekeepers of global international society. 
  
Both the diffusionist account of the emergence of global international 
society, and the explanation focusing on the enlargement of this society through the 
power possessed by actors within it, have their strengths and weaknesses.  However, 
the idea of constituent power, as presented in section 2 of this chapter, can best 
account for the emergence of global international society. Significantly, this 
perspective draws attention to the centrality of recognition in the emergence of the 
global constitutional principles that form the basis of global international society. In 
this sense, recognition can function not only as an affirmation of these principles, but 
can also be productive of these principles, since recognising a state of affairs as 
acceptable on the basis of an ideal of global international society serves to define 
what such a global international society looks like in practice. In addition, the 
theoretical framework drawing on constituent power, as expressed in section 2 can 
explain how actors, having recognised certain constitutional principles as significant, 
come to respect and uphold these norms of international society. This form of global 
constitutionalism is also attuned to the fact that some actors may have more power to 
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recognise that actors are complying with global constitutional principles. This 
includes here, the notions of sovereignty and sovereign equality. However, unlike 
theories of stigmatisation (see Zarakol, 2011), the theoretical approach presented in 
this thesis does not accept the presence of a closed social system in the world, with 
established insiders and outsiders. This is because even though certain actors may 
have more power, enabling them to recognise others as complying with global 
constitutional principles, this does not mean that these actors have unlimited power 
to enforce these principles. Accordingly, even though recognition is often treated as 
a good that is distributed in political theory (see Markell, 2003), similar to the 
understanding of the role of gatekeepers in the stigmatisation model, recognition can 
also be understood as an acknowledgement that an existing state of affairs is 
acceptable. This, in turn, means that those who recognise others as complying with a 
set of rules may not necessarily have a complete awareness that those they are 
recognising are actually complying with a set of norms.  
 
 The fact that the appearance of compliance may conceal a truth of non-
compliance or deviance from ideal constitutional principles does not imply the 
irrelevance of global constitutional principles. Instead, as demonstrated in this thesis, 
it can be taken to show the extent to which the constitutional principles of global 
international society are open to interpretation. This openness, in turn, partly 
accounts for the normalisation of different states and their respective societies within 
global international society. Although a degree of power is required to secure 
recognition at the international level, this thesis has demonstrated how a state that 
was sovereign, in terms of having established authority over a jurisdiction, was able 
to gain recognition as an equal sovereign in global international society. The 
Ottoman, later Turkish state, was situated on the periphery of European international 
society (Rae, 2017). It had been stigmatised and excluded by the most powerful 
European states throughout the period. In contrast to states that experienced 
colonisation, the last generation of Ottoman leaders faced a separate challenge of 
stigmatisation on the basis of the standard of ‘civilisation’, which deprived them of 
recognition as an equal sovereign state by Western powers (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 100). 
However, the Ottoman Empire and its final generation of leaders were in a unique 
position. These individuals were able to exploit this context and harness the power of 
their state, to ensure the recognition of their state as an equal sovereign in the 
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emerging global international society. Through these means, they ultimately 
succeeded in challenging the understandings of global constitutional principles held 
by sovereign states in global international society. The global constitutionalist 
perspective advocated throughout this thesis, and summarised in section 2 of this 
chapter, can therefore demonstrate how the Young Turks and their successors sought 
their recognition as equal sovereigns in global international society. It demonstrates 
how they did so through seeking recognition in line with or advancing specific 
interpretations of this society’s constitutional principles.  
  
5. The constituent power in global international society 
 
The argument of this thesis concerning the relevance of global constitutional 
principles for understanding the emergence of global international society has a 
number of implications for International Relations theory. It demonstrates how 
approaches drawing upon the history of ideas can contribute to developing non-ideal 
theories of International Relations. This thesis has provided a descriptive and non-
ideal theory, examining the role of ideas in the emergence of global international 
society. It therefore points the way towards future normative and descriptive theory-
building that can develop non-ideal theories of International Relations (Sleat, 2016: 
34 - 36). The thesis also shows how studies of history and philosophy can be 
advanced, through revealing how concepts such as sovereignty evolved historically 
as different interpretations and practices were developed in various contexts. The 
thesis draws attention to the significance of transnational links of which the Young 
Turks were a part. Transnational links may continue to have an impact after non-
state actors, such as the Young Turks, take control of states and use this position to 
influence constitutional principles of global international society (Davies, 2019). 
This thesis has also highlighted the importance of power relations, present locally 
and globally, in explaining the emergence of these constitutional principles of global 
international society. Studying power relations, and how they influenced the way 
constitutional principles of global international society were understood and applied, 
can take into account the processes of stigmatisation and normalisation of outsiders. 
This thesis has provided a novel conception of recognition beyond the idea of 
recognition as a good that is distributed by the gatekeepers of society, since the very 
rules concerning the recognition of sovereign equality can be changed by constituent 
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powers. All these implications for International Relations theory stem from the 
central aim of this thesis, which is concerned with how transnational networks of 
actors engaged in intellectual theorising in different contexts can explain the 
expansion of global international society. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how a non-ideal political theory of International 
Relations can be developed by using the concept of the constituent power to 
understand how actors advanced and contested the constitutional principles of 
international society. Ideal theories in International Relations advance a set of ideal 
types, prior to studying reality. However, this thesis has asserted the explanatory 
value of the concept of constituent power by showing how actors seek to challenge, 
appeal to or advance new forms of the constitutional principles of global 
international society. It then argued that the concept of constituent power can better 
account for the deviation from existing explanations of the emergence of 
sovereignty. The case of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey was 
presented as a deviation from existing “analytical narratives” of the diffusion or 
assertion of sovereignty (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 115). Studying this case has shown 
how the concept of constituent power can be used to understand how actors engaged 
with the constitutional principles of international society (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 115). 
The Ottoman Empire was already sovereign, in the sense of  displaying 
“independence” (see James, 1986: 5), but it was not recognised as a sovereign, equal 
to established European states in global international society. However, through 
using their normative and social power, the Young Turks sought to gain recognition 
of their sovereign equality. The use of the concept of constituent power, in this 
context, builds on the existing tradition of the use of the concept of a constitution, to 
make sense of the basic principles that actors adhere to in an international society. 
Specifically, the concept of constituent power can provide an account of how 
constitutional principles may alter in time, or explain how the spatial extent of an 
international society could change. It can thus explain the local and global changes 
which occurred that allowed the elites of a state that was already sovereign to gain 
recognition of the sovereignty of their state, in accordance with the emerging 
constitutional rules of international society in the early twentieth century.   
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Drawing attention to the importance of different contexts in the construction of 
the current global international society, this thesis also shows the significance of 
traditions of philosophy in influencing history. A study that combines history and 
philosophy involves accepting the role of ideas in constructing social reality in the 
present and the past (Bartelson, 2007). As Hacking (2004) and Bartelson (2007; 
2018: 23) suggest, ideas enable individuals to make sense of the world, which, in 
turn, shapes their actions (see also Geuss, 2008: 37 - 40). However, such an 
approach also involves studying philosophy historically. One must be mindful of 
how historical events have an influence on philosophical discussions (Bartelson, 
2007). Events impact on philosophy by determining which interlocutors are engaged 
in philosophical debate and what tools are available to them. The ways in which 
historical events influence the development of ideas impact on how ideas come to 
influence reality after they are adopted by actors. According to constructivists, not 
only do these actors believe that such ideas are accurate representations of reality, 
but by acting on this belief, they serve to create a reality that is shaped by these 
beliefs (Bartelson, 2018: 23).  An example of the interconnectedness between history 
and philosophy is seen in how the use of arguments to justify sovereignty based on 
an idea of the nation or the people in the French Revolution, spread and came to be 
accepted within European international society. It is possible to conclude that major 
historical events such as revolutions and wars that alter the nature of society should 
be studied to understand the emergence of novel ideas. However, it is equally 
important to consider how traditions of philosophy, such as political theories of 
sovereignty, and those individuals who sustain them, are able to respond to such 
events in ways that advance the proposals contained in ideas throughout their history 
(Reus-Smit, 2001; Rorty, 1984). This thesis has shown how the various events that 
occurred between 1908 and 1923 involved the Young Turks and their offshoots 
engaging with a wide range of intellectual traditions, ranging from Islam, positivism 
and nationalism. 
 
 Constituent power offers a means of ordering phenomena within 
International Relations and therefore allows theory-building322 to take place, in a 
way that is similar to how sovereignty informed many of the earlier attempts to 
 
322 see Waever (2009).  
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conceptualise and understand what has variably been termed the international system 
or international society. Using the concept of constituent power, in the way it has 
been deployed in this thesis, does not assume that the object of study of International 
Relations consists of a static system, made up of different sovereign units subject to 
the same laws323, even if the units themselves change. Instead constituent power, as a 
concept, offers a way of explaining how these units and the rules that allow them to 
coexist emerge and undergo change. Using the concept of the constituent power also 
adds to historical and historical sociological approaches that stress how events 
resulted in the emergence of global international society (Buzan and Lawson, 2015; 
Lawson, 2010). This is because the concept of constituent power also offers a way of 
supplementing analytical narratives, which are focused on events, by drawing 
attention to the intentions and actions of individuals. This thesis has demonstrated 
how this, in turn, involves studying how individuals use ideas in wielding constituent 
power. The use of the concept of constituent power can also demonstrate how 
proposals for specific constitutional rules, to be enacted in domestic or international 
contexts, are realised or thwarted. Hence, the concept of constituent power can be 
used to explain how states may undergo processes of reconstitution internally, when 
local forms of constituent power, are invoked, in tandem with historical changes to 
global constitutional principles. Finally, the use of the constituent power in this 
thesis has also illustrated how transnational actors can bridge local and global 
contexts and act as forms of local and global constituent power. 
 
The central argument of the thesis, concerning the role of local and global 
forms of constituent power in enabling states that are already in effect sovereign, but 
which are not accepted as equals in international society, to be recognised as equal 
sovereigns in global international society, draws on the understanding of constituent 
power mentioned above. The thesis shows that sovereignty is not a timeless concept, 
but is one that explains certain phenomena in International Relations in conjunction 
with the emergence of a global international society in the early twentieth century. 
During this expansion, several states, including the Ottoman Empire, were, in fact, 
sovereign, in the sense of possessing ultimate authority over a jurisdiction, even if 
they were not recognised as such by European states. The Ottoman state was unique 
 
323 For an example see Waltz (1979) and the discussion in Ruggie (1983; 1993).  
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insofar as it had emerged on the periphery of European international society in the 
early modern period through sustained interaction with states on the boundary of 
Europe. By the early twentieth century, actors within the Ottoman Empire were in 
the unprecedented position of being excluded from global international society, even 
though the empire had interacted with European powers for centuries. The empire 
had previously been excluded on the basis of religious differences. It was now 
excluded on the basis of its supposed lack of conformity to the standard of 
‘civilisation’. Yet, the constituent power of the Young Turks and their successors, 
expressed locally through their consolidation of internal sovereignty and 
internationally in their constituent diplomacy, challenged the exclusion of their state 
from global international society on the basis of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Both 
local and global constituent powers, which forcefully changed existing constitutional 
principles and put forward new ones, enabled the successors of the CUP to 
ultimately secure the recognition of Turkey as a sovereign equal to others in global 
international society. Justifications of sovereign equality, based on ideas such as 
‘civilisation’, ‘nation’ and ‘self-determination’, therefore played a role in the 
processes of local and global reconstitution of domestic and international society that 
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